by publius
Ok – let’s talk Heller. The question in Heller was not “individual” versus “collective” right, but whether the individual right must relate in some way to militia service. The Court said no, in a 5-4 party-line vote. I’m not crazy about the result, but I don’t care that much about guns. The reasoning, however, is far more troubling. Scalia’s opinion is blatant results-oriented analysis dressed up as rigid historical analysis. The idea that this result is compelled by the history is, frankly, absurd.
There are a million things about Heller on the Internets, so I’m limiting myself to this one point – the Heller opinion is an indictment of originalism. In particular, it shows the gaping weaknesses of a methodology that says our constitutional rights should turn on the ability of non-historian judges and law clerks to sift through cherry-picked snippets of early American history. Stuart kings should be less relevant than the realities of 21st century urban violence on this particular issue.
To begin, let me emphasize that history shouldn’t be irrelevant to constitutional analysis. It can be a valuable tool when the historical record is fairly clear. For instance, let’s say Congress decided to put images of our troops on quarters (25 cent pieces), and someone sued saying the Constitution prohibits “quartering” of troops. History there clearly illustrates that the text doesn’t refer to coins. Similarly, the “domestic tranquility” clause isn’t a basis for a federal domestic abuse statute. So yes, history can be relevant and even dispositive.
But the value of history to constitutional interpretation largely vanishes when the historical record isn’t clear – e.g., when it plausibly supports both interpretations. At this point, courts lack the institutional competence to decide which side’s cherry-picked history citations are more accurate. Judges aren’t historians. They haven’t been trained that way. They have no idea whether the subset of materials being presented is representative and sufficient and so on. Thus, when it’s close, courts need to move on to other interpretative methods.
In Heller, the opinion itself illustrates how unclear the record is. Both sides present historical examples that, taken alone, support their point well. But the evidence doesn’t compel a conclusion either way – particularly from institutionally incompetent judges. It can retroactively justify the decision, but it’s not determining the outcome.
Even if you’re not persuaded by Stevens’ dissent, he at least notes several powerful challenges to Scalia’s historical analysis. Just off the top of my head – (1) the original draft of the Second Amendment was more military-related; (2) several state constitutions explicitly mention self-defense, unlike the federal one. And there are many others. Again, I don’t want to get into a historical debate because it’s silly. The point is that Stevens provided several examples that, at minimum, complicate Scalia’s overly-rosy historical record (which of course neatly held up to a 5-4 vote).
But moving beyond Heller, the extensive use of history in complicated situations has at least two other major problems: (1) it’s anti-democratic; and (2) it’s completely divorced from real-world considerations. More on each below the fold:
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