by hilzoy
Brian Tamanaha has a good post at Balkinization. Taking Andrew Sullivan as a representative of those conservatives who are now asking themselves what they got wrong in deciding to support Iraq, he says:
“Yeah, yeah, yeah, but:
The first and overarching error of neoconservatives, Mr. Sullivan, is their willingness (nay, eagerness) to use war to achieve their ideological objectives. Neoconservatives see war as a tool, perhaps messy and unpleasant, not to mention expensive, but sometimes useful.
War is the greatest horror we inflict upon one another, destroying bodies and lives, inflicting untold pain, often on innocent bystanders. War must be a last resort, undertaken with great reluctance, when no other option is available–appropriate only when necessary to defend ourselves against an immediate aggressor (as international law recognizes).
That was not the case with Iraq. Bush and the neoconservatives were bent on starting a war in Iraq for their own ideological and personal reasons and they made sure it came about. Bush’s premptive war doctrine, recently reiterated, is more of the same failure to recogize the utimate horror of war.
None of the neoconservative mea culpas I have read have recognized this true (moral and pragmatic) error of their vision and understanding, which is more fundamental than Sullivan’s three so-called “huge errors.” If neoconservatives understood that war is appropriate only as an absolutely last resort to defend ourselves against an attack, the war would never have happened–hence no WMD debacle (because there was not enough to justify war), no offending allies with our arrogance of power, and no attempt to shape another country in our own image. “
This is right. I am not a pacifist. I supported a lot of recent wars, including not just the first Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, but also at least one that didn’t happen, namely Rwanda. (Here I differ from Tamanaha: I think that war can also be justified in response to a genuine unfolding humanitarian catastrophe, as distinct from a repressive government that carried out atrocities a decade in the past.) But it is absolutely crucial to recognize what exactly you’re supporting when you support war: namely, one of the most awful things imaginable. No matter how smart our bombs and no matter how well trained our soldiers, horrible things will happen in wars. Children will be blown to bits. People whose only “crime” was to be in the wrong place in the wrong time will get caught in the crossfire. Markets will be shelled, if not deliberately then by accident: there are always accidents in wars. Families will huddle in terror as soldiers shout at them in a language they do not understand, aiming guns at them, ready to shoot if, whether from terror, malice, or sheer confusion, they set a foot wrong.
And that’s without taking into account possibilities like Abu Ghraib.
I recall once talking to an Israeli soldier who had just come back from Lebanon, and who told me the following story: a woman with a baby had approached the wire around their encampment, asking for milk for her child. The soldiers, against regulations, went to give her some. She threw the child over the fence; it was rigged with a bomb, and killed (I think) one of the soldiers. They caught her and at some point someone asked her why she had done what she did. She said: you killed my son, my husband, and my brothers; why not should I not give up my baby as well?
The soldier, whose friend had been killed for his generosity, asked: what kind of animals are these people, that they would do something like that? For better or (more likely) for worse, I thought I could at least dimly glimpse the pitch of grief that might explain it. What I couldn’t understand was: when there are stories like this between two peoples, how on earth can there ever be peace between them? How can either ever possibly forget?
The decision to go to war is not part of a chess game. It’s not an act of national self-assertion. It is, among other things, a decision to deliberately create stories like that. As I said, at times it seems to me the least horrible option. But it is essential to be absolutely clear about what you’re supporting.
But there are a few more points worth mentioning.
Greg Djerejian writes:
“In good time, I will write my personal mea culpa in this tragic affair. I had greater faith in this Administration, and they have let us down time and again. But it’s too easy to say it would all have been OK but for the dumbies who effed up the show. People who supported the war, and there were many of us (on both sides of the aisle, lest we forget), had to keep in mind the abilities of those charged with prosecuting it, and the resources that would be brought to bear. We knew the Powell Doctrine had been shunted aside in favor of utopic transformationalist nostrums, and we knew that some who were listened to in the leading counsels of power had memorably declared the effort would be a cakewalk. We should have smelled the danger signals better, and we deserve the scorn of those who were against this effort from the get-go, at least those who honestly believed we were doing the wrong thing rather than just opposing anything the horrible Bushies would bring to the plate.”
As it happens, I was right about the war. I would very much rather not have been. I appreciate Greg’s comments. A few of my own:
First, being right about the war was not all that hard. At least in my case, it required some familiarity with the Middle East, familiarity gained before 9/11 made all discourse about that region hysterical and politicized. Given that familiarity, I was absolutely clear about Saddam Hussein’s dreadfulness, but also inclined to think that he was one of the last leaders in the Middle East who would cooperate with al Qaeda on more than an incidental basis. I certainly thought he would not give them WMD. That being the case, I could not for the life of me see why we were taking our focus off al Qaeda. Moreover, I knew enough about Iraq to think that the outcome of any invasion, even a competent one, would be very hard to predict, and that the likelihood of its being a complete disaster was non-negligible. And I had no confidence in Bush’s competence, though I would never have predicted the level of sheer idiocy that we’ve seen.
As I’ve said before, I had also concluded before the invasion that there was no reason to think that Saddam had WMD, and a lot of reasons (some technical) to doubt that he had nukes in particular. This was based on the thought that it would be overwhelmingly in our interest to produce evidence that he did, whether directly or by telling Hans Blix where to look. When Blix failed to find any, I concluded that we probably had no such evidence. Moreover, I seemed to find the prospect of Saddam with some WMD, especially if they didn’t include nuclear weapons, less apocalyptic than a lot of people, having grown up with a much more powerful country armed with many more nuclear weapons pointed at our cities — a situation I hated, but that did not lead to catastrophe.
I also had the aforementioned conviction that wars should never be entered into without extremely compelling reasons, which I didn’t see in this case.
But the point is: it was not a particularly difficult line of argument to work out.
That said, I don’t have “scorn” for people like Greg Djerejian. (I mean: I’m not familiar with his entire oeuvre, having come to blogging late in the game, so perhaps there’s something somewhere that should make me have scorn for him, but I’m not aware of it.) (Insert smiley face here.) I do have — not scorn exactly, but a certain amount of anger* for two groups of pro-war commentators.
First, there are those whose mistakes were just idiotic. They include Tom Friedman, whom Harold Meyerson quotes as follows:
“”I have to admit I’ve always been fighting my own war in Iraq,” Friedman wrote in the summer of 2003. “Mr. Bush took the country into his war.” Was it too much to ask the nation’s most important foreign-policy journalist to focus on Bush’s war — particularly because, well, it was Bush, and not Friedman, who was president?””
Confusing the war he would have fought with the war Bush actually fought, and then proceeding to advocate “the war”, is an idiotic mistake. Since reading that column, I have never bothered to take Friedman seriously again, especially not after this.
Then there’s Tacitus, who now informs us that his pro-war reasoning included this absolutely amazing error:
“I was wrong to think that one venue in the heart of the Muslim world was as good as another: that Iraq was as sufficient as Jordan, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt.”
Really? He thought that? Just as a thought, that would be silly in the extreme; as a reason for advocating the deaths of tens of thousands, the destruction of American prestige, and the complete squandering of our ability to respond to all sorts of other challenges, it’s shameful.
Second, there are those who vilified anyone who opposed the invasion: the people who challenged our patriotism, informed us that we didn’t care about the threat of Islamofascism or the sufferings of innocent Iraqis, and generally wrote as though raising questions about the wisdom of the war could be explained only by insanity, perfidy, or both.
What bothers me about this is not having had some of this directed at me. I was an unpopular child; I have a thick skin; this sort of thing doesn’t bother me personally. The problem is rather that the prevalence of this stuff tended to shut down intelligent arguments about the wisdom of going to war just when we needed them the most. We absolutely needed to hear, and to examine, questions about the invasion before we invaded, not afterwards. The people who made that examination much more difficult, and who subjected anyone who dared to question the wisdom of the invasion to real and serious slander, have, in my view, a lot to answer for.
Now people are belatedly realizing that some of the people who raised those questions were not, in fact, deranged by Bush-hatred or a desire to see America fail or an unwillingness to call terrorists evil. They were wondering whether invading Iraq was really a good idea. If any good at all can come of this, it would be for all those who participated in, or who were swayed by, the demonization of their opponents to resolve never, ever to participate in anything like that again. If they have good arguments, they can make them. But equating disagreement with treason or insanity or some appalling character flaw doesn’t just insult a person. It does a disservice to the country, which needs to debate policy vigorously before embarking on it.
***
* Update: I had originally written: “I do have — not scorn exactly, but a certain amount of anger, and in some cases contempt, for two groups of pro-war commentators.” I removed the contempt part after about nine hours (of sleep), since it’s wrong. As I wrote in a comment just before updating:
“I’m updating to remove the reference to ‘contempt’, which I wrote in anger (having reread some of the pre-war invective before this, and been struck by the willingness of some people to denounce others’ patriotism, character, and even, at times, sanity, while themselves doing an immense disservice to the country. ‘Contempt’ isn’t really what I feel — even Hindrocket tends to produce more bewilderment and a desire to wash my computer screen — and I was wrong to write it.”
Confusing the war he would have fought with the war Bush actually fought, and then proceeding to advocate “the war”, is an idiotic mistake.
I’ve remarked on a number of occasions that I think was a deliberate strategy of the Bush Administration: governance through obscurity. By assiduously allowing anyone to believe whatever they wanted to believe of the Administration, irrespective of what it was actually doing, they gave themselves all the political cover they could ever need — but only as long as things were going well enough that people would be complicit in their own deception.
The problem is rather that the prevalence of this stuff tended to shut down intelligent arguments about the wisdom of going to war just when we needed them the most.
But that was precisely its purpose. It was intended to shut down debate; it was intended to marginalize; it was intended to delegitimize. Those engaging in that behavior accomplished their objectives in spades. Your point only works if your interlocutors credit you with possessing a legitimate, albeit contrasting, view… so while I think most everyone would agree to the basic premise that legitimate debate should be encouraged, you would have had to fight a different battle: convincing them that your perspective is not a priori illegitimate for daring to criticize Bush.
And fwiw, I too appreciate Djerejian’s comments.
An possibly interesting sidenote is that Brian Tamanaha seems to be from Hawaii.
While I think that Djerejian is sincere, but in light of the finish of the paragraph, which is
Also, it should be said, war is a tremendously complex endeavor, and while it’s a cliche to state, it’s very true that no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy. We can beat up on the war-planners, and their arrogance and reluctance to admit mistakes makes it feel good, but their jobs are never easy ones, and those of us brandishing laptops to castigate all and sundry do well to recall this now and again.
one has to juxtapose this with his justification of a vote for Bush. If you are too lazy to click on the link, this line might suffice
Does Dan [Drezner] really believe that a Bush victory will have Doug Feith feeling “vindicated” so that group-think would prevail via some Libby-Bolton-Feith axis? Er, I think not. Nor do John Negroponte or Zal Khalilzad, I suspect. Regardless, some of these folks, I’d wager, aren’t even going to be around in a Bush II.
I was reminded of this recently:
‘[Saruman] drew himself up then and began to declaim, as if he were making a speech long rehearsed. “The Elder Days are gone. The Middle Days are passing. The Younger Days are beginning. The time of the Elves is over, but our time is at hand: the world of Men, which We must rule. But we must have power, to order all things as we will, for that good which only the Wise can see.
‘”And listen, Gandalf, my old friend and helper!” he said, coming near and speaking now in a softer voice. “I said we, for we it may be, if you will join with me. A new Power is rising. Against it the old allies and policies will not avail us at all. There is no hope left in Elves or dying Númenor. This then is one choice before you, before us. We may join with that Power. It would be wise, Gandalf. There is hope that way. Its victory is at hand; and there will be rich reward for those that aided it. As the Power grows, its proved friends will also grow; and the Wise, such as you and I, may with patience come at last to direct its courses, to control it. We can bide our time, we can keep our thoughts in our hearts, deploring maybe evils done by the way, but approving the high and ultimate purpose: Knowledge, Rule, Order; all the things that we have so far striven in vain to accomplish, hindered rather than helped by our weak or idle friends. There need not be, there would not be, any real change in our designs, only in our means.”
— The Fellowship of the Ring, Chapter 11
let’s not forget Insty (4/11/03):
Yeah, there has been a lot of pro-war gloating. And I guess that Dawn Olsen’s cautionary advice about gloating is appropriate. So maybe we shouldn’t rub in just how wrong, and morally corrupt the antiwar case was. Maybe we should rise above the temptation to point out that claims of a ‘quagmire’ were wrong — again! — how efforts at moral equivalence were obscenely wrong — again! — how the antiwar folks are still, far too often, trying to move the goalposts rather than admit their error — again — and how an awful lot of the very same people who spoke lugubriously about ‘civilian casualties’ now seem almost disappointed that there weren’t more — again — and how many people who spoke darkly about the Arab Street and citizens rising up against American ‘liberators’ were proven wrong — again — as the liberators were seen as just that by the people they were liberating. And I suppose we shouldn’t stress so much that the antiwar folks were really just defending the interests of French oil companies and Russian arms-deal creditors. It’s probably a bad idea to keep rubbing that point in over and over again.
Nah.
via TBogg
Good job Hilzoy. Though let me note:
I was tempted to support the war before invasion, and even did for a few days here, a week there. War is horrific, but so is life in a dehumanizing authoritarian state. I’ve never experienced either one–few people who read this site have, I’ll bet. But there were some people–few perhaps, but I’m one and I know others–who reasoned roughly like this:
War is horrific, but Saddam’s Iraq is even worse. Give me a choice between being plopped down in the midst of one of them and I’ll choose the former. The Bush administration are a bunch of liars and crooks, but in this case they’ll at least be accomplishing something good, however twisted and inscrutable their motives. They don’t really care about human rights, but at least in this case their ends and the ends of humanity seem to come together, however contingently. This will be the only way to get them to use American power to do something good.
