–by Sebastian
Emergency UN meeting over test expected
Yes, I’m certain there will be a meeting of the same body that said a nuclear test "would represent a clear threat to international peace and security" while removing all language about what it might possibly do if North Korea conducted a test. Really the only important question about the NPT in the past eight years was whether or not Iran or North Korea would be the country to finally prove its obsolescence. I confidently predict the following:
The UN will continue its decades-long policy of speaking loudly and throwing away any possible stick.
If any progress whatsoever comes with North Korea it will come about because China decides to shut off or threaten to shut off the pipelines.
The most likely reason for Chinese action will be if Japan threatens to go nuclear in response–which would have seemed unthinkable if it weren’t for the fact that Japanese politicians talked about it last year in response to North Korea’s missile test.
Things are about to get very interesting in Asia–the kind of interesting I could do without.
This is a failure so large that there is plenty of blame for an entire world of leaders (and yes that includes Bush).
It would certainly be nice to have a real superpower available now, rather than the more or less spent force that is the US.
It’s certainly big of you to acknowledge that Bush can be included in the blame. After all, it would hardly do for a loyal Republican to admit that in 2003, the Bush administration kicked away their chance of stopping North Korea:
Yes, there is plenty of blame to go around. Let’s see you put it where it belongs: in 2003, the Bush administration didn’t think it needed to bother with “nonaggression treaties”, and so in 2006, it’s too late for treaties.
The UN will continue its decades-long policy of speaking loudly and throwing away any possible stick.
“The UN”?
You mean “the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council”, of which the US is the loudest and most pushy member.
Your boys have been in the driving seat of the UNSC since 2001. This is not “a failure so large that there is plenty of blame for an entire world of leaders (and yes that includes Bush)”, this is a signal failure of the 5 nations that compose the UNSC.
Matter of fact, it’s only a failure for those UNSC members that actually give a shit whether NK acquires nuclear weapons or not. From their collective behavior the past 10 years none of the UNSC worthies appear to have lost much sleep over NK’s nuclear ambitions, so it would probably be more accurate to say that it’s a failure from the perspective of pundits and foreign policy fanboys.
You know, I have a feeling that this is related to the fact that the next Sec Gen of the UN is going to be Ban Ki Moon, the candidate who was pushed by Bolton for the position. In fact, I just pulled up Clemons The Washington Note and he suggests it as well, but doesn’t sketch out his reasoning, except to suggest that Ban Ki Moon represents a legitimacy crisis for North Korea, and I’m guessing that the thought is that North Korea, which has held on to the claim that it solely represents Korea, would have the legs knocked out from under it by having a South Korean be recognized as the head of an international body, which seems to underestimate the ability for the North Korean leadership to spin things. I mean, Kim Jong Il did play golf for the first time and got 11 hole in ones. That kind of whopper makes the legitimacy of Moon an aperitif on the mendacity buffet.
My thought (which shouldn’t be attributed to Clemons) is that Ban Ki Moon is not only the weakest of possible choices, he is supported by both the Japanese and the Chinese, and as such, the North Koreans need to, like the juvenile delinquent in the class, bring attention back to itself, and so chose this moment to do so, calculating that Moon will be too weak and ineffective to guide the UN into any kind of action and will immediately be on the defensive when he takes office, reassured by the fact that the US can’t do squat either. Of course, a UN that is effective enough take a stand about NK is going to be a UN that can express a strong opinion on Iraq, so the option of building up the UN to help deal with the problems means accepting criticism about Iraq, which ain’t going to happen.
The question you might ask is why should the US get the blame when Japan and China want the same empty suit in the UN spot? I would think that it is because they both feel constrained by world opinion, Japan (or more precisely, the leaders of the LDP, now led by the lighter and less filling demagogery of Abe) getting ganged up on by the former members of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, and China would definitely not be so happy with the notion that they could get outmanuvered by a bunch of other nations just because of the historical accident that said nations happen to be in the majority. So, in that sense, their objectives line up with the US in making the UN as weak a body as possible. Had the Bush administration shown some real leadership pre-Iraq, we might not be at a point where it is every asian country from themselves, but that is where we are. I don’t think that you can blame that on the UN.
Wow! Now that is some serious f*cking entertainment.
I think the Bush administration’s approach is to try and take advantage of their edge as the party that Americans look to to take care of them when things are dangerous and scary by making the world as dangerous and scary as possible.
The UN will continue its decades-long policy of speaking loudly and throwing away any possible stick.
If we’re talking of entities “speaking loudly and throwing away any possible stick”, don’t forget the gold-medallist contenders in the Bush Administration. I can’t think of anyone who’s spoken louder, nor thrown away sticks any harder, than they.
Bush, Bush, Bush… with no mention of the administration that was actually in charge when NK actually developed their nukes and longer range missiles.
As Sebastian said, there is plenty of blame to spread around. This problem has festered through 4 terms and two presidents, as well as 10 years of Kofi Annan.
Regardless, here we are. As to the test itself:
-550 tons and no radiation detected? There is nothing to prove at this point that it wasn’t conventional explosives designed to look like a nuclear test. I don’t believe that is the case, but it remains a possibility. If you have 9-13 bombs, testing even one reduces your arsenal quite a bit.
-If it was a nuke and as reported they were going for a yield of 400kt then this is clearly a fizzle. That would be good news if true.
-Worst case scenario: It was a nuke and 1/2kt was the desired yield. That is a tactical (battlefield) nuke and the level of sophistication required to produce that is exponentially beyond what is required to produce a Hiroshima type bomb.
Now Russia is saying it was in the 5-15kt range. Who knows at this point? It may be a very interesting week.
Let me get dibs on this meme: Rove convinced poofy-hair to do it in order to get Foley off the front page and get the focus back on national security before the election. …genius.
Well, it’s not as if North Korea’s nuclear test is good news, but their atomic ambitions were never a big secret: I think their actual testing of a nuke is probably less dire news than it might appear. But your snarky jibes at the UN ring a bit hollow, given that it has been more-or-less official policy with the Bush 43 Administration – since it took office – to deal with UN and most other international, multi-national institutions with little better than outright disregard and/or contempt; except only in such cases as they support American (i.e. Bush Administration) policies. Or ignoring policies, as in the Bush gang’s bizarrely myopic disregard for nuclear nonproliferation issues. The UN is scarcely a perfect organization, Sebastian, and, as has been pointed out, other Major Powers have their own agendas, but the American undermining of UN prestige over nearly six years of neocon disdain cannot be a positive factor in determining “what to do” about situations like a “rogue” nuclear state.
No “stick”, Sebastian?
What, then should be done? So far, I see that the US, the UN, and the world in general have only two choices about “what to do” wrt NK:
A. Do nothing
B. Start a Second Korean War.
Alternative suggestions welcomed.
“Alternative suggestions welcomed.”
Bomb Iran!
To be fair, Steve, NK’s long-range missile program preceded Clinton. We had Taepodong in our design-to threat back in the early 1990s. I know rather less about their nuclear ambitions, but I believe those too preceded Clinton by quite a spell.
There are particulars of the latter topic that are relevant, but I believe that these particulars are already fairly well-known to those posting here.
This problem has festered through 4 terms and two presidents, as well as 10 years of Kofi Annan.
What does Kofi Annan have to do with any of this? The man’s the secretary general, with precisely squat authority to launch any military or punitive measures.
This is the Security Council’s ballgame and any blame to be spread re the UN is the UNSC and the UNSC’s alone. Can’t duck responsibility here.
The question you might ask is why should the US get the blame when Japan and China want the same empty suit in the UN spot?
The US gets the blame because it has set itself up als global arbiter of Good and Evil. NK is China, Japan’s and South Korea’s problem. All three countries are – or should be – rich and powerful enough to handle the problem, and if they can’t, well that’s too bad for them. Whichever way, they’re perfectly capable of f*cking up on their own, without GWB’s “help”.
How is it that I’m now invited to be just as frightened to death of less than a dozen North Korean nukes and however many nukes Iran doesn’t yet have as I was of the tens of thousands of nukes sitting on top of missles in the old Soviet Union (some of them still sit, don’t they?) and however many China has? Pakistan? Etc? Is anyone scared of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, or is fright merely another facet of American exceptionalism?
Because the current troublemakers are crazy and evil? I just emerged from under my third-grade school desk because I was hoping those were George Kennan’s shoes I recognized.
No such luck. O.K. I’m good and scared. You’ve got me, kids. Now, as Jay C. has requested, what’s a good horror flick without the gory special effects? Someone tell us what should happen. You know, all of those items Clinton and Bush and every other superhuman in the White House apparently hasn’t considered. I need estimates of the number of dead North and South Koreans. I require a mental picture of Seoul after bombs drop in North Korea. I need an outline of a Draft and an estimate of dead U.S. servicemembers. I require an idea of how long it will take China to give back whatever North Korean territory they opportunistically acquire along the northern border. I need a similar estimate of opportunistic crapola in the now democratized, stable Middle East, and the flight schedule of the Marines who will be pinned down in Baghdad in the morning and north of the DMV in the afternoon.
Am I permitted, too, to at least speculate (God forbid, on the internets, where certainty lives) on the remarkable coincidence that the domestic U.S. Government on a World War III (or is it IV, I’ve lost track) footing looks precisely like the wetdreams of the lovers of pre-1932 America looked like.
And poofy-hair and Rove have no connection, except for maybe that the big sigh of relief emanating from that office adjacent to the Oval Office serves as an accidental blow dryer for poofy hair. I would like someone in that office whom at least shares a little bit of my unease at the prospect of the above crap rather than someone who shivers with delight that taxes can be lowered yet again if he wins an election and various Republican contracts on everyone can be renewed. The only difference between Rove’s hatred for the IRS and poofy-hair’s hatred of the IRS is the means by which they would destroy them. (Hey, I didn’t bring it up)
The DJIA is down 28 points. I can’t wait until Larry Kudlow tells me what this means.
Is a 29-point loss enough to nuke? Not to worry if the Dow falls only 27 points?
Incidentally, I favor beefing up the UN to include dozens of satellite-mounted laser zappers so they can back up their words. Everyone, including the U.S., gets one week to dispose of their nuclear arsenals or else. We’ll see what the nationality of the terrorist is who blows up the UN by Friday.
