Barely adequate. Bush’s speech last night did pull the Administration back from Cheney’s "last throes" remark. That’s good, because Cheney’s claim was ridiculous given the facts on the ground. Indeed, in less-partisan times, one might even call it a flat-out lie.
So, at least we’re no longer at the brink of a self-inflicted Vietnamization. Bush also hit the high points, forthrightly stated the difficulty of our task in Iraq, and showed a willingness to stick it out.
After the say, however, comes the do. It will be hard to do the right thing in Iraq. We had cupboards well-stocked of goodwill; reserves of will to win aplenty. Those cupboards are now nearly bare. The public is no longer buying Cheney’s glib pronouncements of imminent victory or premature claims of "Mission Accomplished". The worm is turning on Iraq, and we must complete the mission before it does.
With that in mind, Herbert E. Meyer, a former CIA official with the Reagan Administration, offers the following advice:
Get Real with the Generals
First, you need to fight harder in Iraq. You keep saying that you are giving our generals all the troops they want. With all respect, sir, this couldn’t possibly be true. In the history of the world there has never been a general who thought he had enough troops. If your generals are telling you they have all the troops they want to finish the job in Iraq, either the generals are idiots – or they have gotten the word that asking for more troops will end their careers. Sit down with your generals privately – just you and them — and find out how many troops they really think they need. If they still insist they don’t want more troops on the ground in Iraq, then get yourself a new bunch of generals. If they tell you they need another 250,000 soldiers and Marines – then fly them over from Korea, Germany or wherever they are stationed just as fast as possible. If we haven’t got them to send – then order a draft. One way or another, put enough troops on the ground in Iraq to secure that country — fast. And while you’re at it, give the orders to either take out the governments of Syria and Iran or to hit them with so much force that they quit playing footsie with al Queda and the Baathists, because we cannot win in Iraq so long as Syria and Iran are providing support and sanctuary. In short, do whatever is necessary, and do it now.
Emphasis mine. As The Belgravia Dispatch notes, "Sit down with your generals privately" means without Rumsfeld, Cheney, or, indeed, anyone else in the room. Just the President and the Generals; all cards on the table. (By the way, if The Belgravia Dispatch is not yet a daily stop for you, it should be.)
When public opinion decisively tips against the war (as it, assuredly, soon will), it will be impossible to keep troops in the field. When public opinion decisively tips against the war, the insurgents won’t need to beat us; we will have beaten ourselves. A very public suicide; a disaster for Iraq, our national security, and the Middle East.
The time to win in Iraq is running out. No more buck passing. No more of Rumsfeld’s "it’s above my pay grade." No more a strategy of "just enough." Act. For the good of your country and your administration, act now.
(Title cite.)
UPDATE: A few changes for clarity. Some of the readership point out, rightly, that a draft is a poor way to keep public opinion on your side. Absolutely conceded; indeed, I originally bolded that section of the letter to highlight where I disagree with Mr. Meyer’s advice. Sadly, I didn’t get around to including that discussion in the body of this comment.
But the core of Mr. Meyer’s advice is sound. I don’t buy the dance of "we want to send troops, but the Generals won’t have them." The Generals, I’m sure, are very aware that a larger footprint in Iraq will have some negative consequences. But it seems that all this worrying about "larger footprints" is meaningless if the footprint you have just ain’t getting the job done. It’s similar to being on a starvation diet, and yet all you talk about is how fat you could get if you eat more. A strategic anorexia; not very becoming.
Yeah, there’s a risk (how real? who knows? goes the Rumsfeld koan) more troops will enflame the insurgency. But weigh that risk against the near certainty that the current level of troops cannot defeat the insurgency. Cost-benefit yo’ ass. Ain’t a few more troops — if we have them to send — worth the risk of a few months of bad press? Would enough troops to secure the border with Syria make it more likely that we’ll fail?
(That’s one reason why I found Neurath’s Boat‘s critique of my last post on the subject less than convincing.)
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