Now, I ultimately rejected that argument (to be precise: I thought other considerations outweighed it) but I know at least one intelligent, well-meaning person who accepted it. I’d still pick war over systematic, dehumanizing oppression if I had to choose.
Anyway, I agree with basically everything you write here. But I fear there’ll be a backlash against liberal interventionism. You’re right, we should have gone into Rwanda (and we should go into the Congo and Darfur now). War is almost inconceivably horrific–but we’ve got to keep reminding people that it isn’t the worst thing.
Dang. As a Tolkien fanatic I should have thought of that myself, Passer-by. Tom Friedman and the other prowar, Bush-cheering liberals as Saruman. That sounds about right.
Great post hilzoy. I’ll anticipate Bob McManus and say that I’m not completely sure if what we see in Iraq is entirely due to incompetence. I don’t go nearly as far as Bob–a lot of it is incompetence. I don’t think sensible evil imperialists fight wars this badly. But as Kevin Phillips apparently points out in his new book “American Theocracy”, they were competent enough to place guards around the oil ministry. When something matters to them, they can be competent.
I’m updating to remove the reference to ‘contempt’, which I wrote in anger (having reread some of the pre-war invective before this, and been struck by the willingness of some people to denounce others’ patriotism, character, and even, at times, sanity, while themselves doing an immense disservice to the country. ‘Contempt’ isn’t really what I feel — even Hindrocket tends to produce more bewilderment and a desire to wash my computer screen — and I was wrong to write it.
Otherwise, thanks.
It’s sloppy to say that Saddam’s Iraq was worse than war, Winston. Saddam’s Iraq was at war with itself at certain times, and he presumably killed more Iraqis than have died under the occupation so far. But for the past three years the death rate has been higher than it was in Saddam’s final years.
Also, some of the excess mortality under Saddam occurred because of the sanctions and the deliberate destruction of infrastructure inflicted by the US during the Gulf War. And the suffering inflicted on civilians was deliberate–it was intended to destabilize Saddam’s regime, just as the insurgent attacks on infrastructure now are meant to destabilize Iraq. Some people thought that the ending of sanctions and Saddam would lead to a lowering of the death rate, and I thought that was a possibility myself, but so far the opposite has happened.
Hilzoy:
First of all, let me say that I think this is a thoughtful and well crafted post. But…
I do have some scorn for these weak-kneed neoconservatives. Not for their initial support for the war – but because their resolve has buckled after only 3 short years. These same folks acknowledged 3 years ago that it would not be easy or quick. Yet now they feel the need for a good mea culpa. Bah.
“extremely compelling reasons” – its as simple as this: “Honor the threat”.
We absolutely had to do something to attempt to reshape the Middle East. Iraq was the obvious place to start.
Was there spin in selling the war? Of course. There always is. You have to sell a war – for obvious reasons, they are quite unpopular. But we didn’t need WMD or terrorist ties or anything else. You say you supported GWI. Well Saddam began violating the peace agreement that ended hostilities before the ink was dry. We had clear justification to restart hostilities for all of the 90’s. The first time a US fighter enforcing the no fly zone was locked up by an air defense radar was all the justification we needed. Period.
It is somewhat disingenuous for folks today to say it was obvious Saddam had no WMD, when as we are now learning, his own generals thought he had them. And with the exploitation of the captured intelligence documents, the “no ties to Al-Qaeda” meme is also beginning to disintegrate. It’s also become clear that sanctions were a miserable failure (see oil for food) and that any efforts to take action through the UN were doomed to failure due to Russia and France being in bed with Saddam. My point is that we are still too close in history to be reaching definitive conclusions. Look at the things we only learned about the cold war after the Soviet Union fell and we got a look inside the former regime. The history of WWII is still being revised today.
Anyway – put me in the “unapologetic for supporting the war” category. Obviously I think that some things could have been done better. Name me a war that went as planned (GWI is about as close as you can get).
Next up – Iran. I support immediate military action against the mullahs. No occupation. Decapitation air strikes followed by special ops to seize and destroy all nuclear capability in the country. Then leave and let the people make of their country what they will.
You can call me heartless, cold blooded, and anything else that seems appropriate. You won’t believe this but I believe this is ultimately for the good of the region and the world. If things continue to progress along the current path, the day will come when we will be forced to utterly destroy the entire region – killing millions.
Honor the threat.
It is somewhat disingenuous for folks today to say it was obvious Saddam had no WMD,
it was obvious to me
Winston: Actually, I don’t think that war is worse than life under Saddam. This isn’t because I have any particular illusions about life under Saddam, but because a lot of the things that made life under Saddam awful — the possibility of being killed or imprisoned for no good reason, the lack of effective freedom, pervasive unfairness (at least in results), etc. — are also present during war, usually more so, while one of the few things that lets most people navigate a truly awful regime — namely, the possibility of at least trying to predict what will happen if you do something, and thus of learning to live within the system in some way — is absent, wars being wholly unpredictable.
What might be true is something more like: war is worse, but if we could have some assurance that the war would be over relatively soon, and would be followed by something better than either war or life under Saddam, that might make up for it.
This absolutely relies both on estimates of how likely things are to go completely bad — which can never be ruled out in wars, imho — and also on the commitment and competence of the people leading you.
For my part, I tend to think that one absolute barrier to elective democracy promotion by military means — where ‘elective’ means: it’s not that we have an independent reason to invade, and then decide to promote democracy; it’s that that’s our reason for invading — is that democracy promotion requires a lot of participation by people in the country in question, and that’s only likely to be forthcoming if they don;t absolutely hate you. And war being war, the only way most people will end up not hating an invader is if they understand why the invasion happened, and accept the reason, enough to blame someone else for the hell that ensues.
This always seemed to me the obvious disanalogy between Japan and Germany on the one hand and Iraq on the other. I mean: I don’t really know enough about Japan to say, but I don’t know of any reason to deny that we created a democracy by force there, as I believe we did in Germany. But it made a huge difference that in both cases people were pretty unlikely to say: gosh, what made them invade? They attacked first; they lost; there we were. Germans might have blamed Hitler, and they might have blamed us for specific stuff we did, but they were unlikely to regard our presence in their country as illegitimate or unprovoked; or to ask: “who asked them to invade? what are they doing here?”
And that, I think, makes a huge difference, as far as cooperation is concerned. And that cooperation is crucial for democracy promotion. Imho, this means that it is rarely if ever possible to successfully invade for that reason , as opposed to invading for some other reason and then deciding to promote democracy after you win.
OCSteve,
Kill, Kill, Kill.
amen
Read OCSteve carefully. Opposing the war in Iraq in 2002 would be akin to opposing Hurricane Katrina. I guess we will simply fail to communicate on this one. Hurricane Katrina is approaching, and people are saying:”Hurricane bad thing, let’s not do it.” Right. I am piling up sandbags and bottling water.
Hilzoy,
I don’t know of any reason to deny that we created a democracy by force there [in Japan]
It is important to realize that there was a flourishing democracy there during Taisho period, so I hesitate at the notion that democracy was ‘created’.
OCSteve,
We absolutely had to do something to attempt to reshape the Middle East. Iraq was the obvious place to start.
Why wasn’t Afghanistan the obvious place?
You won’t believe this but I believe this is ultimately for the good of the region and the world.
Is your position the same on North Korea? Or say, Pakistan?
OCSteve: thanks. — I should say that I assumed Saddam had WMD until sometime around January. After all, he had plainly had them in the past, and he was just the sort of guy to keep on trying to have them. Though I always thought that ‘WMD’, in this context, meant chemical and possibly biological weapons, not nukes, so I thought the ‘mushroom cloud’ stuff was just wrong. It was only when we didn’t produce any of the evidence we said we had that I concluded: we don’t have any evidence, at least not any that’s conclusive. We don;t even have strong hunches that actually pan out (since I assumed we would be giving them to Blix, since it would be so much in the administration’s interests for him to find a great huge depot of nerve gas.)
The conclusion, even then, wasn’t: he doesn’t have WMD; it was: we don’t have good evidence that he does.
I also did not think that if he had WMD, that was necessarily a reason to go to war. I mean: if “a dreadful country has WMD” just meant “we should go to war”, then there are a bunch of other countries we should long since have invaded, the USSR and China being the obvious examples. And if ‘a country that’s likely to share WMD with al Qaeda has WMD” meant “we should go to war”, then Pakistan seemed to me a much more likely candidate than Saddam.
As for Iran: I could just repeat what I said above about war. Instead I’ll just say: I think you are greatly underestimating both the difficulty of doing this and the consequences to the region and to our interests there.
lj: thus my hesitation about talking about Japan. I’m a lot more comfortable with Germany, where I think that a lack of experience with democracy was one of the reasons the Weimar Republic fell (along with the economic crash etc.), and thus that we really did do something like ‘create democracy’ there. Where this means not: give the Germans their first ever taste of it, but: create the conditions in which it might actually work. (Those conditions, imho, included: their having completely and decisively lost a war about which there was absolutely no question who started it, and very little room for people to regret our having won.)
Shame of Pundit Class
Glenn Greenwald on same theme
“If there were any intellectual honesty in our political dialogue, people like Hinderaker and Peters and Hanson would be disgraced into silence.”
But there isn’t, and hasn’t been in my lifetime. Favoring nuclear disarmament in 1960 or opposing Vietnam in 1965 might have been the right thing to do, might have been, but is it the most productive use of time and resources?
And why are Hanson and Perle and Krauthammer and Ledeen people with power and influence? Lives aren’t being saved by the peace crowd, and never have been, and never will be.
There will be war.
So off I go to surf the web, and I discover that Glenn Greenwald has written a good post on a similar topic. He has a link to a whole page of wrong quotes, as well as this from Instapundit:
as well as this from Instapundit:
hey, that sounds familiar! 😉 (post #4)
Sorry, cleek. (Note to self: do not comment until coffee has well and truly kicked in. DO NOT DO IT.)
I think you are greatly underestimating both the difficulty of doing this and the consequences to the region and to our interests there.
Actually no. I think it will be extremely difficult. I acknowledge that we are stretched pretty thin right now. That’s why it will have to be mostly a Navy/AF op, with some involvement by special ops from the other branches.
And unfortunately, we will likely lose a lot of pilots. Russia has sold them modern air defense systems.
It will undoubtedly cause a world outcry, condemnation from the UN, etc. Many nations will be secretly relieved while publicly condemning us. Israel will be the only nation to be publicly supportive.
I still think it needs to be done.
Is your position the same on North Korea? Or say, Pakistan?
No. It is “realpolitik” that you have to deal with nuclear armed nations differently. All the more reason to insure that the “mad mullahs” don’t get promoted to that category.
Kill, Kill, Kill.
Ask yourself this – if there were a nuclear attack on several American cities killing hundreds of thousands or millions – would you support nuclear retaliation? I believe most of the country would. If the nuclear material was traced back to Iran, the sitting president (of either party) would have little choice but to destroy Iran.
One step removed, if Iran nuked Israel would you agree that Israel has the right to retaliate?
These are not fantasy scenarios. My point is that limited pre-emptive war today is better than nuclear retaliation tomorrow. I think that when someone says they intend to kill you, you take them at their word and act accordingly.
My point is that limited pre-emptive war today is better than nuclear retaliation tomorrow.
You’re aware that in this case “tomorrow” can’t be any sooner than 10 years down the line, right?
My point is that limited pre-emptive war today is better than nuclear retaliation tomorrow
i envy your ability to predict the future and.or read minds.
I think that when someone says they intend to kill you, you take them at their word and act accordingly.
This cuts both ways, of course.
The war boosters, even the ones who have the faintest glimmer that the Bush Admin played them like cheap banjos, are still reaching for justifications. Their favorite seems to be that our commitment to Iraq must be “generational” – i.e., 20 to 40 years – and that we won’t know the real outcome of the war for at least that long.
I’ve asked them, if the “real outcome” is 20-40 years off, what would’ve been the difference if we hadn’t invaded at all? I’ve asked them if they thought Saddam would still have been in power in 20 years, much less 40. I’ve asked how it might have been different if we’d proven ourselves by completing the rehabilitation of Afghanistan, and actually capturing OBL, and showing we could keep our word… and then been in a position to offer Iraq assistance in a post-Saddam era which would have occurred anyway.
I didn’t get any answers.
As for Iran… well, if the GOP still has control of Congress after this year’s elections, and esp. if the GOP still has the White House after 2008, then I’m all for a war with Iran. Because at that point, the “United States of America” as a democratic republic based on the rule of Constitutional law will no longer exist, and the only thing left to do will be the delivery of the coup de grace. The quicker we get it over with, the better; and war with Iran will accomplish that handily.
You’re aware that in this case “tomorrow” can’t be any sooner than 10 years down the line, right?
I assume you are referring to the NIE from last year. This would be from the same intelligence agencies that failed to predict the Soviet bomb, failed to predict India’s first bomb test, missed Pakistan’s bomb and subsequent proliferation activities, missed the collapse of the Soviet Union, on and on….
Others say 3 years. Some say Iran has already obtained fissionable material from NoKo.
i envy your ability to predict the future and.or read minds.
Not necessary – I just take them at their word. They have said they intend to wipe Israel from the map and destroy the great satan.
On Thursday:
Former Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar said Tuesday that Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told him five years ago that “setting Israel on fire” was the first order of business on the Iranian agenda.
That’s not really reading minds, just the newspaper…
“if the GOP still has the White House after 2008”
And that is my point, although a very sad one, it is also a very very serious one. Why is it important, who do lives depend on how this is handled? Blow the following off as hypothetical if you like.
a)Despite strong opposition from the peace wing of the party, Hillary Clinton gets elected in 2008, manages a drawdown in Iraq, some change in rendition, etc and some negotiated settlement with Iran.
b) Because of Clinton’s position on the war, Russ Finegold gets the nomination, gets beaten like a drum by John McCain, who attacks Iran and thousands to millions die.