Well, the week is shot.
Erick at Redstate asks if North Korea just blew up the Democrat’s chance of capturing the House.
If an inconsequential punk is getting off on poofy-hair’s machinations, I imagine consequential punks in high places are, too.
Nice. Does Diebold manufacture in North Korea?
_____ at Redstate asks if ______ just blew up the Democrat’s chance of capturing the House.
it’s just Mad Libs, for those guys.
Erick used to be a good blogger. Lately he seems to be competing for the title of biggest hack in the blogosphere.
and the flight schedule of the Marines who will be pinned down in Baghdad in the morning and north of the DMV in the afternoon.
Good God Thullen! No one deserves to be sent to the DMV, it’s hell on Earth there waiting for licenses these days.
I always enjoy the disappointment on the part of people like Sebastian that the UN has failed to carry out the foreign policy of the US in every detail, rather than simply most details. They have a hard time imagining how every person on earth could *not* have exactly the same priorities as America’s right wing.
For instance, the US came close to nuking Vietnam at least twice. And yet the Vietnamese don’t seem to understand that the greatest threat to world peace is a possible Iranian nuclear program! Maybe killing two million more of them would help them see the light.
The truth is the UN could play a useful role if the US actually wanted to establish real, universal rules in international relations. For instance, if the US genuinely favored non-proliferation — rather than non-proliferation-if-we-don’t-like-you but if-we-like-you-build-as-many-nukes-as-you-want — we could get some traction vis-a-vis Iran and North Korea. But we don’t genuinely favor non-proliferation, so we can’t.
The UN at this point is not going to carry out America’s wishes in every last respect, and the only other possibility we’ll allow is for it not to do much of anything. I know that makes Sebastian sad, but there it is.
I always enjoy the disappointment on the part of people like Sebastian that the UN has failed to carry out the foreign policy of the US in every detail, rather than simply most details.
And the peculiar animus against Kofi Annan. I just don’t get it. Why? The man’s just the secretary general. A bureaucrat. A civil servant with no formal powers to do anything important. That’s not an accident, that’s part of his damn *job description*. And yet there’s a substantial chunk of the loonier US commentariat that sees him as a proxy for the UN. The same loons who see the US as an entity external to the UN, an entity with no connection whatsoever to the Security Council. It’s almost as if the US didn’t have a permanent seat on the UNSC, listening to them.
Erick at Redstate asks if North Korea just blew up the Democrat’s chance of capturing the House.
You beat me too it, but I thought this comment from Planet Up is Down was particularily insightful.
this comment from Planet Up is Down was particularily insightful.
whew. USURPER!!
And the peculiar animus against Kofi Annan. I just don’t get it. Why?
Because Kofi had the privilege and the pleasure of being Sec-Gen during the reign of the Boy King. If Gandhi or Mother Teresa had been Sec-Gen they would have received the same treatment.
The UN is an credible impediment to US unilateralism, and to those that think the latter is the panacea to the world’s problems, the UN is something to be destroyed.
“Mother Teresa had been Sec-Gen”
Last I heard she was actually evil.
My first reaction on hearing the news was “Kim Jong-il must want the Republicans to maintain control of congress”. Can’t be good to have the electorate feared up.
More meaningless ranting about the UN instead of the source of troubles here.
The UN is a body that acts on consensus and requires leadership from its primary leaders to establish such a consensus. It is a forum for diplomatic strategy. Bush policy toward the UN (and diplomacy in general) has been to treat it like garbage, and therefore, surprise!, its ineffective. Maybe that’s intended by the Bushies, Sebastian?
The UN still may not result in satisfactory action, but the point is to utilize diplomacy in the first instance to address problems. The UN is not independently the mechanism for solving problems — it is one of the diplomatic tools for trying to solve problems jointly with our friends and allies. It cannot work if the US has no intention of engaging in meaningful diplomacy in the first instance.
Bush’s policy toward NK policy has been to bully and threaten with no intention to act on those threats once the bluff has been called. The current situation is entirely the result of horrible policies over the last six years. And guess what? None of our allies are on board with that program, and therefore there is no possibility of achieving a consensus in the UN for US policies. Is that proof of the UN or Bush’s ineptitude?
As for OCSteve and revisionist history, the facts are that NK had suspended its nuclear program and submitted to monitoring during the Clinton years. It restarted it and kicked out the inspectors once Bush kicked over the table and relied solely on a policy of empty threats. Bush’s response to having his bluff called? — fold his hand and walk away, while promoting the OCSteve type spin that its all Clinton’s fault in order to avoid responsibliity for Bush’s failure.
Funny how our current Iraq policy looks exactly like Bush’s failed NK policy, which I assume is also all Clinton’s fault.
Ugh, see, this is exactly what I’m talking about.
😉
If North Korea nuked the DMV, Karl Rove would consider it another victory over government bureaucracy. Cutting the state budget for the DMV to cause long lines, thus proving to the electorate that government doesn’t work, hasn’t been completely succcessful in getting rid of the DMV. You might ask what the Marines are doing north of the DMV. Why not south, or east? Or way east in Baghdad, where a few years ago women could at least stand in line at the DMV without losing a limb or two? I can’t speak for the women seeking help at the Ministry of Torture, but then efficiency there was pretty good. No long lines.
All good questions.
I was wondering which wag would catch that mistake. Sebastian and OCSteve are too nice to point it out. Ugh, who might be me, knows I could handle it. Hey, what’s a rant without a malapropism or two?
Incidentally, I nominate OCSteve as a new conservative front-page poster. I think he likes us and can handle it, too.
The Dow is up a few points. Is this is a sign that North Korea doesn’t have enough nukes? Only Kudlow knows.
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates of the blast don’t seem big enough to me.
Defund it or privatize the USGS and transfer the money to the Department of Defense. There’s gotta be an upside to this.
I want the tax cuts made permanent. Then Iran and Korea will believe we’re Nixon bat-sh#t crazy and won’t mess with us.
I jest. But I bet I’m more scared of North Korea then Karl Rove at the moment.
“…then Karl Rove IS at the moment.”
But both wordings would be true.
Especially if “than” was the wording.
And speaking of Korea and the UN… the new UN leader is… Ban Ki-moon, of South Korea. i suppose this means the wingnutosphere will treat us to ten solid years of “moonbat” puns.
OCSteve, any chance you might respond to the numerous queries put to you in the “suggestion box” thread? Inquiring minds.
Incidentally, I tried e-mailing you, since your e-mail address looked real, but AOL rejected it; if you’re spoofing, you might try making it more obvious that that is the case, so as to avoid leading some of us on, you tempter.
“Bush, Bush, Bush… with no mention of the administration that was actually in charge when NK actually developed their nukes and longer range missiles.”
Wait, you’re charging that North Korea actually reached the point of achieving (“actually developed”) nuclear weapons during Bill Clinton’s term?
I’d like an actual cite on that, please. Or a correction. Thanks.
Really the only important question about the NPT in the past eight years was whether or not Iran or North Korea would be the country to finally prove its obsolescence.
This seems a very narrow, American viewpoint, as one is led to understand that to many signatories it’s the five NWS in general, and the US in particular, that have proved its obsolescence by their pointed refusal to abide by Article VI, and to a lesser degree, articles III and V.
Based on the data available at this time, Dr Jeffrey Lewis of ArmsControlWonk also thinks the test was a dud.
Of course, the down side to that is that a dud nuke still can cause more damage than any sane person would like to endure.
“My first reaction on hearing the news was ‘Kim Jong-il must want the Republicans to maintain control of congress.'”
That was my initial reaction, too, until I thought it over a bit more and wondered how in the universe NK testing an atomic weapon 6 years into a Bush Admin and 4 years into single-Party government could be considered a vindication of either one’s foreign policies, non-proliferation policies, and rhetoric regarding either one.
And, oddly enough, I couldn’t think of a damned thing.
And, oddly enough, I couldn’t think of a damned thing.
Don’t underestimate the average American voter.
“And, oddly enough, I couldn’t think of a damned thing.”
Because Bush will defend us, because he’s strong on national defense, and the Democrats are weak.
If enough people believe the dog is still hunting, it’s still hunting. It’s “values,” not facts.
Jon, “I always enjoy the disappointment on the part of people like Sebastian that the UN has failed to carry out the foreign policy of the US in every detail, rather than simply most details.”
Are you suggesting that the UN has been strongly working to stop the North Korean nuclear program? That would be an astonishing belief to have. Are you suggesting that it would have if the US had gotten out of the way? That would also be astonishing considering that the only reason the UN has paid as much attention to North Korea as it has is because of US pressure over the last 20 years.
Gary: “Wait, you’re charging that North Korea actually reached the point of achieving (“actually developed”) nuclear weapons during Bill Clinton’s term?”
Yes. According to Robert Walpole (National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs under Clinton and Bush) in his March 11, 2002 briefing to Congress: “The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.”
Because Bush will defend us, because he’s strong on national defense, and the Democrats are weak.
I was going to add to my 2:44, “Bush will jus nuke the sunza b!tches.”
“The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.”
so… if that’s true. what’s the BFD now?
Are you suggesting that the UN has been strongly working to stop the North Korean nuclear program?
Why should “the UN” give two hoots about the North Korean nuclear problem? “The UN”, after all, doesn’t care very much about the American nuclear problem, or the Russian nuclear problem, or the Chinese nuclear problem, or …
That would also be astonishing considering that the only reason the UN has paid as much attention to North Korea as it has is because of US pressure over the last 20 years.
Damn straight. As I said, face it, few countries are inclined to care much about what North Korea does, and are certainly not going to do anything about North Korean nukes if the US, China, Japan and South Korea can’t even be bothered to get their shit together.
Sebastian,
Do you dispute this passage?
Who/waht is poofy-hair?
sorry what
Andrew: Yes, I don’t want to imply that I agree with any (premature) conclusions at this time, only to show that (at least one of the) experts have expressed initial skepticism.
Regardless, China is none too pleased, as its status as sole nuclear power in the region is now in jeopardy. But, as Rupert Wingfield-Hayes of BBC News points out, a nuclear NK is still preferable to the flood of refugees that would likely be the result of ‘regime change’.
