by Eric Martin
In the debate over the future of US policy in Afghanistan, it is taken as a given by most proponents of prolonging the occupation that our presence is benefiting the Afghan people. According to this view, we are a bulwark against Taliban aggression – a prophylactic for a liberal-minded, yet vulnerable, contingent of Afghan civilians. In fact, through repetition and embellishment, the factions that we are supporting have become stand-ins for the entire Afghan population, at least in the abstract. To leave, it is argued, would be to abandon "Afghanistan" the nation, or the "Afghan people," writ large.
This formulation ignores the obvious rejoinder that for US forces to stay and battle the "Taliban" (whatever that term is supposed to mean on any given day) means to target large swaths of that same Afghan population. Some of the anti-government groups are remnants of the Pashtun-dominated Mullah Omar-led Taliban that hosted al-Qaeda, some are entirely unrelated tribal entities, some are ordinary Afghans radicalized by the presence of a foreign occupying army, some are narco-warlords defending their turf and revenue stream, some smaller group are foreign fighters, etc.
Regardless of the exact identity and motivations, and aside from the small group of foreign fighters, the people that we are killing also count as the Afghan people. In actuality, we are protecting certain Afghan factions while doing our best to kill others. It is an unstated, reflexive act of dehumanization to associate our favored factions with the "Afghan people" while relegating those groups that oppose the Afghan government to some form of limbo status in terms of their humanity/national identity.
Not to mention the fact that in the crossfire, we are also unintentionally killing Afghans that we readily recognize as Afghans. Here are some stories from some of the people that we are protecting:
At first light last Friday, in the Chardarah district of Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, the villagers gathered around the twisted wreckage of two fuel tankers that had been hit by a Nato airstrike. They picked their way through a heap of almost a hundred charred bodies and mangled limbs which were mixed with ash, mud and the melted plastic of jerry cans, looking for their brothers, sons and cousins. They called out their names but received no answers. By this time, everyone was dead.
What followed is one of the more macabre scenes of this or any war. The grief-stricken relatives began to argue and fight over the remains of the men and boys who a few hours earlier had greedily sought the tanker's fuel. Poor people in one of the world's poorest countries, they had been trying to hoard as much as they could for the coming winter.
"We didn't recognise any of the dead when we arrived," said Omar Khan, the turbaned village chief of Eissa Khail. "It was like a chemical bomb had gone off, everything was burned. The bodies were like this," he brought his two hands together, his fingers curling like claws. "There were like burned tree logs, like charcoal.
"The villagers were fighting over the corpses. People were saying this is my brother, this is my cousin, and no one could identify anyone."
So the elders stepped in. They collected all the bodies they could and asked the people to tell them how many relatives each family had lost.
A queue formed. One by one the bereaved gave the names of missing brothers, cousins, sons and nephews, and each in turn received their quota of corpses. It didn't matter who was who, everyone was mangled beyond recognition anyway. All that mattered was that they had a body to bury and perform prayers upon.
"A man comes and says, 'I lost my brother and cousin', so we gave him two bodies," said Omar Khan. "Another says I lost five relatives, so we gave him five bodies to take home and bury. When we had run out of bodies we started giving them limbs, legs, arms, torsos." In the end only five families went away without anything. "Their sons are still missing."
While on the homefront, many Americans are convinced that we are protecting the "Afghan people," the view in Afghanistan can vary greatly with respect to the security benefits of our presence. Obviously, the Afghans in the above-cited piece might not take such a rosy view of our mission – nor would Afghans in the regions targeted by US military action. Further, as Joshua Foust recounts, some villagers in areas where we have taken up defensive positions have struck deals with US forces to stay outside of their population centers because the presence of US forces brings conflict to their doorstep.
In other words, in Nuristan we had begun enacting the McChrystal policy over a year before it got pushed out as an order. Only, as we know from Want, it ended very poorly (rumor has it the villagers near Want asked the U.S. to withdraw from the region because their presence made security nearby substantially worse off). […]
Moreover, as this Washington Post piece makes clear, in places like Kamu and Kamdesh the U.S. almost never interacts with the local population anyway (a little birdie told me the community of Kamdesh struck an agreement with the military that no one from its Observation Post 300 meters away will ever step foot inside their village). Needless to say, there’s not much “reconstruction” going on there, either—the provincial capital is still a dreary, empty nothing. It’s not like the people will really notice our absence.
Undoubtedly, our presence breeds conflict at least as much – though likely more – than it breeds stability.
The narrative of US forces as peace-bringers, and defenders of the virtuous, is an archetypal story, a common form of wartime propaganda prevalent amongst warring populations intent on buttressing their efforts with some moral undergirding (also, often detached from reality – see, ie, US armed support for the "good guys" in Central and South America, Southeast Asia and elsewhere). It's a good war, after all, and we are the good guys, defending the foreign born good guys, in pursuit of a common humanitarian good. While there are elements of truth to this characterization, the story begins to break down upon closer scrutiny – as touched on above. In truth, we fight wars to further our interests. Sometimes those align with local groups. If so, we champion their cause - often regardless of how "good" or "bad" that group is.
Not only is it the case that the continuation of our mission involves both intentionally and unintentionally killing thousands of actual Afghan people (that we are ostensibly there to protect), so too are the factions that we are championing far from the virtuous liberal-minded freedom fighters that the good guys vs. bad guys narrative demands. For example, Afghan women's groups have complained that the warlords cobbled together to form Karzai's government are every bit as brutal toward women as the Taliban.
The U.S. military may have removed the Taliban, but it installed warlords who are as anti-woman and as criminal as the Taliban. Misogynistic, patriarchal views are now embodied by the Afghan cabinet, they are expressed in the courts, and they are embodied by President Hamid Karzai.
Paper gains for women's rights mean nothing when, according to the chief justice of the Afghan Supreme Court, the only two rights women are guaranteed by the constitution are the right to obey their husbands and the right to pray, but not in a mosque.
These are the convictions of the government the U.S. has helped to create. The American presence in Afghanistan will do nothing to diminish them.
The staggering level of criminality and corruption rife in the Afghan government, in addition to proving a stubborn impediment to winning the population's support, serves as a reminder of the moral ambiguity in terms of our allies and adversaries. While it requires extra effort to keep track of these nuances from a distance, the Afghan people are confronted with these realities on a daily basis. The results from a poll of Afghans commissioned by Britain's Department for International Development are telling of the divergent views of this war and its moral justifications depending on one's proximity to the violence:
Respondents could not understand why the Coalition forces were in Afghanistan. They reasoned that their objectives were clearly not to bring security to local populations, as their mere presence exacerbated violence and increased the numbers of civilians killed in air strikes. They also rejected the idea that Coalition forces were serious either about democracy or, separately, development. Democracy could not be an aim as the Afghan population had never been consulted about the occupation in the first place. And although western publics had been consulted about the recent surge ordered by President Obama the Afghan parliament and people had not (‘So if this is western style democracy we don’t want it’). The development efforts of international agencies was seen as delivering only very small projects which didn’t have significant impact and employed few people (demand for projects that created local employment was huge). The lack of clarity on US and Coalition motivations led to speculations about ‘real’ motives.
Further:
10. All respondents had ideas about what should be done to bring security. The responses were remarkably consistent across all groups and can be summarised as follows:
• The government should formally bring the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami into the democratic process and allow the leaders to stand for election. The leaders must first come off the UN black list (on the basis that some very violent warlords and abusers of human rights were already in government yet some on the black list were not guilty of such crimes). As one respondent said: ‘Even though the Taliban have a restricted idea of Islam and women’s rights they didn’t commit crimes against humanity but the Northern Alliance did, and many who committed such crimes are now in government.’ And: ‘If there are trials then it should be for both parties’.
• The military objectives of foreign forces should be made publically known. Two quotes reflect the general sentiment: ‘They say there are here to root out Al Qa’eda and Osama but we all know that these people are not in Afghanistan’. ‘There should be a legal agreement between the Coalition forces and the government which specifies what they are here for and what they are allowed to do – currently they have no legality from the government or the people of Afghanistan. This ambiguity about their mission and objectives has created a lot of suspicion in the minds of the public – some say they are here for revenge, some say they are after historical relics, some say it is oil or uranium. If their mission is known and people can understand their mission then it would be a lot easier for them as well as the people of Afghanistan’…
Obviously unaddressed in this post are our strategic interests for prolonging our occupation of Afghanistan. Rather, this piece was intended to question some of the moral assumptions that are taken for granted when analyzing our mission in the region, and as a reminder that the situation on the ground looks vastly different to the Afghan people whose cause we are supposedly championing – at least those groups of Afghans that we are not actively trying to destroy (or end up killing mistakenly).
(See, also, conservative foreign policy wonk, Jim Henley)
“Obviously unaddressed in this post are our strategic interests for prolonging our occupation of Afghanistan.”
And however we may disagree on that, I can certainly appreciate you for making the distinction.
Right. This really was intended to focus on some of the assumptions underlying the “for the good of the Afghan people we must prolong this occupation” argument.
Basically: For the good of which Afghan people? Do they get a vote?
It is an unstated, reflexive act of dehumanization to associate our favored factions with the “Afghan people” while relegating those groups that oppose the Afghan government to some form of limbo status in terms of their humanity/national identity.
Very nicely put. Thanks for this, Eric.
So now the libs want to say Taliban=Afghan people to justify surrender in Afghanistan. As if it weren’t easy enough to tell a warlord from a poor little girl trying to go to school.
So now the libs want to say Taliban=Afghan people
So now the conservos want to say Taliban = Swedes? Irish? English?
If not Afghan, what nationality are the Talibs?
Please, enlighten us libs.
And what on earth does “surrender in Afghanistan” mean. Surrender what? We’re not ceding them California fercryinoutloud. If by surrender you mean eventually withdraw our military forces from their country, that is one of the more strained definitions of surrender I’ve come across.
Eric,
I don’t understand your logic. Of course the Taliban aren’t English. But saying that all Taliban are Afghan doesn’t imply that all Afghans are Taliban, or even that the majority are. It’s kind of like how all members of al-Qaeda are muslim, but not all muslims are members of al-Qaeda.
And no, by “surrender” I do not mean “eventually withdraw our military forces from their country.” I mean it in the colloquial sense of give up, capitulate, or quit. We went to war to drive the Taliban from power. After 9/11 we told them to surrender Bin Laden or we would drive them from power. They never gave us Bin Laden. If withdraw from Afghanistan with them still in control of the country, they win. It’s pretty obvious. If you’re willing to let your enemy win because you don’t want to fight anymore, that’s the definition of surrender.
I don’t understand your logic.
Are you sure you read the post?
Of course the Taliban aren’t English. But saying that all Taliban are Afghan doesn’t imply that all Afghans are Taliban, or even that the majority are.
OK, show me where I argued – or implied – that all Afghans are Taliban. Or even that a majority are.
All I said was that Taliban are Afghans too. That is all. You, on the other hand, questioned that by asking if liberals were now saying that the Taliban are Afghan people. Strange.
We went to war to drive the Taliban from power.
I disagree. We went to war to kill and disrupt al-Qaeda. In the process, we toppled the Taliban because we viewed that step as necessary – which I agreed with at the time and stand by.
If withdraw from Afghanistan with them still in control of the country, they win. It’s pretty obvious.
First of all, they are not “still” in control of the country. So, obvious? No. Second, the war to disrupt al-Qaeda was quite successful, so we won. The only way those gains can be turned back is if al-Qaeda is able to set up camps with the same range of motion as before the war.
This won’t happen even if we withdraw because we can disrupt from afar.
So, again, not obvious.
If you’re willing to let your enemy win because you don’t want to fight anymore, that’s the definition of surrender.
Except your premises are all wrong about who our enemy is, and what constitutes winning.
“For the good of which Afghan people? Do they get a vote?”
Well, not to quibble, but technically they did — even if the vote wasn’t given the respect it deserved.
As I understand it, though, the recount is still ongoing — meaning the final tally could show Karzai with less than 50%, and that would mean a runoff between Karzai and Abdullah.
If that election could be handled decently — and I realize this is a lot of “ifs” so far — the legitimacy issue could be dealt with yet.
I know this is a little off topic, so I understand if you don’t want to respond here.
Shit. Let me try something
That work?
Well, not to quibble, but technically they did — even if the vote wasn’t given the respect it deserved.
Well, yeah they got “a” vote. But so did the Iraqis under Saddam. An extreme example, I admit, but the point being getting a vote is meaningless if the outcome is predetermined regardless, or the fraud so prevalent, as to disregard the will of the people.
Well, not to quibble, but technically they did — even if the vote wasn’t given the respect it deserved.
Point, I read Eric’s comment about the vote as referring to whether Afghans got to vote over continued occupation. Clearly, results in the recent election tell us nothing about whether Afghans wish us to continue occupying their country.
If that election could be handled decently — and I realize this is a lot of “ifs” so far — the legitimacy issue could be dealt with yet.