And b) is the “moral” thing to do?
OCSteve and his friends, not me, not hilzoy or Katherine, not Jes or whomever, are the ones with their hands on the levers.
Others say 3 years. Some say Iran has already obtained fissionable material from NoKo.
These would be the others who predicted Saddam had WMD, that he was 6 months away from a nuclear device, that the entire lack of evidence for this was itself a Cunning Plot, and on and on…?
I mean, our intelligence agencies need some serious overhauling, but to simply shrug and replace them with even more dubious sources doesn’t strike me as anything like an adequate solution.
You can call me heartless, cold blooded, and anything else that seems appropriate.
OCSteve, I think I speak for a lot of people that calling you what I think after that screed would violate the posting rules.
Life, unlike Halo, does not have a reset button. You don’t get to play the level over again if you screwed it up the first time. But back to your XBox foreign policy.
Hilzoy:
“I’m updating to remove the reference to ‘contempt’….”
This is a good thing, of course. At some point discourse will be dialed back to, I don’t know, the day before Newt Gingrich was first elected to public office.
But I’ll nurture my contempt for these people until they no longer speak. When the Michael Reagans and the Sean Hannitys and the Hindrockets and the Coulters and the Roves hurl “traitor, treason, unAmerican, anti-American, etc” over the airwaves and the blogosphere, there should be no courtesy extended. They should be knocked to the ground unconscious and set upon. Literally.
Not ethical, but necessary. Bullies reach understanding in a different way than the rest of us.
Liberals find themselves, I believe, in a confounding situation, not unlike the Gene Hackman electronic sleuth character in the “The Conversation”. We hear this sentence from the Republican rhetoric: “They’d KILL us if they could,”
referring to liberals and Democrats.
We mishear at our peril. “They’d kill US if they could”, is the proper emphasis. These folks are malign.
For this reason, I favor the Bush Administration’s various domestic spying scheme’s, as I do the draconian undemocratic rule-making in the House and the Senate, as well as the Orwellian rhetoric mainlined throughout the Right’s media and its government.
As an aside, I’ll note Republican Rep. Mike Pence’s statement on C-Span a few weeks back that he is a Christian first, a conservative second, and a Republican third. An interesting formulation, that. Apparently, he’s not an American and that will be duly noted by the F.B.I in future Democratic Adminstrations.
I hope this infrastructure is in place for the next Democratic President. He or she will need it (some much larger version of it) to eventually restore the Republic and the government. A Republican defeat will not be accepted by roughly 30% of the Republican true-believers. They will be ungovernable and an internal threat to the Republic.
Two enemies deserve my contempt. Al Qaeda and the far Right of the Republican Party. Both understand and desire vengeance against themselves. It makes them feel good. It fulfills their destinies and the pledges they took to never compromise their principles.
There is of course, a statute of limitations on my contempt. After these folks are punished with their own incendiary rhetoric and their own precious bullying governmental tools, and they pledge to never try to govern me again, at any governmental level, they will be released to internal exile.
Then I let go of my contempt, because I’m just not a very ethical person any more when it comes to politics.
I am, however, corruptible, which means that friends of mine who happen to be self-described members of the far Right may go about their business, as long as they shut up and repay the U. S. Treasury the $1 trillion dollars for the war in Iraq.
Why should I pay for it?
OCSteve, I think I speak for a lot of people that calling you what I think after that screed would violate the posting rules.
Fine. I didn’t exactly expect a warm reception for my thoughts. What I have not seen here (or anywhere) are reasonable alternatives.
Premise:
1. Iran has openly declared their intent to wipe out Israel and destroy the Great Satan.
2. Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons at their best possible speed as even the UN now agrees.
3. Deterrence is not a valid option with someone who says “Our revolution’s main mission is to pave the way for the reappearance of the 12th Imam, the Mahdi.”, who BTW, will be resurrected only after “one-third of the world population will die by being killed and one-third will die as a result of epidemics.”
Short of military intervention, how do you defuse this situation? It has become quite clear that sanctions are relatively useless and they use all attempts at diplomacy to hedge for time.
I’ll give up my “Xbox foreign policy” as soon as someone puts a realistic alternative on the table.
BTW – they have a missile now with the range to hit Israel, and if you were not aware, they have tested firing it from ships at sea (the only way they could actually hit us, firing them from freighters off the coast).
I mean, our intelligence agencies need some serious overhauling, but to simply shrug and replace them with even more dubious sources doesn’t strike me as anything like an adequate solution.
That’s a very good point. In the end though, their track record in this area is so spectacularly bad that I just can’t take their estimate on faith. If they say 10 then I automatically think 5.
Does it violate posting rules to suggest that OCSteve is behaving like Charlie Brown with the administration’s football?
Bob’s hypothetical has a structural, only structural, resemblance to the ticking bomb that I want to point out:
if you do good thing X, terrible consequence Z will certainly result
if you do bad thing Y, terrible consequence Z will certainly be averted
which is truly more moral, X or Y?
This is usually done with the implication that people who say Y live in fairy-land and not the real world.
Here’s the problem, though: in the real world, it is never possible to know in advance whether X will actually lead to Z, or Y will actually prevent Z. It is not necessarily even more likely than not. It is NOT certain. The certain things are X and Y.
In the real world, there’s not a ticking time bomb–there’s thousands of interrogations where:
1) you don’t know whether the guy’s guilty, 2) you don’t know what he knows,
3) you don’t know whether he’ll answer truthfully if you don’t abuse or torture him
4) you don’t know whether he’ll answer truthfully if you do abuse or torture him
In the real world, there’s not one bill, one issue, one stand that a candidate takes where we know right now that he’ll lose if he votes his conscience and win if he doesn’t. There’s hundreds of issues, hundreds of votes. Each has a very marginal chance of being decisive in the election of a given Democratic politician, and of course with Congress each race has a relatively small chance of making the difference between the majority and the minority control of the whole chamber (less than 10%, almost always; sometimes much less).
So it SHOULD be blown off. It’s a terrible idea to make decisions this way.
An Extraordinary Editorial
Kingdaddy over at Arms and Influence
“The Administration had a chance to mobilize the country behind ambitious endeavors like re-shaping the Middle East, the primary source of the United States’ greatest national insecurities. However, it chose instead to do everything on the cheap–partly for political reasons”
“Just when the United States needed to mobilize a serious effort to defeat Al Qaeda and related threats, the military transformationists told the President, “Don’t worry, you can do it all on the cheap.” That’s how Britain lost its American colonies, and how the United States today risks not only its war against terrorist groups, but its global position as well.”
Maybe a larger war was as unfeasible and ridiculous as no major military initiative at all.
Ya know, what country do y’all live in? Who is making foreign policy? Chickenhawks from the sixties. You think I like it? But that is forty years of experience, and I like to think I have learned something. There are no serious sixties doves making foreign policy, and never have been. The Clintons were quite late into the game, after it was safe.
Peace is not an option. Liberal hawkishness is not my first choice, but I make my own compromises with reality. And if the Democratic left uselessly and counterproductive opposes the war in Iraq, it is pretty certain they won’t march South over the Mason-Dixon line again.
What I am going to get is Republican foreign policy and Republican domestic policy for the rest of my life. Thanks bunch.
btw, with Iran, here’s a pretty stupid question:
if they get the bomb, who’ll have his finger on the button?
Everyone talks like it’s the president now, but back when Khatami was president instead of this holocaust-denying nutjob, people talked like the mullahs had the real power.
“This is usually done with the implication that people who say Y live in fairy-land and not the real world.”
I meant “X” in this sentence, sorry.
A) I do say “live in fairyland”. I do not believe that America can be non-imperialistic and not militaristc, as presently constituted. I have several centuries of evidence.
B) I do believe there can be a saleable constructive liberal hawkishness, with many benefits, both foreign and domestic. I believe the costs can be limited, but only limited with liberal leadership, but sadly not limited enough to comfort hilzoy or the peace wing of the Democratic party. So maybe it is not viable after all.
a)Despite strong opposition from the peace wing of the party, Hillary Clinton gets elected in 2008, manages a drawdown in Iraq, some change in rendition, etc and some negotiated settlement with Iran.
Wow! Some people read minds and then others have the abillity to predict the future.
b) Because of Clinton’s position on the war, Russ Finegold gets the nomination, gets beaten like a drum by John McCain, who attacks Iran and thousands to millions die.
She has a position? Please tell me what it is today.
These would be the others who predicted Saddam had WMD, that he was 6 months away from a nuclear device, that the entire lack of evidence for this was itself a Cunning Plot, and on and on…?
I would think that those that call GWB stupid, lame (fill in the adjective of your choice) are talking out of both sides of their mouths when they now call him cunning and capable of such a conspiracy while all of those super sharp libs missed the boat and were duped by such a simpleton.
My point is that limited pre-emptive war today is better than nuclear retaliation tomorrow
i envy your ability to predict the future and.or read minds.
I suggest that you people put down the fantasy books and the game controllers and pick up a history book. The man is not predicting the future nor reading minds. If you don’t have any of these books just Google Neville Chamberlain. Better yet,here.
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1938PEACE.html
OCSteve, I think I speak for a lot of people that calling you what I think after that screed would violate the posting rules.
You are wrong you don’t speak for me. If someone needs you to speak for them that is part of their problem.
Life, unlike Halo, does not have a reset button. You don’t get to play the level over again if you screwed it up the first time. But back to your XBox foreign policy.
Interesting that you use a video game in your analogy. Perhaps you should invest your hours in some form of reading of history. Then you could reference reality.
After reading some of these posts it is easy to see why our only choices for the most powerful position in the world are either power hungry megalomaniacs with absolutely no morals offered up by the democrats or tepid versions of what was once a conservative that are “electable” put forth by the republicans. It is sad to think that what was handed to us is doomed because of apathy and laziness.
“This is usually done with the implication that people who say Y live in fairy-land and not the real world.”
I meant “X” in this sentence, sorry.
So your point is… do nothing at all?
B) I do believe there can be a saleable constructive liberal hawkishness, with many benefits, both foreign and domestic. I believe the costs can be limited, but only limited with liberal leadership
Which part of the world are you referencing? The Canadian model or the European? I can certainly see the advantages that both have over the states.
Ask yourself this – if there were a nuclear attack on several American cities killing hundreds of thousands or millions – would you support nuclear retaliation?
If America killed several hundred thousand Iranian children with anthrax to express its displeasure with Iranian foreign policy, would you support Iranian nuclear retaliation?
I’m not suggesting we would, just asking. If you can pose hypotheticals, so can I.
OCSteve: I’ll grant you your first two premises, no problem. However…
3. Deterrence is not valid with someone who actually believes those things. Myriad dictators and would-be dictators have used that rhetoric, however, without actually ponying up when the time came. Bluntly, it’s not clear to me that anyone in Iran who’d have the keys to the nukes would actually be willing to carry through with it — see, e.g., India-Pakistan.
4. The US flat-out lacks the Army in order to do a damn thing to Iran.* The best we can hope for are airstrikes coupled with (maybe) paratroopers and special ops… targetted by precisely those intelligence agencies you’re loathe to trust.
which leads ineluctably to
5. It is not in the slightest clear that the risk/reward scenarios of armed interventions in Iran outweigh the risk/reward scenarios of not militarily intervening especially if we strike and miss.
6. This is particularly true when you consider that the brain trust who gave us the current Iraq fiasco will still be the ones calling the shots during any potential invasion of Iran.
Finally:
It has become quite clear that sanctions are relatively useless and they use all attempts at diplomacy to hedge for time.
First, relative to what? Second, sanctions are capable of working at least in the abstract; consider Saddam’s Iraq, for example. Third, it’s not clear to me that their attempts at diplomacy are purely hedging for time… and even if they are, that neglects the fact that time isn’t necessarily on Iran’s side. A smarter diplomatic course, for example, might energize the reformist movement in Iran and reduce the harshness of their military policy (or even just their rhetoric). It’s bloody unlikely nowadays given how deeply entrenched nukes have become in Iranian nationalism, but hey, it might be worth a shot.
I know that’s not a particularly constructive response in that I haven’t outlined foreign policy particulars for dealing with Iran, but that’s about the best I’ve got given the Bush Administration’s penchant for screwing the pooch. They’ve lied us into war once; I’m not giving them any benefit of the doubt this time around.
* Unless, of course, this is supposed to be the whole silver lining to Iraq collapsing into all-out civil war…
It seems to me that there’s a real difference between dealing with a dictator for life, and dealing with an elected government, no matter how crazy the elected leader might happen to be. Playing for time takes on a whole new dimension.
I personally don’t see that we have a good military option wrt Iran. And it seems to me that our better play is regime change, bubbling up from below. The questions are (a) can we wait as long as this might take and (b) can we speed it up. My view of the Iranian political situation is that the answer to both questions is yes, and that the typical Bush approach is exactly the wrong way to go with either of them. Couple this with the loss of a domestic political benefit would accrue from playing the usual Bush game, and I think that, once again, short run stupidity will defeat long term rationality.
The good news, to go to Hil’s post, is that as time goes on, more and more people are dropping away from the idea that the Iraq adventure makes sense, and maybe, just maybe, the short term calculus wrt Iran will look just a little different this September/October.
CharleyCarp: Yep. — One of my second-tier frustrations about the Iraq war was this: I had always thought that one good thing that might possibly come of the Iranian revolution of 1979 was that Iran might discover, entirely in its own terms, why democracy was a really good thing, rather than rejecting it because they hated us, and we liked democracy. They might, I thought, see that an Islamic theocracy just wasn’t such a good idea. I think we have set that back a long ways, maybe for a generation.