There is also the likelihood of a successful test provoking an arms race in the region. BBC quotes Daniel Pinkston of the Center for Non-proliferation Studies:
More on Japan from BBC:
(For more on Japan’s recent ‘assertiveness’, see The Second Coming of Japanese Nationalism, The Rise of Japan’s Thought Police and Japan’s Lurch to the Right. I’m sure LJ has other more local sources to supplement.)
John: I think the problem is that there is no good reason to believe that North Korea is deterrable — either because (a) their administration isn’t susceptible to deterrence or (b) China’s potential reaction to a nuclear attack on NK makes deterrance threats not credible.
That’s an entirely different kind of frightening than the cold war.
Who/waht is poofy-hair?
Disparaging term for Kim Jong-il, I believe.
Terrorists want to blow us up so we have to vote for Republicans!
But wait a GOP Congressman was sending dirty IMs to teenagers, so we have to vote for the Democrats!
But North Korea blew up a bomb, so wait now we have to vote for Republicans again!
Are Americans really this stupid?
Thanks
“China is none too pleased, as its status as sole nuclear power in the region is now in jeopardy.”
Leaving aside for a moment whether or not NK is a rational actor, I need to understand what China substantially gained by being the sole nukular power. Were Japan and Taiwan bending knee for thirty years? Giving an extra ten per cent on trade deals? I have never seen much concrete gain from nuclearization, except being safe from external aggression.
Now on NK being a rational actor. They will of course defend themselves and try to survive. There are real loonies out there with a history of unprovoked aggression who have openly threatened them. But I have seen little evidence Kim wants Seoul. He wants the rest of the world to feed him and provide Rambo movies. We can afford that.
Let’s unconditionally surrender.
Who do I feel is more a threat to peace and human life and freedom, Bush or Kim? This question is a joke, right?
“Damn straight. As I said, face it, few countries are inclined to care much about what North Korea does, and are certainly not going to do anything about North Korean nukes if the US, China, Japan and South Korea can’t even be bothered to get their shit together.”
Yes, thank you for accurately identifying the utility of international law on the subject.
“Yes. According to Robert Walpole….”
Thanks.
“Are you suggesting that the UN has been strongly working to stop the North Korean nuclear program? That would be an astonishing belief to have. Are you suggesting that it would have if the US had gotten out of the way?”
Are you suggesting that the US under George W. Bush has been strongly working to stop the North Korean nuclear program?
What do you suggest that the UN should have been doing that it has not, and has the U.S. made such requests/demands and been turned down?
When you say “the UN,” Sebastian, who precisely are you blaming? The SecGen, as noted, has next to no powers, which is why all the rightwing ranting about Kofi Annan is perpetually mystifying. The General Assembly also has few-to-no powers, beyond rhetoric.
The Security Council is where 98% of the UN’s powers lie, and where we have a veto, and dominate the Council (though also, of course, subject to the other 4 vetos, and obtaining a majority vote).
So when you blame the UN for anything, the primary blame goes back to… the U.S. government.
“Who/waht is poofy-hair?”
I’m assuming he meant Kim Jong Il.
Placing OCSteve’s source on NK nuclear weapons in context, here’s Jonathan Pollack, writing in the Naval War College Review:
Note that the plutonium was supposed to have been produced in the late 80s. The Agreed Framework shut plutonium production down.
“Yes, thank you for accurately identifying the utility of international law on the subject.”
Tell you what, Seb, give the UN the authority to enforce Int’l law, and the power (arms) to do so, and independence from the major powers and adequate power over them, and the law will be tested.
“On the subject…” The WTO seems to work a little better, because enforcement and fairness is respected. Note:a little better.
Hilzoy: “Placing OCSteve’s source on NK nuclear weapons in context….”
I think you mean Sebastian, but thanks; I meant to write that I might come back to this point, since that’s what I recalled, but I’m in a bit of a hurry at the moment.
Gary, “The Security Council is where 98% of the UN’s powers lie, and where we have a veto, and dominate the Council (though also, of course, subject to the other 4 vetos, and obtaining a majority vote).”
Even without considering the rather strong parenthetical which follows, what makes you believe the bolded section?
Hilzoy, I’m not sure what context you are trying to provide. Given “Though the CIA assessment was widely interpreted as evidence that North Korea had one or two nuclear weapons in its possession, neither the intelligence community nor any senior U.S. official offered a definitive statement to this effect during the remainder of the 1990s.” (which you provide) it sounds to me like the CIA went from believing that NK had nukes but not admitting it publically (late 1990s through 2002) to publically admitting what they believed (2002) including Walpole’s (who worked under Clinton)
statement, to believing it but not wording it as strongly (2003-Yesterday).
However, the US getting its sh*t together is the responsibility of this administration. Which it has failed to do, not through incompetence, but by design.
When the U.S. government sits on its thumbs and trash talks, it’s pretty damned hard for any kind of real diplomatic effort to get traction. And this nuke test is more of the Cheney administration’s desired “clarifying” violence:
Sebastian’s post is not the pure GOP-ism in which every problem is someone else’s responsibility, but it’s close enough to turn my stomach.
bob:
Being an external aggressor? Having a tactical advantage over regional competators (ie, Japan, SK)?
not through incompetence, but by design.
Do you know this, or do you just feel strongly about it?
Are Americans really this stupid?
YES.
Might I suggest that broad generalizations about people, however emotionally satisfying they may be, are neither accurate nor helpful?
Do you know this, or do you just feel strongly about it?
It comes under the rubric of: any sufficiently advanced form of incompetence is indistinguishable from malice.
Ugh is really Arthur Clarke?
“or do you just feel strongly about it?”
Andrew, I feel strongly about it. This administration started with its eyes on China. It is still talking about a fairly ridiculous naval committment solely for the defense of Taiwan and shipping lanes, considering the imaginable competition.
A scarey NK will motivate Japan and others in the area to build up their militaries, which could be useful with, umm, different targets.
In general, I think the Bush administration is deliberately trying to put the world into a new cold war condition, with new threats and military competition for its own sake, and for the sake of domestic politics.
Not necessarily hot wars, but fifty years of cold war, where could have been peace. Peace was too close for comfort for the hawks. They hate it. No profit in peace.
Thank you, bob.
I’ll note I don’t know one way or the other, but I think incompentence plays a much greater role in this administration than malice simply because I find it difficult to believe, given their clear lack of competence in so many areas, they somehow are markedly compentent in others.
“When the U.S. government sits on its thumbs and trash talks, it’s pretty damned hard for any kind of real diplomatic effort to get traction.”
Really? I am sure the rest of the world would appreciate knowing that without the U.S. they can’t accomplish anything on their own initiative.
“Sebastian’s post is not the pure GOP-ism in which every problem is someone else’s responsibility, but it’s close enough to turn my stomach.”
I see how easily you can reach that conclusion… all you have to do is completely and totally disregard Sebastian’s comment:
“This is a failure so large that there is plenty of blame for an entire world of leaders (and yes that includes Bush).”
And pretend that all the world’s problems started in 2000.
Evidence:the various nuclear disarmament talks with Putin early in the 1st Bush term. Putin wanted a far deeper drawdown than Bush would consider. And now we are starting a new buildup, both with SDI, limited nukes, etc.
Why? Why thousands of warheads? They like war.
“When the U.S. government sits on its thumbs and trash talks, it’s pretty damned hard for any kind of real diplomatic effort to get traction.”
What real diplomatic effort? The UN insistence on bilateral US-NK talks? I’m ok with blaming the whole mess on the US–but things follow logically from that. If you (contrary to the evidence in my mind) assume that the international community was seriously trying to employ diplomatic capital to cease nuclear proliferation in North Korea, that assumption should lead you to one of a number of disturbing conclusions:
This could not have been solved by diplomacy. Or;
International diplomacy is largely ineffective without significant help from the US. Or;
The premise that the international community was trying to stop nuclear proliferation is false.
I actually believe that all three are true, but at least one of them has to be true or you can’t both get to where we are and believe that significant blame accrues to the US.
Seb: the context was supposed to be: they started out saying that NK had enough plutonium for a couple of bombs, then moved to: they have a couple of bombs; then moved back again. One can interpret this as: they have thought NK had nuclear weapons all along, but only admitted as much for a short period a few years ago, or as: they really only know that NK has the plutonium, but briefly dallied with the conclusion that it had turned them into weapons, but then walked back from it.
In either case, I think, the knowledge that the CIA was saying something different both before and after the cite you (not OCSteve, sorry) posted is, I think, useful context.
Seb: I’m not sure I see what’s so disturbing about your second possibility (“International diplomacy is largely ineffective without significant help from the US.”), at least if it’s restricted to “on NK and issues like it (since of course two parties to a war in some distant place might well make peace without our help, etc.) I think that with this restriction, and perhaps also changing “largely ineffective” to “a lot less likely to succeed”, I think it’s plainly true.
Ugh is really Arthur Clarke?
You got me!
“They like war” …Bob
“incompetence…much greater role in this administration than malice ” …Andew
Look, coldbloodedly, I see it as neither incompetence or malice. I think I have said it before, What is America’s comparative advantage over our competitors, like China, Russia, or Europe? Are we smarter?
Rising population and assimilation of immigrants. An incredible willingness of the people to devote our resources to military spending, but an aversion to actual bloodshed (at least compared to incompetent hegemons…Sparta, not Athens). Just enough nationalism, just enough cosmopolitanism. Not too much of either.
We are an Empire. We are very good at it.
Might I suggest that broad generalizations about people, however emotionally satisfying they may be, are neither accurate nor helpful?
The “NK bomb knocks Foley off front page/helps GOP election prospects” scenario seems to be taken at least somewhat seriously in some quarters, who therefore see at least some degree of accuracy and helpfulness in it. I would love for them to be wrong, not just because I want to see the GOP suffer losses in the upcoming election, but because I would like to believe that people (some/all/quantify to taste) are not, in fact, this stupid.
Hilzoy, the thing that confuses me is that according to your source, the general intelligence understanding pre-2002 was that the publically disclosed information should be interpreted as showing that NK had nuclear weapons.
At the very least, there was a 2006 period (two, three, four and an unknown number of days before that) where the CIA was failing to publically say that NK had a nuclear bomb when NK did in fact have a nuclear bomb. The CIA was either gravely mistaken (which should instruct us about its reliability in ascertaining such information) or not publically sharing the information.
