Iraq and Terrorism

by Charles

Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado) stepped in it last Friday and the best thing he should do is retract his statements and apologize.  No excuses and no non-apologetic apologies.  None of this "if anyone is offended by what I said, I’m sorry" business.  The content itself was offensive and it merits redress.  It doesn’t matter if the person hearing it was offended or not.  So far, he is digging the hole deeper by refusing to apologize.  Stupid, stupid, stupid.

Just to be clear.  If the United States is hit with an atomic bomb by Islamic terrorists, the answer is not to respond by bombing the birthplace of Islam.  Such an act would constitute an act of war not just against militant radical Isamists but against Islam itself.  This is the worst kind of "suggestion" or "trial balloon" that a representative of the US government could toss out for "discussion", on a radio show or in any other public venue.  What was this guy thinking?

This conservative is not alone in harshly criticizing Tancredo’s words.  Add Hugh Hewitt, Ed Morrissey, McQ, Donald Sensing, Clayton Cramer, Patterico, Michelle Malkin and a host of others.

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by Charles

Last week, the Englishman in New York outlined three "gratuitous admissions" in the wake of the 7/7 terrorist attacks:

1. I have been on two anti-war/anti-Bush marches in New York (2003/2004)
2. I believed that the September 11 attacks on America were the ghosts of US foreign policy coming back to haunt it.
3. On September 11, 2001, and on July 8, 2005, (and on all the bombings in between) I acted as though it had nothing to do with me.

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by Charles

The reason I seldom read Gloom Juan Cole and his weblog Malformed Informed Comment is because he subscribes to the Immutable Laws of Gilliard, described below the fold.  His problem, though a smart and knowledgeable fellow, is that he’s so blindered and shackled to his ideology that he’s prone to whopping mistakes and misjudgments.  His downtalking the Iraqi election last January was one example, and his entries this past week are the latest outbreak.

So obvious and glaring were his recent errors that even a dKos diarist took Cole to task.  Martin Kramer busted Cole on both his wrong interpretation of history and his duplicitousness, both here and in a follow-up here.  It’s one thing for a semi-anonymous sweatpant-wearing blogger to be so blatantly wrong and pettyminded, but it’s another thing altogether for a prominent professor of Middle East studies and Chairman of the Middle East Studies Association to be so.  Dare I say that Cole was being McCarthyesque by getting personal and calling for oppo research against Kramer?

Tony Badran of Across the Bay starts here and follows up here, here, here, here and here.  Ouch.  All in all, a bad week for the academic.

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by Charles

Last Friday, Tom Friedman outlined the challenges awaiting western countries, and more so their resident Muslim populations:

So this is a critical moment. We must do all we can to limit the civilizational fallout from this bombing. But this is not going to be easy. Why? Because unlike after 9/11, there is no obvious, easy target to retaliate against for bombings like those in London. There are no obvious terrorist headquarters and training camps in Afghanistan that we can hit with cruise missiles. The Al Qaeda threat has metastasized and become franchised. It is no longer vertical, something that we can punch in the face. It is now horizontal, flat and widely distributed, operating through the Internet and tiny cells.

Because there is no obvious target to retaliate against, and because there are not enough police to police every opening in an open society, either the Muslim world begins to really restrain, inhibit and denounce its own extremists – if it turns out that they are behind the London bombings – or the West is going to do it for them. And the West will do it in a rough, crude way – by simply shutting them out, denying them visas and making every Muslim in its midst guilty until proven innocent.

And because I think that would be a disaster, it is essential that the Muslim world wake up to the fact that it has a jihadist death cult in its midst. If it does not fight that death cult, that cancer, within its own body politic, it is going to infect Muslim-Western relations everywhere. Only the Muslim world can root out that death cult. It takes a village.

What do I mean? I mean that the greatest restraint on human behavior is never a policeman or a border guard. The greatest restraint on human behavior is what a culture and a religion deem shameful. It is what the village and its religious and political elders say is wrong or not allowed. Many people said Palestinian suicide bombing was the spontaneous reaction of frustrated Palestinian youth. But when Palestinians decided that it was in their interest to have a cease-fire with Israel, those bombings stopped cold. The village said enough was enough.

