Message to Petraeus, Part II: Information Ops Overhaul Overdue

by Charles

In my earlier post, I touched on the importance of information operations (IO) in Iraq, noting that it is one of the five main pillars of a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. In that light, I mentioned the travails of Michael Yon, who is doing important work in reporting what is happening on the ground, yet is being shut down by a petulant general. In the cross-posted thread, Bob Owens from Newsbusters.org showed up and named names:

The General who wants to silence Yon is Brigadier General Vincent K. Brooks. In 2005, Brooks was the the lead Public Affairs Officer (PAO) for the United States Army. The stories that got Yon in trouble with Brooks were Proximity Delays and Gates of Fire. Proximity Delays got Yon in trouble, and in Gates of Fire, Yon picked up a rifle and joined combat to help LTC Erik Kurilla, who had been shot three times by an insurgent while CSM Robert Prosser was engaged in hand-to-hand combat with another insurgent. For inserting himself into battle (which violated embed rules) to help fallen American soldiers, and then having the gall to write about it, Brooks tried to kick Yon our [out] of Iraq.

Brooks is back in Iraq, this time as deputy commanding general – support for Multinational Division-Baghdad, and he still obviously carries his grudge against Yon. I confirmed last night with Michael Yon that it is this same General Vincent K. Brooks that sent Yon the email threatening to kick him out of Iraq.

Following his RUBS post, Yon writes a lengthy entry that merits a full read (Warning: Graphic images).

Some excerpts from Yon:

But even critics like Mr. Ricks recognized that some military leaders saw it differently. While old-school commanders stormed in and crushed anything that dared resist, one particular two-star general slipped ingeniously from the kinetic force-on-force mode to a sort of "pre-counterinsurgency." His 101st Airborne Division swept up through Iraq and with masterful strokes—punching when needed, yet pulling punches that other leaders likely would have thrown—they took northern Iraq, and the key city of Mosul.

Mosul was a made-for-insurgency city, surrounded by huge amounts of former generals, tens of thousands of soldiers, and enough weapons and explosives to outfit several European armies.The commander’s work in northern Iraq was the subject of study at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and Newsweek called him Iraq’s Repairman.

To see what a restaurant’s kitchen looks like, just check the restroom. Counterinsurgency—especially when much of the world is watching—is the most complex form of warfare and requires our most agile commanders and soldiers. As with the restroom to kitchen analogy, there is a simple litmus test in this war for commanders who are able to win counterinsurgency battles. Check their press. Good or bad, there should be some; little or none is a bad sign, especially if the enemy is using media.

Some in the military even now disparage this general for his embrace of media, for understanding that complex counterinsurgency warfare can only be successful when the media battles are decisively won. He once corrected a junior officer who wanted to track media coverage according to whether the reports were "positive" or "negative," saying that it only mattered that the reports were accurate, since it was how the soldiers did THEIR job that would largely determine the way people on all sides reacted to news, so long as it was accurate. This Major General’s name is David Petraeus.

General Petraeus is now in charge, but there is no small number under his command who are working at cross-purposes to the COIN strategy. More Yon:

I’ve been back in Iraq now for about three months, and sadly have to report that, despite signs of progress in many key areas of the battle space, the conditions on the media/military front have not improved since early 2005. The hardest part of my job should be surviving the missions, and after that, deciding which one of a dozen possible dispatches should be written. But lately I’ve been fighting just to find a place to live and work—like that tiny trailer with that tiny desk and tiny stool in Mosul. It’s been a month since I’ve had reliable internet access. A month. It took twenty-five hours spread over two days to transmit about a dozen photos for this dispatch. Two work days.

Responses to my questions about a safe place to live and work get wrapped in remarks about being here for free rent and free food. And they’ll say, "You know, we are in a war zone." Then chatter about how busy they are helping press, and almost in the same breath complain about the shortage of accurate stories about the war in our media. Some of the offices of media officers here in Baghdad are bigger and nicer than my attorney’s office. That’s what we’ve come to at the threshold into the fifth year at war in Iraq.

I’m finally starting to understand what so many Vietnam veterans have told me. One overarching message from the front is that our combat forces are overwhelmingly good to the Iraqis and extremely accommodating to media, but there is a deeper substrate. We simply cannot beat the terrorists if we do not learn how to embrace media realities. With all the focus on training Iraqi Security Forces, it might be worth considering training our own team, too.