Regarding the plutonium issue: doesn’t the 5-15 kiloton range suggest something more along the lines of “Little Boy” (a uranium bomb) than “Fat Man” (the plutonium bomb).
“I actually believe that all three are true” …Seb
Probably right. Diplomacy might have worked, but NK are bad guys, a poor country without scruples as to how they behave. Counterfeiting.
A possible answer might have been just to give Kim whatever he wanted, to flood the place with dollars. Kim, given a choice between a billion dollars cash and selling a nuke to Iran and getting sanctions, might have taken the cash.
That’s a cost calculation, and a political calculation.
“…intelligence understanding pre-2002 was that the publically disclosed information should be interpreted as showing that NK had nuclear weapons.”
I wish this stuff could be assigned probablities. And then heavily discounted for political considerations.
I think Clinton both overestimated Iraq’s WMD capabilities in the second term, and possibly hyped the NK threat. If NK had not had a couple nukes, the pressure on Clinton for military action would have been much higher. Clinton had reason to fudge.
Hilzoy, I should have said “disturbing to your premise”. (Which to be clear isn’t “Hilzoy’s” premise).
I fully believe that in a very broad range of international issues–especially having to do with nuclear proliferation, international diplomacy is almost entirely useless without the active involvement and leadership of the US. Therefore, plenty of blame ought to accrue to Bush and Clinton.
I think the lack of movement by the international community in the face of the genocide in the Sudan is largely explained by the truth of that statement coupled with the disinterest of the US.
My confusion is with those who believe in the independent effectiveness of international diplomacy and who also insist on blaming the US for failure.
I believe that the effectiveness of international community diplomacy on such issues is very near zero. Coming from that angle, I am fine with blaming the US. But you don’t get to simultaneously blame the US for failure and suggest that the diplomacy of the international community is a particularly useful tool in such extreme cases.
No. You can do the same thing to achieve criticality with a subcritical mass of uranium as you can with plutonium.
Sebastian:
What I’m suggesting is exactly what I said:
Is that not clear? In the case of Iran, we will never get the rest of the world to support a policy of “Iran can’t have nukes or even nuclear energy even though it’s within their NPT rights while we will never fulfill our NPT obligations and also Israel gets to have all the nukes it wants. India too! Oh, and we won’t rule out an unprovoked nuclear attack on Iran.” You think that’s a reasonable policy, but very little of the rest of the world does. For instance, as I mentioned, Vietnam. Sadly enough, they aren’t convinced that a country that’s never threatened them is a bigger threat than one that killed two million of them and almost nuked them twice.
BUT — thanks to our power, we might be able to get most everyone behind making the Middle East a WMD-free zone. Even the most cynical world leaders understand the value of non-radioactive oil. In fact, we now know Saddam repeatedly told subordinates that Iraq would give up all WMD ambitions if the UN followed through on its commitment to create such a zone. (That was all along supposed to follow on Iraq’s disarmament.)
Of course, we and Israel have zero interest in this. Thus, there may be no way to stop Iran from getting nukes.
North Korea is a more difficult case. It probably would have been possible to stop things if we’d had a consistent non-proliferation policy twenty years ago; that’s how powerful the U.S. is. But by now it’s probably impossible.
Anyway, we can have a less-tense, less-militarized world in which we are less relatively powerful. Or we can have a more-tense, more-militarized world in which we are less relatively powerful. What we CAN’T have is a less-tense, less-militarized world in which we are as or more relatively powerful than today.
Again, I realize this makes many people in America angry and sad. Such is life. One of the challenges of human existence is coming to terms with not getting exactly what you want all the time.
Which country are you nominating as having more influence than the U.S.?
Note: I didn’t say the U.S. controlled the Council; I say that it has more influence than any other country, for the obvious reasons of the U.S. being wealthiest, contributing the most, being militarily strongest, historically invented the UN, and so on and so forth, including all the ways the U.S. is acknowledged to be the world’s superpower. Perhaps you misunderstood me.
Regarding the plutonium issue: doesn’t the 5-15 kiloton range suggest something more along the lines of “Little Boy” (a uranium bomb) than “Fat Man” (the plutonium bomb).
Agh. “Little Boy” was a gun-type bomb; what I was saying upthread is that you can use uranium in a “Fat Man”-type design, as well. “Little Boy” was horribly inefficient; it used nearly a man-weight of uranium to get a smaller yield than Fat Man did with six or so kilos of Pu.
I’d guess that NK has more modern designs to work to; they’d practically have to, given the lack of materials.
Support for Bob’s thesis here.
I must have. I would have sworn you used the word “dominate”. I’m loathe to get into a usage flame with you, but I’m confident that the number of times where the word “dominate” means less than “control” is far fewer than where it is a synonym of or intensifier for “control”. But if you define “dominate” as “definitely not controlling” I guess I can’t argue with you.
Bob makes an excellent point, which many have made before him. Although China could use nukes to be an external aggressor, it has not (I wouldn’t count the Vietnamese tussle of the late Seventies, as the nukes weren’t relevant, and besides they got their nose bloodied).
Beyond that, nukes are useless in trade, and I don’t understand the meaning of “tactical advantage over regional competators” in this context, though perhaps I would if Mattbastard expanded.
Nukes are, indeed, of limited usefulness, beyond deterrent, whether in defensive or offensive situations. This has been recognized for decades. (Which is not to say that they are undervalued as deterrents, since they are not.)
“Beyond that, nukes are useless in trade,”
I should clarify that I meant “as leverage in trade negotiations”; not that one couldn’t trade nuclear weapons themselves for considerable cash.
You seem very spry. But I bet you can’t remember when we met. (I doubt the real Clarke could, either; it was a chat of about 5 minutes, 33 years ago.)
“I’ll note I don’t know one way or the other, but I think incompentence plays a much greater role in this administration than malice simply because I find it difficult to believe, given their clear lack of competence in so many areas, they somehow are markedly compentent in others.”
This is a point I feel conspiracy theorists, by nature, consistently ignore.
And I pretty well can’t over-state it.
Of course, it can all be explained by noting that very single example of incompetence is proof of the conspiracy.
People are unendingly prone to Huge Simple Explanations. The universe doesn’t really tend to work that way.
I agree with you entirely that that (or an equivalent) was a perfectly available choice, but I suggest that ideology, on the part of the Bush people, is a sufficiently valid explanation of their rejection of it. (Not negotiating with/”appeasing” “evil.”)
“A possible answer might have been just to give Kim whatever he wanted, to flood the place with dollars. Kim, given a choice between a billion dollars cash and selling a nuke to Iran and getting sanctions, might have taken the cash.
That’s a cost calculation, and a political calculation.”
The problem, as we learned to varying degrees from the Agreed Framework, would be flooding the place with billions in cash, being unable to verify what Kim was doing, and him selling the nuke anyway.
“…and him selling the nuke anyway.”
Well, yeah, but I don’t like our other options.
Trying to think of times when heavy sanctions = internal military overthrow has worked well. Trying to think of times when forcing a country to total desparation has worked badly, i.e., lashing out.
Not really comin up with much. Cuba policy hasn’t really been productive. Iran not responding well.
As I understand Bob, his claim is that every single example of supposed incompetence is actually an example of something that turned out the way the administration wanted it to, or at the very least an example of a situation where the administration didn’t care about the outcome one way or another.
“…it used nearly a man-weight of uranium to get a smaller yield than Fat Man did with six or so kilos of Pu.”
Kinda of a technical question based on the possible “dud” and low yield reports. We are talking implosion devices here, right? Is there any purpose in testing the implosion shell without the fissle core, and would that produce a big enough explosion to match the seismic reports?
I shouldn’t think so, but thought I would ask. 500 tons seems way big for even a dud, if the shell went off without generating fission.
“As I understand Bob, his claim is that every single example”
I claim neither perfect conspiracies or perfect competence. I do think you need to posit some really massive levels of incompetence to explain the last few years.
A level of incompetence that is less believable to me than accepting a greater level of intent.
“Bush and crew still believe there are enough troops to accomplish the mission in Iraq, as he has publicly defined it?”
Excuse me, I just want to examine other possibilities.
A bit of a meandering thread, what with invocations of Clinton, poofy-hair, UN politics and such, so just a few links to the potpourri.
An interesting view on NK’s actions. not sure I agree with it.
And pretend that all the world’s problems started in 2000.
Actually, to understand this situation, one has to go back to the post WWII situation. Cumings is often reviled as left wing, but I think he’s a pretty solid historian. If viewed as an explanation rather than a justification, it seems to be an important part of the puzzle.
As for Japan’s rightward lurch (thanks for the shoutout, MB), I think it is important to realize that Shinzo Abe is a virtually unknown quantity, in that a recent poll said that only 11% knew the content of his campaign pledges. His cabinet is packed with rightwing idealogues, and he’s from the pro-USA wing of the LDP. It is not clear to me that the electorate matches this, though the people I hang out with may not be representative. But Koizumi and the LDP are committed to a surface policy of arguing for a more nationalist Japan that is independent, but pursuing an underlying policy of maintaining dependence on the US. How long this balancing act can continue is a question. This is probably at the root for the support for Moon, because a weak UN will not put Japan in the position of having to choose.
Finally, I have to admit, I find it depressing that Sebastian’s title mirrors Tony Snow’s description of Foley’s emails. Perhaps it is just errant word choice, but it leaves the impression that all of this is a game to assign blame.
“People are unendingly prone to Huge Simple Explanations.” …GF
And saying, for instance, that the real mission in Iraq is not 100% as publicly defined does not make me a crazy conspiracy theorist. Nor is it a Huge Simple Explanation. In fact, it is much more complex than saying our leaders are simply idiots.
“And saying, for instance, that the real mission in Iraq is not 100% as publicly defined does not make me a crazy conspiracy theorist. Nor is it a Huge Simple Explanation.”
I agree, Bob.
I wasn’t trying to make a Huge Simple Explanation, either of Iraq, or you.
🙂
“Of course, it can all be explained by noting that very single example of incompetence is proof of the conspiracy.”
Sigh; this should have been “every single example.”
“I do think you need to posit some really massive levels of incompetence to explain the last few years.”
Bingo.
