by Eric Martin
Given the ongoing debate about US policy in Afghanistan, and the interplay of al-Qaeda in that decision making process, some background on al-Qaeda's origins and goals would be worthwhile to examine.
al-Qaeda's ideology and outlook are rooted in an Egyptian, not Saudi or Afghan, tradition (drawing heavily on Qutbism and similar doctrine). Many of al-Qaeda's founding members are veterans of the struggle between groups of militant Salafists and the secular regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. One of al-Qaeda's central figures, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was a member of a group (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) that was implicated in, amongst other activitites, assassination attempts on Sadat.
After being imprisoned and tortured for one such assassination plot, an even more radicalized Zawahiri left Egypt for Saudi Arabia and then Pakistan – where he lead a splinter group of Egyptian Islamic Jihad members who were disillusioned with the organization's unwillingness to embrace the takfirist doctrine (or the practice of declaring other Muslims apostates, thus circumventing Koranic prohibitions on the killing of Muslims).
Osama bin Laden, for his part, was one of the 54 children of Muhammed bin Laden - a self made construction mogul of Yemeni nationality (though he relocated to Saudi Arabia at a young age). His mother was a relatively poor Syrian villager, who was married off to the elder bin Laden at young age, giving birth to Osama at the age of 15. Ironically, one of the world's most recognizable Saudis is the son of a Yemeni and Syrian.
His path to radicalization began with the tutelage of members of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization of Egyptian origins) in Saudi Arabia, which teachings were later augmented by al-Zawahiri while both were in Pakistan during the conflict in Afghanistan. As bin Laden and Zawihiri became close, a nascent, though still formless, precursor to al-Qaeda began to coalesce around a worldview rooted in expansive Salafist/Qutbist thought.
Soon thereafter, the formerly unwieldy mass of likeminded radicals was whittled down to "the base" or "al-Qaeda." Two events led to the self selection of al-Qaeda within this context. Initially, when the Afghan campaign ended, many jihadists went back to their nations of origin leaving behind only the most die-hard and those incapable of returning home (often one and the same). Then, this core group (headed by bin Laden himself) migrated to Sudan. bin Laden's group was expelled from that safe-haven in the mid-1990s, and, while some members scattered, bin Laden and his core opted to return to Afghanistan, which again caused a winnowing of the ranks until only the most committed and, increasingly, the most anti-American were left behind to form the vanguard of the Salafist jihadist movement.
The primary raison d'etre of this group, animated by the belief that secular regimes in the Muslim world are quislings of the United States, apostate in character and "against Islam," became to overthrow the corrupt leaders and replace them with proper Islamic rulers and Sharia law (such process to be replicated across the region until there is the contiguous, quasi-mythical, caliphate). By restoring this form of pure Islam, it is believed, the Muslim world will be rewarded by Allah and returned to glory.
Initial attempts to spark revolutions and usher in pure Islamic rule in places like Sudan, Chechnya and the Balkans were unsuccessful, and attacks in places like Egypt were not well received by the locals. At this point, there was a shift in strategy for the demoralized group. Zawahiri counseled in favor of targeting the "far enemy" (read: the United States) as a means of expediting the toppling of local leaders (the "near enemy"). According to Zawahiri, al-Qaeda could not unseat the target regimes because they were being propped up by the U.S. If al-Qaeda could cause the US to withdraw its support, however, the regimes would then be vulnerable to usurpation.
In addition, while targeting fellow Muslims (the representatives of the governments being attacked) was alienating potential recruits, striking the US would galvanize support and create a mass movement that would be primed to topple the regimes once the US was chased from the region. Osama bought into this shift in focus, and began issuing calls for action against the U.S. interests everywhere.
The linchpin to this strategy was to provoke the US into invading a Muslim country (Afghanistan) and thus tie it down for several years of futile - and excessively costly - warfare, while Muslims from throughout the world poured in to join the cause. Then, with the US weakened, bankrupt, fatigued and unable/unwilling to project power and provide resources to its Middle Eastern allies, a reinvigorated al-Qaeda would launch its "near" campaign anew, with its army of new recruits already mobilized.
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