The Muslim village has been derelict in condemning the madness of jihadist attacks. When Salman Rushdie wrote a controversial novel involving the prophet Muhammad, he was sentenced to death by the leader of Iran. To this day – to this day – no major Muslim cleric or religious body has ever issued a fatwa condemning Osama bin Laden.

Emphases mine.  The United Kingdom is afflicted with this Islamist cancer, and the transit terrorist bombings are but the latest manifestation.  Last year, I wrote about reports which asserted that ancestral Britons have a case of Islamophobia, but it’s also apparent that large numbers of Muslims have a case of Anglophobia.  In a joint poll of 500 Muslims by the Guardian and ICM:

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by Charles

Von and Norm Geras formed an effective tag team in outlining the nature of our enemy and the barbaric lengths they will go, and it got me to thinking about the nature of this beast, i.e., the war.  In the Times of London, Paul Wilkinson–Chairman of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrews University–gave a fair description of what we’re up against:

It astonishes me that there are still so many commentators who seem oblivious to the key facts about the al-Qaeda network. They do not realise that it is not simply like any other terrorist group: it is in a league of its own for ruthlessness and cruelty. Some have even tried to write the obituary of the al-Qaeda network, but it has adapted and morphed since 2001.

The al-Qaeda network is the only terrorist organisation which has both the motivation and the capability to carry out coordinated mass casualty attacks of this kind. This is a major difference between the al-Qaeda network and traditional terrorist groups. The latter, as Brian Jenkins so aptly put it, wanted “a lot of people watching rather than a lot of people dead”.

Al-Qaeda has the most widely dispersed network in the history of modern terrorism. It still has global reach, with a presence in an estimated 65 countries. Its decentralised network makes it particularly hard to suppress: it is a true hydra.

Moreover, unlike more traditional groups, it is actively pursuing materials and expertise to make unconventional weapons, such as chemical devices and radioactive isotopes to create radiological dispersal devices. They were experimenting with chemical weapons in their bases in Afghanistan under the shelter of the Taleban regime, and several al-Qaeda plots to use dirty bombs have been thwarted.

(Pig lard update below the fold)

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by Charles

Most of the conversations arising from Bush’s speech on Iraq last week dealt with his usage of 9/11, how we’re doing, whether or not we’re losing, troop withdrawal timetables, manpower, sticktuitiveness and so forth.  What received little press or attention were some of his new initiatives.  The following should have been bigger news:

To further prepare Iraqi forces to fight the enemy on their own, we are taking three new steps:

First, we are partnering coalition units with Iraqi units. These coalition-Iraqi teams are conducting operations together in the field. These combined operations are giving Iraqis a chance to experience how the most professional armed forces in the world operate in combat.

Second, we are embedding coalition "transition teams" inside Iraqi units. These teams are made up of coalition officers and noncommissioned officers who live, work and fight together with their Iraqi comrades. Under U.S. command, they are providing battlefield advice and assistance to Iraqi forces during combat operations. Between battles, they are assisting the Iraqis with important skills such as urban combat and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques.

Third, we are working with the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense to improve their capabilities to coordinate anti-terrorist operations. We are helping them develop command and control structures. We are also providing them with civilian and military leadership training, so Iraq’s new leaders can more effectively manage their forces in the fight against terror.

This was something I recommended over a year ago (the first two steps, at least).  I hate to bring up Vietnam when discussing Iraq because I really don’t want to get into a big comparison debate, but the above tactics reflect some of the lessons learned from that lost war.  Commanders in Vietnam adopted a plan similar to the one outlined above but they failed to follow through, foregoing one of many strategies that actually produced beneficial results.  From America in Vietnam by Guenter Lewy:

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by hilzoy

As I noted in a comment on Charles’ thread, Democrats have offered a number of good ideas about Iraq, starting with the best one of all: don’t do it. None of them have been listened to, and by now, there are very few good options left. However, in a spirit of helpful opposition, I will offer one, which I don’t think has been fully explored. I should say at the outset that I do not particularly like this idea, and that its necessity seems to me to be yet another good reason for not going to war in the first place. However, we have gone to war, and I want us to succeed.