Since the topic is punditry:
Lips Barely Move
Gleen Greenwald again, tearing Eleanor Clift apart. Subject: Feingold and Censure
“Just when the Republicans looked like they were coming unhinged, the Democrats serve up a refresher course on why they can’t be trusted with the keys to the country.” …Clift
Now Greenwald does the usual Beltway arrogance/Republican talking points stuff, which is all valid and valuable.
But I read Clift sayin that and my first reaction is:”Iran is a done deal.” Bush is gonna do it this year, everyone in DC knows it (but can’t say it), and are calculating the political situation with that in mind.
Democrats are just being more careful on Iraq and security issues than should be the case considering the polls.
Or maybe I should change my login to Hofstadter and tagline my comments “Paranoid Style”
Anarch:
First of all, thank you for the relevant, constructive, and civil response. I don’t always get that here 🙂
Deterrence is not valid with someone who actually believes those things. Myriad dictators and would-be dictators have used that rhetoric, however, without actually ponying up when the time came. Bluntly, it’s not clear to me that anyone in Iran who’d have the keys to the nukes would actually be willing to carry through with it
Agreed. For instance, Saddam led everyone to believe he had WMD when he may have not. The intent seems to have been mostly about making Iran believe he did – deterrence. But what do you gain by openly saying you are going to wipe out Israel and destroy the Great Satan? Political points in the ME I guess, but beyond that I have to take him at his word and believe he means it.
4. The US flat-out lacks the Army in order to do a damn thing to Iran.* The best we can hope for are airstrikes coupled with (maybe) paratroopers and special ops… targetted by precisely those intelligence agencies you’re loathe to trust.
Agreed. I said no occupation/rebuild phase. Mostly a Navy/AF bombing campaign followed by special ops seizing and destroying all nuclear related facitilties. Targeting of the facilities – you got me there. My only hope is that the Israelis have good intel. I’ve read a few things that seem to indicate they have pretty good HumInt on Iran.
6. This is particularly true when you consider that the brain trust who gave us the current Iraq fiasco will still be the ones calling the shots during any potential invasion of Iran.
Got me there too. I’m willing to defend the decision to go into Iraq, but not all of the implementation. Mostly I’m not going to play the hindsight game. I admit I would like to see some changes and some signs of “lessons learned” before it happens.
Sanctions – well they just don’t seem to have a lot of effect. In fact they could have the effect of gaining the mad mullahs popular support (as could bombing obviously). The fact is though, if the UN ever gets around to applying sanctions, Iran is likely to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation and then we will pretty much be at war. We may even get some allies at that point.
OCSteve, I was going to write a measured rebuttal, but I see that Anarch has done a good one.
I would add only that bombing Iran would (at best) delay, not eliminate, its nuclear prospects, while cementing Iranian hatred of the U.S. for another 30-odd years.
We already have some indications that other Iranian leaders are uncomfortable with the repercussions that Ahmadinejad is bringing upon them. Let him hang himself.
And a word to all those “Posting rules won’t let me call you what I’d like to” people: grow UP. Namecalling is namecalling, direct or indirect.
If America killed several hundred thousand Iranian children with anthrax to express its displeasure with Iranian foreign policy, would you support Iranian nuclear retaliation?
I’m not suggesting we would, just asking. If you can pose hypotheticals, so can I.
Well I would say that a hypothetical should have some basis in reality. You can see that scenario happening? I (tried to) made the case that:
-Iran has declared their intent to destroy the great Satan.
-Iran is working on the bomb.
-Iran has strategic missiles and has tested firing them from ships, the only way they could hit us.
So my hypothetical has some grounding in the actual reality. With that said, if we killed several hundred thousand Iranian children by any means – yes, we would deserve it.
Hm, simulposted with OC’s response to Anarch. A. can handle himself, but let me jump in–because I can ….
(1) But what do you gain by openly saying you are going to wipe out Israel and destroy the Great Satan? Political points in the ME I guess, but beyond that I have to take him at his word and believe he means it.
Huh? You answer your own question, then throw away the answer. WHY believe such obvious agitprop?
(2) Airwar doesn’t work.
(3) As you say, if Iran closed the strait, we might have some allies. Why not wait for that?
Finally, OC (can I call you that?), compare what we heard about Saddam before the war with what we’re learning now.
Before, Saddam was a diabolical genius who couldn’t be deterred, utterly set on the destruction of the U.S.
After, Saddam was revealed to be a rather dim bulb on the Xmas tree, making rational (if poor) choices, utterly set on preserving his own power.
Here’s the punch line: the Iranian mullahs are currently being demonized much as Saddam was. I submit that they are at least as rational (surely moreso, in fact) and looking out for #1, which is NOT “glorious nuclear incineration followed by an eternity in Paradise.”
ANY policy premised on “the enemy are not normal people like we are” is highly suspect.
does anyone know the answer to my finger-on-the-button question?
OCSteve: Anderson got my reaction to part of what you said:
“(1) But what do you gain by openly saying you are going to wipe out Israel and destroy the Great Satan? Political points in the ME I guess, but beyond that I have to take him at his word and believe he means it.
Huh? You answer your own question, then throw away the answer. WHY believe such obvious agitprop?”
But I’d add: we are talking about military action against a country with nearly 70 million people, many of whom dislike us a lot already. It’s not at all clear that air strikes would do the trick at all, and still less clear that if we did a “decapitating strike” without ground troops to oversee the aftermath, we wouldn’t just get a similar government that hated us more. What is clear, however, is that we would have shredded whatever tiny semblance of goodwill we might have in the region.
This doesn’t matter because I will just burst into tears if anyone anywhere hates us ever, or anything. It matters because if we are going to neutralize al Qaeda, we have to have some people who are willing to actually work against them, turn them in, not give them safe harbor, etc. People who hate us are not going to do that.
Moreover, turning the entire ME against us could have a bunch of unfortunate consequences for those regimes that have been willing to work with us so far, regimes that are often not exactly popular to start with. It will also make it harder for us to push them to democratize.
Can you see, at all, why some of us might think that what Ahmedinejad says, when it is easy to explain as grandstanding, isn’t a good reason to bring on all these bad consequences?
does anyone know the answer to my finger-on-the-button question?
(1) The Finger of Allah, of course. Or is that the name of their first rocket?
(2) No, really, I don’t know. But why would the Iranians know yet, either? That doesn’t sound like something you work out while the bomb is on the drawing board.
(3) That said, the only safe answer would appear to be “more than one person,” i.e., some subset of mullahs. Can anyone imagine them nominating ONE person to start a nuclear war with the U.S.?
well, who controls the military now? Subset of mullahs?
Can you see, at all, why some of us might think that what Ahmedinejad says, when it is easy to explain as grandstanding, isn’t a good reason to bring on all these bad consequences?
Yes. That is why I come here and other “left-leaning” blogs. I don’t have all the answers. I’m just trying to get by in this mess like anyone. I try to keep an open mind and provoke you folks into getting me to see the light. I mostly stay away from right-wing “echo chamber sites”. I don’t have 100% assurance that my opinions are right – I come here to be challenged in my thinking. The hosts here – and you commentators – make me think. That is what I want. I admit to having a knee jerk reaction to many things. Blogs have made me think a lot more about what I really believe – justify it to myself.
I state my current opinions, and then look for you to deconstruct them. Relevant arguments I pay attention to and follow up on. I am open to having my mind changed. Just give me viable alternatives.
I hope to see an informed answer to that on this thread, Katherine, but I daresay that a nuclear bomb would be on a different decisional plane than the standard military.
Wiki says that the Supreme Leader, Khameini not President Ahmadinejad, has supreme command of the armed forces under their constitution.
Just give me viable alternatives.
Take nothing on faith, especially claims about government being able to change human nature. Or think through unintended consequences.
In short, be a conservative.
Just give me viable alternatives.
(1) Accept that Iran will get the Bomb if they really, really want it–built, bought, borrowed, however.
(2) Rely on the fact that Israel has the Bomb to provide sufficient deterrence. I mean, why else did Israel get the Bomb? Have the Israelis demonstrated any serious inability to take care of themselves?
(3) Treat Iran as a major ME player with many interests opposed to ours, rather than as a part of the “Axis of Evil.”
Economically, time is on our side. The Iranian population will get tired of the mullahs’ regime, *unless* we energize the population into unity by attacking them.
Totally OT, but since we have a Kantgrrl in the house: is there any gossip in the academy as to why Marcus Weigelt’s revision of the Max Muller KdRV translation keeps getting pushed back by Penguin? First 2005, then April 2006, now March 2007. Who is this Weigelt, anyway?
Civil War in Iraq
Democracy Arsenal on an analysis by Nir Rosen
But I wanted to amuse the crowd with a comment from Dan Kervick, who hangs out and Clemons place and sometimes CT and didn’t even get a Wampun nomination.
“So eventually, we now hear, Iraq will get another strong man, and get itself put back together again. The only difference between that new strong man and the old one will be that the old one will be hung and dead, while the new one will be alive and ruling much the same way as his predecessor. The new one will probably have an even more hostile attitude toward the US than the old one, and may very well be a religious fanatic rather than a secular statist.
The whole cycle would be comic, if it weren’t for the fact that thousands of American soldiers are dead, injured or wounded, along with a few hundred thousand Iraqis – or maybe millions, who can count? – and their survivors aren’t laughing.”
“The pompous primate lords who brought us this spectacle are still preening, and puffing out there chests, and baring their teeth, and attempting to impress and scare us all with their phony displays of cold and hard-hearted ruthlessness, and their poisonous threats of purges and suppressions – and they keep talking, and talking, and talking, and attacking, and adjusting their plans as they go. They make a lot of noise. But they increasingly look like a mangy pack of jibbering, murderous babboons – scrambling randomly to a fro over the the dessicated plains, gesticulating wildly and vocalizing energetically and biting each other – but communicating in an occult manner that make sense only inside the babboon world.” …Dan Kervick
Beautiful.
OCSteve, allow me to suggest you play the thought experiment yourself, and ask yourself:
1. If there are legitimate grave criticisms of how the Bush Admin implemented its war plans in Irq, and if there are legitimate grave reservations about the Bush Admin’s capacity to learn from and correct previous errors, then why entrust the same people with a military strike on Iran?
2. If the war in Iraq didn’t follow the Bush Admin blueprint, then why believe a military strike on Iran will follow the Bush Admin blueprint?
3. Is Iran a stronger or weaker country than Iraq was when we invaded? Does Iran have a better or worse military than Iraq? Does Iran have a stronger or weaker economy? Would Iran’s response to a US military strike be stronger or weaker than Iraq’s was?
4. Is Iran a larger or smaller country than Iraq geographically? Does Iran have a larger or smaller population than Iraq? Are these relevant considerations in weighing a military strike on Iran?
5. Supporters of war in Iraq believed, or said, that Iraq had WMDs, including an active nuclear weapons development program. This turned out not to be so. In light of this previous error, how likely is it that supporters of mililtary action against Iran are correct in saying that Iran will be a nuclear threat in the next 5 years?
6. Supporters of war in Iraq believed, or said, that Iraqis would greet US forces as liberators. This also turned out not to be so. In light of this previous error, how likely is it that supporters of mililtary action against Iran are correct in saying that Iranians will be in any way glad of a US military strike against their country?
7. Supporters of war in Iraq did not take the insurgency seriously, calling the insurgents “dead enders” and claiming that the insurgency itself was in its “last throes.” Some of the people who said that are senior officials in the Bush Admin, who are likely to be involved in planning military action against Iran. What are the chances that a military strike in Iran will result in an insurgency; and what are the chances that a military strike in Iran will cause some sort of spillover or blowback in Iraq? What are the chances that the Bush Admin officials responsible for planning military action against Iran are going to be more accurate in predicting Iranian response to a US military action than they were in predicting Iraq’s response to the US invasion?
8. Does the US hope to effect regime change by a military strike in Iran? Which persons or groups would the US like to see take power, if the current government were to fall? Does the US have any reason to believe those persons or groups actually would take power if the current government were to fall? Does the US have any scenarios ready in case someone else takes power?
9. Does the US have any idea how its current allies in the region would react to a military strike on Iran? For example, has the US received any assurances from Musharref that he will not meaningfully protest such an action? Does the US have any information indicating whether a military strike on Iran could cause our current allies in the region to turn against us; or cause their populations to turn against them?
10. In planning a war, one might say contingency planning is a good idea: that is, to envision what could possibly go wrong as well as what could possibly go right, for the purpose of devising response strategies ahead of time. Do you think contingency planning a military strike on Iran might be a good idea? If so, what possible things going wrong should such contingency planning address?
11. If you agree contingency planning might be a good idea, how likely do you think it is that the Bush Admin is doing any?
Good questions, CaseyL.
I’d like to add:
Suppose a limited attack of the type you advocate were not completely successful in eliminating Iran’s nuclear capability. What would be the consequences?
someone should ask Bush what effect such an attack would have on the ways the ‘moderate’ Gulf states perceive us – i’ve heard he cares about that stuff, now.
With regard to the idea that Iran cannot at all be allowed the bomb, because they are mad mad mad, and believe in the 12th Imam, hellfire, death and apocolypse and so forth;
Either it is true that they believe this, and they are crazy, or it is rhetoric.
If it is true that they believe this, then why is attacking them a good idea? The decision does not make itself.
If it is true that they seek apocalyptic war, then having the bomb would be a bonus for them but not a necessity. What would the response be from these mad mullahs to air stirkes and special forces raids. I think it would be something like an attack with everything they can muster on Israeli nuclear reactor(s). Enough to provoke said Imams return? Worth a try I would assume for a mad mullah who expects Allah’s Will is being done.
The ‘limited war’ idea of attacking Iran just enough to destroy their nuclear ambitions is predicated on the idea that they are rational enough not escalate madly in response. Therefore any argument for such an attack cannot have as a premise that they are mad mad mad.
