by publius
Unlike Hilzoy, I was more sympathetic to Ezra Klein’s “Down With Values” argument. So at the risk of sparking a rootin-tootin’ ObWi family feud, I’m going to try to defend it.
Maybe I’m expanding it, but I read Klein’s argument as expressing skepticism of abstractions (and policy-by-abstractions), rather than skepticism of the individual abstract values themselves. In this sense, his foreign policy argument seems to be philosophical — he’s skeptical of theory itself. One question it raises is whether theory has any useful role to play in the foreign policy realm.
I recognize that I’m using “theory” a bit loosely. For today, “theory” refers to a comprehensive abstract ideology cited as an animating foreign policy principle. For instance, a foreign policy based on “freedom” or “justice” is what I’m calling “foreign policy by theory.”
With that in mind, the first problem with foreign policy by theory is that it flips empiricism on its head. The idea of empiricism is that you study the individual situation first, and draw abstract conclusions second. An abstraction-based foreign policy — whether democracy-promotion or Communism — reverses this order. It begins with the abstraction (often with excessive epistemological certainty) and applies it to the individual situation.
Consider how these two approaches might play out regarding, say, China and Taiwan. Approaching the dispute with a blank slate would likely lead the US to stay mute and ambiguous. China is very touchy about it, and a military escalation over Taiwan would be disastrous for pretty much everyone (and every market) involved. If we decided, however, that our commitment to the abstract idea of freedom outweighed these pragmatic concerns, we might act in a very unwise way (or interpret events in an inaccurate way). This is a simplified example, but the broader point is that approaching objective reality with a pre-existing theory in mind colors and distorts our perceptions.