It has been obvious from the outset that if we are to succeed in Iraq, we need to close the borders. We do not need foreign fighters, foreign money, or foreign materiel coming into the country. One part of closing the borders is providing enough troops to cover them, not just in an occasional, whack-a-mole way, but consistently. (And one reason to do provide enough troops is that it would have made other steps less important. Enough troops might, perhaps, have made other steps unnecessary. But that’s moot now.) Of course, we did not send enough troops; and there seems to be little prospect of our being able to send them now, with our army already stretched to the breaking point and recruiting a serious problem. But another part, not that I particularly like saying this, is securing the cooperation of Iraq’s neighbors. I hope Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are already on board; if not, we should get them on board. I also imagine that Turkey has sealed off the northern border; in any case, though, Sunni Arabs moving through Kurdistan is probably the least our worries. That leaves Iran and Syria. And our dealings with Iran and Syria, on this front, have been inexplicable to me.

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Via TAPPED, I found a very interesting article from Sunday’s Mercury News. It’s by Larry Diamond, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution who served as an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Diamond gives us his take on how we ended up in the situation we’re in in Iraq, from the perspective of someone who was involved in the decision-making. He notes the positive developments of that time: the interim constitution, the handover of sovereignty, and so forth. But he also notes the missteps:

“The coalition government relied heavily on a revolving door of diplomats and other personnel who would leave just as they had begun to develop local knowledge and ties, and on a large cadre of eager young neophytes whose brashness often gave offense in a very age- and status-conscious society. One young political appointee (a 24-year-old Ivy League graduate) argued that Iraq should not enshrine judicial review in its constitution because it might lead to the legalization of abortion. A much more senior Iraqi interlocutor (a widely experienced Iraqi-American lawyer) became so exasperated with the young man’s audacity that he finally challenged him:

“You must have thoroughly studied the history of the British occupation of Iraq.”

“Yes, I did,” the young American replied proudly.

“I thought so,” said the Iraqi, “because you seem determined to repeat every one of their mistakes.” “

Let’s stop right there. There are, in the United States, a lot of people who have real experience trying to reconstruct states, advising them on constitutions, and the like. We seem to have reached out to a few of them — Diamond, for instance. But we could have reached out to a lot more; after all, it’s not as though reconstituting a country after decades of brutal dictatorship is the kind of simple task that anyone could do. But no: we actually employed and sent to Iraq a 24 year old whose idea of good advice was to say that Iraq should not have judicial review because it might lead to the legalization of abortion? And did we really allow such a person to negotiate in our name with senior Iraqis? What on earth could we possibly have been thinking?

I mean: judicial review is one of the single most important institutions a country can have if it wants to avoid tyranny. It does many, many things that matter a lot more to the future of Iraq than its possible future effects on abortion law. Things like, oh, allowing unconstitutional usurpations of power to be struck down as unlawful. Only someone who was both a complete idiot and a neocon fantasist bent on importing American political issues into the completely different world of Iraq would advise Iraqis not to have judicial review on the grounds that it might lead to the legalization of abortion. And if that struck him as a good idea, who knows what else he might have recommended? Why not advise them not to protect freedom of assembly on the grounds that it might interfere with some future President’s ability to bar people who disagree with him from his rallies, or to allow searches without a warrant on the grounds that that would make it so much easier for some future Iraqi administration to pass the PATRIOT act, or to allow future Presidents the power to declare war at will so that they would never have to ask Congress for permission to invade Iraq? — Um, something’s wrong with that last one…

But wait: there’s more…

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Barely adequate.  Bush’s speech last night did pull the Administration back from Cheney’s "last throes" remark.  That’s good, because Cheney’s claim was ridiculous given the facts on the ground.  Indeed, in less-partisan times, one might even call it a flat-out lie.

