Charles Bird

by Charles

This post is a collection of observances from people who are (or were) there.  First, some excerpts from Michael Yon, who was earlier embedded in Mosul and has since been to Baghdad and elsewhere:

Often the most dangerous places in Iraq are at the front gates of bases where suicide attackers roll in. Outside the wire—and often inside the wire—is bad-guy country. A block away from a base might as well be a hundred miles away. We rolled out in humvees for what would be about a 1,225 mile trip inside Iraq, and another portion to Germany and back.

On the 18th, we drove from Baghdad to Ramadi for a “Transfer of Authority” from the 1st Brigade 1st Armored Division, to the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

Geraldo Rivera was there. He’s got a cool mustache. Monte Morin of Stars & Stripes was there. Monte’s a serious war correspondent. Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno was there. Odierno is a serious general who runs a huge portion of this war. Next time Odierno comes on the news, it can be good to stop and listen.

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by Charles

Had Iraq clearly been on the path of becoming a free, peace, non-theocratic representative republic, the GOP would have been in the majority today (in my opinion), missteps by Republicans in Congress notwithstanding. The fault for the embarrassing loss last November can be squarely laid at the feet of George W. Bush. Because of his substandard performance on Iraq for the past three-plus years, I became a Dissatisfied. What’s more, after considering the cumulative effects of all of his other un-conservative actions, I’m at a point where I’ve pretty much lost confidence in Bush as even a semi-competent commander-in-chief. This isn’t an easy conclusion to come to because I’ve carried Bush’s water on a whole range of issues over most of his six years in office. It’s also not easy because I’m a Republican and have been one for over a quarter century.

But despite my skepticism of the president, I do support Bush on the Petraeus plan to turn Iraq around, but under one condition: that al-Maliki be reasonably committed to it. I say this not because I have faith in Bush, but because I believe Petraeus is the best man for the job, and the general has literally written the book on counterinsurgency ops.

The Petraeus plan should have been in effect over two years ago, so it is encouraging to hear that the Senate approved Petraeus’ promotion to four-star general and to his new job as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. At the same time, it is equally discouraging to see Republicans display spines of Silly Putty in supporting resolutions that would rebuke the very plans that Petraeus would execute. And that is why I put my name on the list, and I find myself in full agreement with Mark I.

Petraeus gave a frank assessment of the mistakes we’ve made in Iraq, and it was refreshing to hear it (more on him here). More importantly, Petraeus has a plan to address the mistakes. Embedding more of our soldiers with Iraqi troops and training more Iraqi troops are part of the package, and so is adopting an effective clear-hold-build strategy in the areas of conflict.

To get more of a flavor of what Petraeus will do, the new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual is an indicator, and it’s worth taking the time read (I’ve paged through it and read portions, and am in the process of going through it word-for-word). Military might is but one component of the strategy. Most of the other tactics are political, economic, intelligence and media related. Under COIN doctrine, military responses are measured and judiciously applied. Unfortunately, the media message is harsher rules of engagement and a freer hand at going after Irianian spies and militants. There are cases where harsher tactics are necessary, but in general the focus is restraint. The COIN strategy is indeed "graduate level warfare", but that is what it will take.

Al-Maliki has been more in the forefront recently about securitizing Baghdad, and there may already be signs that it’s working. His most important job is to back up his words with actions and to consistently sustain them. I hope he can do it.

Finally, since this is an Information War, the White House can do its share by better communicating the new plan. There should be less focus on "more troops" and more on what those troops will be doing. Tony Snow can challenge reporters to embed more and rely less on stringers with unknown biases. The mainstream press has faithfully catalogued the numbers of casualties by terrorist and insurgent attacks, and it wouldn’t hurt for Snow to fill in the rest of the picture with insurgent/terrorist casualties (this might trigger Vietnam memories, but this is a different war, different situation).

As embeds Michelle Malkin, Bill Roggio, Michael Yon and Bill Ardolino have pointed out in their posts, Iraq is a complex situation. There are many incidences of success, and obviously there have been setbacks. But most of the soldiers on the ground appear optimistic of success and believe in their mission. Too bad that more politicians in DC do not believe so, and do not have the stones to stick to it.

Quite frankly, it appears to me that those advocating unilateral withdrawal must also believe that Iraq is a lost cause. It is a defeatist position. I believe it’s premature to think that, but I’m closer today to thinking we’ve lost than a year ago. But if we go down, I’d rather go down after making every effort to make it work. The Petraeus plan looks to be one of the last and best tries. If we’ve made no discernible progress by this November, I may just put myself in the defeatist camp and call for a phased drawdown. But not now, and not with this plan.