“Good questions, CaseyL.”
But you see, none of that matters, before or after the fact, because Bush wants to do it.
Blood Pressure tristero at Digby’s. I was looking for this earlier. It is short.
“I can’t go. I’d probably have a thrombo, as Austin Powers sez. But if you live in New York, and you’re starting to feel much too calm and relaxed, you can get your blood racing on Monday night by going to a yak-fest at Miller Theater, Columbia U entitled Iraq: Three Years Later. The participants are Noah Feldman, Victor Davis Hanson, Joe Klein, Kenneth M. Pollack, and Andrew Sullivan. [emphasis added]
It is bound to be a thoughtful, serious discussion. There will be no third-rate minds on hand – you know, the kind of childish, unimaginative mentalities that thought in 2002 that Bush’s invasion of Iraq was the stupidest f***** idea they’d heard in their lifetimes.” …tristero [edited for content]
yadda, yadda…tristero. You were right and they were wrong, and yet they are still listened to and you are not. blah blah. Unfair. I have been listening to this for two years…no I have been listening to this for forty years. The guys who got the Soviet capability wrong in the 70s did the intelligence for Iraq are bulling us into a war with Iran.
Why do they have power and you don’t? That is the interesting question. Why do they keep making mistakes and the decisions? Do you even care why?
Katherine,
I think that Steve Clemons has noted that the Iranian negotiators have apparently been unable to come up with a coherent position, based on the fact that they replaced their chief and most experienced negotiator and didn’t show up for some negotiating sessions with the Europeans. I can’t find the specific post, but the fact is that in the paranoia that we see in regards to Iran, if they do show up and negotiate tenaciously, they will be accused of stalling for time while if they don’t show up, they will be accused of being set on creating a bomb.
Clemons posted this (the problem with Clemons is that it is impossible to find a ‘nut graf’, especially when discussing a topic like Iran, but I tend to this of that as a strength rather than a weakness)
In my own view, Iran’s nuclear pretensions are a direct result of America removing Iran’s chief antagonist in the region, Iraq under secular (and yes, fascist) rule — as well as from the sad fact that America’s mystique of power and capability has been greatly damaged by bogging down in the Iraq quagmire. When the perception of American power declines, allies are prompted not to count on the US as much and enemies have an incentive to move their agendas.
Other factors that Charles Krauthammer, Frank Gaffney, James Woolsey, Clifford May, Michael Ledeen and other neoconservatives fail to mention in their commentary is that Iran’s current president had his preferred Oil Minister rejected four times by Iran’s National Assembly. What was that about? What system of checks-and-balances exists in Iran (that seems to be less evident in America of late) that we are not discussing? Does that tension inside Iran’s political system between the assembly and president offer any opportunities? Is Ahmadinejad attempting to outmaneuver his legislative shackles with his “wipe Israel off the map” jingoism, and is this having a positive or negative effect on his executive authority?
Iran’s president is not a monarch — and as nasty a character as I feel he is, he is not a Saddam Hussein. He’s teasing deeply held theocratic convictions to try to legitimate himself and thus is doing what any rational power-maximizer would try and do when constrained. We need to apply our intelligence and thinking to this puzzle and familiarize ourselves with the factors that are driving his behavior.
We need to become more knowledgeable about Iran’s internal government processes that enhance and constrain his abilities to move.
All that said, I do believe that Iran’s nuclear pretensions run deeply and are morphing into a benchmark of ascendant nationalism. Even “healthy” nationalists in Iran would have robust nuclear power — and perhaps even nuclear weapons — on their list of what a “great nation” must have in its tool kit.
I believe that there are a great many options between war with Iran and doing nothing regarding its nuclear activities, but I am also convinced that Iran — in the long run — will probably have nukes. Iran has 70 million people and is a rich nation with a great past. As China reclaims some of its historical prestige, others who aspire to past glory also will — and there is little that America or the world can do to permanently preempt such pretensions.
Economic sanctions, political and econoic carrots — even harsher sticks — can slow Iran’s nuclear program, but the blowback from a harsh, military intervention will produce the single worst outcome in such an encounter: a significantly isolated, angry, democratically empowered hypernationalist nuclear power that will be focused more on the emotional need for revenge than on the pragmatic objective of regional balance with Israel, and general order and security.
The earlier entry about Woolsey also has this
cannot validate the accuracy of a report I have — but with the caveat that this may be erroneous information — TWN has been told that senior Congressional leaders, including senior Democratic officials, were given a top secret briefing on Tuesday, 17 January, on potential military options against Iran. No Congressional leaders have publicly stated that they received such a briefing, but others close to the intelligence community have conveyed that information to TWN.
This briefing date coincides with Secretary of State Rice’s meetings with European officials over next steps to take with Iran.
Another disturbing part of the brewing Iran problem is a classified Air Force bombing study that allegedly reports that it is possible for an American bombing campaign to destroy and/or incapacitate 85% of Iran’s nuclear program.
This study is classified but has been informally referred to repeatedly by many intelligence and American military officials. The study is not new and has been making the rounds for more than a year, but there seems to be significantly greater confidence in the report now than a year ago — and more celebration of the potential “85%” number.
Others in the government, the intelligence community, the nuclear weapons laboratories, and the military with whom I have spoken think that it is lunacy to adopt a highly confident position that the U.S. Air Force can knock out Iran’s nuclear program.
And stating the obvious, there has been no discussion of what such a strike might do to undermine America’s standing in the Middle East for years, if not decades and permanently.
There is much more that needs to be said about Iran — and I will be at it tomorrow. However, for now — people need to be aware that there is a serious effort underway to legitimate “early military action” against Iran.
It is very hard not to simply agree with McManus and suggest that everyone should be buying up survival supplies.
I’m guessing, Bob, the answer you seek (and you may be right) is that these people obtain power because the US is and always has been more warlike and paranoid than we like to pretend, and
so warlike, paranoid people who inflate threats have an advantage on election day. So the answer I think you’re suggesting is that the Democrats accept this as a fact and respond by putting forward people who can beat the Republicans at their own game, but are at least a bit more rational about it.
You might be right. (Assuming I’ve read you correctly upthread and this is what you think.) But JFK did just that–he played up the missile gap and won. And he acted tough in Vietnam. As did LBJ on a bigger scale. He was preferable to Goldwater, you might argue, who wanted to use tactical nukes. The problem with going this route is that those tough-talking Democrats might actually act much like Republicans. And when you get into Vietnams and lose, it just sets the stage for people who want to find some other country they can throw against the wall, just to prove how tough they are. I’d like to break the cycle. I don’t know if we can.
Iran has a limited number of relatively ineffective centrifuges. It would take YEARS, yes, even decades, for them to create enough fissile material to make ONE bomb, let alone multiple bombs.
And what then? Are those far distant bombs going to deliver themselves? How does one get a bomb, for bob’s sake, into the US? In a suitcase?
No. Maybe in a shipping container, but, hey we have homeland secuity all over that, right?
No you say? Well, color me surprised.
So, ok, back to Iran. THEY CAN’T MAKE A BOMB. They have neither the tools nor the technology. And they have no delivery system.
This is the time to talk, to repair fences, to look past the grandstanding and be adults, not children with WMD’s, ’cause, guys, WE are the only WMD threat in this scenario.
And OCSteve has his hand on the trigger. If that doesn’t give you chills, then you have no children.
Jake
LJ & Katherine,
Katherines’ question:
… is not stupid, not one bit. The confusion here, I believe, is the result of a misunderstanding of human institutions. All of them – whether democratic in a strict sense or dictatorial – are subject to the will of the people in some way, whether that’s built in to the system (democracy) or excluded (autocracy).
There’s been quite some talk about how resource rich (i.e. oil) nations have a hard time transforming into democracies. It should be very clear why that is – the “leaders” of these nations can raise enormous amounts of wealth without having to seize it directly from the populations wealth. Tax arguments in the US reflect this tendency – you would have to be doing a pretty damn good job of running the country to keep people quiet about it. The tension of those autocratic nations that do not have the same resource advantages – here China comes to mind – wind up having a bizarre “checks and balances” system that, while not being free and open, definitively exists. In my rather futile attempts to understand China and other autocratic Asian regimes, this formulation is often openly expressed. As far as I’ve seen, an elite group of rulers in China have operated knowing that if they did not provide prosperity and security, their position would be severely compromised. This acknowledgement of the situation, lacking in many other autocratic regimes, can partially explain its relative permanance.
Iran seems to me to operating similiarly. You can’t say that when compared to other middle eastern countries that they aren’t doing relatively well in the security and prosperity departments. They are doing ridiculously poorly in the freedom department. And that’s the likely tension that exists there.
But freedom, when lacking very fierce ideological fervor that champions it (see the US revolution) will often been regarded as a luxury, or simply a more peripheral issue than security and prosperity.
Iran probably has just enough of this tension in its system to continue its existence. It seems the young, who are the vast majority, would disproportinately being amenable to Western-style freedoms. This isn’t surprising given the conditions they’ve lived under. But putting everything on the line to fight for it is a major commitment which is difficult for any human being to make.
Back to the question – who has their finger on the button? I don’t exactly know, but I do know this – the mullah autocracy which now explicitly controls the pseudo-democratic processees in Iran now has someone in “power” whose rhetoric matches theirs exactly. The exceedingly fragile checks and balances of this autocratic system are gone.
And that being said, the rhetoric is not meaningless. Taiwan is likely in danger from China because its autocratic factions know they can engender more popular support by being more hawkish about it than the other guy. This can, and has in the past, escalated out of control. All of the autocratic actors are likely completely cynical – they probably don’t personally care one whit about Taiwan – but they’ll do it anyways.
And Iran has the same problem. Conservatives are harping on the constant threats to destroy Israel – while oddly overlooking the the publicly stated ones promising to destroy “Anglo-Saxon civilization,” whatever that means. But no, I don’t think you can ignore it.
“But you see, none of that matters, before or after the fact, because Bush wants to do it.”
It matters in a… a thought experiment way, which is all I asked of OCSteve. I know my questions don’t amount to a warm bucket of piss in terms of what actually happens; I’m also very well aware no one’s doubts or critiques or questions do.
Except, maybe, the military establishment’s possible doubts or critiques or questions.
That’s what’s going to be interesting about the Iran Question. No one in the WH or Congress will stop Bush from doing whatever the hell he wants. The media won’t even question it, just start cheerleading like they did for Iraq. The public – already sour on Bush, having finally seen him for the empty-headed thanatophile that he is – is powerless to stop him. (Yes, even to the point of the ultimate attempt. Bush goes nowhere without a Praetorian Guard sweeping the streets and rooftops and skies clear first.)
What’s left? The military.
Not the Joint Chiefs or the top brass, Bush/Rumsfeld creatures to a man, but the career, professional military officers. They’re very aware of the damage Bush has done to their service branches, and are very aware that a military strike on Iran will result in at least two countries declaring open season on the 130,000-odd US troops in Iraq. I doubt the prospect pleases them, based on the earfuls they’ve given sympathetic listeners like Murtha every chance they’ve had.
I mean, there’s following the CinC’s orders, and then there’s following obviously insane orders that amount to turning 130,000-odd soldiers into involuntary kamakazis.
So this is where things get interesting: what if Bush says, “Yippee ki-yi-yay, mofo; let’s bomb Iran,” and the military says, “No effing way. Sir.”?
Does Bush have them all hauled off to Gitmo? Does he order his Praetors to up and shoot them on the spot? Does he keep doing this until he finds someone who’ll knuckle under? Is it the Saturday Night Massacre all over again, only in khaki and camo?
Does Bush commence a literal, bloody purge of the military ranks, replacing defiant commanders with mercenaries loyal only to him?
Does the entire military establishment rebel, take down the MalAdministration, and announce that our civilian government has been replaced by a military junta?
Since I’ve pretty much given up on the country recovering itself, and am resigned to the end of the Great Experiment, the only thing left is entertainment value.
A Bushist Junta Versus A US Military Junta would be hugely entertaining.
“and then there’s following obviously insane orders that amount to turning 130,000-odd soldiers into involuntary kamakazis.”
Iran will be an Airforce and Navy operation,which have to feel under budget pressure because of our need for more troops. They need to show themselves real useful. Interesting that this week the Army felt it needed to put on a show.
Never get between a Colonel and a star.
The public – already sour on Bush, having finally seen him for the empty-headed thanatophile that he is – is powerless to stop him. (Yes, even to the point of the ultimate attempt. Bush goes nowhere without a Praetorian Guard sweeping the streets and rooftops and skies clear first.)
Uh… no, CaseyL. Just: no.
Bob, an Iran op might start out as an AF/Navy operation. But about 70 million enraged Iranians fairly well guarantee it won’t finish as one. Presumably, the Army knows that.
And Anarch, I’m not advocating it. I’m just saying it’s not do-able.
Jonas,
I don’t want to pick at you, because the points you make would be fair ones if what you said was unequivocally true. The ease of oil producing nations to generate revenue without having the tension makes them immune to the kind of pressure that other nations are under. But this administration and the oil industry has fought tooth and nail against any kind of effort that would reduce demand (with the possible exception of drilling in ANWR) as well as dismissing the idea of global warming, so there has been some enabling involved there. You also say
Iran seems to me to operating similiarly. You can’t say that when compared to other middle eastern countries that they aren’t doing relatively well in the security and prosperity departments. They are doing ridiculously poorly in the freedom department. And that’s the likely tension that exists there.
but that is certainly arguable and even granting arguendo that this is the case, the rhetoric that this administration continues to employ (like Bush asserting an IED-Iran connection) only serves to isolate those who might be more willing to provide a balance.
I don’t exactly know, but I do know this – the mullah autocracy which now explicitly controls the pseudo-democratic processees in Iran now has someone in “power” whose rhetoric matches theirs exactly. The exceedingly fragile checks and balances of this autocratic system are gone.