Many people believe that Karzai is a crook who rigged an election. If he refuses to rig another election, that does not settle the legitimacy issue. If I murder someone and get off on a technicality, my refusal to murder the judge in my trial does not mean I’m a good citizen.
OK, show me where I argued – or implied – that all Afghans are Taliban. Or even that a majority are.
From your original post:
This formulation ignores the obvious rejoinder that for US forces to stay and battle the “Taliban” (whatever that term is supposed to mean on any given day) means to target large swaths of that same Afghan population.
Now, maybe you didn’t intend “large swaths” to imply majority, but that’s what it sounds like, and it at least implies a substantial portion. I was trying to read your post charitable by assuming that you meant something more than the trivial point that Taliban fighters are of Afghan nationality, which is obvious and not in dispute by anyone I’ve ever heard of.
The problem is that Taliban does not comprise “large swaths” of the population. They have a small number of highly motivated fighters. To the extent that Afghan civilians “support” the Taliban, they tolerate them because they are scared for their lives. Or because they’re even more afraid of people like Dostum. Removing the US from the country is not going to help these people. A real COIN operation, however, with the goal of victory will. (It’s funny how afraid some people are of the V-word.)
the war to disrupt al-Qaeda was quite successful, so we won.
Google Tora Bora. Plus, this ignores the fact that we did NOT go to war just against al-Qaeda: we also explicitly went to war against the Taliban as well. The Taliban harbored al-Qaeda, refused to turn them over, and we publicly declared that we would make no distinction between terrorists and the regimes that harbored them, i.e. between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. That was a major part of U.S. strategy, and the President repeated it over and over. You may disagree because you think Bush “stole” the election or whatever, but you can’t just pretend it didn’t happen or push it down the memory hole.
And yes, the Taliban are in control of the country. At least outside of Kabul. At least at night. The Afghan people know this, which is why they accept them, but you misjudge this as authentic support.
“This won’t happen even if we withdraw because we can disrupt from afar.”
I apologize if you’ve made this point before but — weren’t we “disrupting AQ from afar” throughout the 1990’s? I’m pretty sure we made a number of predator drone strikes and the like.
Problem was we had some trouble getting intel on their locations, given restrictions on the ground, so our opportunities were few and far between. Nowadays, drone strikes and other such “disruptions” have become commonplace (with their share of fallout and collateral damage).
So wouldn’t “withdrawal” (and I apologize if this mis-characterizes the position) bring us back to the position we were in before?
(PS I should probably explain my last short comment was an attempt to reverse the italics problem, which now seems resolved.)
Eric, just to be clear, your last response was part of the point of the original post.
We’re in no disagreement on the the illegitimacy of the initial vote results.
I apologize if you’ve made this point before but — weren’t we “disrupting AQ from afar” throughout the 1990’s? I’m pretty sure we made a number of predator drone strikes and the like.
I think Eric has already explained why this is wrong here.
Problem was we had some trouble getting intel on their locations, given restrictions on the ground, so our opportunities were few and far between.
I imagine we must be getting spectacular intel now from all those Afghani towns and villages that have cut deals with us requiring that we never go anywhere near them. I’m still confused how we’re supposed to get good intel just by having soldiers sitting there.
Removing the US from the country is not going to help these people. A real COIN operation, however, with the goal of victory will. (It’s funny how afraid some people are of the V-word.)
I don’t hear you clapping! LOUDER!
So wouldn’t “withdrawal” (and I apologize if this mis-characterizes the position) bring us back to the position we were in before?
Yeah, exactly. It’s designed to restore the status quo ante. Rewind the clock to September 10, 2001.
Uncle Kvetch,
Is that some kind of inside joke. I’m sorry, but I don’t know what that means.
Now, maybe you didn’t intend “large swaths” to imply majority, but that’s what it sounds like, and it at least implies a substantial portion.
Imply majority? No, I was going for the actual definition. Substantial portion? Yes.
was trying to read your post charitable by assuming that you meant something more than the trivial point that Taliban fighters are of Afghan nationality, which is obvious and not in dispute by anyone I’ve ever heard of.
But you wouldn’t know that if you listened to the rhetoric about abandoning the “Afghan people” and “abandoning Afghanistan.” As I pointed out in the post, so you wouldn’t get confused.
The problem is that Taliban does not comprise “large swaths” of the population.
But they do. Read the linked pieces. Read about the Tajik factions joining the coalition of resistance groups.
To the extent that Afghan civilians “support” the Taliban, they tolerate them because they are scared for their lives. Or because they’re even more afraid of people like Dostum.
This is simply not true in the absolutists terms that you are using. This actually proves my point about disregarding certain Afghan civilians as actual Afghan civilians!
A real COIN operation, however, with the goal of victory will. (It’s funny how afraid some people are of the V-word.)
No, a goal of “victory” doesn’t help anyone. Achieving “victory” could, in theory. But, pray tell, what is this victory that people are so afraid of. Please provide a definition to dispel fears.
Google Tora Bora.
I did. It says nothing about disrupting and killing al-Qaeda.
Do yourself a favor and google Marc Sageman, Peter Bergen and any other terrorism expert and read what they say about our efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Plus, this ignores the fact that we did NOT go to war just against al-Qaeda: we also explicitly went to war against the Taliban as well.
Only for their relation to al-Qaeda. We were actually on decent terms with the Taliban otherwise. But we toppled the Taliban, and accomplished that goal too.
we publicly declared that we would make no distinction between terrorists and the regimes that harbored them, i.e. between al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Don’t be fooled by speeches and public rhetoric. We make obvious and significant distinctions. See, ie, Pakistan.
That was a major part of U.S. strategy, and the President repeated it over and over. You may disagree because you think Bush “stole” the election or whatever, but you can’t just pretend it didn’t happen or push it down the memory hole.
No, you’re getting fooled again by speeches. I don’t care how Bush was elected, we clearly distinguish between the Pakistani government and their terrorist proxies, be they Lashkar or al-Qaeda.
And yes, the Taliban are in control of the country. At least outside of Kabul. At least at night. The Afghan people know this, which is why they accept them, but you misjudge this as authentic support.
Again, you illustrate my point!
The Afghan people don’t support the Taliban. Therefore, any people in that region that support the Taliban aren’t the Afghan people. You speak for the Afghan people, and they are solely comprised of our allies or those too scared of the Taliban (who aren’t the Afghan people?)
“If I murder someone and get off on a technicality, my refusal to murder the judge in my trial does not mean I’m a good citizen.”
This metaphor has a few problems, but one sticks out:
Namely, the point of murdering somebody is, presumably, to make that person dead, which, once done, is irreversible.
Whereas a stolen election, the point is to stay in power, and if that prospect is endangered (with, say, a runoff election where you can’t double down on fraud), the point is lost.
Yeah, exactly. It’s designed to restore the status quo ante. Rewind the clock to September 10, 2001
No, please see the link Turbulence provided for why this is wrong on so many levels.
This metaphor has a few problems
I agree, and yet I think that Karzai is damaged goods beyond repair.
Unfortunately, it will be very hard to find a pro-US voice that isn’t immediately compromised by virtue thereof.
So now the libs want to say Taliban=Afghan people to justify surrender in Afghanistan.
This was disingenuous(1), question-begging(2) and irrelevant(3) when it came from a front-page poster a week ago, (“If you think that US interests are best served by leaving Afghanistan as a failed state or under Taliban control, it won’t change your outlook on the war. You’ll still want the troops to come home.”) and following so soon on von’s heels, it’s boring too.
(1) He simply did not say “Taliban=Afghan people”. He said the former were a subset of the latter. You read into his statement that “large swathes” implies majority for no reason I can see – even only 10 percent of the population of a country of millions is a large swath. You should really either clarify what you meant or apologize for your own misunderstanding or misstatement, whatever it was.
(2) Actually, yes, it often is hard to tell the difference between Taliban supporters and non-Taliban supporters. The difference between a poor little girl about to go to school – with an apple to put on the teacher’s desk, maybe? – versus a warlord may be obvious, but what’s the difference between an Afghan teenager who’s mad at American soldiers because he’s been drinking Taliban Kool-Aid and an Afghan teenager who’s mad at American soldiers because he’s a teenager? What’s the difference between villagers who want us to pay because they like the Taliban and villagers who want us to pay because a NATO airstrike just blew up their brothers?
(3) OK, even if you’re right, so what? Obviously a politician can’t say this, but I’m not running for an elected office at the moment. What if we leave Afghanistan even if war fetishists could honestly describe it as “surrender”? There’s an argument to be had about that, but you aren’t making it, you’re just questioning the patriotism, or maybe balls, of people who disagree with you.
The difference between a poor little girl about to go to school – with an apple to put on the teacher’s desk, maybe? – versus a warlord may be obvious
The harder distinction is between a warlord we classify as “Taliban” and another that we don’t.
One more thought:
The problem is that Taliban does not comprise “large swaths” of the population. They have a small number of highly motivated fighters
And yes, the Taliban are in control of the country. At least outside of Kabul. At least at night.
So let me get this straight:
A small group of fighters controls an entire country, despite the best efforts of over 100,000 NATO/Afghan gov forces.
How is that possible? Are they that good, this small group of fighters, that they can control that much territory despite US military opposition? Wow.
Uncle Kvetch, Is that some kind of inside joke. I’m sorry, but I don’t know what that means.
Here’s a primer. HTH.
Whereas a stolen election, the point is to stay in power, and if that prospect is endangered (with, say, a runoff election where you can’t double down on fraud), the point is lost.
Legitimacy is about trust. If the President tried to steal an election and was caught in the act, would you trust him? Would you consider him a trustworthy leader? More to the point, let’s assume that the runoff is not rigged. Why should an average Afghan believe that to be true? The rational thing to do is to assume that Karzai is an untrustworthy crook who cheated once, got caught, and has now found a way to cheat without getting caught.
Once you’ve destroyed trust, it is extremely difficult to rebuild it. I mean, if Karzai is such a dishonest crook that he would rig an election, what rational basis is there to believe that he’s trustworthy? And if he’s not trustworthy, how can his government possibly have any legitimacy, no matter how many elections he “wins”?
My main problem with this post is that Eric seems determined to believe that the Taliban are, in fact, representative of “large swaths” of the Afghan population. By fighting the Taliban, we are also fighting these people and their rights, because the Taliban are their legitimate representatives.
I think this vastly overestimates Taliban support. Eric hasn’t marshaled any real evidence for this view, and I have major problems using the DFID “poll” for this purpose. The “poll” is really interviews with a grand total of 192 people from three insurgent-heavy areas of Afghanistan – Wardak province, Kandahar, and areas near Kabul that are under insurgent attack.
The purpose was to determine why people might join insurgent groups, NOT to figure out how broad Taliban support was. Naturally a survey of enemy motivation will find many complaints about foreign forces and corrupt officials, just as an equivalent survey of ANSF recruits might find stories of Taliban atrocities or determination to protect Afghanistan’s first elected government.
Compare vs. the BBC’s poll of over 1,500 Afghans from every province in the country, which shows massive and broad rejection of the Taliban (only 4% want a Taliban government, while 90% reject the presence of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan).
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf
The Afghan gov is undoubtedly corrupt and filled with cheating and vote-rigging. But better a government of such than one that openly denies the right to an election at all.
The Afghan gov is filled with people who are determined to see Afghan women cowed and submissive, yes. But the Afghan government also promotes education for women and girls, and encourages women to work. The Taliban is adamantly and openly against both.
To say that there is no difference between even a brutal and corrupt Afghan gov influenced by Western donors and a Taliban government influenced primarily by jihadis from al-Qaeda and the Pakistani military is a lie. The Afghan people know the difference, and we should as well.
No, you’re getting fooled again by speeches. I don’t care how Bush was elected, we clearly distinguish between the Pakistani government and their terrorist proxies, be they Lashkar or al-Qaeda.
I think, if we’re discussing what the goals of a war were, repeated declarations by the President as to the goals of the war, made at the time the war commenced, are pretty relevant, if not conclusive.
As for “the Afghan people,” we seem to be talking past each other. I understand that the Taliban are themselves Afghan, so it’s inaccurate to say that 100% of Afghanis oppose the Taliban because the Afghanis in the Taliban do not oppose themselves. The question is their level of “support” among the civilian population, and what constitutes “support.” I’m not trying to be absolutist: I’m sure there are SOME Afghan civilians who think the Taliban are just swell. But they are not typical or representative, which is the impression given by your “large swaths” comment.
I don’t care how Bush was elected, we clearly distinguish between the Pakistani government and their terrorist proxies, be they Lashkar or al-Qaeda.