Not that there hasn’t been malice aplenty, and conspiracies here and there. Just that a lot of the conspiracies are obvious.
Ok, expanding upon my brief response to Bob (as per Gary’s request – perhaps we began by talking past here, since, judging by your query re: ‘regional competitor/tactical advantage’, you seemed to interpret my statement within an economic context, whereas I was talkin’ straight geostrategy [or at least attempting to do so:P].)
What (I believe) China is likely most upset about is the potential loss of stability in the region posed by nuclear proliferation. As previously noted, a nuclear armed NK could provoke SK and Japan to also seek nuclear arms. Relations between China and (an increasingly militant) Japan aren’t exactly copacetic (although there seem to have been some recent olive branch extensions.) I seriously doubt Beijing is comforted by the the idea of a nationalistic, nuclear Japan (backed by a passive-aggressive US) in the neighbourhood.
The deterrance value of nuclear weapons also falls into play WRT conventional warfare, as nations with a non-conventional arsenal are far less likely to face the threat of military engagement (hence why some speculate that Saddam Hussein wished to let the world believe Iraq had – or endeavoured to develop – an extensive non-conventional arsenal [see Cobra II]). Just because China isn’t likely to plan a conventional (or non) attack upon Japan, NK, SK, etc any time in the near future doesn’t mean having that option at its disposal (if necessary) is of no little concern.
The loss of sole nuclear power status will force China, by whatever degree, to reevaluate a number of its (potential) military options, as well as its diplomatic interaction with other regional actors – thus its long held ‘tactical [military] advantage’ may have been lost.
(Of course, if this test does turn out to be a dud, I won’t be surprised to hear the hawks in Washington angling for regime change sooner rather than later, before NK has the chance to actually arm itself with non-conventional weapons. Again, the threat of regional destablization looms.)
I would have sworn you used the word “dominate”. I’m loathe to get into a usage flame with you, but I’m confident that the number of times where the word “dominate” means less than “control” is far fewer than where it is a synonym of or intensifier for “control”.
Not to get into a sideline here, but if someone says “The Detroit Tigers dominate the AL Central this season, ” it does not mean the Tigers can literally control who wins and who loses. This is the usage I imagine Gary was after, and it’s so common as to be unremarkable. Your confidence is . . . misplaced. Yes, that’s the charitable word.
those who believe in the independent effectiveness of international diplomacy
There are such people?
“I seriously doubt Beijing is comforted by the the idea of a nationalistic, nuclear Japan (backed by a passive-aggressive US) in the neighbourhood.”
Placenote: I have a post I’ve been meaning to make about this for a while, and presumably I’ll finally get to it Real Soon Now.
I remain very much convinced that the Japanese ultra-nationalists are only a dormant, and greatly overlooked and underestimated, threat. I don’t take Abe’s ascension with equanimity in this regard.
No, I was using it in the sense of “have more power and influence than anyone else” or “have more control than anyone else.”
I didn’t say, after all, “totally dominate,” or “totally control.”
If it will help, I’ll agree that I could have been clearer.
I think we dominate the Security Council more than anyone else; I don’t think we control it; I think we have more power and influence over it than any other country. Yes? No?
Sure. I have this whole straw village over here….
“Not to get into a sideline here, but if someone says “The Detroit Tigers dominate the AL Central this season, ” it does not mean the Tigers can literally control who wins and who loses. This is the usage I imagine Gary was after, and it’s so common as to be unremarkable.”
As you use it, “dominate” is a verb with the direct object of “the AL Central”. The phrase means that in the context of “the AL Central” the Tigers beat their opposition. Do you assert that in the context of the UN Security Council the US beats its opposition? Gary’s parenthetical remarks suggest he doesn’t believe that is true.
As the resident baseballer, I should note that to say ‘the Detroit Tigers dominate the AL Central this season’ would be inaccurate, as the Minnesota Twins won the AL Central this year.
“I think we dominate the Security Council more than anyone else; I don’t think we control it; I think we have more power and influence over it than any other country. Yes? No?”
Marginally more? Slightly more? Significantly more? So long as the context is “the Security Council” I don’t think you have an argument for anything more than “slightly more”. I think “dominate” suggests “significantly more” which I would say is wrong.
In the course of my professional career, I’ve had the opportunity to negotiate with political agencies that have appeared, from the point of view of my clients, utterly irrational. (the US Fish and Wildlife Service is a prime example.)
now, generally there’s two possible approaches: the whole ball of wax, and incrementalism.
WBoW solutions are preferable, but sometimes unobtainable.
When faced with an agency that flatly refuses a WBoW solution, clients generally have two choices: incrementalism or walk away.
Some walk away, either dumping the project on the next aspiring developer or putting the project in deep freeze. (note: even after complete Republican dominance in DC, staff level regulators aren’t exactly rolling over for developers.)
Some, however, choose incrementalism. They get some of what they want, but they know that the project still is subject to significant risk. They proceed for two reasons: (a) to make any progress at all, and (b) to create confidence-building measures that allow for next phase negotiations.
As we have seen in US-North Korea relations, the worst of all possible worlds is to have a management change from incrementalist to WBoWs just as first phase negotiations are completed. WBoWs, who reject the very idea of incrementalism, can not only torpedo second phase negotiations but cause such anger and frustration that matters end up worse than status quo ante.
As best I can tell, US foreign policy from 1945 to 2000 was bi-partisan support for incrementalism. But when you insist on having all or nothing, when you say you’re with us or against us, a bunch of people who were kinda adverse but kinda neutral are going to jump straight into adverse.
As the drafters of the Constitution discovered, ambiguity has its benefits. yes, it took a civil war to work out some of the worst ambiguities, but we would have never formed as a nation if we hadn’t had a bunch of committed incrementalists among the Founding Fathers.
Could the test yesterday been avoided? We’ll never know. But if the goal of the last few years was to avoid the test, then we failed. Note: K.Drum has a post suggesting that some hardliners have wanted this test to occur, on the grounds that it provides the opportunity to resolve the NoKo situation “once and for all”. (A truly frightening turn of phrase — have our relations with anyone, even our EU allies, been resolved once and for all?)
See for example the Sudan. None of the veto powers has a huge interest one way or the other. (China and Russia have a mild interest at best). The US doesn’t seem interested in military action, but was interested in sanctions over the genocide (and if d-squared is lurking, yes I’m using the word “genocide”). A power which could dominate the Security Council would get its way when other powers have marginal interest. In reality the US position was thwarted first by France, then by Russia, then by China, then by Russia and then by China.
Hilzoy:
I am glad you dug up and posted the clarification about what the assessment was at various times regarding the NK nuclear capability. Sebastian’s cite is highly misleading without the context.
The relevant point to note here is that in the 90s, the CIA and other agencies did NOT assess that NK had developed nuclear weapons, whereas under the Bush administration, this assessment was retroactively changed. Given the love of cooking the books on intel by the Bush administration, this is pretty clearly just that. It was also timed for the time period when the Bush administration was trying to defend its unsuceesful get tough strategy with NK. A big part of the defense was that NK going nuclear had allegedly already happened, and would not be a result of flawed Bush administration strategy.
Its also important to note that in the 90s, NK submitted to inspections and other in-country monitoring. Not really consistent with also building bombs. It is undisputed that NK had been processing plutonium in the 90s and earlier which would give it the capability to make a nuclear bomb, and agreed to quit as part of the deal in the 90s.
You can criticize that 90s deal (though the Bushies have clearly underperformed those earlier efforts), but please do not make up facts that the bombs were already built in the 90s.
I have no idea about sports teams. Possibly, given that I explained what I meant, Sebastian, you could respond to that, rather than engage in usage flame/quibble?
“Marginally more? Slightly more? Significantly more?”
More. Whatever. This is uninteresting.
Later.
Andrew:
As the resident Tigers fan, I should note that the (AL Central champion) Twins were swept by the A’s, while the (wildcard) Tigers sent the Yankees back home early to the Bronx, with great weeping and gnashing of teeth throughout Gotham. A-Rod resembles a very expensive sacrificial lamb atm.
😛 (Go Tigers!)
“Possibly, given that I explained what I meant, Sebastian, you could respond to that, rather than engage in usage flame/quibble?”
This from you Gary? 🙂
Sure. In the context of the Security Council the US is more powerful than China, France, the UK or Russia. Economic and military power don’t translate into power on the Security Council (see France).
Bob,
The small size of the explosion may indicate a fizzle, that is the attempted a nuclear explosion which achieved critical mass but had inadequite containment. The fissile material was blown apart before the reaction came anywhere close to the designed degree of completion. We know that at least one of India’s early tests was a fizzle. That is much better than the alternative. It’s much harder to design a small nuke than a large one. If it really was a successful detonation with a yield in the 500 ton range it would mean the North Korea is a lot closer to having a weapon they can actually mount on their launchers that anyone thought.
NK test as a “dud”
It does appear that the blast was very low for a plutonium A-bomb — under 1 kiloton according to the seismic experts. It is unlikely that the low yield was intentional — its actually trickier to design a bomb with a deliberately low yield. Calling it a “dud,” though, is probably not accurate. More likely its just an inadequate design causing a very poor yield (i.e., sloppy implosion which results in only partial fission before the bomb blast destroys the reaction). The design is a tricky problem, from all accounts. The whole point of tests is to refine the design. Tests by NK scientists on the bomb blast debris enables them to calculate the efficiency of the blast, and act accordingly.
I’ll resist Sebastian’s temptation to turn this into a baseball thread, unless by baseball, he means sex.
I will note that John Lennon dominated the Beatles early on but Paul was the force to be reckoned with later, beginning with Sgt. Pepper.
O.K. Back to nuclear annihilation and the Blue Meanies.
mb
What (I believe) China is likely most upset about is the potential loss of stability in the region posed by nuclear proliferation.
This is a really important point and serves to underline the validity of SK’s sunshine approach. A lot of effort has gone into trashing it by the Bush admin, from the moment W stepped into office
The Clinton team briefed Powell for two hours on the status of the North Korean talks. Halfway into the briefing, Condoleezza Rice, the new national security adviser, who had just flown in from meeting with Bush in Texas, showed up. One participant remembers Powell listening to the briefing with enthusiasm. Rice, however, was clearly skeptical. “The body language was striking,” he says. “Powell was leaning forward. Rice was very much leaning backward. Powell thought that what we had been doing formed an interesting basis for progress. He was disabused very quickly.”
