by publius
Rather inexplicably, I’m only now reading James Mann’s Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (it’s good). If anything, though, Mann’s book has made me somewhat less angry at the individual neoconservatives responsible for our disastrous Iraq policy. My net levels of anger haven’t changed — it’s just that I’ve reallocated some of that anger from these individuals to the American public. Specifically, I’ve realized that neoconservatism is not so much a cause, but a manifestation of larger political movements. Wolfowitz did not lead a Lenin-esque vanguard — he was himself created by underlying structural forces. Thus, blaming the individual neoconservatives lets the American public (and American nationalists in particular) escape their own culpability.
To back up, Mann does a good job laying out the basic intellectual foundations of neoconservatism, including its Straussian influences. Personally, I think the whole “Straussian noble lie” is a conspiracy theory too far. The real influence of Strauss upon modern politics was his Manichean worldview of absolute good and absolute evil. Evil (or tyranny) existed, Strauss believed, and strong action was necessary to confront it.
The Straussian legacy that matters, then, is his absolute certainty in “our” own goodness and in the “Other’s” evilness. That’s the true theoretical underpinning of neoconservatism — everything they espouse follows if you are certain that you are good and certain that you are fighting evil. If arms control treaties or the UN or torture statutes prohibit fighting evil, then they must be put aside. It’s as un-Burkean as you can get. As Andrew Sullivan has explained at length, doubt is a far better foundation for conservatives. [UPDATE: One point I should have stressed better is that the most practical harm of neoconservatism is its extreme over-reliance on military force to solve problems and to pursue goals. This militancy, in turn, is made possible by underlying certainty of one’s correctness.]
But back to the lecture at hand, the neoconservative certainty had a number of practical implications in both the Cold War and beyond. Pre-1989, excessive certainty about the evils of communism provided the foundation of the opposition to Kissinger’s détente (which also provided the impetus for Reagan’s challenge to Ford and his ultimate ascension). Post-Cold War, the same excessive certainty led to the Wolfowitz/Libby worldview that American foreign policy should consciously attempt to maintain a global monopoly on power. Even back in 1992, obstacles such as the UN were being theoretically jettisoned for ad hoc coalitions that some would later call “willing.”
All of these intellectual currents combined in spectacularly disastrous fashion in Iraq, with certainty being their theoretical foundation. The certainty of our own good allowed us to ignore obstacles to our desires (both laws and IAEA reports). Similarly, the certainty of the “Other’s” evilness allowed us to rationalize overthrowing a secular Arab nationalist regime in the name of fighting transnational radical fundamentalists who viewed them as infidels.
It’s all very depressing, and there’s a tendency to blame it all on people like Wolfowitz and Perle. But we can’t blame them alone. Ironically enough, blaming these individuals only makes it easier for the future Wolfowitzes of the world to start new wars. To see where the rotten apples came from, you have to turn back to the tree.