On March 2, 2004, when this blog had about a third of the daily readership that it has today, I wrote the following. Watch as it comes back to bite me in the ass:
I have no idea how the average Iraqi feels about his situation, but Kevin Drum, David Adesnik, and Bird Dog at Tacitus all feel pretty darn good about our progress. Here’s a sentence I thought I’d never write: Drum, Adesnik, and Bird Dog are in agreement on Iraq.
All three posted before today’s round of bombings and attacks, so it’s fair to say that they’ve been somewhat upstaged by events. But their claim still holds up. Iraq is getting better. …
(There’s more.)
But it’s not over yet. Swaths of Iraq are ruled by bandits, militias, or increasingly-radicalized Shi’ite clerics (sometimes all three). The facts that led some to conclude that Iraq was on the verge of a civil war mere weeks ago have not disappeared. Indeed, you can capture enough Iraqi playing cards to open a riverboat casino, but you can’t erase centuries of long-simmering ethnic and religious tensions. That is what threatens to tear the country apart.
….
It’s the third quarter of a race that’s always the most difficult. You’re exhausted by what you’ve already accomplished, and yet the end seems so very far away. You lose focus and your pace slackens. It’s the point in which you decide whether you want to win. And the funny thing is: There is no drama about it. No burst of power or whoop of victory. Determination is boring.
The race is not yet won in Iraq. ….*
Today, from the Financial Times:
US military officers in Baghdad have warned they cannot guarantee the security of the perimeter around the Green Zone, the headquarters of the Iraqi government and home to the US and British embassies, according to security company employees.
(Via Drezner.) And also, from Salon:
“I see no exit,” said [Jeffrey Record, professor of strategy at the Air War College]. “We’ve been down that road before. It’s called Vietnamization. The idea we’re going to have an Iraqi force trained to defeat an enemy we can’t defeat stretches the imagination. They will be tainted by their very association with the foreign occupier. In fact, we had more time and money in state building in Vietnam than in Iraq.”
And also, from the New York Times:
A classified National Intelligence Estimate prepared for President Bush in late July spells out a dark assessment of prospects for Iraq, government officials said Wednesday.
The estimate outlines three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war, the officials said. The most favorable outcome described is an Iraq whose stability would remain tenuous in political, economic and security terms.
One should always be careful of living too much in the moment. But, for the record, if you want to know what losing looks like when you’re in the moment, you need do nothing more than look around. Because, slowly — by our failure to commit sufficient forces, by our failure to plan, by our failure to provide enough funds, by our failure to understand our limitations — we are indeed losing Iraq. And it’s not at all clear that it can be turned around.
*Some internal links omitted; Bird Dog’s post at the old Tacitus website is dead.
von, we cannot “lose” what we never had to begin with. Any illusion of control in Iraq was just that and never anything more.
And yet the administration’s response to these developments:
MR. McCLELLAN: It talks about the great challenges to Iraq’s peaceful and democratic future. And the President has talked about how transition — the transition to a democracy is hard work. But it is for an important cause. The NIA really states the obvious in what the President has said many times. But it makes clear that it’s important to stand with the Iraqi people as they face these challenges. The stakes are very high in Iraq. There is progress being made on the five-point plan that the President outlined for success. There are certain areas where there are ongoing difficulties and security threats. The Prime Minister of Iraq has made it clear that he is determined to address those situations. They have addressed the situations in Najaf and Kufa, and have made a lot of progress in Samarra, as well.
Certain areas, yes–like the Green Zone, purportedly the most secure area in Iraq.
I would be greatly reassured about Bush’s competence and grasp on reality, had he really stated “many times” what is in the NIA. But this was simply a lie.
Apparently it is no longer the Potomac that runs through Washington, but Denial.
And then Fallujah, Sadr and Abu Ghraib happened. Our responses to those situations have been lackluster and ineffectual, opening the door to more mischief and violence. As I wrote here, here and in multiple other posts, we cannot achieve progress until the “insurgents” and terrorists are quelled. Going into Iraq was a huge risk, but now that we’re in, we cannot afford anything but victory, defined by me as hitting the five “tipping points” as stated in the CSIS report and Iraq becoming a peaceful, free, non-theocratic representative government.
Bird Dog, I’m mostly in favor of escalating our efforts in Iraq, but I’m curious to know if there are circumstances under which you think that would become counterproductive and if we could recoginze them.
As I wrote here, here and in multiple other posts, we cannot achieve progress until the “insurgents” and terrorists are quelled. Going into Iraq was a huge risk, but now that we’re in, we cannot afford anything but victory, defined by me as hitting the five “tipping points” as stated in the CSIS report and Iraq becoming a peaceful, free, non-theocratic representative government.