This is a red herring. I was talking about Afghanistan . In Afghanistan it was explicitly US policy NOT to distinguish between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Did we consistently apply this principle to other nations and other terrorists groups? No, but this has no bearing on the point. Are you seriously trying to argue that we didn’t go to war against the Taliban? Saying that we were “on decent terms” with the Taliban, except for the whole 9/11 thing, is like asking “except for that Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the theater?” After 9/11, we were most certainly not on good terms with the Taliban. We publicly threatened them with war, issued an ultimatum, and when our demands were not met we went to war against them. No that war isn’t working out so well, so instead of trying a new strategy (COIN), you want to pretend like they were just innocent bystanders.
I mentioned Tora Bora because that’s where Bin Laden got away. He’s still putting out videotapes, but you pretend we’ve been remarkably successful.
After 9/11 we told them to surrender Bin Laden or we would drive them from power. They never gave us Bin Laden
They tried.
The Taliban government knew damned well that if the US wanted to start bombing their country, there was nothing the Taliban could do to stop them. They attempted, at least twice, to offer a negotiated settlement that would have included surrendering Osama bin Laden for trial: the Bush administration rejected it.
Had the issue simply been wanting Osama bin Laden on trial for the terrorist attack on the US, the direct and obvious option would have been a backroom deal with the Taliban offering aid to Afghanistan in exchange for information about exactly where bin Laden was to let him be captured by a small strike force.
From my memory of the weeks between 9/11 and 10/8, there was such an overwhelming blood lust in the US – a need to hit back at something – that mere police work of taking bin Laden would not have satisfied. Americans wanted a war: they wanted thousands of “ragheads” to die: they had (many of my friends) the fantastic belief that American missiles and bombs would only ever hit deserving targets.
The country which could be said to be directly responsible for 9/11 and al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, was a country the US could not afford to attack, both for oil-related and religiopolitical-related reasons. And attacking Iraq required a lot more build-up. So if the US people were to be satisfied with a rapid-response war, Afghanistan was a safe target.
By early 2002, Marc Herrold pointed out, even the news reports (which we can guess may have shown 1/10th of the total casualties) were recording at least three thousand Afghan civilians killed. People who had absolutely no power to surrender Osama bin Laden: who probably couldn’t have found New York on a map: who were not Taliban or al-Qaeda or anything but innocent victims of the US bloodlust following 9/11.
The claim that the US is in Afghanistan for the benefit of the Afghan people was always a lie. Afghans are paying for the US occupation with their lives.
Also, let’s not confuse Nuristan or the Korengal Valley with the rest of Afghanistan, or even the rest of the Afghan south. It’s an extraordinarily remote place, ethnically and religiously different than the rest of Afghanistan (Korengalis are the only Afghans who embrace Wahhabism), and the quite ferocious opposition there is more likely Taliban-backed local militias fighting for timber smuggling rights and revenge rather than Taliban themselves. Joshua Foust certainly doesn’t believe that we should withdraw from Afghanistan (quite the opposite), so it’s a bit dishonest to use him to back your argument.
There’s an argument to be had about that, but you aren’t making it, you’re just questioning the patriotism, or maybe balls, of people who disagree with you.
No, just your judgment. I never said anything about “patriotism” or “balls.” This is an old rhetorical trick. Liberal advocates a position that Conservative thinks endangers national security. Instead of dealing with the Conservative’s concern, Liberal accuses of Conservative of questioning his patriotism. Thus, Conservative either has to accept Liberal’s policy or be portayed as a McCarthyite. It’s an old trick, and I’m not falling for it.
Uncle Kvetch,
Ok, I read that link, what’s the point. It’s some Peter Pan analogy to Donald Rumsfeld? What does that have to do with anything? Or is it just some kind of all-purpose liberal taunt?
The Taliban are also killing the Afghan people, twice as fast as ISAF-ANA. The answer, to me, is to refrain from actions that put civilians at risk, which is what we’ve started doing, which will expose Taliban tactics for what they are.
Scott Simon from NPR recounts how good for the people the Taliban was, and Afghans weigh in here. They want a change in strategy, too, specifically better security:
The Pakistani government says that our presence is for the good of its people.
Concerning your Foust link, his point was that Nuristan had little to no strategic value, and he makes sense.
In your “Testing Hypotheses” link, this point is also highly relevant.
Rather than cut and run, Eric, I think we can do it better, and I think McChrystal should have a shot in trying.
“We have [a] hardened our targets, [b] trained enormous amounts of intel resources on al-Qaeda, [c] began coordinating between intel outfits (foreign and domestic), [d] unleashed economic warfare… Today we [e] have rules of engagement regarding missile strikes that are arguably too loose, but in any event NOTHING like before 9/11.”
I’ll try to get back to talk about step e, but:
Steps a and d are fine enough for making life a little harder for AQ, and steps b and c are fine in preventing terrorist attacks — but when it comes to finding the bases, to capture or (more likely) kill those within, you need a little something more.
Like I said, I’ll try to get back…
think, if we’re discussing what the goals of a war were, repeated declarations by the President as to the goals of the war, made at the time the war commenced, are pretty relevant, if not conclusive.
Not if the rhetoric is demonstrably false. You said that we make no distinction between regime and terrorist group, and we know this because Bush said so. I pointed out that this was clearly false. Also, stated goals change. Bush’s initial goals of building a western liberal democracy were altered also. Doesn’t mean the new goals = surrender.
This is a red herring. I was talking about Afghanistan . In Afghanistan it was explicitly US policy NOT to distinguish between al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Not a red herring, a direct refutation of your proof.
I mentioned Tora Bora because that’s where Bin Laden got away. He’s still putting out videotapes, but you pretend we’ve been remarkably successful
We have been extremely successful in disrupting al-Qaeda. This is a consensus opinion amongst experts. Look to the West Point Counterterrorism Center. Look to the NCTC. Look to Bergen, Sageman, etc. Osama got away. That was most unfortunate, and a big mistake of the Bush team. But that doesn’t change the fact that we have greatly, greatly disrupted al-Qaeda. In fact, Petraeus says they aren’t even in Afghanistan any more. That’s pretty good. Unless you think he’s lying?
See, also:
http://washingtonindependent.com/58518/al-qaeda-is-almost-finished
Are you seriously trying to argue that we didn’t go to war against the Taliban?
I’m saying that we went to war with them because of their relationship to al-Qaeda. Meaning, we could and did tolerate their existence but for that connection. Thus, we could again tolerate their existence if that connection is not an issue. And this would not equal surrender since our goals should be focused.
you want to pretend like they were just innocent bystanders
Nonsense. Show me where I said or implied this?
But the Afghan government also promotes education for women and girls, and encourages women to work. The Taliban is adamantly and openly against both.
So are key parts of the Afghan government! See my post on women’s groups for a recap.
To say that there is no difference between even a brutal and corrupt Afghan gov influenced by Western donors and a Taliban government influenced primarily by jihadis from al-Qaeda and the Pakistani military is a lie.
I actually never said that. But, yeah, good point otherwise.
Also, the Taliban are not so much influenced by al-Qaeda. Mostly, the Taliban are a Deobandi sect that is inwardly looking and not interested in international affairs. al-Qaeda are Salafists, whose raison d’etre is motivating the ummah in a mass uprising.
Steps a and d are fine enough for making life a little harder for AQ, and steps b and c are fine in preventing terrorist attacks — but when it comes to finding the bases, to capture or (more likely) kill those within, you need a little something more.
But why? What about our success in Yemen? Somalia? Pakistan before the Afghan invasion?
How were those possible without a massive occupying army?
Jes’ history is pretty much BS.
The Taliban offered to detain bin Laden or turn him over to Pakistan for trial under their version of sharia law. These were obviously not serious offers — these were attempts to play for time.
Had the issue simply been wanting Osama bin Laden on trial for the terrorist attack on the US, the direct and obvious option would have been a backroom deal with the Taliban offering aid to Afghanistan in exchange for information about exactly where bin Laden was to let him be captured by a small strike force.
In what fantasyland does this scenario occur? What makes you think the Taliban, who were already harassing and ejecting the aid organizations in the country, wanted more foreign aid in exchange for selling out bin Laden and al-Qaeda? By this time AQ forces constituted a majority of their most dedicated fighters which they needed in order to complete their conquest of the north or even to hold onto power.
The country which could be said to be directly responsible for 9/11 and al-Qaeda, Saudi Arabia, was a country the US could not afford to attack, both for oil-related and religiopolitical-related reasons. And attacking Iraq required a lot more build-up. So if the US people were to be satisfied with a rapid-response war, Afghanistan was a safe target.
Like you would have supported an invasion of Saudi Arabia. Like an invasion could even be justified. The only reason why Saudis were chosen as hijackers on 9/11 was because Saudis could get American visas much more easily than other Arabs. Afghanistan was attacked because that was where bin Laden was, and he was not coming out on his own.
Seriously, I hate it when my own leftists embrace the same sort of distortion of history as the neocons.
Joshua Foust certainly doesn’t believe that we should withdraw from Afghanistan (quite the opposite), so it’s a bit dishonest to use him to back your argument.
No, not dishonest at all. Because I never said that Foust favors withdrawal. I merely cited Foust’s findings on a certain matter, and did so with 100% accuracy.
If McChrystal issues a report that says X, and I argue that because of X, we should leave, that’s not dishonest.
Just a quick word:
“I think that Karzai is damaged goods beyond repair.”
You may well be right (and I’d probably just agree with you on it if I hadn’t seen crazier shit happen in these past years). But even so, it’s not like Abdullah Abdullah is a Taliban fan; it’s not necessarily the end of the mission.
(I’ll still try to get back with more detailed rebuttals, building on the last post.)
No, just your judgment. I never said anything about “patriotism” or “balls.” This is an old rhetorical trick… Conservative either has to accept Liberal’s policy or be portayed as a McCarthyite. It’s an old trick, and I’m not falling for it.
True, you didn’t use the word “patriotism,” nor “balls.” You did, however, say “now the libs want to say Taliban=Afghan people to justify surrender.” You also said “It’s funny how afraid some people are of the V-word.” Maybe those have some coherent message that relates to Eric’s points in the original post rather than just the character of people who oppose this war, but if so I confess it’s just going right over my head.
“But why? What about our success in Yemen? Somalia? Pakistan before the Afghan invasion?”
Like I said before, I’ll get back to you on that. (Did I mention I’m at work?)
But I will say, for now, that the AQ bases in Afghanistan were a little more central than those places…
Also, the Taliban are not so much influenced by al-Qaeda. Mostly, the Taliban are a Deobandi sect that is inwardly looking and not interested in international affairs. al-Qaeda are Salafists, whose raison d’etre is motivating the ummah in a mass uprising.
I don’t think you know what Salafi means, no offense. Salafi just means follower of the companions of Muhammad. There’s nothing contradictory between Salafis and Deobandis. Deobandi is to South Asian what Wahhabbi is to Arabia. The idea that there’s some theological barrier to these groups working together is absurd.
Rather than cut and run, Eric, I think we can do it better, and I think McChrystal should have a shot in trying.
Cut and run, huh!
Wow. Deja vu all o0ver again.
In your “Testing Hypotheses” link, this point is also highly relevant.
I don’t disagree, but I don’t see that as an argument for continuing the occupation
The Taliban are also killing the Afghan people, twice as fast as ISAF-ANA.
Based on whose count?
Scott Simon from NPR recounts how good for the people the Taliban was?
There is no doubt that the Taliban were and are extremely unpopular in certain regions and with certain groups. There is also little doubt that they were and are brutal and retrograde. Unfortunately, some of our close allies in the current government are the same in many if not most respects. And there are Afghans that believe in and support Taliban rule.
The Pakistani government says that our presence is for the good of its people.
You mean the parts of the government that aren’t sheltering Mullah Omar and the other Taliban elements that are killing US troops! You mean the parts that aren’t funneling arms and money to the Taliban in Afghanistna??
Come on Charles, you know better than that.
Cyrus,
I think people like Eric should be honest and admit that they advocate surrender. I don’t think Eric advocates surrender because he’s unpatriotic or lacks testicles. I think he thinks surrender is preferable because victory isn’t worth the cost. I disagree, but that position doesn’t make Eric a bad person in my view either. I just wish he wouldn’t pretend that driving the Taliban from power wasn’t a major objective in the war, and that ceding the country to them is something other than defeat.
I don’t think you know what Salafi means, no offense. Salafi just means follower of the companions of Muhammad.
Salafism is also a sect of Islam – one that seeks to recreate life as in the time of the companions of Mohammed. They ape the same dress code, and some even take to copying posture and body language.
So, I’d say you don’t reall know what it means, no offense.
There’s nothing contradictory between Salafis and Deobandis.
Contradictory is the wrong word, but then I never used it. They are different sects, with different worldviews.
The idea that there’s some theological barrier to these groups working together is absurd.
Um, I never said that. Yet again, you score points against a strawman. Still, al-Qaeda is not the agent influencing the Taliban. Their brand of Islam predated al-Qaeda, and their outlook vis-a-vis international affairs has not changed.