Again, this does not seem as obvious as you feel it is. I go back to the argument about whether Ahmadinejad was a dark horse candidate or not. But if you assume that there is a blind autocracy in power, then there is nothing that the government of Iran can do, short of completely relinquishing power and let this administration choose who should rule them. (a similar reasoning applies to Venzuela and even Palestine)
As for China, the notion that Taiwan is in ‘danger’ is a vast overstatement. Taiwan’s position in the world economy makes it difficult to imagine, and despite the prism of ‘nationhood’ that Taiwan’s aspirations are viewed thru, it makes much more sense to view them as a third ‘city-state’ after Hong Kong and Singapore.
Furthermore, the China threat has always been overplayed. This article is by Gregory Clarke (who I have had to deal with and don’t particularly care for) but even if he is half right in what he discusses here, it should dictate that we take concerns about China with a very large grain of salt. Even this article which assumes the worst about China’s intentions, points out the time frame that they are operating under. If this time frame is correct, the US should not be setting out to exhaust not only its military but its moral capital.
And if China does not have the wherewithal to threaten the US, why would one think that Iran has?
I don’t see the relevancy, since there’s no possible way this will happen, in my view.
If Bush ordered, say, the nuking of Portland, maybe. Bombing Iran? Huh? I wouldn’t even expect any resignations, let alone anything stronger. (Nor, frankly, would I want senior members of the military taking it upon themselves to refuse civilian orders in such a circumstance; again, were it bombing France, maybe, but not over Iran, which might be unwise, but not, in my view, remotely sufficient cause to justify a coup or civil war or rebellion by the U.S. military.)
Minor general note on the thread: a prominent U.S. Senator is Senator Russ Feingold, Democrat of Wisconsin. Not “Finegold.”
CharleyCarp earlier said this:
“It seems to me that there’s a real difference between dealing with a dictator for life, and dealing with an elected government, no matter how crazy the elected leader might happen to be.”
That’s certainly true, but it seems to be a non-sequitur in this thread; what country are you referring to? Not Iran, surely, which, of course, has a Supreme Leader for life. So what is this in regard to?
Gary mentioned one WaPo piece by Zayed, but this article is quite interesting in regards to our discussions about Iran. It says
The agreement, known as the Algiers Accords, codified the 1981 deal between the United States and Iran under which the hostages were released, billions of dollars in Iranian assets were unfrozen, and an arbitration tribunal was established in the Netherlands to settle claims between the two countries. In the first part of the document, the United States pledged that it “will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.” Elsewhere, the United States pledged to “bar and preclude” any claims filed by the hostages against Iran.
For the hostages, the situation is rich in irony. The State Department, in legal arguments and on Capitol Hill, has maintained that allowing the hostages’ case to go forward will violate the Algiers Accords. But Rice has announced a $75 million plan to bolster democracy in Iran and to foster opposition to the theocracy that controls the country. The hostages say Rice’s program violates the prohibition on interfering in Iran’s affairs; Iran has also filed a complaint with the United States through the Swiss Embassy, which handles U.S. interests in Tehran.
“This administration has not been shy about breaking international agreements,” said Barry Rosen, who was press attache at the U.S. Embassy and who now heads the Afghanistan Education Project at Columbia University’s Teachers College. “The administration appears to be in contradiction of itself. It seems to me the Algiers Accords should be dead and buried.”
Rosen, angry that others have “laid claim to millions and millions of dollars of compensation,” added: “This may sound weird, but if I were made aware of that agreement, I would have stayed in Iran.”
U.S. officials say that supporting democracy does not amount to interference under international law. And they say abrogating the Algiers Accords, though not a formal treaty, would be viewed overseas as a serious breach of international norms, harming U.S. interests. U.S. banks and companies have been able to settle claims with Iran because of the accords, while the United States has been forced to pay about $900 million to Iran for contract violations and property damage.
Tres bizarre.
Bob McM: Interesting that this week the Army felt it needed to put on a show.
That show was at least as much intended to highlight the Iraqi Army as our own. (Though the helicopter-heavy aspect did drive home the undercutting point that all the air power is ours.)
Wiki says that the Supreme Leader, Khameini not President Ahmadinejad, has supreme command of the armed forces under their constitution.
Reading up on the Iran-Iraq War a few days ago, I seem to recall a mention of the Ayatollah taking over the CINC role from the President early in the war when things went sour. From the link above, it doesn’t look like that’s changed in the intervening years.
I also recommend at least glossing over the Iran-Iraq War for anyone who hasn’t done so: Hussein believed that the Iranian Arabs would welcome him with open arms and rise up against Tehran. They didn’t. Khomeini believed that he’d be able to kick the rotten Baathist power structure down and install an Islamic republic in Baghdad. That didn’t work out too well either. And then you have the tenacity with which both sides defended their homeland, as well as the Iranian citizenry manning the Pasadran units even after the war was taken beyond the Iranian border…
“Tres bizarre.”
The arguments over the lawsuit have, of course, been going on for decades, and have recently been in the news quite a bit. I did also read that piece (I tend to read most of the daily WaPo, and NY TimeS, as part of my daily round, more days than not), and did find the reminder of the Algiers Accord interesting. It does seem to take, shall we say, a rather lawyerly argument to argue that the present U.S. government policy doesn’t violate it, but that would hardly be remotely surprising or unusual, would it?
Nell: “That show was at least as much intended to highlight the Iraqi Army as our own.”
I’d put it much more strongly: the show was intended entirely to highlight the Iraqi Army; highlighting ours was merely incidental.
“…undercutting point….”
That’s only undercutting if you accept the presumption that it’s the U.S. goal to get out and not retain bases and not keep the Iraqi military partially dependent upon the U.S. military; that seems an as yet questionable presumption, at best, to me. General Abizaid did, after all, once again this week drop-kick the notion of our keeping bases in Iraq to “the future Iraqi government,” etc., rather than in any way affirm that we didn’t want them.
I think the major undercutting aspect of Swarmer was the, you know, lack of discernable results. Secondarily that it was trumpeted as based on Iraqi intelligence, which is supposed to be better than ours, etc. If I were trying to be some sort of optimist, I’d have to fall back on pointing out that the op was clearly done for the timing and show, and that therefore one shouldn’t draw much of a conclusion from it, as a one-shot affair. If I were trying to be some sort of optimist.
“I also recommend at least glossing over the Iran-Iraq War….”
Basically good points; nationalism (and tribalism and other ethnicism) remains a strong force in both countries, and there are limits to pan-Shiism, just as pan-Arabism was always exaggerated by many from many sides.
But I do find it alarming how many educated people seem to take the notion that the Iranian Presidency is a serious power seriously; that’s just ignorant. Iran’s government is velayat-e faqih.
The presidency is not a position of utter figureheadism, but in comparison to either the Supreme Leader (faqih) or the Council of Guardians, it is. Ask Khatami. Saying that Iran has a democratic government would be bizarre, or at least as accurate as claiming that the Soviet Union had a democratic government (though the reasons why are different, of course). But if elected officials, be they President, or in the Majlis, or appointed by them, hold no power whatever to contradict the Supreme Leader For Life, and the Council he appoints, that’s hardly a “democratic” government. And the President doesn’t even have power to pick all of his cabinet, and you can’t run for the Majlis if you’re not approved by the Supreme Leader. Thus, the incomprehensibility of anyone calling this a democratic government.
Amplification:
Iranian Constitution here. What’s the only means of changing the Constitution?
The Leader has always had supreme command of the armed forces, by the way; see Article 110.
LJ, citing that story about the Algiers Accords has unleashed a rant, but because it involves my work, I can’t really share it. I can invite you to read my cases arising from / touching on this — Abrahim-Youri, which is concluded, and another, which I will not name because it is still on.
It’s funny to see complaints about greedy lawyers messing everything up, because the point of the 1996 law (and 1998 and 2000 laws — anyone see a pattern? Or think of a reason why Congress might not have been willing to defer to the State Department on how to run an intelligent foreign policy?) was to unleash trial lawyers on the terrorists. See, just like diving boards at municipal swimming pools, terrorism would be destroyed by those damn greedy lawyers.
It was a simpler time.
Gary, I do not think that the role of the elected officials is completely insignificant under the Iranian Constitution, either on its face or as applied. Iranain politics matters, especially to Iranians. The question is whether we’re going to act as if (a) it doesn’t and (b) ‘it can’t get worse’ OR whether we’re going to approach this like adults.
It does seem to take, shall we say, a rather lawyerly argument to argue that the present U.S. government policy doesn’t violate it, but that would hardly be remotely surprising or unusual, would it?
Missing a chance to link the Iranian treatment of the hostages (and stoke resentment against Iran) seemed a bit surprising from a purely political point of view.
Charley’s point about unleashing trial lawyers on terrorists brought back the memory of the worry that somehow, terrorists would flood out courts with suits and appeals and cause us to lose the war on terrorism. (anyone else remember that?) I was trying to find it (I thought it was a concern at Volokh, and I thought I remembered an excreable ‘cartoon’ by Alec Rawls), thinking it was pretty much dead and buried, so imagine my surprise when I found this Dec 05 piece by Novak. Hadn’t heard much of him since he left CNN, so it’s comforting that it’s the same old Novak.
Another topic, Gary wrote:
Thus, the incomprehensibility of anyone calling this a democratic government.
To follow up on CC’s suggestion, well, that cuts both ways, doesn’t it? If the president is simply a figurehead, why have the candidates for oil minister he has put forward been rejected.
Also, you mentioned that the Supreme Leader was elected for life, but wikipedia link given by Anderson above points out that
The Supreme Leader is appointed for life after being elected, however the Assembly, which is also in charge of supervising the Leader to comply with his legal duties, has the power to dismiss and replace him at any time. The point that has caused the Iranian political system to be known by many as an undemocratic system, is in fact an ordinary law (not constitutional law) which creates a closed loop of power, discussed in the next section.
This is not to forward a claim for Iraq being democratic, but when you have a group of people as opposed to a single leader, there is a certain conservative preservation of the status quo that sets in, so to me, it seems that claiming that Iran is simply the next step after Iraq not only glosses over the power dynamics involved, but fails to utilize them in a way that makes sense.
Also, from googling, it seems that Iran has a parallel power structure for its armed forces,
The division of Iran’s combat forces between the regular military and IRGC dates to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when the IRGC was formed in order to maintain internal security, safeguard the ideological purity of the revolution, and counterbalance the regular military.(12) The new clerical regime distrusted the regular army because of its association with the deposed Shah and saw it as a potential counterrevolutionary force.(13) For this reason, relations between the regular military and the IRGC have been characterized by ambivalence, mistrust, and at times outright hostility. This distrust was also a major factor behind large-scale purges of the military after the revolution and the formation of a political-ideological directorate which ensures clerical oversight of the military by placing personal representatives of the supreme leader in all major commands. These activities and organizations are all part and parcel of the regime’s efforts–dating to the early days of the revolution–to “Islamicize” the armed forces.
[snip]
In October 1998, however, at the height of the crisis wither Afghanistan, Khamene’i created a new position, that of supreme commander of the regular military. This step put the regular military on a par with the IRGC for the first time (the latter has had a supreme commander since 1981), and represented an upgrading of the importance of the regular military. It derived from a recognition of the fact that in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the regime could not rely on the IRGC alone but would have to rely on the regular military to bear the brunt of the fighting. The interests of the state thus made such a step imperative.(19) The dual structure of the armed forces, however, remains intact, and is likely to do so as long as the current regime survives, as it reflects a fundamental organizational principle of the Islamic Republic, rooted in the political logic of the regime. link
This is from 2001, but it seems that the parallel structure is retained. One could take away the fact that presumably nuclear weapons are under the control of the IRGC suggests danger (but the weapons and the delivery system have to be at least 10 years off, unless one thinks you can whip these up with a laptop), but the fact that there is a parallel structure would suggest to me that offensive action would be much harder to manage than defensive action. Thus, taking steps that would serve to unify the country (like OCSteve’s proposed military strike) is precisely the wrong thing to do.
This IHT op-ed makes a lot of sense to me, especially this.
Faced with these realities, it’s time for Washington to call Ahmadinejad’s bluff by playing the card the hard-liners fear most: a dramatic U.S. offer of reconciliation, including a security guarantee like that offered North Korea. Such a move would expose the rifts in the regime, deny the hard-liners the confrontation they court, and deprive the bankrupt revolutionaries of their Great Satan.
Unfortunately, it seems clear to me that the admin is using Iran to rally its base and stop the bleeding of popularity. It is a Hail Mary pass and should be seen as such.
Lots of thoughts but no second thoughts here. I supported the removal of Saddam because the first Gulf War never really ended. The man who started it all was still in power and still not acting in good faith, continuing to breach binding UNSC resolutions. In the wake of 9/11, the Iraqi dictator no longer got the benefit of the doubt.
continuing to breach binding UNSC resolutions
Not wanting to revisit an argument long thought put to rest, but I must have missed when the UNSC determined that.
Nevertheless, they all lived happily ever after.
Off topic, but Charles, if you’d like to post your impressoins of states you have visited, please do. If you’d like to do it as a post but not here, just forward it to me and I’ll toss it up at HoCB.
cheers
“Gary, I do not think that the role of the elected officials is completely insignificant under the Iranian Constitution, either on its face or as applied. Iranain politics matters, especially to Iranians.”
I didn’t say it was “completely insignificant”; I specifically said it wasn’t, and said it was what it was: “The presidency is not a position of utter figureheadism, but in comparison to either the Supreme Leader (faqih) or the Council of Guardians, it is.”
Then there are also the local politics of cities and villages, where similarly an elected politician can’t go against higher authority, but does play a role. (I also didn’t delve into the political influence of bazaar merchants, industry, and corruption, all of which is significant, as well, of course, as are other threads of political power.)