In early March, barely a month into Bush’s term, Kim Dae Jung, South Korea’s president, made a state visit to Washington. On the eve of the visit, Powell told reporters that, on Korean policy, Bush would pick up where Clinton had left off. The White House instantly rebuked him; Bush made it clear he would do no such thing. Powell had to eat his words, publicly admitting that he had leaned “too forward in my skis.” It was the first of many instances when Powell would find himself out of step with the rest of the Bush team–the lone diplomat in a sea of hardliners.
If Powell was embarrassed by Bush’s stance, Kim Dae Jung was humiliated. KDJ, as some Korea-watchers called him, was a new kind of South Korean leader, a democratic activist who had spent years in prison for his political beliefs and had run for president promising a “sunshine policy” of opening up relations with the North. During the Clinton years, South Korea’s ruling party had been implacably hostile to North Korea. Efforts to hold serious disarmament talks were obstructed at least as much by Seoul’s sabotage as by Pyongyang’s maneuverings. Now South Korea had a leader who could be a partner in negotiating strategy–but the United States had a leader who was uninterested in negotiations.
The spin will be that it is obvious that the Sunshine policy didn’t work, and had Bush been supported from the get-go, we wouldn’t be in this position. My feeling is that the Sunshine policy now provides South Korea with huge amount of moral clarity can now lobby for greater control by China. This will have the unfortunate side effect of isolating the US from Northeast Asia and encourage the development of a regional bloc that is going to be opposed to US interests. Given that any number of neocons feel like China is opponent of the 21st century (right after this little mess in the mideast gets cleared up), it is going to be interesting when they realize that to get to China, they are going to have to go thru Japan and South Korea. The fact is that they would have had to do that anyway, but the neocon grasp of geostrategy has never been too firm.
btw, mahablog has assembled its series on North Korean nukes and it has a lot of info in it for the interested and this page has a good listing of events.
Nell: not through incompetence, but by design.
Andrew: Do you know this, or do you just feel strongly about it?
I believe what I read, especially when it fits with an established pattern of behavior. Do you think that Post reporter Glenn Kessler made up what he said in the excerpt I quoted?
This is entirely plausible, so much so that the burden of proof should be on those who want to pin the administration’s behavior towards NK entirely on incompetence.
Bush cut Colin Powell and the president of South Korea off at the knees during the president’s visit here early on, then went on to label North Korea part of an ‘axis of evil’.
At no point has this administration shown any serious interest in negotiation, and they’ve done just about everything possible to indicate their scorn for the UN, international organizations and international law, and diplomacy.
There are people in the administration — Cheney, Rumsfeld, and their acolytes (Bolton, Addington, Joseph, Edelman, Fleitz, among others) who believe that regime change is the solution to hostile governments, period, and that diplomacy is a waste of time.
This is an explicit policy, articulated in the September 2002 National Security Strategy and reaffirmed in the most recent version. Why should I believe it’s just bumbling, rather than purposeful?
matt,
And I’m very happy for those Tigers, as my teams are the Red Sox and whoever’s playing the Yankees. Saturday was a good day.
Nell,
I’m not arguing either way. I was just asking a question. I do that sometimes.
“that is the attempted a nuclear explosion which achieved critical mass but had inadequite containment”
Thank you. That is a significantly different event than a “dud”. I wasn’t sure that what you describe was possible. Now I know.
Thanks to dmbeaster too. I hadn’t scrolled that far.
that is the attempted a nuclear explosion which achieved critical mass but had inadequite containment
This is not conducive to my entertainment, please desist and restore tapes of nuclear weapons’ tests, stuff exploding, and Brangelina.
Thank you.
American Voters.
Various:
The Korea Times speculates that NK may be using the test to pressure the US for bilateral negotiations:
Steve Clemons suspects Ban Ki Moon may have been one of the contributing factors in Pyongyang’s timing:
The NY Times on how NK ‘brazen’ defiance has left China in a precarious diplomatic and geostrategic footing:
Indeed it was. Nice to know I wasn’t the only one here who did a spiteful happy-dance at the expense of the poor, pathetic Bombers (who says there’s no crying in baseball?)
😛
Andrew: I was just asking a question.
Yes. It was this: Do you know this, or do you just feel strongly about it?
If the tone of my response to your comment sounded aggreived, it’s mostly due to the way this question is posed, which seems to have a rather large excluded middle.
That is, it seems to overlook the possibility that I might draw reasonable conclusions from patterns of behavior and the evidence available to me, rather than developing an emotional attachment to a position.
That doesn’t mean I don’t have strong feelings about what I and many others conclude wrt this administration.
@mattbastard: Go Tigers!! We saw three now-trademark comeback games this summer during the family reunion and a wedding. It was touching to see the dazzled happiness of the relatives, after all these abysmal years.
Kenny Rogers really got to the minds of that high-priced lineup. Extreme speed changing is a lot of fun to watch. It reminded me of McGregor with the 78-83 Orioles, when he was on.
Nell,
I’m a lazy man, what can I say. When I said ‘feel strongly about it’ I meant simply that you have strong reasons to believe that is the case, but no smoking gun. Sorry.
This sounds like an example of a “the actions of the terrorists prove the validity of my policy” fallacy. The “Sunshine Policy” of engagement by paying off North Korea’s army has continued unabated for years. Its generosity has never been repaid and the nuclear test is at a very minimum a slap in the face for the policy. Whatever the nuclear test did it certainly doesn’t provide anything positive for the policy.
Its generosity has never been repaid
what do you call the presence of IAEA seals and the lack of weapons testing during the Clinton administration? sounds to me like the quo for our quid.
(also, the term “generosity” implies that we weren’t expecting anything in return. an odd word choice from you.)
(which reminds me of an old joke about why no one ever goes drinking with libertarians. you see, 2 aussies and a libertarian go drinking. 1st aussie buys first round; second aussie buys second round. When the third round is served, the libertarian starts a rant about the oppression and unfairness of implied social contracts.)
Well, perhaps ‘prove’ is too strong, but given the following old news item from 2002
The US Government has announced that it will release $95m to North Korea as part of an agreement to replace the Stalinist country’s own nuclear programme, which the US suspected was being misused.
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework an international consortium is building two proliferation-proof nuclear reactors and providing fuel oil for North Korea while the reactors are being built.
In releasing the funding, President George W Bush waived the Framework’s requirement that North Korea allow inspectors to ensure it has not hidden away any weapons-grade plutonium from the original reactors.
President Bush argued that the decision was “vital to the national security interests of the United States”.
via nitpicker blog
one wonders. Now, that’s just a small news item from back in the day, but it seems like there are three propositions
1)The sunshine policy encouraged NK to run a nuclear test
2)The sunshine policy could have been carried out without the support of the US
3)The sunshine policy didn’t represent the will of the South Korean electorate
and unless you want to answer yes to all of them, you have to genuinely consider the possibility that the Sunshine policy was the correct path. However, if you answer no to any of them, you will have to look in askance at attempts to blame this on the sunshine policy, though I will predict that such accusations will get a lot of play in the coming weeks, especially by people with little knowledge of the long term history of DPRK-US problems.
Also, I’d argue that the Sunshine policy didn’t ‘pay off’ the North Korean army and the ‘unabated for years’ suggests a longer span than the 8 years it has been in place. It may have ‘paid off’ the North Koreans, as a suggested goal of the policy was to prevent reunification and the potential drag on the economy. Of course, you worrying about the generosity of SK not being repaid is interesting, especially since I believe you have argued that the US should withdraw its troops from South Korea because of the ‘ingratitude’ of the South Koreans. I would also note that there is the possibility for South Koreans to regard the nuclear test as a slap in the face to Bush and his refusal to participate in bilateral talks. We will be able to judge that when we see what Ban does in taking office as he has said that one of the first things he will do in office is to travel to North Korea.
But regardless of whether you think the sunshine policy is responsible or not, do you disagree with the suggestion that what has happened will make Northeast Asia much less amenable to US appeals and such? This unfortunately takes us away from blaming the UN, which may distress you, but since we agree that the UN has been neutered in this (though we are probably of different opinions as to why that is) it might be more interesting to talk about the shape of things to come.
It should also make one more cautious, rather than less, that there was apparently zero intelligence that indicated a test was imminent. Losing the ability to predict what is going to happen goes to the heart of what this admin has done.
Finally, a personal note, when Iraq started to unravel a couple of years ago, I often honestly wondered if I was taking secret glee in having been proved correct. While I don’t think I was (or am), I can’t deny that there is a ‘I told you so’ voice in the back of my head. I would suggest that your trumpeting of this as the fault of the UN, with the blame incidentally sloshing a bit onto Bush may also be examined with that in mind.
Here is my question about the UN and North Korea — what do you expect the UN to do?
As far as I can tell, the UN can’t do anything that it’s member states don’t want to do. In particular, what the UNSEC wants to do.
It’s a forum for nations to resolve their issues through diplomatic means, rather than through war. The levers it can bring to bear are, more or less, predicated on good faith and a willingness to abide by the rules. It can bless sanctions and, in extraordinary cases, military action, but it can’t undertake those in and of itself.
What do you expect the UN to do in this case?
Regarding Bush, it’s my understanding that N Korea put an offer on the table of shutting down it’s nuclear weapons program and submitting to inspections in return for a non-aggression agreement. That seems like a pretty damned good deal. It’s also my understanding that Bush walked away from that. So, as far as I can make out, he screwed up.
And, yes, my assumption is that it falls more heavily on the US to make these things happen. That is because we can.
Other minor comments.
“poofy-hair” is a metonymic reference to Kim Jong Il.
“(at least compared to incompetent hegemons…Sparta, not Athens)”
The thing is, Sparta won.
I shouldn’t think so, but thought I would ask. 500 tons seems way big for even a dud, if the shell went off without generating fission.
Already asked and answered, but: only a couple of pounds of high explosive are needed for an implosion bomb.
Now, if they’ve gotten hold of the design for the Bullpup warhead, the size and yield are about right for a non-fizzle. Still, having the design isn’t quite enough; there must be understanding of how the design work. If I were NK and I had a decent design to get a high-order nuclear explosion from the minimum amount of fissionables possible, that’s what I’d test.
