Iraq and Terrorism

by publius

I spent a lot of the week on the Amtrak east coast line, so I picked up John Gaddis’ The Cold War:  A New History at one of the stations.  For those of you who, like me, know less about the Cold War than they should, it’s a good quick summary.  The book teeters on the edge of becoming a morality play at times, and I half-expected the world to break out in chants of "Rocky! Rocky!" by the end.  But as an intro, it’s a good place to start.

What really stood out as a reader in 2007 is the contrast the book provides between the Cold War and our new whatever-we-call-it-now war.  And the contrast shows just how dangerous it would have been if the Bush-Cheney-Kristol n’er-do-rights (and their working assumptions) had been in charge from 1946-1964.  Specifically, in a number of ways, the choices America made in the Cold War (and the consequences of those choices) discredits practically the entire Bush/Cheney approach to foreign policy.

Before I get into specific examples, what really stands out about the immediate aftermath of World War II is how fluid history became during this brief window of time.  The years 1946-1950 in particular was one of those rare historical periods in which the world was basically born anew.  Everything was in flux and therefore the choices made in that period had a disproportionate and lasting effect upon the shape of the world to come — just like the strikes to glowing-hot metal forever shape the sword as the metal cools.  For that reason, it was particularly important to have people making correct choices in this critical, formative period.  And for the most part, with notable exceptions, we did.  The world didn’t blow itself up after all.

Although it’s not on the scale of the postwar era, Bush did for good or bad create a new Middle East.  And like postwar Europe, Iraq and the larger Middle East are going to be forever shaped by the choices of the actors currently in charge.  Indeed, many of these irreversible choices have already been made, mostly for the worst.  Unfortunately, the world-historical importance of the moment is matched only by the utter incompetence of the people currently making decisions.  And with war with Iran looming and the brilliant new plan to align the Middle East along sectarian lines, the real question is whether the Bush administration will run out of time before or after it has to chance to engulf the entire region in war.

To get a sense of how different the current Deciders are from the Cold War Deciders, consider the following examples:

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by von

Richard Lugar, writing in the Washington Post, makes the most reasonable case that I’ve seen so far in favor of giving the Bush Administration’s on last chance:

Some commentators have compared the Bush plan to a "Hail Mary" pass in football — a desperate heave deep down the field by a losing team at the end of the game. Actually, a far better analogy for the Bush plan is a draw play on third down with 20 yards to go in the first quarter. The play does have a chance of working if everything goes perfectly, but it is more likely to gain a few yards and set up a punt on the next down, after which the game can be continued under more favorable circumstances.

Compelling imagery this is not.  Nor is it an endorsement of George Bush as Commander in Chief to think that the most we can risk now is a riskless play — for anything fancier would, in these hands, more likely than not lead to disaster.  Better hand if off for a draw, kick the (almost) inevitable punt, and leave Iraq to the next Administration to fix. 

The Senior Senator from Indiana, however, has given me pause in my opposition to the surge.  In a choice between bad and worse — the choice Lugar recognizes is before us — we should prefer bad.  If you don’t trust your QB to throw, it’s better to run on third and at least set up the punt.

But it is only been pause.  Although I respect Senator Lugar as much as any man — and have gladly voted for him in the past — I’m not convinced that even his lukewarm support for the surge is correct.  Here are three reasons for my continued skepticism (below the fold):   

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by Charles

Had Iraq clearly been on the path of becoming a free, peace, non-theocratic representative republic, the GOP would have been in the majority today (in my opinion), missteps by Republicans in Congress notwithstanding. The fault for the embarrassing loss last November can be squarely laid at the feet of George W. Bush. Because of his substandard performance on Iraq for the past three-plus years, I became a Dissatisfied. What’s more, after considering the cumulative effects of all of his other un-conservative actions, I’m at a point where I’ve pretty much lost confidence in Bush as even a semi-competent commander-in-chief. This isn’t an easy conclusion to come to because I’ve carried Bush’s water on a whole range of issues over most of his six years in office. It’s also not easy because I’m a Republican and have been one for over a quarter century.

But despite my skepticism of the president, I do support Bush on the Petraeus plan to turn Iraq around, but under one condition: that al-Maliki be reasonably committed to it. I say this not because I have faith in Bush, but because I believe Petraeus is the best man for the job, and the general has literally written the book on counterinsurgency ops.

The Petraeus plan should have been in effect over two years ago, so it is encouraging to hear that the Senate approved Petraeus’ promotion to four-star general and to his new job as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. At the same time, it is equally discouraging to see Republicans display spines of Silly Putty in supporting resolutions that would rebuke the very plans that Petraeus would execute. And that is why I put my name on the list, and I find myself in full agreement with Mark I.

Petraeus gave a frank assessment of the mistakes we’ve made in Iraq, and it was refreshing to hear it (more on him here). More importantly, Petraeus has a plan to address the mistakes. Embedding more of our soldiers with Iraqi troops and training more Iraqi troops are part of the package, and so is adopting an effective clear-hold-build strategy in the areas of conflict.

To get more of a flavor of what Petraeus will do, the new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual is an indicator, and it’s worth taking the time read (I’ve paged through it and read portions, and am in the process of going through it word-for-word). Military might is but one component of the strategy. Most of the other tactics are political, economic, intelligence and media related. Under COIN doctrine, military responses are measured and judiciously applied. Unfortunately, the media message is harsher rules of engagement and a freer hand at going after Irianian spies and militants. There are cases where harsher tactics are necessary, but in general the focus is restraint. The COIN strategy is indeed "graduate level warfare", but that is what it will take.