“Iranain politics matters, especially to Iranians.”
Yes, and no. Mostly disillusionment with elections under the present system reigns, which is why so many walked away from political involvement or enthusiasm this time (lowest turnout ever), since it was clearly useless and pointless. I can point to about a million articles that have made these observations running up to and after the past election-of-the-figureheads.
LJ: “To follow up on CC’s suggestion, well, that cuts both ways, doesn’t it? If the president is simply a figurehead, why have the candidates for oil minister he has put forward been rejected.”
Unusual to see the fact that a political figure is powerless to get through an appointment cited as, apparently, some sort of evidence that the figure has power, I think. Not reasoning I easily follow.
“…however the Assembly, which is also in charge of supervising the Leader to comply with his legal duties, has the power to dismiss and replace him at any time.”
That provision clearly only has force in the face of incapacity of the Supreme Leader. If you think there’s any evidence for the notion that the Majlis is in a position to replace Khamenei simply because they disagree with his opinions, please, by all means, link to it. It’s a position specifically made to be for life. And it’s not “Supreme Leader” for nothing. I’m not making this stuff up. (Nor did I get into any specifics about the Expediency Discernment Council, or the Guardians Council, neither of which I’d call a “democratic institution,” either; notice, also, who appoints the judiciary.)
To re-emphasize: the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council vet all the candidates for the Majlis. This is not some theoretical thing: they tossed out all the significant reform candidates in the last election, and most of those who were even mildly “reform” minded. Those elected are, in the end, tools of the Supreme Leader. They’re hardly going to replace him, are they? This is as realistic as pointing out that the Supreme Soviet could vote Brezhnev out. Yeah, it was in the Soviet Constitution, after all, right? And in the reality of both situations?
You carefully neglect to quote the remainder of what you were quoting from:
No duh. This isn’t, I repeat, something theoretical. If you seriously think that the Majlis is some independent body in a position to vote out Khamenei, you’re simply nuts. Or, more reasonably, simply misinformed. Or most likely, just don’t have much background here.
“…so to me, it seems that claiming that Iran is simply the next step after Iraq not only glosses over the power dynamics involved….”
Okay, now I have absolutely no idea what you’re talking about. It certainly has nothing whatever to do with me, or anything I’ve said. I certainly have made no such claim whatever, and make no such claim, any more than I’ve ever claimed we should now conquer Mars in retaliation for the tripod attack. WTF?
Also, with all due respect, if you have to google and check Wikipedia (“Also, from googling, it seems….”) to find out about the Iranian governmental structure, apparently you don’t happen to already know the stuff, and thus presumably don’t have much contextual knowledge to evaluate what you’re reading. (This is not to say that you can’t and won’t make sense of it; I’m not trying to be offensive or say that you don’t have a right to an opinion; you’re a smart guy who regularly makes sense; I’m just saying that you seem to be suggesting that you don’t presently come to the table with much background on the topic; if I’m misunderstanding, I will happily accept correction.)
“If you seriously think that the Majlis is some independent body in a position to vote out Khamenei….”
I sort of blurred over the distinction there between the Majles-e-Khobregan (Assembly of Experts) and the Majlis of Iran; sorry. But the point remains that Khamenei isn’t going to be voted out over policy conflicts any time in the foreseeable future.
In the wake of 9/11, the Iraqi dictator no longer got the benefit of the doubt.
Fair enough.
In the wake of GWII (ongoing), Katrina, etc. this President no longer gets the foreign policy benefit of the doubt. On this score, I think OCSteve has the burden backwords, you need to show us why you think preemptive action in Iran is a good idea, especially in light of CaseyL’s laundry list of fair questions.
“On this score, I think OCSteve has the burden backwords, you need to show us why you think preemptive action in Iran is a good idea, especially in light of CaseyL’s laundry list of fair questions.”
In using “preemptive,” you’re granting the argument that Iran is somehow on the verge of attacting us; what you want to be arguing about is “preventive” military action, not “preemptive.” Not unless you believe that, in fact, Iran is within weeks of using nukes.
Just for the record, I do lean strongly towards the theory that the primary reason we invaded Iraq (note “primary” does not mean “sole”) is that Cheney was driven a bit nuts by 9/11, like an awful lot of people — hell, I think it made me a bit nuts for about three years, out of trauma — and that Bush didn’t much know better, and that Cheney sincerely was obsessed with Hussein partially out of unfinished business and partially out of genuine, if misguided, fear of what they said their fear was: this notion that the existence of hostile states that were at least highly interested in getting WMD (defined extremely broadly, if not outright promiscuously, and blurring locally usable chemical weapons and potential and bioweapons and potential, with nukes and missiles, and short and intermediate range missiles with longer range capability) could theoretically hook up with hostile terrorist groups (also tending to blur somewhat groups that were primarily hostile to Israel with groups that were hostile to the U.S., although granted that they were helped in this bit by the fact that such groups are themselves almost always at least theoretically hostile to the U.S. as well as Israel; just not so much so often in practice, though there have been plenty of cases of the latter as well).
Then from that obessesion, and past experiences with intelligence under-estimations of the Soviet Union (the sort of concern OCSteve just ran through), the distinction between “it seems reasonable to assume that Saddam will continue to pursue WMD as much as possible” became indistinguishable for the neo-cons with “we know Saddam has WMD!,” not just rhetorically, but in their convictions and minds, and thus Cheney and the micro-Cheneys genuinely were convinced they were seeing a Real Danger that Just Like The Soviet Union they could see that others were foolishly blind to, and to which the American public had to be led to deal with, whatever the argument and whatever the cost.
That’s the gist of my theory as to the primary (not sole!) cause of How We Got Here, so far, myself, though I emphasize that it’s yet very early in the history of unearthing Real Info, and that we won’t really know enough to be sure for some decades worth of retrospective books, archive-openings, etc.
Naturally, that many people were quite sincere in their delusions and erroneous judgments (and I made more than my own share of erroneous judgments in not thinking the thing would go far worse than I thought it most likely would) is no defense of their policies, or endorsement of their current or future desired policies. Of course.
But my own Theory Of How We Got here leads me to see not so much reason to think that Bush is going to steer distinctly differently on Iran than on Iraq. He does show some capability of learning, and of changing course when forced to, but not so much. Maybe he’ll act differently towards Iran than Iraq, but I wouldn’t count on it until it definitely happens, and I’m inclined to think that he’ll act the same until I’m given reason to think he’s acting/thinking differently.
So, to try to be perfectly clear, I’m as inclined to be concerned and worried about the Bush-Cheney Administration’s actions and policies over Iran as many people are, despite the fact that I most certainly hold no love for the Iranian regime (although I think that people arguing about Ahmadinejad are to a large extent granting him more significance than he actually has; on the other side of that, though, is that the real powers in Iran have always held the same inflamnatory views that he just happens to have not been shy about saying loudly in his first few months in office; but what Iran’s actual foreign policy will be at any given moment is apt, I think, to be in flux due to the fact that for all that I’ve said about Supreme Leader Khamenei, I’m not trying to suggest that he dictates daily policy on day-to-day issues to specific Foreign Ministry negotiaters; rather, he sets general policy and makes sure that people with excessive wrongthinking aren’t the midlevel policy-enactors or highlevel policy-setters.)
And I’m, if not quite the furthest thing from expecting Bush-Cheney to handle Iran well, pretty damn far from it; I don’t know why Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld would handle Iran better than Iraq (or North Korea: hey, remember that Bush also says we’re “not going to tolerate” them having nuclear weapons?; how’s that going, anyway?), although I do think that Rice has more power in the second term, and far more power than relatively-neutered Colin Powell had, and that’s at least a slight improvement, not that I think Rice is a genius or in full control.
On the bottom-line question as to whether it makes more sense to ultimately tolerate a nuclear Iran in a few years, or act militarily, I don’t know. But I don’t think it’s a question we need to rush to address in the next six months. Unlike OCSteve, absent some good evidence that Iran actually is in possession of sufficient fissionables for some bombs, or is literally on the verge of receiving them, I’m willing to risk punting until we get to such good evidence; I see the downside of military strikes as too large to feel otherwise. (Noting that I felt that containment of Saddam in ’91 was sufficient, and later concluded that I was wrong about that, and that I was wishy-washy about invasion in ’03 [I’ve at times retrospectively characterized it as wishy-washy tenative support, but having reread again what I wrote back then, the fact is that I really never quite committed one way or another], and now tend to think I would have been smarter to have been more opposed, readers are advised that they might want to doubt my opinions.)
A side note on comments such as this:
Decapitation air strikes followed by special ops to seize and destroy all nuclear capability in the country.
describing methods of attacking Iran.
(a) The US relied heavily on foreign special op teams during both the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts – in particular, the UK and Australian SAS forces. I wouldn’t assume that these forces will be freely given to the US for an attack on Iran, given the domestic fallout of becoming involved in another US-pushed war.
(b) Not being an expert on war myself, what do other people think are the chances of airdropping special forces into a populous, well-defended country, having them seize and blow up some of the most well-defended nuclear technology in the country, and then leaving? From what I read of the work of the SAS in Afghanistan and Iran, they rely on stealth and planning to achieve their objectives, and try and enter firefights only when absolutely necessary. The situation OCSteve describes would give them neither stealth, nor the ability to plan. I think he is overestimating the effectiveness of special ops in such circumstances.
Sorry if someone already linked it, but David Sanger has a piece in today’s NYT on precisely the question of whether we can live with a nuclear Iran.
“…what do other people think are the chances of airdropping special forces into a populous, well-defended country, having them seize and blow up some of the most well-defended nuclear technology in the country, and then leaving?”
I think your question might better be “without casualties.”
But mostly any such strikes will be ordnance, not SOCOM, and would inevitably be highly incomplete and only a delaying operation, at best. What kind of fallout would result amongst the Iranian public, our situation in Iraq, the world diplomatic situation, and so on, is another matter. It would all be survivable for the U.S., of course, and unlike some, I can’t see that the notion that somehow most of our troops in Iraq would therefore be slaughtered as making any kind of sense, but I don’t think it would actually be a positive step in destablizing the Iraqi regime or helping the reformers, shall we say.
Mostly, to reiterate what I said earlier, I’m entirely unconvinced of the need to rush into such an act, although if done in, say, October, I’d imagine it would be very conveniently helpful to the Republicans in the November elections.
Yeah, I read Sanger’s thumbsucker (it’s a rare, though not unheard of, week in the past thirty-five years I don’t read the “Week In Review”), but didn’t see it as saying anything different than a jillion such pieces have said in the past couple of years. The bottom line question is how crazy/realistic do you expect the decision-makers in Tehran to be based on Twelver notions, and I don’t know what the answer to that is, but I’m not sanguine that anyone who is sure either way is correct. What’s Khamenei think in the end? Beats me. Is he willing to trade off nuking Tel Aviv for seeing Tehran nuked? I have no idea. I don’t see that one can either definitively be sure of it or definitively exclude the possibility. What would be the basis for such surety? The notion that his kind of believers don’t believe in martyrdom? Pull my other one. The notion that his kind of believers assuredly want to see Tehran disappear or don’t believe it would ever happen? Pull my gripping hand. If you’re not a rilly close confidant of Khamenei’s, I don’t know why I should believe your opinion (generic second-person).
The operative factors I weigh here are that I tend to take people who are very sincere believers in something at their word, and I also neither believe people automatically want to die nor that they never want to.
But as I keep saying, I don’t find the arguments that the Iranians are on the verge of having deliverable weapons, or should be treated as such until proven not to be, to be worth acting on for now. Fool me once (of course, “don’t refight the last war” is always also something to keep in mind).
Gary,
You carefully neglect
Is a bit of mind reading, isn’t it? Especially when I said that I was not claiming that Iran was democratic. The wikipedia makes this interesting point about ‘the closed loop of power’, but I was merely trying to get across the fact that the situation is a bit less cut and dried that what you originally said, which was
That’s certainly true, but it seems to be a non-sequitur in this thread; what country are you referring to? Not Iran, surely, which, of course, has a Supreme Leader for life. So what is this in regard to?
I worry that stating things this way may have some people fail to understand that power in Iran seems not to be monolithic. Surely, you, of all people, can appreciate that difference.
In fact, we are moving from Iraq (where it was argued that Sadaam was a madman who had to be taken out) to Iran (where it is a group of people who no one in this thread has identified who has to be taken out) which is, if one is a supporter of moving on Iran, an argument that might work against equating the two. Of course, I did not (and am not) suggesting that you think the two are the same, but when you suggest that there is a Supreme leader for life without discussing possibilities of recall, some others less careful than you may think so, no? Especially when coupled with the statement that
The Leader has always had supreme command of the armed forces, by the way; see Article 110.
As for relying on google and not knowing very much about the internals of Iranian politics, well, that’s why I said this is what google turns up. And from that googling, it seems that Iranian politics is influential in a way that Iraqi politics (which seemed to boil down to one person) is not. If you feel this is not the case, I hope you could point out why. When people come to the discussion and say ‘this is what we should do’, I don’t think it is the best idea to say ‘I have no idea what they are thinking, so I can’t really say’. Suitably making the caveat that we don’t know what goes on in people’s minds, I think we can still see that the power structure in Iran is different enough that we have to take serious defenders of Iran. And if this is the case, then there is no reason to even consider a military strike in ‘a few years’, even if they have or could get fissionables.
This has nothing to do with Iran, but…
past experiences with intelligence under-estimations of the Soviet Union
Huh? Are you suggesting that Team B got it right?
“Huh? Are you suggesting that Team B got it right?”
No, I was just referring to the not doing so great on the collapse of the USSR; sorry for having been unclear.
Now watching one of the last West Wing‘s, so back to you, LJ, later.
And since I was referring to Cheney and company’s subjective beliefs, he quickly wrote during the commerical, I should have referred to “perceived under-estimation.”