And yes, comments regarding trickiness of making nuclear weapons small are on target. Why assume their scientists are incapable?
I don’t have any reason for thinking they could do it, but I don’t see any reason for assuming they can’t.
Teach me to comment before looking about to see what others have said.
“Finally, a personal note, when Iraq started to unravel a couple of years ago, I often honestly wondered if I was taking secret glee in having been proved correct. While I don’t think I was (or am), I can’t deny that there is a ‘I told you so’ voice in the back of my head.”
I take this as a given in almost any political argument. Or maybe I’m just projecting my own schizoid tendencies on everyone else.
One more thing: I’m not sure you’d get the proper effect from a fizzle. I’ve never built, designed or even developed much more than a passing understanding of nuclear weapons, but I rather doubt that a fizzle would have the same…brissance as a high-order explosion.
Excellent point, Donald.
Why assume their scientists are incapable?
The same reason we must assume that KJI must be an absolute lunatic with no rationality. In fact, I tend to view the Clemons argument that KJI can’t stand the fact that Moon is going to head the UN, so they do the nuclear test, as falling to the KJI is mad, I tell you, mad! line. To me, it is the current constellation of political actors and positions that permitted the hard liners to do this and it seems like, given the absence of intelligence, that it must have been set up earlier or at least planned. The lag time from announcement to test was 1 week, though how successful it was is a very good question, and the absence of confirmation (Starr on CNN was saying that they had to figure out what kind of rock was underneath the detonation site before they could give the magnitude. Well, yeah, but if they are only getting around to doing that now, what does that say?) points more to a resurgence of hard-liners in NK.
The Belmont club post is (surprisingly) balanced about the possibilities of a suitcase nuke, but it is very clear that it is only the possession of plutonium (about 25 pounds of the stuff) that makes the suitcase nuke a possibility. This is why the Clinton admin was so anxious to negotiate and why Bush’s choice was the wrong one to make.
Oh, and I just wanted to note that the invocations of ‘poofy hair’, while good for a chuckle, tend to focus on the character (and choice of hair stylists) for KJI and get us away from viewing this as an outgrowth of political stresses and strains within North Korea, stresses and strains that I think have to be taken advantage of if we want a solution that doesn’t involve a second Korean war.
Francis, “(also, the term “generosity” implies that we weren’t expecting anything in return. an odd word choice from you.)”
The Sunshine Policy was a South Korean policy.
L_J:
I don’t believe #1 at all. I believe that the sunshine policy–which had as its major aims the prevention of reunification if caused by the collapse of the NK government (i.e propping up the regime) and the descalation of the hostile environment between SK and NK (interestingly enough by propping up the NK regime). The sunshine policy was often linked with the Agreed Framework. A nuclear test absolutely makes the Sunshine Policy look bad from the point of view of the second aim.
Did it encourage NK to run the test? I doubt it. But since the policy was intended to discourage such things, it certainly failed in that sense.
As to #2, the Sunshine policy was in fact carried out without the United States. I’m not sure I understand what you are trying to say.
As for #3, what is your point? It was a South Korean initiative. I don’t believe in the infallibility of the US electorate, and I certainly don’t believe in the infallibility of the South Korean electorate.
What is this “blame” on the Sunshine Policy? You seem to be transforming “didn’t succeed” in discouraging really aggressive moves like nuclear tests into “caused” nuclear tests. Who is arguing that? I’m certainly not. The only sense that you could blame the Sunshine Policy is that it propped up a super-nasty regime long enough for it to get nukes. I suspect the regime would have survived without the Sunshine Policy so I don’t buy that argument. But if you believe that the regime would have toppled without the Sunshine Policy, I suppose you could “blame” the policy.
“Of course, you worrying about the generosity of SK not being repaid is interesting, especially since I believe you have argued that the US should withdraw its troops from South Korea because of the ‘ingratitude’ of the South Koreans.”
While this is sort of close to something I have said–I believe that we should withdraw ground troops from SK because we have no strategic reason whatsoever for their presence and because their presence seems to drum up resentment–I don’t see how it fits into your argument at all. Are you suggesting that if North Koreans are ungrateful to South Koreans, it is impossible for South Koreans to be ungrateful to the US? I didn’t make that argument at all, and don’t see the contradiction even if I had.
“I would also note that there is the possibility for South Koreans to regard the nuclear test as a slap in the face to Bush and his refusal to participate in bilateral talks.”
Ah, so propping up the dictator with the Sunshine Policy cannot be seen as “causing” the test, but refusing to engage in unilateral talks with the dictator can? That seems odd. Perhaps the dictator himself is more of a cause than either?
“But regardless of whether you think the sunshine policy is responsible or not, do you disagree with the suggestion that what has happened will make Northeast Asia much less amenable to US appeals and such?”
This is far too general for me to agree or disagree with. But the idea that the North Korean bomb will push Japan into the arms of China (as your 7:14 post seems to suggest) is rather unorthodox thinking.
While reading this post, I thought I might check up on the status of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. I came across a March, 2005 Center for National Policy Event Report, “Engaging North Korea: Congress Plays a Role,” that might be of interest to all, especially Rep. Curt Weldon’s (R-PA) comments on page 10.
(Sorry for the long link, but the PDF file wouldn’t come up – found by Googlin’ “nuclear deep earth penetrator.”)
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:JumF5VMgwfsJ:www.cnponline.org/Press%2520Releases/Transcripts/NK%2520Transcript%2520MS%2520edits.pdf+%22nuclear+deep+earth+penetrator%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=4
Thanks for the topic, SH.
In re Nell (4:07, 7:35*), bob mcmanus, LJ, Anarch’s 5:23 link to the Kevin Drum piece (and comments), and others via a series of haikus:
Justification
of GWoT/Cold War policies
leads to this event.
If this is the goal,
why bring up incompetence?
If not, then why war?
Over and over,
self-fulfilling prophecies.
The admin’s MO.
Yet many of us
still take them at their stated
a priori cause.
Too simple a test?:
Do Kim’s nukes best serve the goals
Of the neocons?
Moral clarity:
The only thing understood
is force. Convenient.
A win-win gambit:
US either destroys you
or you duel with guns.
The US’ weapons
are the best tool in the box.
Let’s try to use them.
In re Bob’s thesis:
It is in their interests
to avoid much peace.
It is disheartening to think that those who represent us are engaged in actions that offend our values. But instead of trying to fit the evidence into wished for goals or the end state proffered by the administration, why not follow the evidence and try to base conclusions on that trajectory? I hear a lot of talk about peace being the goal, but so far the preponderance of evidence suggests continued war (from all three admins since the fall of the USSR – US actions in re Israel’s attacks on Gaza and Lebanon being a recent example) unless we accept the very unrealistic outcome of peace being achieved through the eradication of all who oppose the US (see 6:49 – thanks, Francis). To the victors go the spoils…
*Re the September 2002 National Security Strategy: Compare its language and goals to PNAC’s 2000 “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” and other papers in the preceding few years.
Sebastian,
before I address any point you make, why is it L_J? Does the underscore represent some internet convention that I am unaware of?
As far as ‘positing’ that you believe or imply the three statements, I did nothing of the sort. The structure is precisely the same as your 4:29. I can understand that you don’t like being put in the same position, but it is the exactly same thing, so why the outrage?
I find a large part of your comment filled out with the sort of straw that Charley pointed out here and if you actually want discussion about North Korea rather than the perfidy of the UN, you might think about racheting it back a bit. Please also note that my comment was made not in response to anything that you said, but to mattbastard’s comment, so please don’t accuse me of picking this fight.
I would just note 3 points about the content of your post. The first is that the Sunshine policy _was_ supported by the Clinton administration (see the quote of Powell given above) and it was the undercutting of that by Bush, followed by putting NK on the Axis of Evil (with no proof of links to Iraq or Iran) that made the Sunshine policy unworkable.
The second is that calls for pulling out American forces from SK because of their ingratitude seems to underlie your approach to almost all US foreign policy (it certainly seems to underlie your feelings about the UN) and is something that I cannot understand at all. I don’t believe gratitude should be a component for consideration in US foreign policy, and moreover, the idea that the US can withdraw from SK and somehow the regional balance would result in something that the US would be happy with is bizarre (something which this post seems to acknowledge, unless you think that we wouldn’t have had this problem had we just gotten the hell out of there when Bush took office). Though I would point out that your notion of pulling out of SK mirrors the advice that Saudi Prince Bandar apparently gave Bush (according to Woodward):
George W. pulled Bandar aside.
“Bandar, I guess you’re the best asshole who knows about the world. Explain to me one thing.”
“Governor, what is it?”
“Why should I care about North Korea?”
Bandar said he didn’t really know. It was one of the few countries that he did not work on for King Fahd.
“I get these briefings on all parts of the world,” Bush said, “and everybody is talking to me about North Korea.”
“I’ll tell you what, Governor,” Bandar said. “One reason should make you care about North Korea.”
“All right, smart alek,” Bush said, “tell me.”
“The 38,000 American troops right on the border.” …”If nothing else counts, this counts. One shot across the border and you lose half these people immediately. You lose 15,000 Americans in a chemical or biological or even regular attack. The United State of America is at war instantly.”
“Hmmm,” Bush said. “I wish those assholes would put things just point-blank to me. I get half a book telling me about the history of North Korea.”
“Now I tell you another answer to that. You don’t want to care about North Korea anymore?” Bandar asked. The Saudis wanted America to focus on the Middle East and not get drawn into a conflict in East Asia.
“I didn’t say that,” Bush replied.
“But if you don’t, you withdrawl those troops back. Then it becomes a local conflict. Then you have the whole time to decide, ‘Should I get involved? Not involved?’ Etc.”
At that moment, Colin Powell approached.
“Colin,” Bush said, “come here. Bandar and I were shooting the bull, just two fighter pilots shooting the bull.” He didn’t mention the topic.
“Mr. Governor,” Bandar said, “General Powell is almost a fighter pilot. He can shoot the bull almost as good as us.”