Al-Maliki has been more in the forefront recently about securitizing Baghdad, and there may already be signs that it’s working. His most important job is to back up his words with actions and to consistently sustain them. I hope he can do it.

Finally, since this is an Information War, the White House can do its share by better communicating the new plan. There should be less focus on "more troops" and more on what those troops will be doing. Tony Snow can challenge reporters to embed more and rely less on stringers with unknown biases. The mainstream press has faithfully catalogued the numbers of casualties by terrorist and insurgent attacks, and it wouldn’t hurt for Snow to fill in the rest of the picture with insurgent/terrorist casualties (this might trigger Vietnam memories, but this is a different war, different situation).

As embeds Michelle Malkin, Bill Roggio, Michael Yon and Bill Ardolino have pointed out in their posts, Iraq is a complex situation. There are many incidences of success, and obviously there have been setbacks. But most of the soldiers on the ground appear optimistic of success and believe in their mission. Too bad that more politicians in DC do not believe so, and do not have the stones to stick to it.

Quite frankly, it appears to me that those advocating unilateral withdrawal must also believe that Iraq is a lost cause. It is a defeatist position. I believe it’s premature to think that, but I’m closer today to thinking we’ve lost than a year ago. But if we go down, I’d rather go down after making every effort to make it work. The Petraeus plan looks to be one of the last and best tries. If we’ve made no discernible progress by this November, I may just put myself in the defeatist camp and call for a phased drawdown. But not now, and not with this plan.

(Update below the fold)

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UPDATE by von:  Comments are closed.  Thanks for playing, folks.

by von

Why do the anti-war liberals get no love, despite their apparent vindication by events on the ground?  Kevin Drum has an answer and Publius — an anti-war liberal himself — responds below.  It should surprise no one that I think Drum has the better argument. The dominant arguments of the anti-war camp in 2002 were arguments against preemptive war, and did not emphasize the real flaws that resulted in the current mess.  Indeed, if anything, these pre-war cries may have helped those in power justify a smaller force in Iraq — to our enormous detriment.*

But that’s a digression, and we’ll not know the may-haves or could-bes for a long time to come (if ever).  A contribution can still be made to the debate, however.  It’s important to recall that there were reasonable bases for many liberals and moderates to favor intervention in Iraq (I count myself among the moderates) .  These reasons required neither total allegiance to President Bush nor a blind acceptance of General Frank’s strategy:  Indeed, many of us were calling for more troops from the very start.  For context, consider the following statement, which I posted* on November 25, 2002 and which comes closest to explaining the bases for my decision to provide guarded support for the war.  You’ll note that the context was the ongoing Security Counsel debate regarding whether the invasion would have UN backing.

Resolved: The United Nations’ Security Counsel should endorse a U.S.-led attack on Iraq if Iraq does not fully comply with the U.N.-mandated inspections regime. The credibility of the Security Counsel is at stake; an Iraq armed with weapons of mass destruction will destabilize its neighbors; Iraq may share such weaponry with terrorists or other, rouge states; and Iraq’s past violations of international law merit a response, however belated. In addition, even a minimally-democratic Iraq, with its educated and secularized population, will likely restrain the Arab street and serve as a counterweight to an increasingly radicalized Saudi Arabia. Indeed, in no other (so-called) rogue nation — Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya — are the advantages of military action so clear, and the risks of inaction so dire.

There were two significant factual flaws in that analysis, of course.  The first and biggest one was that Iraq possessed WMDs.  Yet, I continue to think that this flaw was an excusable.  Although it’s undoubtedly true that Bush cherry-picked the best intelligence to aid his case, those who (today) act as if this lack-of-WMD thing was totally obvious from the start are doing their own selective remembering.   The evidence for and against WMDs was at best muddled, in part intentionally by Hussein who wanted to avoid letting the world know of the "paper" aspect of his paper tigerdom.

If the first flaw is excusable, however, the second is not.  The assumption that Iraq had a substantial "educated and secularized population" that would dominate the post-war environment was an assumption that was not supported by evidence.   Although I was concerned about inflaming tribal and sectarian divisions post war — one reason why I favored more troops from the get-go — I did not appreciate the depth of those divisions.  Nor did I appreciate that much of Iraq’s education and secularization was skin deep (a partial side-effect, no doubt, of the damage done by the long sanctions regime).  That was a significant misunderstanding, and one I continue to regret. 

But, importantly, the context and course of the war debate did not devolve as straightforwardly and simply as Publius describes.  Those who supported war — those who won the argument at home and brought us this mess — had rational reasons to do so.  It may seem black and white now, but it wasn’t then.  And that is part of the reason why anti-war liberals are still getting no love:  many of them*** saw the issue as black and white from the get go, when it wasn’t — and, truth be told, still isn’t.

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by hilzoy

I have now read the Iraq Study Group report. I really, really want it to work, since I am as pessimistic as anyone (with the possible exception of Bob McManus) about what will happen if we fail in Iraq. My problem isn’t lack of appreciation for the downside of failure; it’s an inability to see how we get from where we are now to anything else. And this report really doesn’t change that. I’ll explain why I think this below the fold.

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