2 quick hits:
my dad, as lead outside counsel to Chase Manhattan Bank, which itself took the lead among the lenders group because it was where the Shah stashed his cash, was one of the principal authors of the Algiers Accords.
OCSteve really really needs to tell us what happens after our little iranian air raid. unlike, say, libya of a few years ago, iran has the power to inflict substantial harm on the US. Iranian forces could launch ground-to-ground missile strikes against Saudi Arabia oil facilities, ground-to-sea missiles against US assets and international tankers in the Straits of Hormuz, mine the straits of Hormuz, or even, if they’re feeling feisty, launch attacks against US oil infrastructure assets.
there are some huge refineries here in the LA basin, and they’re poorly guarded. Oil and gas pipelines criss-cross southern Louisiana and they’re totally unguarded.
what about suicide attacks against Gulf of Mexico oil rigs? there are plenty of cargo ships in the Gulf every day. how hard would it be to smuggle a group of commandos on board?
instead of us teaching them a lesson about daring to build nukes, they may end up teaching us one about the vulnerability of US infrastructure.
“You carefully neglect
Is a bit of mind reading, isn’t it?”
Well, you neglected to say; maybe it was careless; obviously I don’t know what you were thinking. If it was carelessness, my apologies for my phrasing.
“I worry that stating things this way may have some people fail to understand that power in Iran seems not to be monolithic. Surely, you, of all people, can appreciate that difference.”
No one has ever had utterly monolithic control, Hitler and Stalin included. Everyone delegates, and thus power gets spread; there are always interest groups in every society, and different groups have different amounts of power. I wouldn’t know how to quantatize the the distinctions, but only how to make them very broadly.
“…but when you suggest that there is a Supreme leader for life without discussing possibilities of recall….”
Absent some form of illness or senility, or some dramatic near-revolutionary political changes, I don’t think there are any such possibilities. Maybe I’m wrong. That’s what I think today.
I’m afraid I don’t know what you mean by that.
“And from that googling, it seems that Iranian politics is influential in a way that Iraqi politics (which seemed to boil down to one person) is not.”
I think Hussein was paranoid (with excellent cause) and probably mildly addled (stuff like focusing on his novels) in a way that I have no reason to think Khamenei is (but the amount of information I have about Khamenei the individual, and the details of his rule are extremely tiny, indeed). I think Hussein was probably more of a micro-manager than Khamenei probably is (but I don’t really know for absolutely sure), but how great the differences are, I have no idea. Don’t see it as all that important; Jimmy Carter was more a micro-manager than Ronald Reagan; unlike some, I don’t see that as inherently clearly absolutely better or worse; it’s worth noting, but not really, in my view, the most important issue about them, and how much of a micromanager someone is really isn’t, in my view, the most important matter about any politician. You may take a different view on this. Saddam Hussein certainly wasn’t entirely free to ignore the opinions of others; much of his time was spent appeasing various tribes and interests, and playing one off against the other, and dealing with various people influential in Iraq, and so on; this is something every dictator has to do; it’s not a cartoon of “off with their heads!” for everyone, after all. Off with some people’s heads, sure, but either the consequences were weighed, or there was a downside; this was, again, perfectly true for our best examples, of whom we know the most, Stalin and Hitler. Certainly in their later years they didn’t have to worry greatly about the public consequences of most executions, but they weren’t free to entirely ignore them, either; thus Rommel got to suicide, and Stalin had show trials. What’s left are differences of degree, and what clear distinction you may be attempting to make about Saddam Hussein, I’m not clear.
The crucial point in judging the danger of Iran going nuclear in the mid-term future would seem to be the question I previously formulated: would they be willing to to exchange destroying Tel Aviv for destroying Tehran. As I said, I have no idea what the answer is to that. I’m inclined to maybe put it at slightly more against than not, but it would be very nice to have clearer notions. I’m actually much more inclined to think that Khamenei and followers would be possibly willing to make the trade than Hussein ever was, though, if you ask me; I don’t see any reason to think that Saddam Hussein was a religious fanatic, whereas whether Khamenei and co’s obviously deeply-held core beliefs extends to willingness to make such a trade-off, or not, is an unknown to me. It’s what they say they’re willing to do. Should I disbelieve them more than I should have disbelieved Hitler? Again: I dunno. And I don’t know who has credibility to assure me otherwise. As I said.
“When people come to the discussion and say ‘this is what we should do’, I don’t think it is the best idea to say ‘I have no idea what they are thinking, so I can’t really say’.”
I don’t quite follow this sentence, either, I’m afraid. What people who are thinking what about which discussion? I’m lost in unclear antecedents here.
“Suitably making the caveat that we don’t know what goes on in people’s minds, I think we can still see that the power structure in Iran is different enough that we have to take serious defenders of Iran.”
I don’t know what this one means, either. No idea at all, I’m afraid. Sorry if I’m being slow.
Well, I was trying to avoid calling anyone out in particular, though I have some people in mind when I am talking about ‘people’. However, identifying them specifically tends to raise the temp and since I don’t have much knowledge of Iranian politics, I simply chose to quote some things that I had found. If people can’t see that I am trying to increase my understanding of the situation (which actually may impinge on me quite a bit as Iran is the third largest supplier of oil to Japan, with about 14% of the total market) by laying out some things I found through googling, well, c’est la vie.
As far as thinking about differing power structures, Stalin and Hitler are not the compare and contrast that I had in mind, but something more along the lines of a single man versus a politburo type of set-up. Hitler versus Khruschev, if you will, though we get into problems of timelines here. While any single leader has to balance factions, etc. it seems that there is a council of people that run Iran rather than a single leader and while this may be bad for democracy as such, it is not the same as someone who feels that they are the state. Of course, the imability for Americans to understand why a population might tolerate repressive conditions has always seemed, to be at least, to be the Achilles heel of how US foreign policy is determined.
As a side note to your Hitler/Stalin comparison, the fact of Iranian ideological units put within the military sounds like something that took place in the military of the Soviet Union during WWII, but not something that took place in the German military, though this is just conjecture on my part. This is not to assign levels of badness, but to wonder why, if an appropriate response to Stalin was containment after the defeat of Hitler’s Germany, a similar set of actions is not appropriate here?
As for the difference in Carter and Reagan, I hope I’m not being too hopelessly naive to think that something like Iran-Contra would have never occurred under Carter, which I think is a difference in leadership styles and structure.
I also wonder if the admission that someone is not sure is precisely the kind of wiggle room that people who argue for striking Iran take advantage of. It seems that we have to take stands even though our knowledge is imperfect. If the Iranian president is a figurehead, does that mean with take his anti-zionist rhetoric more or less seriously? The IHT link I gave suggests that the rhetoric is representative of his lack of power, which would suggest that permitting the Iranians to rally to his defense is the wrong thing to do. So, when you say
The crucial point in judging the danger of Iran going nuclear in the mid-term future would seem to be the question I previously formulated: would they be willing to to exchange destroying Tel Aviv for destroying Tehran.
This presumes the situation will be the same 10 years from now, which is a very long time, or even 3 years from now, which is also a long time, and I think this makes it not a crucial point, but an argument that forces people to accept a lot of dubious reasoning about the ability/willingness of Iran to not only amass fissionable material, but to create a delivery system and reach a point where mutually assured destruction would be acceptable. I’m not sure if that explains my thoughts more clearly, but since the people with the strongest opinions about attacking Iran don’t seem to have stuck around, I shall leave it at that.
The crucial point in judging the danger of Iran going nuclear in the mid-term future would seem to be the question I previously formulated: would they be willing to to exchange destroying Tel Aviv for destroying Tehran.
I’d just say that my impression is that Israel has made it about as clear as they can without admitting to the size of their arsenal that if Tel Aviv gets nuked then everybody gets it in return. You’re not giving away Tehran, you’re giving away most of the cities in the Mideast. You’re talking maybe 100 million lives for maybe 100,000.
“And with the exploitation of the captured intelligence documents, the “no ties to Al-Qaeda” meme is also beginning to disintegrate.”
Err, if you can call “I heard from an Afghani guy that he heard from the Afghani consul who heard it from the Iranians” proof positive. Because *of course* the Iranians wouldn’t have any incentive to put out disinformation.
Uri: Err, if you can call “I heard from an Afghani guy that he heard from the Afghani consul who heard it from the Iranians” proof positive.
Good point (though we seem to have chased OCSteve off the pitch) – but Afghani *nitpick* is the currency, not the inhabitants.
LJ: “…but since the people with the strongest opinions about attacking Iran don’t seem to have stuck around, I shall leave it at that.”
I wrote a fairly lengthy comment just above, here, in which I point out for the nth time that I oppose taking any near-future steps to militarily strike Iran. Since I’ve never said anything otherwise, and since my “strongest opinion about attacking Iran” is that at present we shouldn’t, and since I’ve repeated this multiple times here, and since you seem intent on arguing with someone or ones other than me, in the guise of arguing with me, I shall leave it at that.
Tim: “I’d just say that my impression is that Israel has made it about as clear as they can without admitting to the size of their arsenal that if Tel Aviv gets nuked then everybody gets it in return. You’re not giving away Tehran, you’re giving away most of the cities in the Mideast. You’re talking maybe 100 million lives for maybe 100,000.”
You base this on what, exactly? I’m sure it’s your impression; I don’t think your impression has much basis in reality, but if you can provide some supporting information, perhaps I’ll reconsider.
Since I’ve never said anything otherwise, and since my “strongest opinion about attacking Iran” is that at present we shouldn’t, and since I’ve repeated this multiple times here, and since you seem intent on arguing with someone or ones other than me, in the guise of arguing with me, I shall leave it at that.
If you took my comment to be simply concerned with your position on attacking Iran, as it seems that you have “carefully neglected” about 90% of it, while not surprised, I am left to wonder if the Ambien is talking. Not that you are under any obligation whatsoever to address all of my comment, mind you, but if I have left the impression that I am solely, or even primarily, interested in your point of view on the particular matter of attacking Iran (since it is the same as mine), I’ve clearly not been able to get my thoughts across to you.
LJ: would it help if I pointed out that “people with the strongest opinions about attacking Iraq” is ambiguous? Gary, to all appearances, considers himself quite strongly opinionated. Against, I’d guess.
would it help if I pointed out that “people with the strongest opinions about attacking Iraq” is ambiguous?
Actually, no, because given the fact that I was responding directly to Gary, it could be assumed that I didn’t think he had left, so therefore, it is again a reasonable assumption that I wasn’t talking about him. I try pretty carefully to not pin positions on people. I am also aware of the lament that we aren’t able to retain commentators from the conservative side here, so when I try and lower the temperature of the discussion here, by not directly calling out people, I think a little less defensive reactiveness might be in order.
gets me into trouble quite frequently; YMMV. Not that I don’t appreciate the effort, but I think that one can ask direct questions without being antagonistic.
“…I am left to wonder if the Ambien is talking.”
Since I’ve not had any in more than a week, and little in the week before that, it seems unlikely.
“…so when I try and lower the temperature of the discussion here, by not directly calling out people, I think a little less defensive reactiveness might be in order.”
There’s a considerable difference between not “directly calling out people,” and not directly or clearly addressing the concerns of specific people. If you want to argue with OCSteve, no need to be coy about it, IMO; naturally, you may disagree; myself, I find it unhelpful when you are so indirect that I can’t even make sense of what you’re trying to say.
I don’t see any evidence that OCSteve is going to have a cow at being politely argued with (although I figured that his main comments were far back enough in the thread that I wasn’t going to bother; if he comes round again, I can certainly tell him where he went wrong. :-)).
Speaking of clarity, I’m again unsure what’s going on in this sentence:
Clearly, I’m the antecedent and therefore the “he” and “him.” But it reads to me as if you are actually referring, again, to OCSteve, and not to me as the “he.” So I don’t really know.
Slart: “…I think that one can ask direct questions without being antagonistic.”
So do I, but clearly I’m not the best judge in the world on that question, and some might, rightly or wrongly, argue the same of you. Nonetheless, I agree.
OCSteve sucks and is ruining the site!
No, wait.
Slarti,
Not that I don’t appreciate the effort, but I think that one can ask direct questions without being antagonistic.
I’m not sure what question I was supposed to ask. ‘Was I referring to Gary?’ seems a bit of stretch. After all, I just finished up a long comment with a closing remark (which certainly seemed offhand to me, but if it wasn’t, I think the question is not mine to ask) about how the people who support attacking Iran don’t seem to be here any more. The bulk of my comment was about how particular political structures create different dynamics, and following Gary’s observation that my knowledge of Iranian political structure isn’t on a par with his, I certainly hoped for something about that rather than what seems to me to be a reverse strawman manuever. A nice place to start might have been this WaPo article, but I always hesitate to cite things because I expect Gary to tell me that he’s already blogged about it, which could be taken to mean he’s already read it and added a 3 sentence gloss, so therefore he has anticipated any fact arising from the citation. Note ‘could be taken’, as it is probable that Gary will say that the thought never occurred to him and how could anyone even think of this as a possibility? That, coupled with the selected warping of Grician conversational maxims that various conversations with Gary seem to develop, finds me strangely fatigued and tending to think that I was wrong and Jes and rilkefan were correct in their choosing abstention over engagement.
And jftr, I don’t think it is such a good idea to take a shot at someone after they have left, hence my desire to be ‘coy’, which, if one takes it to mean “annoyingly unwilling to make a commitment”, is a rather unfair shot. I think of it as just simple courtesy.
Besides there are much more important things in the world.
Of course I don’t think that about you, but I do think that it’s possible to address questions (whatever questions you had in mind) at those who are presumably leaving (never to return?) without the “taking a shot” factor.
JMHO, of course, and probably counter to your preference. As (ok, practically) always, I don’t presume to instruct, just to opine.