Pericles — if, as many on your side claim, the Taliban has little support in Afghanistan, then why is our withdrawal equivalent to ceding them the country? What factors keep the majority you claim is there from exercising their legitimate political power?
I just wish he wouldn’t pretend that driving the Taliban from power wasn’t a major objective in the war, and that ceding the country to them is something other than defeat.
I wish you would just be honest and admit that the only reason we targeted the Taliban is because of their connection to al-Qaeda.
That’s my point.
If you can disrupt that, then the Taliban qua Taliban are relatively meaningless to us. Even if part of the reason that we went in was to topple them, that was only because of the primary concern of al-Qaeda. It would be a huge mistake to get into a war with the Taliban outside of that context.
I think people like Eric should be honest and admit that they advocate surrender.
I’ll note that I asked you for a definition of “Victory” (the word that I have a hard time uttering), and you remain silent.
Any updates?
My main problem with this post is that Eric seems determined to believe that the Taliban are, in fact, representative of “large swaths” of the Afghan population. By fighting the Taliban, we are also fighting these people and their rights, because the Taliban are their legitimate representatives.
I think this vastly overestimates Taliban support. Eric hasn’t marshaled any real evidence for this view
Tequilla, I’ll repeat my query upsthread: If the Taliban are such a small movement, and they have no real base of support, then how could they pose such a risk should we leave? How can they be gaining ground now with us there? With our superior firepower and manpower? With our superior training and equipment. Something doesn’t jibe.
They are currently gaining ground, with significant presence in 97% of the country, as described here.
If they are such a hated, tiny, fringe element, how can they do that?
Results 1 – 10 of about 118 from obsidianwings.blogs.com for “Charles Bird”+”cut and run”.
Ok, I read that link, what’s the point. It’s some Peter Pan analogy to Donald Rumsfeld? What does that have to do with anything? Or is it just some kind of all-purpose liberal taunt?
The point is that the fetishization of the v-word is not a plan. There’s about 8 zillion words on the subject on ObWi, just check the comments of any post by Charles Bird since 2006 or so if you need more info.
No, just your judgment. I never said anything about “patriotism” or “balls.” This is an old rhetorical trick.
Yet
So you’re not questioning his patriotism or balls, just claiming that he wants to justify surrender, doesn’t want to fight anymore, and is afraid of the word “victory.”
It’s an old trick, and I’m not falling for it.
You are not falling for it. You are *living* it. Rather than discussing why Eric’s criticisms aren’t correct, you suggest that he just lacks willpower and is frightened of victory. To paraphrase, this is an old conservative trick, and no one is falling for it.
Contrasted with Point and tequila, who are actually debating the matter at hand. Even Charles managed to raise a reasonable point about radicalization before his tired, obligatory “cut and run” smear.
Eric,
I don’t see the difference between what we said about Salafisim. I called them “followers of the companions of Muhammad.” You called them a “sect” that “seeks to recreate life as in the time of the companions of Mohammed.” It seems we’re saying the same thing and your response is just pique.
If you didn’t mean to suggest that there was anything about Salafi and Deobandi theology that would inhibit a working relationship between Salafis (Al-Qaeda) and Deobandis (Taliban), then I apologize, but in that case what’s your point?
You were clearly pointing out a perceived contradiction–or whatever else you want to call it–between the supposedly “inward looking” Deobandis and the Salafis. (And, as you later noted, and I tried to point out, the “raison d’etre” of Salafis is to recreate the brand of Islam that existed in the time of the companions, not start a “mass uprising” as you originally claimed.) Your persistent strawmen accusations are, well, strawmen.
I don’t see the difference between what we said about Salafisim.
Are you serious? You were the one that suggested there was a difference! You were the one that claimed I didn’t know what Salfist means. You said:
I don’t think you know what Salafi means, no offense. Salafi just means follower of the companions of Muhammad.
But, (a) it doesn’t mean just that (that is an overly broad definition, at least in the context of discussing sects of Islam), it is also the word for a distinct sect; and (b) me describing al-Qaeda as Salafists would not indicate that I was unaware of this.
My point in labeling each by particular sect was to illustrate that there are differences between the two – not that they would never work together. Obviously, they had in the past! Rather, I was making a point about to what extent the Taliban were influenced/controlled by Pakistani intel and al-Qaeda (a response to a point upthreatd). I don’t see the influence there. That is all. You’re the one who made it more.
So, I guess, you win the straw fight.
So are key parts of the Afghan government! See my post on women’s groups for a recap.
Sure. But they are not stopping women or girls from working or going to school, because other groups in the Afghan gov are against them.
The Taliban, OTOH, are actively burning down girls’ schools in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Boy, I wish I could figure out who was worse for women. If only there was a way …
I actually never said that. But, yeah, good point otherwise.
No, you don’t quite come out and say it. But you equivocate, you complain bitterly about the GoA’s disregard for women’s rights, about their corruption, etc. While never, ever doing the same for the Taliban. While advocating the removal of our support for the GoA, because, don’t ya know, the GoA really sucks. But that would NEVER lead to the Taliban, who are incomparably worse in all respects, taking over. Oh no.
Come on. Just come out and say that the Taliban ruling Afghanistan is not that bad, and indeed quite acceptable for the U.S. Just don’t play around and pretend to care about Afghan civilian casualties at U.S. hands, because they will be far worse at Taliban hands, or Afghan womens’ rights under the GoA, because they would be unbelievably worse under the Taliban.
Also, the Taliban are not so much influenced by al-Qaeda. Mostly, the Taliban are a Deobandi sect that is inwardly looking and not interested in international affairs. al-Qaeda are Salafists, whose raison d’etre is motivating the ummah in a mass uprising.
Really? Are you speaking of their original roots, or their current situation, where the Taliban gleefully uses al-Qaeda style tactics like suicide bombing of civilian targets and the beheading of hostages in both Pakistan and Afghanistan? Does the TTP in Pakistan strike you as inwardly focused and non-expansionist?
I don’t think you know what Salafi means, no offense. Salafi just means follower of the companions of Muhammad.
This is as bluntly stupid as claiming that Baptists are distinguished from other Christians solely because of their belief in or emphasis on baptism. Because that’s what the name means, right?
And the Methodists, they are presumably distinguished from other Christians by their belief in some sort of Method.
I’ll note that I asked you for a definition of “Victory” (the word that I have a hard time uttering), and you remain silent.
Any updates?
Sorry, Eric, I’m trying to work too. I would define victory as accomplishing what you set out to accomplish. If we had opted from the beginning to only launch limited strikes against the al-Qaeda training camps, then we would have already achieved victory. But we didn’t. We decided to go to war against the Taliban too. (Yes, I “admit that the only reason we targeted the Taliban is because of their connection to al-Qaeda,” in the sense that we wouldn’t have gone to war with them absent al-Qaeda and 9/11.) Having gone to war against the Taliban, with the express purpose of removing them from power, anything that cedes the country to them constitutes not victory, but defeat. To withdraw forces and accept this defeat is to surrender. Yes, Carleton, hoping for victory is not a plan; I never said it was. I think COIN is a viable plan. Obviously many here disagree. Many believe there is no way to attain victory at all, in which surrender is a rational course of action. But I’m not ready to give up on the Afghan people like that yet.
But I’m not ready to give up on the Afghan people like that yet.
Round and round we go…
Pericles,
Just to get a handle on what you mean by “victory” and “defeat”, would you characterize our withdrawal from Vietnam as either a “defeat” or “surrender”? If so, do you think that “victory” was achievable?
Sure. But they are not stopping women or girls from working or going to school, because other groups in the Afghan gov are against them.
But that’s not true. In certain non-Taliban regions (not Kabul), women are subjected to the same bans on education.
Boy, I wish I could figure out who was worse for women. If only there was a way …
It’s not that hard to figure out. And you’ll get no argument here on that baseline point. But what Afghan women’s groups have been saying is that the ongoing war is worse than any alternative – they’d rather live under the Taliban. It’s all at the post I’ve linked to.
While advocating the removal of our support for the GoA, because, don’t ya know, the GoA really sucks.
But I don’t actually advocate that. Please re-read. I advocate a measured withdrawal of our armed forces, with a continuation of support for the GoA.
But that would NEVER lead to the Taliban, who are incomparably worse in all respects, taking over. Oh no.
But they’re not worse in all respects. Actual Afghans cited in the report want both sides to be held accountable for atrocities. They cite the hypocrisy of the blacklist. And there is a consensus that the Taliban were much better in terms of corruption. Yours is an overstatement.
Come on. Just come out and say that the Taliban ruling Afghanistan is not that bad, and indeed quite acceptable for the U.S.
Come on, just come out and say that you don’t care if we spend ten trillion dollars and 30 years trying to turn a bunch of corrupt warlords into models of liberal democracy. Even though they are unpopular at home, despite what YOU say is there incomparable advantage in every way.
And in the process, do you care about the Afghans that we’ll be killing to achieve this?
Come on. Just come out and say that the Taliban ruling Afghanistan is not that bad, and indeed quite acceptable for the U.S.
Is that right though? I mean, the Taliban already ruled Afghanistan for a period, and was death and destruction occurring on a larger scale than now? I don’t think the numbers back you up on this.
Really? Are you speaking of their original roots, or their current situation, where the Taliban gleefully uses al-Qaeda style tactics like suicide bombing of civilian targets and the beheading of hostages in both Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Not sure what you mean here. Suicide bombings are popular in Sri Lanka too. I’m not sure that’s an al-Qaeda tactic per se. And even still, it’s just a tactic.
Does the TTP in Pakistan strike you as inwardly focused and non-expansionist?
They strike me as focused inwardly and on India (Kasmir in particular). But there are myriad regional conflicts around the globe, and we lack the resources to get involved in each.
I think COIN is a viable plan
COIN are tactics, not strategy. Nor are they a plan.
But I’m not ready to give up on the Afghan people like that yet.
Maybe I should write a post about that linguistic tic, and the underlying myopia it betrays.
Tequilla, I’ll repeat my query upsthread: If the Taliban are such a small movement, and they have no real base of support, then how could they pose such a risk should we leave? How can they be gaining ground now with us there? With our superior firepower and manpower? With our superior training and equipment. Something doesn’t jibe.
They are currently gaining ground, with significant presence in 97% of the country, as described here.
I’d dispute that 97% of the country. The BBC poll noted that the majority of Afghans, while viewing the Taliban as the major threat to the country, had not personally experienced or knew of Taliban attacks, etc.
But they are gaining influence — at the point of a gun — because both us and the Afghan government are extremely weak, far too concentrated in certain areas (Kabul and super-FOBs like KAF and Bagram), and not much of a presence in many others. They are moving into a governmental vacuum, not outcompeting us or the ANSF or the GoA.
Now why is this the case? Why are they able to do this?
Because from 2001-2005, we followed exactly what you and other advocates of the “light footprint” are pushing as the solution now (unless you’re pushing complete and total withdrawal). We concentrated on killing AQ and Talib commanders. We pulled ourselves into isolated super FOBs which allowed us to avoid casualties and also the Afghan population.
The result was allowing the Taliban to collect their strength and recover to the point where we are now. It also allowed AQ to launch deadly attacks in London, Madrid, Turkey, Iraq, and of course Pakistan. Not the best strategy in the world, IMO.
Having gone to war against the Taliban, with the express purpose of removing them from power, anything that cedes the country to them constitutes not victory, but defeat.
First, you have hobgoblins in your mind.
Second, any nation that refuses to recalibrate strategy to match objectives in a fluid environment is doomed. There are myriad choices between rote “victory” and “surrender.” I reject your classification.
Third, how could our departure be “ceding” them the country when they are only a small, ragtag, fringe group that no Afghan people support?
Neither you nor tequila have been able to explain this conundrum.
Larv,
Yes. We were defeated. We surrendered. Could we have attained victory? Possibly by invading the North, but that may well have started a war with China.
Eric,
COIN is clearly strategy, not tactics. It’s not a particular battlefield maneuver, which is the traditional definition of a tactic. I don’t want to quibble over semantics, but that was a really odd point to bring up.
Eric,
I’ve already said that people are willing to submit to them because they’re afraid. That was my point that the apparent “support” you refer to is just fear, not genuine support. I never said they were ragtag; I said they were highly disciplined. As to how a small group of insurgents can defeat a much larger occupying force, that’s the nature of insurgency.
But they are gaining influence — at the point of a gun — because both us and the Afghan government are extremely weak, far too concentrated in certain areas (Kabul and super-FOBs like KAF and Bagram), and not much of a presence in many others. They are moving into a governmental vacuum, not outcompeting us or the ANSF or the GoA.
But isn’t McChrystal advocating a refocus on Kabul and major cities/hubs? Isn’t that what Foust was discussing vis-a-vis Nuristan?
It also allowed AQ to launch deadly attacks in London, Madrid, Turkey, Iraq, and of course Pakistan. Not the best strategy in the world, IMO.