(via Rox Populi)
The third is that I think you are far too sanguine about the prospect of a nuclear Japan. Japan has always been a ‘paranuclear’ power, and the possession of 40-50 tons of plutonium as well as the refusal to reconsider the Rokkasho reprocessing plant suggests, as Gavan McCormack points out, that Japanese defense policy rests on a longing for nuclear arms. Furthermore, North Korea does not view Japan as a non-combatant in the Korean war, given that Japan based US assets were a major factor in the war. While the Japanese population doesn’t note this, you can be sure that the Japanese military understands this. This Wash Quarterly article can give some dimensions to the conflict which discusses the reasons why Japan would not go nuclear. However, that article presumes ‘favorable circumstances’ would prevent Japan from going nuclear, and I believe that the circumstances have changed enough that I find it quite possible that despite public revulsion with the notion of going nuclear, Japan would. Of course, if 3-5 years from now, Japan announces ‘defensive nuclear capabilities’ (which have already been discussed and are presumed to be constitutional), I’m sure that I will be told that it wasn’t the fault of the US, but the decision of the Japanese themselves, so in order to avoid that, I’ll agree. But this administration, with its inability to understand that one doesn’t just negotiate with friends but also with enemies, will have set up the conditions to make it happen.
“Is there any purpose in testing the implosion shell without the fissle core, and would that produce a big enough explosion to match the seismic reports?”
In order: yes, and no. You can and should test your implosion shell, lots of times, before the first nuclear test, because implosion is rather difficult to get right.
But for a non-nuclear test to yield a 500t explosion, it would obviously have to involve 500t of explosive, which is far, far more than any implosion shell. Fat Man, all up, weighed less than 5 tonnes.
it would obviously have to involve 500t of explosive
where “explosive” = TNT. i assume there are more powerful conventional explosives – though probably not orders of magnitude more powerful. right?
Right.
There’s more powerful stuff than TNT, but the number of different gauges of explosive power are so varied that there’s no consistent comparison. Octol is generally regarded as more powerful than TNT, but some gauges (blast pressure, for instance) give it less of an advantage. I think ANFO scores fairly low, but certainly one could make a rather large amount of ANFO on the cheap, and fake a small-scale underground test explosion that way.
I’m not aware of anything that gives you an advantage of much over 1.3 over TNT, though, so I doubt there’ll be some miracle explosive that will yield 500t with only 20kg or so of explosive.
it is very clear that it is only the possession of plutonium (about 25 pounds of the stuff) that makes the suitcase nuke a possibility
Less, actually. Fat Man used about 6kg of plutonium and was fairly inefficient by modern standards. From what I’ve readm modern fission weapons have about double the efficiency and can be initiated with smaller masses of fissile material, because they achieve higher compression of the pit and hence can achieve criticality with a lower mass of just a few kg. Although with reactor-grade Pu you can’t do quite as much with so little.
Oh, and there is no “suitcase nuke“.
Interesting, Slart. I wonder who does this website and why they would be interested in presenting it as fact.
“As far as ‘positing’ that you believe or imply the three statements, I did nothing of the sort. The structure is precisely the same as your 4:29. I can understand that you don’t like being put in the same position, but it is the exactly same thing, so why the outrage?”
Having three points doesn’t make a similar structure. Well, except in terms of counting.
You suggested that people are blaming the Sunshine Policy for causing the nuclear test. They aren’t blaming it for causing the test, they are saying that it failed in its aim to prevent and minimize provocations like the nuclear test.
I honestly wonder sometimes if you bother reading my comments before you respond. I have already responded to this. When you said the same thing only a few posts ago I wrote:
So you misunderstanding about my position on US ground troops in South Korea appears to have blossomed into an incorrect characterization of my whole foreign policy understanding. This is especially annoying when the expanded characterization takes place after I have bothered to respond to you by correcting your earlier mischaracterization of my position.
Whatever Sebastian, my original observation was this
The spin will be that it is obvious that the Sunshine policy didn’t work, and had Bush been supported from the get-go, we wouldn’t be in this position. My feeling is that the Sunshine policy now provides South Korea with huge amount of moral clarity can now lobby for greater control by China.
‘will be’ along with my opinion that the Sunshine policy gives SK a lot more leverage with China than Japan, which is trying to force China to sign on to a host of stronger measures. You pick at that and turn it into
You suggested that people are blaming the Sunshine Policy for causing the nuclear test.
“Will be” does not equal “are” so please stop the whining about mischaracterization. You don’t have to agree with what I say, but twisting it so you can claim that it is wrong is pretty pathetic.
Comity, folks.
Can someone please explain to me what this means? I don’t understand it.
I think it means he doesn’t like the corn bread, either.
It means that you are accusing LJ of saying something he didn’t say. Which you are.
Nice Aliens ref, Andrew.
Ok, and so he is ridiculously hurt by transforming his (probably wrong) prediction “will say” into “are” but he is ok with transforming
“I believe that we should withdraw ground troops from SK because we have no strategic reason whatsoever for their presence and because their presence seems to drum up resentment”
into “that calls for pulling out American forces from SK because of their ingratitude…” and furthering even that into “…their ingratitude seems to underlie your approach to almost all US foreign policy…”.
Someone so hypersensitive about the former might want to not repeatedly engage in the latter.
If you transform my argument from “are” back to “will say” you lose absolutely nothing in the argument. It remains true that it would be exceedingly stupid to say (at some point in the future) that the Sunshine Agreement “caused” the test, but it would be normal and logically correct to say (at some point in the future) that the Sunshine Policy failed to stop the nuclear test.
If you transform liberal_japonicus’ distortion back to my actual words, you are left with absolutely no coherent argument whatsoever. It would be: “calls for pulling out American forces based on a lack of strategic reason for their presence seems to underlie your approach to almost all US foreign policy (it certainly seems to underlie your feelings about the UN) and is something that I cannot understand at all.”
To vigorously complain about the former while engaging in the latter is ridiculous.
Sebastian, if you believe that there is “no strategic reason whatsoever” for the US troops to be in South Korea, I’m not really sure if I can make you understand (just as I can’t make you understand the difference between future and present tense).
I simply took this (the “no strategic reasons”) to be your typical rhetorical hyperbole. Would you like to make the case that there is absolutely no strategic purpose to the US presence in South Korea, go ahead, explain why US military policy since Eisenhower has been totally misguided. After all, you are in every other current thread on this, wondering why we didn’t just give North Korea diplomatic recognition in the 60’s (before we actually recognized the PRC)
Just in case you would like to reference what you previously said, the basis for my comment about your position on South Korea was the following
That is fine. But that still doesn’t explain why we have to actually be involved in holding up one of the most evil regimes in the world. If they are going to get nuclear weapons anyway, and if China and North Korea won’t let them collapse, why are we involved at all? Withdraw the troops from South Korea and let them sort it out. South Korea makes huge public shows of not wanting us anyway. Withdraw to Japan and let South Korea and China deal with it. What are we gaining by being involved? It made sense when the Cold War was on. But if no-one wants to take the NPT seriously enough to stop North Korea from getting nukes, and if it is as inevitable as people above claim, why not just withdraw? What is the advantage we gain? We can’t blockade the ships which will trade the nukes anyway without starting the war we cannot start.link
“South Korea makes huge public shows of not wanting us anyway.”
I’m not sure how to take that, except that perceived gratitude does factor into your view of how foreign policy should be run and it seems to influence your view of global strategy.
As far as the other stuff, I’m not hurt by it, I just think it makes you look unserious and underlines your ability to read quickly and merrily skip over things that you might agree with (or even simply disagree with in order to develop the discussion) in order to score points against someone you perceive to be on the ‘other side’. (your ‘probably wrong’ annotation of my prediction is a classic, I might add). Tribalism epitomized, one might say. But just because one [redacted] acts like a tribal idiot, it doesn’t mean that the other side is being tribal when he complains about it.
“Would you like to make the case that there is absolutely no strategic purpose to the US presence in South Korea, go ahead, explain why US military policy since Eisenhower has been totally misguided.”
I didn’t say that at no point in the history of the world did the United States have a strategic interest in having troops in South Korea. I said that it does not (in the present) have a strategic interest. There is no tripwire needed in the Cold War because the Cold War is over. North Korea isn’t a beach-head for the domino theory. It is a cranky state that if it invaded South Korea would be defeated by South Korea. The strategic reason for being there has passed–almost 15 years ago.
Thank you for dredging up exactly what I said before. I think I made the case just as well in my old statement. I outlined the strategic lack of necessity. What you claim as the “gratitude” component is very small–certainly not worthy of you transforming into the entirety of my foreign policy theory.
In short, you have again drastically distorted the core of my position while whining about completely non-critical ‘distortions’ on my part. You are right that one of us isn’t being serious, but like your interpretation of Slarti’s jokes you are wrong about which one of us it is. I’ll also note that again in that case you got incredibly huffy, made insulting projections about my inability to understand simple jokes, and simultaneously biffed the simple understanding.
Face it Sebastian, you misread what I wrote and are now trying to dredge up some parsing where it can be said that I misread what you wrote so you can claim we are even and can avoid responsibility. In a completely separate thread on a different blog, even. Brazen, even for you.
I’ve been more than willing to apologize when I misread something, but in the case that you bring up, I should apologize to Slarti for misreading him, not to you for being a complete and total [redacted]. You are from the party of personal responsibility, own up. Or not, you have the last word, which you can make as Foleyesque as you like.
Cute baby pictures! Well, pictures of a cute baby.
I’m a Yankees fan – what’s your excuse for being cranky?
Umm, no. You misrepresented what I wrote three times in this thread. The first time might have been a misunderstanding.
The second and third are something else entirely.
How about them Knicks?
Hey, and if I wrote something, somewhere that I intended as a joke and someone actually recognized that I intended it as a joke, we should have it bronzed.
Getting the joke calls for pewter, at least, and being amused by it…I dare not hope.
Hey, more pewter! Maybe derived from spelter, aka zinc, not an ingredient of pewter.
A funny video!
“Umm, no. You misrepresented what I wrote three times in this thread. The first time might have been a misunderstanding.”
Sebastian, you might want to quote what you’re responding to.
“You” might not be so mysterious that way, although it’s certainly polite of you to attack some nameless person.
Darn those mysterious “you” people!
“I’ve been more than willing to apologize when I misread something”
Maybe not actually so much.