(Update below the fold)

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by Charles

I’ve written little (if anything) on Haditha since last June (here, and a 9,000+ word whopper here), but there are a few subsequent pieces worth bringing up.  The first is a New York Times article which does its own job of piecing together what took place.  The writers put themselves in the shoes of the investigators, interviewing Marines, their lawyers, Iraqi residents and the investigators themselves.  They did a fair job at reconstructing events, and although it’s premature to come to any conclusions, there is a possibility that U.S. Marines committed crimes.

Open questions abound.  There are inconsistencies in the stories about the Iraqi men killed in or near a taxi (and conflicting accounts about other events that day).  There are questions about the Marines using the same tactics in Haditha (where civilians were intermingled with paramilitants) as were used in Fallujah (where civilians were warned to leave and most did).  There are questions about the Marines not changing tactics after clearing the first house.

Last month, an article by the New York Times reported allegations of malfeasance higher up the chain of command:

The investigation found that an official company logbook of the unit involved had been tampered with and that an incriminating video taken by an aerial drone the day of the killings was not given to investigators until Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, the second-ranking commander in Iraq, intervened, the officials said.

Those findings, contained in a long report that was completed last month but not made public, go beyond what has been previously reported about the case. It has been known that marines who carried out the killings made misleading statements to investigators and that senior officers were criticized for not being more aggressive in investigating the case, in which most or all of the Iraqis who were killed were civilians. But this is the first time details about possible concealment or destruction of evidence have been disclosed.

But the October 2006 Atlantic Monthly takes a different look at Haditha, with the author seeing it not from the perspective of an investigator, but an infantryman.  The initial conclusion is apt…

How did the heroes of Fallujah come to kill civilians in Haditha? A Vietnam veteran who witnessed the battle of Fallujah says it’s too soon to judge the marines—but not the high command.

…but requires much more explanation than the simple paragraph would indicate.  It is too soon to judge the Marines, but in terms of "high command", Bing West wasn’t talking about the alleged cover-up by superior officers.  Rather, he is addressing the entire strategy employed by the coalition after major combat operations were completed.  I’ve been meaning to re-subscribe to the Atlantic Monthly, and the Road to Haditha is as good a reason as any for a re-up.  Below the fold are some excerpts worth mentioning.

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by Charles

As noted in my previous post, I’ve been critical of Donald Rumsfeld’s performance as Defense Secretary. But my opposition does not extend to cheap shots. An example is the hatchet job by Robert Burns of Associated Press, making stuff up about Rumsfeld’s Tuesday speech at the American Legion National Convention. Thankfully, McQ at QandO exposes the rank bias that Burns is guilty of, comparing Burns’ interpretation of Rumsfeld’s speech with Rumsfeld’s actual words.  [Update:  In typical fashion, AP changed its content without announcing any changes.  See the QandO update.]

The worst part of Burns’ misleading reportage was that it was unquestioningly spread to other news sources such as CNN, ABC, Fox and who knows how many other outlets. Mainstream media was already burned with fauxtography in the Israel-Hezbollah War, yet here we are again, witnessing a mainstream media reporter peddling faux news. Predictably, the Democratic Party took the Burns’ hit piece and ran with it, never mind the actual text of the speech. [Update: Allahpundit has found more interpretation problems concerning Rumsfeld’s speech.]

It’s hard enough fighting an information war against al Qaeda and its sympathizers. The challenge is all the greater when a sometimes hostile media twists and distorts the words of the very people who are directly engaged in fighting this War Against Militant Islamism.  Concerning the Information War, Rumsfeld is dead right:

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by Charles

This may no longer be an issue in the present situation because so many civilians have fled southern Lebanon.  But if not there, the topic remains relevant because it is likely that one party or another will use human shields in future engagements.  In the Israel-Hezbollah War, Hezbollah has been clearly violating Article 28 of the Geneva Conventions for protecting civilians:

The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

If Hezbollah does not allow civilians to leave, they are committing a war crime because it is illegal to take hostages.  There also provisions under Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, although Israel (and the United States) is not a signatory.  However, the U.S. and Israel have accepted many of its provisions under customary international law.  When Hezbollah launches rockets from an apartment building into Israeli territory, that building has become a base for military operations.  Same principles apply for mosques, hospitals, schools, etc.  Each time Hezbollah launches a rocket, they are committing a terrorist act because their target is a zip code, not a military target.  So far, over 3,000 terrorist rocket attacks have occurred.  It is a legitimate act of self-defense to take out those launchers and rockets before militant Islamists launch again.  If civilians die in those counterstrikes, the fault lies with Hezbollah for putting their own people in peril.  Former professor of human rights Yoram Dinstein:

Customary international law is certainly more rigorous than the [Geneva] Protocol on this point.  It has traditionally been perceived that, should civilian casualties ensue from an attempt to shield combatants or a military objective, the ultimate responsibility lies with the belligerent [party] placing innocent civilians at risk.  A belligerent…is not vested by the laws of international armed conflict with the power to block an otherwise legitimate attack against combatants (or military objectives) by deliberately placing civilians in harm’s way.