So, at least we’re no longer at the brink of a self-inflicted Vietnamization.  Bush also hit the high points, forthrightly stated the difficulty of our task in Iraq, and showed a willingness to stick it out. 

After the say, however, comes the do.  It will be hard to do the right thing in Iraq.  We had cupboards well-stocked of goodwill; reserves of will to win aplenty.  Those cupboards are now nearly bare.  The public is no longer buying Cheney’s glib pronouncements of imminent victory or premature claims of "Mission Accomplished".  The worm is turning on Iraq, and we must complete the mission before it does.

With that in mind, Herbert E. Meyer, a former CIA official with the Reagan Administration, offers the following advice:

Get Real with the Generals

First, you need to fight harder in Iraq.  You keep saying that you are giving our generals all the troops they want.  With all respect, sir, this couldn’t possibly be true.  In the history of the world there has never been a general who thought he had enough troops.  If your generals are telling you they have all the troops they want to finish the job in Iraq, either the generals are idiots – or they have gotten the word that asking for more troops will end their careers.  Sit down with your generals privately – just you and them — and find out how many troops they really think they need.  If they still insist they don’t want more troops on the ground in Iraq, then get yourself a new bunch of generals.  If they tell you they need another 250,000 soldiers and Marines – then fly them over from Korea, Germany or wherever they are stationed just as fast as possible.  If we haven’t got them to send – then order a draft.  One way or another, put enough troops on the ground in Iraq to secure that country — fast.  And while you’re at it, give the orders to either take out the governments of Syria and Iran or to hit them with so much force that they quit playing footsie with al Queda and the Baathists, because we cannot win in Iraq so long as Syria and Iran are providing support and sanctuary.  In short, do whatever is necessary, and do it now.

Emphasis mine.  As The Belgravia Dispatch notes, "Sit down with your generals privately" means without Rumsfeld, Cheney, or, indeed, anyone else in the room.  Just the President and the Generals; all cards on the table.  (By the way, if The Belgravia Dispatch is not yet a daily stop for you, it should be.)

When public opinion decisively tips against the war (as it, assuredly, soon will), it will be impossible to keep troops in the field.  When public opinion decisively tips against the war, the insurgents won’t need to beat us; we will have beaten ourselves.  A very public suicide; a disaster for Iraq, our national security, and the Middle East.

The time to win in Iraq is running out.  No more buck passing.  No more of Rumsfeld’s "it’s above my pay grade."  No more a strategy of "just enough."  Act.  For the good of your country and your administration, act now.

(Title cite.)

UPDATE:  A few changes for clarity.  Some of the readership point out, rightly, that a draft is a poor way to keep public opinion on your side.  Absolutely conceded; indeed, I originally bolded that section of the letter to highlight where I disagree with Mr. Meyer’s advice.  Sadly, I didn’t get around to including that discussion in the body of this comment.

But the core of Mr. Meyer’s advice is sound.  I don’t buy the dance of "we want to send troops, but the Generals won’t have them."  The Generals, I’m sure, are very aware that a larger footprint in Iraq will have some negative consequences.  But it seems that all this worrying about "larger footprints" is meaningless if the footprint you have just ain’t getting the job done.  It’s similar to being on a starvation diet, and yet all you talk about is how fat you could get if you eat more.  A strategic anorexia; not very becoming. 

Yeah, there’s a risk (how real?  who knows?  goes the Rumsfeld koan) more troops will enflame the insurgency.  But weigh that risk against the near certainty that the current level of troops cannot defeat the insurgency.  Cost-benefit yo’ ass.  Ain’t a few more troops — if we have them to send — worth the risk of a few months of bad press?  Would enough troops to secure the border with Syria make it more likely that we’ll fail?

(That’s one reason why I found Neurath’s Boat‘s critique of my last post on the subject less than convincing.)