Are you sure about that? The London bombers were not trained in Afghanistan. And the Madrid bombers weren’t either. There were reports that one had been, but he left when the conflict broke out. As for Turkey, same basic story. Iraq too – Zarqawi left Afghanistan before the invasion. Not sure this adds up. As for Pakistan, those are Pakistani militants that have been, and are still, in Pakistan. Are you saying that our posture in Afghanistan is affecting this to the point that they wouldn’t have sanctuary in Pakistan otherwise? How?
But they are gaining influence
Enough to take over the country if we leave? Enough to gain ground with us there?
How much influence? The support of large swaths of the population? Less? Percentage?
Come on, just come out and say that you don’t care if we spend ten trillion dollars and 30 years
Eric, stop that. You know costs have no place in this discussion. The topic at hand is whether you believe in victory or surrender. Talking about money makes it all so cheap and tacky.
As to how a small group of insurgents can defeat a much larger occupying force, that’s the nature of insurgency
But only with the support of the population! That’s the whole point of employing COIN tactics.
COIN is clearly strategy, not tactics. It’s not a particular battlefield maneuver, which is the traditional definition of a tactic. I don’t want to quibble over semantics, but that was a really odd point to bring up.
But we quibble. COIN doctrine provides a series of tactics to employ (and where there is an objective, it can become a strategy), but what is the underlying objective? That is, what constitutes “victory.” At least let’s agree that COIN is not an end unto itself. What is the end then? What is “victory”?
You know, I thought it was us libs that were supposed to be afraid of the word, but you seem to be avoiding it like the plague when it comes down to providing a definition.
Also, tequila, you said:
Because from 2001-2005, we followed exactly what you and other advocates of the “light footprint” are pushing as the solution now (unless you’re pushing complete and total withdrawal).
2009 is coming to a close soon. So, if you will, what strategy did we pursue between 2005-2009? Was it more successful? Less? Same? Why?
But only with the support of the population! That’s the whole point of employing COIN tactics.
That gets back to the meaning of the word “support.” If “X supports Y” is equivalent to “X is intimidated by Y and acquiesces to Y out of terror,” then I would agree. But I don’t think we should use the word “support” that way.
I already gave you a definition of “victory.” Victory in the case of Afghanistan requires defeating the Taliban. Basically, creating a stable pro-US government that will not allow the country to fall into the hands of the Taliban. What’s so hard about that?
What’s so hard about that?
Well, 8+ years and several hundred billion dollars later, you tell me.
But I don’t think we should use the word “support” that way.
Again, there are clearly some Afghans that support the Taliban because they agree with their worldview.
tequila: Jes’ history is pretty much BS.
Tequila is basically just BSing here.
True, I can’t prove the bloodthirstiness of the American people between 9/11 and 10/7. That is based on my personal observation of Americans talking online – friends, acquaintances, and strangers, on blogs, newsboards, craigslist, yahoogroups, etc. I kept no records and I’m certainly not about to attempt to collect them now. But I witnessed friends talking eagerly about an attack on Afghanistan – and dismissing my protests with a handwaved “Our military will target their attacks” – and others talking eagerly about thousands of “ragheads” who would and should die.
The facts are that the Taliban offered to surrender Osama bin Laden for trial twice – and that the Taliban were desperate for international aid – is undisputed. Tequila claims that the offers weren’t serious: we don’t know and can’t know because the fact is the Bush administration preferred to bomb Kabul. Preferred to kill civilians rather than try to capture Osama bin Laden.
No, of course I wasn’t in favor of the US attacking Saudi Arabia. Any military attack on Saudi Arabia which in any way put the holiest sites of Islam at risk would be an appallingly stupid thing to do.
I wasn’t in favor of war as a response to a terrorist act, period. War kills civilians. It is irresponsibly stupid and beyond pointless to set out to kill civilians as a reaction to a terrorist attack by a non-state group. That the Bush administration preferred war to justice did not surprise me even then: that anyone could defend their actions after eight years of thousands of Afghans being killed by the US military … doesn’t, in fact, surprise me now.
But that’s not true. In certain non-Taliban regions (not Kabul), women are subjected to the same bans on education.
But in many areas, they ARE getting an education and working. Do these women not count?
But what Afghan women’s groups have been saying is that the ongoing war is worse than any alternative – they’d rather live under the Taliban. It’s all at the post I’ve linked to.
No, that’s two Afghan women writers for Alternet wrote. Please don’t misrepresent their opinion as that of the majority of Afghan women.
But I don’t actually advocate that. Please re-read. I advocate a measured withdrawal of our armed forces, with a continuation of support for the GoA.
You realize that this means ceding large parts of the country to either the Taliban or bandits/warlords/opium barons because of the way we’ve under-resourced and bungled the war for the past eight years?
But they’re not worse in all respects. Actual Afghans cited in the report want both sides to be held accountable for atrocities. They cite the hypocrisy of the blacklist. And there is a consensus that the Taliban were much better in terms of corruption. Yours is an overstatement.
What report? The DFID report where they interviewed less than 200 people, many of them Taliban or Taliban supporters?
Come on, just come out and say that you don’t care if we spend ten trillion dollars and 30 years trying to turn a bunch of corrupt warlords into models of liberal democracy. Even though they are unpopular at home, despite what YOU say is there incomparable advantage in every way.
And in the process, do you care about the Afghans that we’ll be killing to achieve this?
The ten trillion figure is so ridiculously overboard, it’s hard to take you seriously when you quote it. I might as well say if the Taliban take over, 25 million Afghans will die. Neither is going to happen.
And unpopular at home, compared to what? Please don’t cite your DFID report next to the BBC poll. They’re apples and oranges.
Suicide bombing used to be popular in Sri Lanka, until that supposedly invincible insurgency was defeated. And it was actually quite different from what AQ practiced, in that most Tiger suicide bombings were assassination-oriented or aimed at political or military targets, as opposed to mass-casualty bombings as AQ likes. More to the point, the Taliban has embraced the religious justification for suicide bombings that AQ uses, which they never used to before 2001. That it’s become a major tactic for them indicates a very close relationship between them, perhaps even operationally close.
They strike me as focused inwardly and on India (Kasmir in particular). But there are myriad regional conflicts around the globe, and we lack the resources to get involved in each.
You’re confusing Islamist groups. Find me a single TTP attack in Kashmir. However, there are many, many TTP attacks outside of Pashtun areas inside Pakistan, aimed specifically at weakening the Pakistani government, and spreading their rule out of the FATA and the NWFP. Point being the TTP went from being nothing to taking over the entire FATA to invading the Swat Valley to attempting to encircle the capital, never mind their numerous suicide attacks on Pakistani political, military, and civilian targets.
“Basically, creating a stable pro-US government that will not allow the country to fall into the hands of the Taliban. What’s so hard about that?”
I think Eric’s fear, aside from the prohibitive cost and low chance of success of victory-as-you-define-it, is that a stable pro-US government might be a nasty oppressive one that would closely resemble the Taliban. Notice how “stable pro-US government” was once a good description of Iraq.
The ten trillion figure is so ridiculously overboard, it’s hard to take you seriously when you quote it.
I have yet to see you counter with a more realistic figure, tequila, let alone suggest where it will come from.
I don’t expect that to change, mind you…
@tequila:
That it’s become a major tactic for them indicates a very close relationship between them, perhaps even operationally close.
Wait, what? Post hoc ergo propter hoc much? If group X takes to imitating a (pretty damned simple) tactic that has widely and dramatically been publicized by group Y, where on earth do you derive the least evidence that it’s evidence of a very close relationship, let alone an operational relationship, between the two? I mean, seriously.
Pericles – do you want a stable *representative* government, or just a stable government? Can we have both a stable representative government and a pro-US government in Afghanistan? Can we have both and still afford the level of protection for women that we are holding up as one of our cause celebre for not giving up on the Afghan people? What parts of the equation would you prioritize over the others if any of these are in conflict?
Or were the answers to these questions implied in your original answer?
But in many areas, they ARE getting an education and working. Do these women not count?
Of course they count! I’ve never said that they didn’t, or that life wasn’t better for some than under the Taliban. The question is, how does that translate into policy? IS that enough to spend the trillions and decades necessary. And even then, is the Karzai government good enough to safeguard these things regardless.
No, that’s two Afghan women writers for Alternet wrote. Please don’t misrepresent their opinion as that of the majority of Afghan women.
Actually, no, those women are not simply “writers for Alternet.” One is the leader of a very large Afghan woman’s group. The other is a member of another.
I never said theirs are the opinions of a majority of Afghan women. Those were your words. Please don’t misrepresent me. But they aslo speak more for just themselves in their individual capacity.
You realize that this means ceding large parts of the country to either the Taliban or bandits/warlords/opium barons because of the way we’ve under-resourced and bungled the war for the past eight years?
You realize this is inevitable regardless, right? That is, unless you plan on spending several trillion dollars and a couple decades (at least) in large scale occupation. Might need a draft too to cover the manpower requirements.
What report? The DFID report where they interviewed less than 200 people, many of them Taliban or Taliban supporters?
Really? That was the first you’d heard of corruption or atrocities by the current Afghan govt? You know, right, that some of the current Afghan govt is actually Taliban factions that agreed to join the govt. So they are just as bad as…well, Taliban factions that didn’t in almost all respects.
Here’s more information on corruption and such:
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10551/
The ten trillion figure is so ridiculously overboard, it’s hard to take you seriously when you quote it.
Wow, really? You get to use outlandish hyperbole, and mindread, and when I do it it’s somehow guache. Gotcha. Obviously 10 trillion is an exaggeration. I was responding in kind. But the price tag will be trillions in the plural.
And unpopular at home, compared to what? Please don’t cite your DFID report next to the BBC poll. They’re apples and oranges.
Really? First of all, the BBC poll is old – pre-election. Second, if you read McChyrstal’s leaked report, he goes on and on about how unpopular the current Afghan government is. He considers it a major impediment to success. So how about we forget the DFID report, and focus on McChrystal’s report as the go-to resource on how unpopular the current government is. Here are some excerpts.
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48553
Find me a single TTP attack in Kashmir.
I was being charitable and cautious in conceding that most of these militant groups will cross borders for Kasmir. But I’m more than willing to concede that point.
Point being the TTP went from being nothing to taking over the entire FATA to invading the Swat Valley to attempting to encircle the capital, never mind their numerous suicide attacks on Pakistani political, military, and civilian targets.
And this makes them internationally oriented how?
2009 is coming to a close soon. So, if you will, what strategy did we pursue between 2005-2009? Was it more successful? Less? Same? Why?
We pursued a very under-resourced version of COIN. Some units tried COIN, that is before they rotated out. All, however, were tied (and still are tied) into the super-FOBs built between 2001-2004, and the incredibly confused lines of authority between ISAF and U.S. forces and the Afghan gov made things and still make things incredibly difficult. There was no unity of effort, no unity of command, and definitely not anywhere close to enough resources or troops (see Iraq).
The facts are that the Taliban offered to surrender Osama bin Laden for trial twice – and that the Taliban were desperate for international aid – is undisputed.
For trial in a sharia court. Once to Pakistan, and once they offered to try him themselves. If you can’t see these for the farcical efforts to buy time that they were, I really don’t know what to say to you.
Also, please provide any example possible of their desperate pleading for humanitarian assitance, given that they did things that endeared them to the international community like banning female aid workers from driving and blew up the statues at Bamiyan.
Since then, they’ve murdered hundreds of aid workers and Afghan employees of aid organizations. Such humanitarians, the heart bleeds.
You realize that this means ceding large parts of the country to either the Taliban or bandits/warlords/opium barons because of the way we’ve under-resourced and bungled the war for the past eight years?
You realize that large parts of Afghanistan are already ceded to the Taliban or to warlords? That the only way to change this is via long term investment in Afghanistan – which investment necessarily requires the full withdrawal of the foreign military occupation which has killed, kidnapped, bought, and tortured Afghans over the past 8 years? How convincing can any foreign military be when they claim “Sure, we were bombing, kidnapping, torturing, and killing you pretty much randomly for eight years, but from now on we’re only going to kill bad people! (Our definition of bad, by the way. Not yours.)”
Oh, and how convincing can any expression of good will be when the current US administration is expanding Bagram Airbase so that they can hold even more extrajudicial prisoners there in an oubliette to which none but the US military and the CIA have access?
We pursued a very under-resourced version of COIN. Some units tried COIN, that is before they rotated out. All, however, were tied (and still are tied) into the super-FOBs built between 2001-2004, and the incredibly confused lines of authority between ISAF and U.S. forces and the Afghan gov made things and still make things incredibly difficult. There was no unity of effort, no unity of command, and definitely not anywhere close to enough resources or troops (see Iraq).
Not that was an interesting answer, and one that we don’t even disagree on 😉
“But I’m not ready to give up on the Afghan people like that yet.”
How profoundly noble, of you, you must be very proud of yourself.