Except that we’re not quelling the insurgents and terrorists. Indeed, the opposite is occurring. Wanting to win, needing to win, not being able to afford “anything but victory” — all true. But none of that means that we actually will win. And it may be too late to turn things around. (More troops, more money — Bush rejected the advice when it the moment was ripe, and now the time has passed.)
rilkefan,
I’m one of those who believes that if there is sustained will, a full commitment to stamping down the “insurgents” and terrorists, and application of unyielding force to same, then we wouldn’t even be having this conversation. After 30-plus of brutal rule by Saddam, one thing that these guerillas and terrorists understand is brutal force returned in kind. It’s a harsh assessment, but so far we’ve let the door open for far too long. We can’t make real progress until the security situation is fully addressed. It needs to happen right now.
von,
We can go back in any time and reassert ourselves militarily. The question is whether Bush and the command structure are willing to do it. It sure the hell failed in Fallujah and we can ill afford the status quo.
After 30-plus of brutal rule by Saddam, one thing that these guerillas and terrorists understand is brutal force returned in kind. It’s a harsh assessment, but so far we’ve let the door open for far too long. We can’t make real progress until the security situation is fully addressed. It needs to happen right now.
Do they still have Hussein in lockup? Why not bring him out, pay him a billion dollars or so to keep him loyal to the allies, and put him back in charge? That would probably be cheaper in the long run, and pretty much accomplish what you’re suggesting, BD.
Bird Dog:
We can go back in any time and reassert ourselves militarily.
No, we can’t. (1) We transferred soveriegnty to Iraq (prematurely, to my mind: we should have dealt with Sadr first). We “go back in” only when authorized by the Iraqi government. (2) We’ve now “gone in” a number of time and, regardless of the wisdom of initiating the various actions, we have never secured victory.
The question is whether Bush and the command structure are willing to do it.
I think we know the answer to that by now (although I’d leave out “the command structure” from the critique, unless you’re referencing the Iraqi government. All reports are that the Marines were willing to see the job done, but were held back).
By the way, BD, I know you’ve been a consistent critic of the Administration’s kid-glove approach in Iraq. I don’t mean to suggest otherwise in this dispute.
What is clear is that with the current clown in charge, a loss is a near certainty.
All of the problems are directly attributable to mistakes made in the face of sound advice (which was rejected), and then compounded by refusing to acknowledge that anything is wrong. So expect the crappy approach to Iraq to continue unabated, thereby assuring failure.
After 30-plus of brutal rule by Saddam, one thing that these guerillas and terrorists understand is brutal force returned in kind.
let’s not forget just what kind of “brutal force” Saddam use to his country quiet: he gassed his own people, filled mass graves and employed wood chippers, rape rooms and a large network of secret police and informants (just to name the highlights everyone’s familiar with). i don’t want my country to come anywhere near any of that stuff.
“We can go back in any time and reassert ourselves militarily.”
Bird Dog, haven’t you learned anything about guerrilla wars? They are fought primarily along political, not military lines. This is not like defeating the Wehrmacht or Saddam’s Republican Guard in the Gulf War. We could devastate Fallujah, and all you will see is an increase in people joining the guerrillas elsewhere in the country. The Iraqi people are no longer on our side; they want us out.
If I should concur with Bird Dog that Dan Rather will probably never be able to go back in and reassert his credibility in the world of journalism, would he concur with me that we (not my son, by the way) probably cannot go back in and reassert ourselves (not my son, in that hell-hole) militarily in Iraq?
I’m sure we have qualifications on both sides, but let’s make the trade simple.
Because at some point … soon… we’re all going to have to give up something, or America is going to become unlivable politically.
I know Moe Lane believes me to be an alarmist.
P.S. We can take care of North Korea and Fox News in a future trade.
Actually, von, you make a great point about the fact that we HAVE transferred sovereignty, doesn’t this mean the US really means we can’t go in with full force, right? We have to respect sovereignty, right?
I think that BD and his critics are, to some degree, talking past each other. At one time, application of more force/troops would have been clearly productive. I think we can all agree that if we had had 300,000 troops in Iraq in May of 2002 that things would likely be better (not solved: better).
The question today is whether ramping up to that number now would resolve the security situation. It would certainly help, but have we reached the point in the conflict where there are so many insurgents that we don’t have enough soldiers in the arsenal to put the cork back in the bottle. The reports that von cites (and Edward, in today’s post) argue that we might actually have passed that point. That’s a debate that we clearly need to have.
Even if we decide that we can still “win”, there are two critical questions that I honestly don’t know the answers to:
First, where do we get the extra tens of thousands of troops needed to work on security? The US military is tremendously strained, and I’m not sure we have enough ourselves. Does anyone know different? If we don’t have enough, whom do we ask for troops?
Second, does this administration have the political willpower to make the “right” decisions to effectively fight this war. As several people (from both the left and the right) have noted, the US has several times pulled back from direct confrontations in urban areas. Winning those fights are necessary if the insurgency is to be broken. That is an ugly process, in Iraq (turning more Iraqis against us – hopefully only in the short term), internationally (a further loss of support) and domestically (opening Bush to further political attacks and potentially damaging his support with the people). Will this administration do the right things?