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by Charles

As anyone could probably guess, I voted for Bush in the last two elections and I generally agree with many, if not most, administration policies.  There are also some actions and policies I do not support, encapsulated best in this piece last August.  One of the biggest ongoing irritants for me is that, while Reagan was the Great Communicator, Bush is the Occasional Communicator and it’s hurting our progress in Iraq. Here’s the problem:

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by hilzoy

From the Omaha World-Herald, via DKos:

“GRAND ISLAND, Neb. – More than 200 Nebraska American Legion members, who have seen war and conflict themselves, fell quiet here Saturday as Sen. Chuck Hagel bluntly explained why he believes that the United States is losing the war in Iraq. It took 20 minutes, but it boiled down to this: The Bush team sent in too few troops to fight the war leading to today’s chaos and rising deaths of Americans and Iraqis. Terrorists are “pouring in” to Iraq. Basic living standards are worse than a year ago in Iraq. Civil war is perilously close to erupting there. Allies aren’t helping much. The American public is losing its trust in President Bush’s handling of the conflict. And Hagel’s deep fear is that it will all plunge into another Vietnam debacle, prompting Congress to force another abrupt pullout as it did in 1975.

“What we don’t want to happen is for this to end up another Vietnam,” Hagel told the legionnaires, “because the consequences would be catastrophic.” It would be far worse than Vietnam, says Hagel, a twice-wounded veteran of that conflict, which killed 58,000 Americans. Failure in Iraq could lead to many more American deaths, disrupt U.S. oil supplies, damage the Middle East peace effort, spread terrorism and harm America’s stature worldwide, Hagel said. That’s what keeps him on edge these days. (…)”

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by Charles

In all the years of reading, watching and listening to Nancy Pelosi, I can safely say that we see eye-to-eye on just about nothing.  But after we reading this piece yesterday, the streak has ended.

The White House on Tuesday rejected the proposed creation of an independent commission to investigate abuses of detainees held at the U.S. military prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and elsewhere.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the Pentagon has launched 10 major investigations into allegations of abuse, and that system was working well.

[…]

Democrats on Capitol Hill have increasingly called for an independent commission to look into detainee abuses. On Tuesday, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., said a commission is crucial to answering questions about the atmosphere that permitted abuses, troop training and the length of detentions at Guantanamo.

"These questions are important because the safety of our country depends on our reputation and how we are viewed, especially in the Muslim world," she said.

It is commendable that ten investigations are underway, but the problem is that they are a patchwork, conducted by various departments and having varying lines of authority.  As I wrote here, taking nothing away from the conduct and integrity of those performing the investigations, the US military is investigating the US military and it gives the appearance of a conflict of interest. Reporting to an independent bipartisan commission removes that appearance and gives the world greater assurance that the issue is being addressed.  Putting the disparate investigations under one umbrella (and perhaps adding a few more to fill in the holes) is an effective way clarify the hierarchy.  Instead of ten separate reports, they can be folded into one.  Once the commission has absorbed the investigations, analyzed the situation and made recommendations, the detainee issue is settled and we can move on. 

The 9/11 Commission performed a similar function.  Despite political maneuvering, grandstanding (Slippery Dick, for example) and other ins and outs, the 9/11 Commission Report was a positive and constructive contribution.  If put together right, a Detainee Commission could accomplish similar results.

(also at Redstate.org)

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One of The Onion’s funnier pieces was written fifteen days after September 11th, titled US Vows to Defeat Whoever We’re at War With:

"America’s enemy, be it Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the Taliban, a multinational coalition of terrorist organizations, any of a rogue’s gallery of violent Islamic fringe groups, or an entirely different, non-Islamic aggressor we’ve never even heard of… be warned," Bush said during an 11-minute speech from the Oval Office. "The United States is preparing to strike, directly and decisively, against you, whoever you are, just as soon as we have a rough idea of your identity and a reasonably decent estimate as to where your base is located."

Added Bush: "That is, assuming you have a base.

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