Like a Roman citizen proclaiming his allegiance to the people of Moses, in Palestine, willing to see millions of them die, so that they may one day be free of those pesky radicals who obviously hate Civilization.
How are the breads and circuses, you brave and proud cheerleader.
Jesurgislac: Oh, and how convincing can any expression of good will be when the current US administration is expanding Bagram Airbase so that they can hold even more extrajudicial prisoners there in an oubliette to which none but the US military and the CIA have access?
The New York Times (Sept. 12,2009): Since July, the prisoners at Bagram have refused to leave their cells to shower, meet with family members or Red Cross officials, or take part in other activities, to protest their indefinite imprisonment, human rights advocates said.
Sapient, from the same article:
Granted (I hadn’t been aware of that) the Obama administration is apparently going to give the Red Cross/Red Crescent the names of the prisoners being held in the new expanded extra-judicial prison camp. But the Obama administration’s belief that they can continue to use Afghanistan as a long-term base to hold the prisoners who are being held illegally, doesn’t suggest that the Obama administration thinks of Afghanistan as anything more than a useful black hole.
You don’t set out to build prison camps where kidnap victims can be held illegally for as long as you want, if you have any goal of bringing any justice or a system of law or democracy to a country.
Probably best to link to the article rather than excerpt it.
Well, after all that, I still find myself pressed for time responding. I apologize for not giving my promised extension the thought and effort it deserves — in fact, I can really only add a quick comment. That said:
“What about our success in Yemen? Somalia? Pakistan before the Afghan invasion? How were those possible without a massive occupying army?”
In addition to my aforementioned point about Afghanistan’s centrality in relation to these nations, I should note that two of them — Yemen and Pakistan — are less friendly to AQ, and so it was unlikely they received any support on the ground, or local government support.*
I realize also promised to get to missile and drone attacks — Eric’s point is that there increased usage is mainly attributable to changes in the rules of engagement (par 9/11).
So here’s the attempt, in what time I have: The drone attacks, arguably, never had a serious problem with rules of engagement, as such — from accounts I’ve read of the Clinton administration, he was pretty supportive, especially in his later years, of sending these things after a man he considered the most dangerous to national security.
The difficulties were more in the mechanics than the legalities — for example, the administration couldn’t really send off these planes from anywhere in the region, so the long flights cut down on volume. Plus, intel on the organization’s center was few and far between, because what we got had to come from the global organization.
But now that were in the region, these problems are greatly reduced — from bases in Afghanistan, we can send more unmanned aircraft, and the people on the ground can get intel from locals who know locals who actually encounter AQ’s moving leadership.
But that said, I do take Eric’s point — even if we did withdraw, the military would have new rules of engagement, so it wouldn’t be exactly like the 1990’s again. I just don’t think our strategic losses would be so small, either.
*(And FWIW, I’d speculate that the US gave some kind of head’s up to parts of said governments — with deniability, of course. I would emphasize “FWIW” and “speculate” though.)
@ Pericles:
I remember how I defined victory in 2002: Victory means that the ideology of your opponents has been discredited. I was using WWII as a model. My hope was that, five years after we invaded Afghanistan, virtually everyone would think that it was a good thing that the Taliban was no longer in power. This was an incredibly ambitious goal, but I thought I had a shot at it. We were facing a toxic ideology, and the example of WWII shows that ideology can sometimes be discredited by applying military and economic power. I thought we should try to do this again.
When Bush talked about a “Marshall plan” for Afghanistan, I believed he agreed with me, but Bush’s actions, as opposed to his words, made it clear that he didn’t. You claim that our goal was to permanently remove the Taliban from power, but Bush’s words don’t count for much when they aren’t matched by actions. After Kabul fell, the Bush Administration lost interest in Afghanistan, and so did the American press (which takes its lead from the Administration). As far as I can see, once Kabul fell, a majority of Americans, both in and out of the Administration, felt we had accomplished all we really needed to there, and the big question was what to do about Iraq. People may have hoped that the Taliban would be permanently out of power, but a hope is not an objective.
If victory is, “accomplishing what you set out to accomplish,” I have a real problem with claiming that we have to destroy the Taliban in order to achieve victory in Afghanistan because it suggests there is or was some national commitment to achieving that goal that we now have to carry through on. I still think I was right in 2002, but I lost the argument. When you have troops in the field, I think you need to have a pretty strong reason to re-fight old arguments.
This is not meant as a rebuttal, and I don’t endorse Mr. Rashid’s positions (in full, anyway). But his voice is one that can’t really be dismissed out of hand, I don’t think. I’d be interested in any discussion of this interview that Eric or others would like to offer.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113378138
You know, my personal feeling about the Taliban is: f**k them. They strike me as a bunch of fanatic authoritarian bullies.
But I’m not a conservative Muslim Pashtun.
If I’m not mistaken, the Taliban are an indigenous religious and political movement rooted in the Pashtun regions of southeastern Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. I’m sure they royally piss off pretty much everyone in the area who isn’t a Talib, and I’m equally sure that given a choice of a government run by the Taliban or a government run by an obvious US puppet, the odds that the average Afghani Pashtun is going to go with the Taliban are probably about even.
It strikes me that a definition of victory that includes “defeating the Taliban” is not one that reflects reality. Especially if you’re talking in military terms.
When you kill a Talib, you’re killing somebody’s father, brother, uncle, cousin, or son.
Al Qaeda’s a different kettle of fish, because they aren’t locals. But they’re conservative fundamentalist Muslims, so they for sure have a leg up on us in that part of the world.
And if we make it too hot for them in Afghanistan, or Pakistan, they’ll just go somewhere else.
Our interest in Afghanistan is preventing Al Qaeda from using it as a platform for killing us. There may be other geopolitical brainiac objectives mixed in, but for the average American, the goal is to not get blown up or have their throat slashed with a box cutter.
If your goal is to reform Afghan society so that it more closely resembles the West, I guess my comments are (a) why?, and (b) good luck.
The Afghan people have their own fate to hammer out. We have interests there, but no more. It’s not our place or our privilege to tell the rest of the world what kind of society to have.
Wow. Deja vu all o0ver again.
Indeed, Eric. I’m hearing the same “anti” arguments today as I did in January 2007, the previous major decision point.
I don’t disagree, but I don’t see that as an argument for continuing the occupation.
First, it’s not an occupation. Second, why would you not be concerned about a growing Taliban and increasingly radicalized Afghan population? The Taliban is a cancer to both countries.
Based on whose count?
A credible source.
Come on Charles, you know better than that.
So should you. According to this survey, 86% of Pakistanis agree that the Taliban and al Qaeda are a serious problem, yet you’re proposing that we bail out of a nation with a serious Taliban problem, and in doing so, will make it tougher for the Pakistanis to deal with it. Also, our credibility will be zilch with them because we will have given up.
First, it’s not an occupation.
How is it not an occupation? Generally unpopular foreign troops are operating in the country with permission from the corrupt, anti-democratic government that they installed and continue to prop up. Sounds very much like an occupation to me, albeit one gussied up with a thin veneer of “democratic” legitimacy.
I’ll add the qualifier that the scenario I outline above would not seem like an occupation to me if the installed government had a reasonable degree of control over said foreign forces. As one doesn’t exactly get the impression they do, I repeat: how exactly is it not an occupation?
Charles – so the fact that, according to the Christian Science Monitor, coalition forces are only directly responsible for 38% of the 2k plus civilian deaths over the last two years is a metric for our superiority?
Are the Afghan people parsing the conflict this finely in order to allocate blame and responsibility? If you were a civilian in the region with a family in the line of fire between two groups of combatants would you be concerned with knowing which one of the groups exchanging fire killed your niece or would you curse them both for bringing their conflict to your doorstep?
We only keep count because we bear a share of the moral responsibility. Those truly in the middle have no reason to keep count this way.
Well, it is comforting to see that it’s not me that is stirring things up. Stepping back a bit, insofar as there is a fair amount of anger involved, a lot of the passion can be attributed to the fact that there is a certain helplessness involved with all points.
Pericles, I don’t think the liberal/conservative split explains what is going on here. George Will is on the side that Eric is on, and I’m on the liberal side, but I’ve tried to argue for the McChrystal option.
I think the question of whether the Taliban enjoys broad popular support or not is what a lot of questions here hinge on, and I don’t think anyone here has an god’s eye view of that. I think anyone who argues that the Taliban is a popularly supported indigenous movement rather than a much smaller group of ‘hard men’, supported by not only poppy money but also various donations is wrong, but I imagine the rejoinder is that I am merely taking Western propaganda as truth.
I also think that it will be necessary to actually bring Taliban elements into some sort of government, which was a big departure in the Obama rhetoric concerning Afghanistan. Of course, that might depend on having a Pashtun as president, so the act of going with Karzai may ruin any chance of success.
Eric strengthens his argument by cutting out the strategic questions, but that doesn’t mean that they disappear. Pepe Escobar, a Brazilian journalist, has written a lot about the various strategic considerations. Scroll down for the Afghanistan related pieces. He’s anarchist left, so he doesn’t really countenance US military action, but I don’t see how the strategic considerations that involve China, Iran, Russia and India can truly be set aside.
Here are some articles that express an opposite take here and here
I usually don’t do consecutive comments, but I thought this WaPo article has a number of interesting points for both sides that I copy here.
Senior White House officials have begun to make the case for a policy shift in Afghanistan that would send few, if any, new combat troops to the country and instead focus on faster military training of Afghan forces, continued assassinations of al-Qaeda leaders and support for the government of neighboring Pakistan in its fight against the Taliban.
“A lot of assumptions — and I don’t want to say myths, but a lot of assumptions — were exposed to the light of day.”
Among them, according to three senior administration officials who attended the meeting, is McChrystal’s contention that the Taliban and al-Qaeda share the same strategic interests and that the return to power of the Taliban would automatically mean a new sanctuary for al-Qaeda.
I wouldn’t say automatically, but I would suggest probably, but a lot depends on whether this is true or not. I linked to the other article about financing, and I’d suggest that the kind of financing that is being talked about would be much more susceptible to pressure. The ‘you can’t eliminate safe havens’ argument envisions terrorist cells setting up shop anywhere. I think that the ability to set up cells requires some sort of stable financial operations, so looking at it not as the potential of a small group setting up in an apartment, but on the logistical tail of such an operation suggests that you may not be able to eliminate safe havens, but you can make them much harder to set up.
In regard to utilizing the Petreus numbers as an argument against McChrystal
Senior White House officials asked some of the sharpest questions, according to participants and others who have been briefed on the meeting, while the uniformed military, including Gen. David H. Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, did not take issue with McChrystal’s assessment.
Of course, Petreus may have had his own agenda, but I think this suggests a danger in taking any ‘fact’ in this debate as a touchstone for a policy.
Asked whether a more limited counterterrorism effort would succeed in Afghanistan, [McChrystal] said, “The short answer is: no. You have to navigate from where you are, not where you wish to be. A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy.”
Of course, if where we are is a domestic polity that refuses to support the measures proposed, well, that’s where we are. I can live with that, but I still think it would be short-sighted.
Several senior Obama advisers argued this week that two significant events since then have changed the calculus on the ground. (Chaudry’s reinstatement and the Karzai election)
“Eight months ago, if you had asked people which was worse, everybody would have said Pakistan is worse and Afghanistan is in good shape,” one senior Obama adviser said. “Today we find out they had an election that wasn’t clean, the Taliban is doing qualitatively better than we presumed and Pakistan is doing so much better.”
The discussion here has largely avoided any discussion of Pakistan, except the negative assertion that the Pak Taliban are not really interested in challenging the US, only the Pakistan government, which I disagree with. However, if the Pakistan government takes stronger measures against the ‘Pak’ Taliban, that would reduce some of my objections.
Republican leaders in Congress have called on Obama to approve McChrystal’s request quickly, but one presidential adviser noted: “In eight months, it is impossible to reverse eight years of neglect.”
This is something that I have tried to acknowledge, and I’ll say it here again, that it may be too late. However, that is not a moral argument but a realistic one and people should avoid conflating the two.
I think anyone who argues that the Taliban is a popularly supported indigenous movement rather than a much smaller group of ‘hard men’, supported by not only poppy money but also various donations is wrong, but I imagine the rejoinder is that I am merely taking Western propaganda as truth.
The current Afghan government is supported by poppy money and donations. The fact that we’re making the donations does not make the warlords we’ve decided to call a government any more or less legitimate than the Taliban.
I find the notion that your beliefs have been influenced by propaganda to be consistent with your rhetorical comparisons of the Taliban to the Khmer Rouge. I will admit, this is classier than comparing them to Nazis, but not really that different.
I also think that it will be necessary to actually bring Taliban elements into some sort of government, which was a big departure in the Obama rhetoric concerning Afghanistan. Of course, that might depend on having a Pashtun as president, so the act of going with Karzai may ruin any chance of success.
I concur.