Yet trapped here with Dr. Strangelove, while some commanders undermine the media war, it bears frequent reminding that General Petraeus has won complex battles before in Iraq. He is extremely open with the media, and nobody with PhD from Princeton would invite a bunch of writers to document an historical fight he plans to lose. He’s invited press to a process he aims to resolve. I’d planned to watch the surge unfold in and around Baghdad and focus on that, but haven’t had much of a chance with Brooks and Gang playing musical chairs. And so that’s a brief of the route here, and the struggle with some commanders to stay and report on your friends, loved ones, and your war. Because, like it or not, this is YOUR war.

I can understand why–since the Vietnam era–soldiers hold a certain amount of bitterness and distrust toward the media, but that won’t solve the problem. Commanders need to engage with local and international media in this Information War. This is part and parcel of the COIN strategy, and those soldiers who fail to apply these methods are hamstringing the war effort. If you don’t believe me, then believe the COIN manual, starting on page 89, emphases mine:

Media and the Battle for Perceptions
5-25. Effective commanders directly engage in a dialogue with the media and communicate IO themes. With the proliferation of sophisticated communication technologies throughout the global information environment, the nature of media coverage has a significant impact on COIN operations at all echelons. Civilian and military media coverage influences the perceptions of the political leaders and public in the host nation, the United States, and throughout the international community. The media directly influence the support of key audiences for COIN forces, the execution of their operations, and the opposing insurgency. Recognition of this influence creates a war of perceptions between insurgents and COIN forces that is conducted continuously through the communications media.

5-26. The media are a permanent part of the information environment and effective media/public affairs operations are critical to successful military operations. Every aspect of a military operation is subject to immediate scrutiny. Well planned, properly coordinated, and clearly expressed IO significantly clear the fog of war and improve the effectiveness and morale of COIN forces, the will of the U.S. public, and the support of the HN people for their government. The right messages can reduce misinformation, distractions, confusion, uncertainty, and other factors that cause public distress and undermine the COIN effort. Constructive and transparent information enhances understanding and support for continuing operations against the insurgency.

5-27. There are numerous methods available to commanders for working with the media to facilitate accurate and timely information flow. These include the following:

• Embedded media.
• Press conferences.
• Applying resources.
• Network with media outlets.

5-28. Embedded media representatives get to know the Soldiers’ and Marines’ perspectives in the context of the COIN environment. Embedding for days rather than weeks runs the risk of media representatives not gaining any real understanding of the context of operations and may lead to unintended misinformation. Media representatives embedding for weeks become better prepared to present an informed report. The media should be given access to the young men and women in the field. These young people nearly always do a fantastic job articulating the important issues for a broad audience and, given a chance, can share their courage and sense of purpose with the American people and the world.

5-29. Weekly press conferences might be held, particularly with HN media, to explain operations and provide transparency to the people most affected by COIN efforts. Such venues also provide an opportunity to highlight the accomplishments of COIN forces and the HN government.

5-30. Commanders should apply time, effort, and money to establish the proper combination of media outlets and communications to transmit the repetitive themes of HN government accomplishments and insurgent violence against the populace. This might require COIN forces to be proactive, alerting media to news opportunities and perhaps providing transportation or other services to ensure proper coverage. Assisting in the establishment of effective HN media is another important COIN requirement. A word of caution here: there can be no perception by the populace or the HN media that the media is being manipulated by COIN or HN forces. Even the slightest appearance of impropriety here can undermine the credibility of the COIN force and the host nation.

5-31. Establishing relationships between COIN leaders and responsible members of the U.S. media is in the interests of the Nation. Without a clear understanding of the COIN efforts, U.S. media representatives relay a message to the American public as best they can. Through these professional relationships, the military can ensure U.S. citizens better understand what their military is doing in support of the Nation’s interests. Operations security must always be maintained, but that should not be used as an excuse to create a media blackout that can lead to misinformation. Similar relationships can be established with international media sources.

5-32. The media are ever present and influence perceptions of the COIN environment. Therefore, successful leaders engage the media, create positive relationships, and help the media tell the story. Otherwise the media develops a story of its own that may not be as accurate and may not include the COIN force perspective. (See JP 3-61, FM 46-1, FM 3-61.1.)