The above is cited from his 2004 book The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict.  Admittedly, Dinstein have may a bias toward Israel since he was a professor at Tel Aviv University.

Israel doesn’t have a spotless record in the matter of human shields either.  Just a month ago, the IDF used Palestinians as human shields for an incursion into Gaza:

After seizing control of the buildings, the soldiers held six residents, two of them minors, on the staircases of the two buildings, at the entrance to rooms in which the soldiers positioned themselves, for some twelve hours. During this time, there were intense exchanges of gunfire between the soldiers and armed Palestinians. The soldiers also demanded that one of the occupants walk in front of them during a search of all the apartments in one of the buildings, after which they released her.

IDF also illegally used Palestinian human shields in the Battle of Jenin.  According to Louis Rene Beres, professor of international law at Purdue University, human shields also fall under the category of perfidy, which is not permissible under international law (but ruses are okay).  So what is the proper response under international law when the enemy uses these perfidious acts?  In a September 2004 issue of Military Review, Daniel Schoenekase defines the different types of human shields–proximity, involuntary and voluntary–and raises questions about other groups such as civilian workers at a munitions factory.  Schoenekase puts forth "targeting principles" when the enemy uses human shields to prevent counterattacks:  military necessity, discrimination (distinction), humanity and proportionality.  Commanders must evaluate the following before giving the green light to striking a human-shielded target:

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by Charles

I wrote in an earlier comment thread that Israel is doing the work that the Lebanese army should be doing but cannot.  The simple answer to ending the current violence between Israel and Hezbollah is to degrade Hezbollah to the point where Israel can hand the keys to the Lebanese army, giving the government full sovereignty over its country.  Another Charles agrees with me:

The road to a solution is therefore clear: Israel liberates south Lebanon and gives it back to the Lebanese.

It starts by preparing the ground with air power, just as the Persian Gulf War began with a 40-day air campaign. But if all that happens is the air campaign, the result will be failure. Hezbollah will remain in place, Israel will remain under the gun, Lebanon will remain divided and unfree. And this war will start again at a time of Hezbollah and Iran’s choosing.

[Update:  Add Josh Trevino to the ranks, too, who adds a little more detail on tactics.]  The interesting part to this is that, by going in and treating the Hezbollah cancer in southern Lebanon, Israel is helping Lebanese abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1559.  This is exactly why the "international community" should refrain from speaking about what Israel should do and focus its attention on Iran and Syria, sponsors of these terrorists, and urge Assad and the Iranian mullahs to tell their Hezbollah puppets to cease fire and return the hostages.  The only diplomacy necessary from Condi Rice is "keep up the good work" to Israel and "hang in there and you’ll get your country back" to Lebanon.  To Syria and Iran, the diplomacy will be more nuanced, but the general message should be, "get the f**k out."

More below the fold, including lots of updates!

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by Charles

In an attempt to get up to speed on Haditha, I looked through a number of links to find out what witnesses said and to offer some commentary. Unlike John Murtha, I haven’t judged those Marines guilty because I’d rather wait until the NCIS finishes its investigation. But in the meantime, the following is what I was able to dredge up. It still clocks in at over 9,000 words but there’s still a lot we don’t know.

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by Charles

Whether a war crime by U.S. Marines happened or not, there are problems in Haditha, just as there were in Fallujah. The failure is, in part, ours. As the Vietnam War and other insurgencies have shown, the clear-and-hold strategy works. Haditha has been cleared at least once (or at least attempted), but it has not been truly held. In the Guardian last August:

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by Charles

Several terms and phrases have floated across my computer screen the last few days, and I thought I’d dig into a few of them.  In a prior post on Muslims, a certain prominent commenter stated that there is a "massive sense of cultural humiliation in the Muslim world."  Perhaps there’s some truth to it, but I can’t help but interpret "cultural humiliation" to mean "we lost and our feelings are hurt!"  I don’t believe it’s a sound idea to craft policy based on another group’s emotional state.  After all, the saying goes, we can only control our own emotions, not the feelings of others.  It also sounds suspiciously like the victim card is being played, with those facing "cultural humiliation" to be the next candidates for interest group status.  Approaching psychobabble levels, there’s even a feelings-based community ready to fertilize and generate interdisciplinary research (both intra and interculturally) on macro, meso and micro levels.

In a Google search, "cultural humiliation" is oft applied to Iraq, Guantanamo detainees, Abu Ghraib, black American women, and so forth.  In a February 2004 essay by Jessica Stern of the Harvard Kennedy School of Goverment:

Individually, the terrorists I interviewed cited many reasons for choosing a life of holy war, and I came to despair of identifying a single root cause. But the variable that most frequently came up was not poverty or human rights abuses ­as has been posited in the press but perceived humiliation. Humiliation came up at every echelon of terrorist group members ­leaders and followers.

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