I don’t see how the strategic considerations that involve China, Iran, Russia and India can truly be set aside.
Perhaps they can’t be set aside, but they’re very hard to square with your “moral” side of the equation. If we’re talking hardnosed geopolitics, a stable, functional democracy in Afghanistan (putting aside the extent to which such a thing is feasible) is hardly ideal. Democracies have an unfortunate tendency to not stick to the script that’s been written for them. If we’re really worried about Russia and China and India, the best bet is probably to prop up a compliant thug. It’s hardly a novelty in US foreign policy, but not exactly the kind of “moral” approach you’re talking about.
So it seems to me that those “strategic considerations” actually weaken your case more than they strengthen it.
Pericles – do you want a stable *representative* government, or just a stable government? Can we have both a stable representative government and a pro-US government in Afghanistan?
Ideally, I’d want both. But if forced to chose, I’d chose stability over democracy. Did that ever describe Iraq? Not so much. We supported Iraq in the war against Iran, but that was an enemy of my enemy thing. I would never describe the Hussein regime as pro-US.
Kenneth Almquist makes some really good points. I would say though that we never abandoned the goal of destroying the Taliban. We thought we could do that and invade Iraq at the same time. Poor calculation? Maybe. But the idea that Iraq was distracting from Afghanistan was a liberal meme against the Iraq war, the Bush administration never renounced the goal of defeating the Taliban.
Jesurgislac,
I would respond to you, but I’m due back on the planet Earth.
How is it not an occupation?
You said it yourself, NV. The key words are “with permission”.
As dysfunctional as it is, the Karzai government is the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan, and we are there with government and UN approval. 62% of the Afghan people have a favorable opinion of the U.S. and 19% have a favorable opinion of the Taliban (cite). So who’s the real occupier, the U.S. or the Taliban? I say the latter.
…coalition forces are only directly responsible for 38% of the 2k plus civilian deaths over the last two years is a metric for our superiority?
Of course not, nous. Eric asked me to back up my statement and I did. Civilian casualties at the hands of ISAF and ANA forces are unacceptable, and the high number reflects the incoherent and counterproductive strategy that we were employing.
McChrystal isn’t just advocating for more troops, he’s proposing a new strategy together with the resources and manpower to enable mission success. Like Petraeus was given for Iraq, I think McChrystal should be given that chance for Afghanistan.
On civilian casualties, the point I was making was that, lost in all the discussion about civilian deaths is that the Taliban are multiple times worse, and that doesn’t count the bullying and intimidation tactics they’re using. You talked about moral obligations. Well, I think we have a moral obligation to get it right and keep our word to the Afghan and Pakistani people.
Umm, this makes no sense. The Taliban, whatever it’s many faults, is an indigenous movement. They can be awful and lack popular legitimacy, but they can’t be an occupier. We, on the other hand, are a global superpower from the other side of the world that invaded their country, installed a government more to our liking, and maintains a significant and active military presence. And yet you claim the Taliban is the true occupier? Silly rhetorical flourishes like this weaken your arguments and make me less inclined to take anything else you have to say seriously.
I’ve seen nothing that argues that the Taliban should be treated as the appropriate and lawful representatives of the people of Afghanistan except by their ability to direct violence. I’m not comfortable with regarding that ability as the only metric for determining which group is considered representative but if you know other information that would have us regard the Taliban as legitimate representatives, it would be nice if you would share it. Given pre 9/11 behavior like this and this, I don’t share your certainty of the Taliban’s representative nature, a certainty that mirrors your certainty about the right path in Afghanistan.
Uncle Kvetch, if we prop up a compliant thug, we simply maintain the same behavior that seems to be at the root of a lot of the messes we currently have. Withdrawing and maintaining an over the horizon ability seems like a recipe for the status quo, a realpolitik without the mess. A realpoltik that ends up looking like this.
In early December, four bearded and turbaned Afghan clerics dressed in traditional baggy pants stepped from a helicopter onto an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico operated by Unocal Corp., a huge, California-based global energy company.
link
Arguing for continued involvement in Afghanistan is perhaps the opposite of realpolitik. Realpolitik would be trying to engineer a pro-US goverment in Pakistan to dislodge the Chinese, or cast our lot with India and attempt to demonize Pakistan. That sort of approach is not novel. What would be novel would be the US putting its money where its mouth is.
I concur.
As do I.
Do we like the Taliban? No. Are they our friends? No. Will they be favorably disposed to our interests? No.
But they live there, they’re from there, and they have some constituency there, even if it’s just folks who see them as the least bad of available options.
It’s not our country. We can’t make it our country. The Afghans aren’t going to just do whatever we want them to do.
We’ve sat at the table and talked turkey with bigger bastards than the Taliban.
Hell, we’ve funded, armed, and trained bigger bastards than the Taliban.
Want to keep the Taliban from hosting foreign terror camps? Bring them inside the tent.
But the idea that Iraq was distracting from Afghanistan was a liberal meme against the Iraq war
I’d call it an observation of fact, myself.
They can be awful and lack popular legitimacy, but they can’t be an occupier.
I disagree, Larv. The Taliban is holding territory against the will of the people. Article 42 of the Hague Conventions says nothing about the origins of the occupiers. Quote:
The Taliban is that “hostile army”. That isn’t “silly rhetorical flourish”, it’s a fact according to the laws of war.
Pericles: I would respond to you, but
I’m due back on Planet EarthI can’t cope with the idea that not everyone perceives global politics according to US military propaganda.Fixed that for you.
I do recognise the difficulty that Americans who never look at news media from outside their own country have with the concept that people in other countries are more aware of what their government does than they themselves are… and that people from countries outside the US don’t interpret US military action with the same kind of willed good faith, either.
Larv: You should bear in mind that Charles Bird was consistently and persistently wrong about Iraq, in much the same optimistic “things will get better Real Soon Now” way, and I wouldn’t expect him to be any righter about Afghanistan.
Fixed that for you.
Have you noticed that you’re the only person who still thinks that meme is funny? Have you noticed that no one else does the “fixed” thing anymore? Why do you think that is?
Thank you for providing your ever so sophisticated European perspective you bitter harpy.
What Larv said. That little rhetorical flourish makes you look utterly ridiculous, and undermines any credibility you have in defining the US control of Afganistan as “an occupation” or “certainly anything but an occupation”.
An occupier is a foreign military power who exercises unlimited control over some territory other than their own. The US can be an occupier of Afghanistan. By definition, the Taliban cannot.
That we have “permission” is only meaningful so long as the occupied nation can actually consent or refuse. Our pliant installed government doesn’t really qualify, even if we get the international community to rubber-stamp it. By your standard, for example, France was never actually occupied in WWII.
Oops, didn’t see there was a second page. The above is “@Charles Bird“.
Uncle Kvetch, if we prop up a compliant thug, we simply maintain the same behavior that seems to be at the root of a lot of the messes we currently have.
I fully agree, LJ–please be assured that I wasn’t advocating our installing a compliant thug. I was merely pointing out that geopolitical considerations of the kind you raised, taken in isolation, would mitigate against our trying to create a democracy, for the simple reason that true democracies can’t be counted on to do as they’re told.
Now, given that I don’t think the US military is capable of creating anything more than a Potemkin Village democracy in Afghanistan (which will be good enough to fool the mainstream media here at home, at least for awhile), the point is kind of moot. But you seem to be assuming that our hypothetical democratic Afghanistan would just naturally and automatically be “on our side,” and I see no reason to believe that.
Pericles: Have you noticed that you’re the only person who still thinks that meme is funny?
What makes you think I think your determination to dismiss the facts is at all amusing?
When you call me a “bitter harpy” I don’t assume you’re trying to be amusing: I assume that having failed to dismiss the facts by joking about them, you’re trying to dismiss the facts by insulting the messenger.
The Taliban is that “hostile army”.
When I read this sentence, the quotation marks don’t seem to signify a quoted phrase so much as a creatively used one. The Taliban isn’t even a cohesive, singular group, let alone an army of any sort. If I and a friend attempt to rob a bank a la Dog Day Afternoon, do we become an occupier of the territory of the bank branch according to the laws of war?
@CB:
The Taliban is that “hostile army”. That isn’t “silly rhetorical flourish”, it’s a fact according to the laws of war.
So we’re to do region-by-region public opinion polls to establish the popularity and welcomeness of all belligerent armies in Afghanistan? Really? Thanks, Charles, you just conceded that the US is an occupier. I’m sure we can safely conclude that the populace of at least one region where the US’s de facto authority extends views them as a “hostile army”. Which by the standard of your silly rhetorical flourish makes them an occupier.
I also might add that your citing of the Hague Convention in this case might be disingenuous; IANAILL, but its provisions are specifically aimed at dictating the nature of conflicts between nations. The US occupation occurred over top of a civil war, which complicates questions of legitimacy rather considerably, and makes your easy, breezy declarations of the Taliban as occupier that much less credible.
The most prominent point, however, is that you’re applying two standards as to what constitutes “legitimate” “non-occupying” military forces. And looking rather silly while doing so. All for the sake of a semantic contortion to dodge a the application of a term you feel disparages the US military presence in Afghanistan.
62% of the Afghan people have a favorable opinion of the U.S. and 19% have a favorable opinion of the Taliban (cite). So who’s the real occupier, the U.S. or the Taliban? I say the latter.
Insert joke about the Republican Party here.
I disagree, Larv. The Taliban is holding territory against the will of the people. Article 42 of the Hague Conventions says nothing about the origins of the occupiers.
*sigh* This is sophist nonsense of a kind you’ve attempted many times before, rarely successfully since other people can actually read. The context of that article amongst the entirety of the Hague conventions makes it clear that it’s referring to an occupying army from outside the territory in question.
I was going to respond to Charles, but I see NV has already done so, and said it better than I could. So, what NV said.
…and Phil made more succinctly and clearly a point I alluded to, but did not explicitly state. So emphatically what Phil said, as well.
So here’s the attempt, in what time I have: The drone attacks, arguably, never had a serious problem with rules of engagement, as such — from accounts I’ve read of the Clinton administration, he was pretty supportive, especially in his later years, of sending these things after a man he considered the most dangerous to national security.
All I can say is that directly contradicts everything I have read (that contradicts the account in Jane Meyer’s book, in Marc Sageman’s work, in Steve Coll’s book The Bin Ladens, in Legacy of Ashes by Tim Weiner, Michael Scheuer’s work, etc.)
In each of those books, they describe situations where: (a) the Clinton administration hesitated because they were uncertain of the legality of such actions – and which agency would handle them (went against CIA protocols on assassination); and (b) that the Clinton administration hesitated because there were Saudi royals in the mix – and Bin Laden himself comes from a powerful family – and they didn’t want to roil Saudi Arabia.
The difficulties were more in the mechanics than the legalities — for example, the administration couldn’t really send off these planes from anywhere in the region, so the long flights cut down on volume. Plus, intel on the organization’s center was few and far between, because what we got had to come from the global organization.
But even to this day, many if not most are flown out of Creech in Nevada.
The discussion here has largely avoided any discussion of Pakistan, except the negative assertion that the Pak Taliban are not really interested in challenging the US, only the Pakistan government, which I disagree with.
Not in terms of my posts. I have dedicated at least a half dozen to Pakistan, and its interplay with our policies and the region.
Eric strengthens his argument by cutting out the strategic questions
Funny, I think it weakens my argument. I think the best argument is still that we are pursuing an implausible policy objective that is not only outlandish in its prospects for success, but is also enormously costly on many levels. For instances, we’re supposedly undertaking a COIN mission despite the fact that: (a) we have far fewer troops than necessary; and (b) the government we are defending is wildly unpopular, and largely viewed as illegitimate after the election debacle.
Those are fundamental flaws according to COIN doctrine.
Second, why would you not be concerned about a growing Taliban and increasingly radicalized Afghan population?
I am concerned. But, if you read the piece that you cited, our presence is itself a radicalizing agent. Foreign armies always are. Read Kilcullen.
According to this survey, 86% of Pakistanis agree that the Taliban and al Qaeda are a serious problem, yet you’re proposing that we bail out of a nation with a serious Taliban problem, and in doing so, will make it tougher for the Pakistanis to deal with it.
First of all, most Pakistanis (59% according to gallup) consider the US to be a bigger threat than the Taliban. In fact, that same poll indicates that most Pakistanis feel that we are THE biggest threat – even bigger than India. Further, 67 per cent say they oppose US military operations on Pakistani soil.
The USIP’s numbers from last year were even worse:
According to a USIP
poll from February 2008, more Pakistanis (about 84 per cent) see the US presence in Asia as a [bigger] threat to Pakistan than they perceive Al-Qaeda (about 62 per cent) or the Taliban (50 per cent) to be.”
Second, our involvement in the region is what’s created Pakistan’s Taliban problem in the first place. The Pakistani Taliban has risen up in response to incursions into their territory by US and Pakistani forces.