5-33. In developing the information LLO consider the following:

• Consider word choices carefully. Words are important—they have specific meanings and describe policy. For example, is the COIN force a liberator or an occupier? Occupiers generate a "resistance," whereas liberators may be welcomed for a time. Soldiers and Marines can be influenced likewise. In a conflict among the people, terms like "battlefield" influence perceptions and confuse the critical nature of a synchronized approach. Refrain from referring to and considering the area of operations (AO) as a "battlefield" or it may continue to be one.
• Publicize insurgent violence and use of terror to discredit the insurgency.
• Admit mistakes (or actions perceived as mistakes) quickly, and explain these mistakes and actions—including mistakes committed by COIN forces. However, do not attempt to explain actions by the HN government. Instead encourage HN officials to handle such information themselves. They know better the cultural implications of their actions, and honesty should help to build legitimacy.
• Highlight HN government and COIN force successes promptly. Positive results speak loudly and resonate with people. Do not delay communications waiting for all results. Initiate communications immediately to let people know what the COIN force is doing and why. Delaying announcements creates "old news" and misses news cycles.
• Respond quickly to insurgent propaganda. As stated above, delaying a response can let the insurgent story dominate many news cycles, allowing their version of events to become widespread and accepted. This consideration may require giving increased information assets and responsibilities to lower-level leaders, since they are also at the "point of the spear" for IO.
• Shape expectations of the populace. Generally people expect too much too soon, and when the government or COIN force is slow to deliver, people become easily and perhaps unfairly disgruntled.
• Give the people some means to voice their opinions and grievances, even if that activity appears at first to cause short-term friction with ongoing efforts. This applies not just to the formal political process, but even more to the informal, local issues (where government actually touches the people). Develop a feedback loop from populace to local government to ensure needs are identified and perceptions aligned.
• Keep troops engaged with the people. Presence patrols facilitate Soldiers and Marines mingling with the populace. The communication flow works both ways, as the people and COIN forces learn to know each other better.
• Conduct ongoing audience analysis and seek to identify key personnel that influence the people at the local, regional, and national levels. Seek to determine with great specificity the relevant lines of loyalty of a population.
• Take a census as soon as is practicable. Help the local government do this. This information can be helpful for learning about the people and meeting their needs.
• Assist the government in the production and distribution of identification cards. This is an effort to register all citizens—or, at least those nearing a predetermined, adult age. Identification cards may help to track people’s movements, which are useful in identifying illicit activity.
• Treat detainees professionally and publicize their treatment. Arrange for local HN leaders to visit and tour your detention facility. Consider allowing them to speak to detainees. If news media visit your detention facility, allow them as much access as is prudent. (Provide a guided tour and explain your procedures.)
• Consider initiating a dialogue with the opposition. This does not equate to "negotiating with terrorists," and is an attempt to open the door to mutual understanding. There may be no common ground and the enmity may be such that nothing specifically or directly comes of the dialogue. However, if COIN forces are talking, they are using a positive approach—and may learn something. Do not rely solely on the host nation to do this. Consider adopting a "We understand why you fight" mentality—and maybe stating this to the insurgents.
• Work to convince insurgent leadership that the time for resistance has ended and that there are other ways to accomplish what they desire.
• Take the insurgents’ demands and turn them on the insurgents. Examine the disputed issues objectively, and then work with the host nation to resolve them where possible. Then communicate any success as a sign of responsiveness and improvement.
• Communicate the message that the COIN force is robust and persistent, and will assist the population through their present difficulty.
• Learn the insurgent’s messages or narratives and develop countermessages and counternarratives to attack the insurgents’ ideology. An understanding of indigenous culture is required for this activity, and HN personnel can play a key role.

The Bush administration could take a page or two from these principles. I excerpted this portion of the manual to emphasize that this is graduate-level warfare, yet there is no small number in the military who are behaving at third-grade level. Michael Yon calls them "media idiots", and he’s right. If we fail to execute this pillar of the COIN strategy, then we are hurting the rest of the war effort and hamstringing our chances for success. Since our chances aren’t that great to begin with, we don’t have the luxury making more big mistakes. There are some military folks who say that the bitterness and distrust is too entrenched to follow this plan. My answer is this: get over it. It needs to be tried, because if done reasonably well, we get the upper hand in the Information War, and it improve our chances in the Long War. The enemy already understands the importance of the Information War quite well.

To me, the COIN strategy for information ops is both honorable and honest, and if the media sees it put into practice in this fashion, our situation will improve. I should also say that the concepts of information ops and journalism are not the same, but they don’t have to be mutually exclusive. If done right, there could be plenty of overlap. The first step toward improving the environment would be giving Michael Yon a small room, an Internet connection and a unit to embed with, then having our leaders open the door and make it easier for other responsible writers to embed with our forces.