As the Council on Foreign Relations puts it:
The Pakistani Taliban, organizationally distinct from the Afghan group, rose up in 2002 in response to the Pakistani army’s incursions into that country’s tribal areas to hunt down militants. In 2008, Pakistani security forces clashed with pro-Taliban militants in the tribal area near Peshawar, jeopardizing peace talks between the militants and the government. The clashes continued in early 2009, expanding into the Swat Valley.
One addendum to this “But even to this day, many if not most are flown out of Creech in Nevada”
And most others are flown out of Pakistan. Which we could still do even without an enormous occupying army in Afghanistan.
Charles — thank you, as always, for your reply to my questions. As to your response, I note that you call the Taliban “multiple times worse.” In terms of the numbers you cited here they are about 1.6 times worse, though I agree that this is strictly a quantitative comparison and not particularly qualitative at all.
I’ll also note that you claim I talked about moral obligations, but I did not. I spoke of moral responsibility and I don’t think these two things are the same, though I understand why you would want to reframe things that way.
“But even to this day, many if not most are flown out of Creech in Nevada…And most others are flown out of Pakistan. Which we could still do even without an enormous occupying army in Afghanistan.”
I stand corrected — though I’d still love to see (a) link(s).
I have to say I’m completely surprised that, given the bases we have in Afghanistan, the US would send drones on non-stop flights from the midwest to these regions. (I mean, given the increased spending on gas, the increased risk of failure due to greater flight times, what reason is there to do it this way? Are they scared of moving these things a little closer?*)
I’m also surprised, given the shitstorms a lot of these attacks create in Pakistan, that we’re relying so heavily on their military installations to carry this out.**
But, again, I stand corrected, and I thank you for your response.
*TBAC, I’m not doubting your statement’s veracity — just wondering WTF the guys who implement these policies are thinking.
**Again, TBAFLC….
I mean, given the increased spending on gas, the increased risk of failure due to greater flight times, what reason is there to do it this way? Are they scared of moving these things a little closer?*
Good question. I think we want to be sure we have a working facility and are not at the mercy of conditions in Af/Pak. Also, it’s cheaper to keep the controllers there (though I don’t suppose they need to be in the same place – that’s kind of the point, huh).
I’m also surprised, given the shitstorms a lot of these attacks create in Pakistan, that we’re relying so heavily on their military installations to carry this out.**
Totally agree.
On Creech and the drones. A few years back I was playing blackjack in Vegas and I struck up a conversation with the gentleman to my left, and it turns out he was a drone “pilot.”
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread292665/pg1
BTW: That link says “most” flights FWIW
“A few years back I was playing blackjack in Vegas and I struck up a conversation with the gentleman to my left, and it turns out he was a drone “pilot.””
Wow, goes to show you…
“That link says “most” flights FWIW”
Not to quibble, but I think it said “control center” — that makes a certain amount of sense, given the skills needed for the job.
But I was thinking about the planes themselves in my previous post. What did your blackjack friend say about that?
All I’ve read indicates that the many of the planes themselves are flown out of Creech. Protest groups claim that they take to the skies from Creech regularly. And then there’s Pakistan of course, which has been hosting more and more flights.
here’s some info
On second thought, I don’t think they do fly out of Creech. The more I’m reading, the more I doubt it. I must have confused terms in mind previously. Still, we can and do operate them from bases in Pakistan. Further, even if we withdrew for the most part, we would presumably leave behind some residual contingent of support forces, and you don’t need many to operate drones.
OK, I think this is getting clearer now — it looks like these planes are being operated from afar, but the Combat Air Patrols are kept in the air*.
This gets us back to Pakistan though, and using their bases so heavily seems to be a tricky thing to rely on…**
“Further, even if we withdrew for the most part, we would presumably leave behind some residual contingent of support forces, and you don’t need many to operate drones.”
Are we talking support forces to man and maintain bases from which to back up these operations? Because those can run you.
*(are they fueled midflight? do they land, to be refueled? I’m still unclear…)
**I, for one, would love to see a post on this subject. (Not that this one isn’t much appreciated.)
Shit
I think the best argument is still that we are pursuing an implausible policy objective that is not only outlandish in its prospects for success, but is also enormously costly on many levels. For instances, we’re supposedly undertaking a COIN mission despite the fact that: (a) we have far fewer troops than necessary; and (b) the government we are defending is wildly unpopular, and largely viewed as illegitimate after the election debacle.
Let’s address these arguments.
(A) Yes, we don’t have the troops available to saturate Afghanistan, even counting ANSF. However, COIN doctrine is just that – doctrine. It’s not a road map, it’s not a prerequisite, it’s something that is always context-dependent.
Even with the troop increase, we are not going to win the war next year, or the year after. But we can position ourselves and the GoA and ANSF for eventual success. The ANSF can be built up and eventually take the lead, though this will take time. The ISF took years to build up to a point where they could defeat the Mahdi Army and AQI in open combat, but they’re there now. The ANA can get there as well.
2) You haven’t proved to me that the GoA is “wildly unpopular” or seen as illegitimate by the Afghan people, especially compared to the Taliban. I think the massive preponderance of evidence is that while the Afghan people do view the GoA as corrupt and often incompetent, they reject the Taliban overwhelmingly and have strong confidence in the Afghan National Army. The majority of them also still support the presence of foreign troops in their country. The popularity of even foreign troops compared to Taliban fighters is especially striking.
Any argument that calls for removal of foreign troops, I think, has to ignore both the overall wishes of the Afghan people and their welfare. If you’re going to argue for removal of foreign troops, you have to do it on a resources and realpolitik standpoint.
</tagclose>
apologies for a brief comment, but I’ve got some Japanese proofreading to do, which occupies a lot more time than usual work. Eric, when you mentioned strategic, I assumed that you were referencing Iran, Russia, China and India, natural resources and pipelines rather than Pakistan, I didn’t mean to slight you.
I think that Charles overstates when trying to squeeze the Taliban into a notion of nation-states, but going the other way and arguing that they somehow enjoy legitimacy because they can sow violence seems wrong as well. The Taliban seems much more like an organized crime group, but the difference is that a functioning state can at least hold organized crime in check. I’m having a hard time seeing the current indigenous police and army doing that. However, if you believe that the Taliban represents the legitimate voice of the Afghan people, you would disagree.
Eric, you also reference the concern of legality that drone strikes and the like bring on. I think that concern points to the fact that in places like Afghanistan, the concept of a controlling nation state is broken. Considering things like piracy from Somalia, South Ossetia, and nuclear proliferation, I view those problems of Afghanistan as the thin edge of the wedge, and a retreat to the pre 9/11 mindset of striking from afar encourages a feeling that everything is fine when that will simply be trying to hold the lid down on a boiling pot. The confusion as to where the flights are based, who is controlling them, how they are approved provides the perfect veil of ignorance, so that when things explode, we can stick out our lower lib and wonder what did we ever do to them? And given that technology will push this sort of technology to be more rather than less lethal, it becomes an asymmetrical arms race where second tier nations rush to put defensive measures in place (think not only of Iran and nukes, but of hardened bunkers) and groups like the Taliban adopt a decentralized factional model.
Larv,
The Taliban are Pashtun, a southern ethnic group. They will massacre the Hazaras first chance they get.
Charles,
The new plan sounds though too much like the Soviet plan.
“…The revival of an urban-dominated “ink spot” strategy for the defense of a weak Afghan state may be the best of a series of bad military choices. Certainly the past U.S. military approaches since 2001—a concentration on counterterrorism raids initially, followed by a poorly resourced counterinsurgency approach that also made a dubious priority of rural Helmand Province—have not stanched the Taliban’s revival.
Even if an ink-spot campaign is successful, the Taliban will still own sizable chunks of the Afghan countryside for years. Their forces will be able to move fairly freely at night and in the mountains, as they do now; they will be able to carry out ambushes on the roads; they will attempt to penetrate city defenses to undertake spectacular car bombings and raids; and they will continue to move back and forth across the border with Pakistan, resourced by leadership and financing networks located there. Perhaps, in time, if the proposed McChyrstal strategy succeeded, and a archipelago of relative peace and normalcy were established, and the factionalism within the current Kabul government subsided, and Afghan forces grew and improved, and at least some local Taliban opponents were converted into quiescent local powers, the Afghan state would then be able to push out gradually into the countryside, widening its ink spots.”
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/09/ink-spots.html
You sure you meant to address that to me? If so, may I ask what it’s in response to?
After 8 years and everything we have learned about the American political and military class, during and since the run up to the invasion and occupation of Iraq,…the best thing we can do in Afghanistan, is start developing some sort of peace negotiation with the Taliban. We allowed a cadre of liars and cowards to manipulate one of the most dangerous and lethal armies in history, for nothing more than, “they simply could.” 8 years later and nothing has been accomplished, except fill the pockets of those who make money off of mass death. It’s disgusting and degenerate.
I don’t think Jes posted the 1:34pm comment.
That makes four identity-theft comments – one at the end of the Hokum thread, one at the end of the Rule of Law thread, and these two at 01:34 PM and at 02:14 PM. All of them have tinyurl links that I strongly suggest you not click on… (I don’t know where they go, but I doubt it’s anywhere good).
The 1:34 and 2:14 comments were definitely not by Jes. Especially since the 2:14 is another tinyurl leading to porn.
Thanks, Charles, you just conceded that the US is an occupier.
Sorry, no, NV, by your own words, since we don’t exercise unlimited power and we’re there with the approval of the government of Afghanistan. The first election involving Karzai was legitimate by all accounts, and the one last August deserves a runoff. Even so, before the election he polled close to 50% and his favorability ratings were in the 60s. I’ll accept your comment that the Taliban isn’t an occupier. They’re more of a shadow dictatorship than anything. I fail to see how they would have more legitimacy and why they deserve to return to power.
You should bear in mind that Charles Bird was consistently and persistently wrong about Iraq, in much the same optimistic “things will get better Real Soon Now” way, and I wouldn’t expect him to be any righter about Afghanistan.
You’re still a liar, Jes. I suggest you honor the agreement that we had several years ago.
Sorry, no, NV, by your own words, since we don’t exercise unlimited power and we’re there with the approval of the government of Afghanistan.
The approval of the government we created, and continue to prop up?
Question for ya: a lot of people in your camp have argued that the US withdrawing is surrendering Afghanistan to the Taliban. Do you agree?
And if you do agree, how do you square this with your claims that Karzai’s government is legitimate? After having its enemies hounded and attacked by US and NATO forces for going on eight years, after receiving piles of military aid, after, per your arguments, receiving the support of the majority of the Afghan people… it still wouldn’t be able to hold onto power? Unless we assume the Taliban are an irresistible military and political force of nature… it seems like one or more of your premises has got to give.
The first election involving Karzai was legitimate by all accounts
O rly?
Legitimate, by all accounts? Shirley you jest. Even if we ignore the structural advantage that the illegitimately-appointed incumbent had, the lack of widespread coverage of the fraud that occurred doesn’t magically mean it didn’t occur.
For that matter, another account.
Charles: You’re still a liar, Jes.
No, now you’re just being abusive: you never got anything right about Iraq, and your response to people pointing this out has invariably been personal abuse, because, well… what else can you say? You were wrong about Iraq with awesome consistency and optimism. You appear to be heading down the same route with Afghanistan.
You cannot make your past errors any more correct by abusing people who point them out as “liars”.
I view those problems of Afghanistan as the thin edge of the wedge, and a retreat to the pre 9/11 mindset of striking from afar encourages a feeling that everything is fine when that will simply be trying to hold the lid down on a boiling pot.
I’ll repeat again, the use of military force is not only an ineffective means of pursuing counterterrorism policies, but groups from West Point’s Counter Terrorism Center to RAND have concluded that it is almost always counterproductive.
As in, actually hurts your cause.
The best way to combat terrorism is through law enforcement, intel and targeted, precision use of military force.
Thus, regardless of our decision to occupy Afghanistan for the next quarter century, we will NOT, NOT, NOT return to a pre-9/11 footing. Because with respect to the most effective and most efficient means to combat terrorism, we have improved greatly (with the combination of focus, resource attribution and prioritization).
You haven’t proved to me that the GoA is “wildly unpopular” or seen as illegitimate by the Afghan people, especially compared to the Taliban.
With all due respect, I’m not sure I care much. Why do I have to prove that to you? It either is, or it isn’t. Most think tank reports and news stories from groups like McClatchey (that get things right) indicate that Karzai is extremely unpopular. Believe it, or not. Time and a few trillion dollars will tell.
As for “as compared to the Taliban,” I have never contended that the Taliban are widely popular. But the Tajik factions are popular in Tajik regions, and other factions are popular in their home regions as well. Either way, they’ve had enough local support to continue to dig in and gain ground in some areas.
And, according to you, they will topple the Karzai government shortly after we pull our troops out even if we continue to offer air support, massive funding, military aid and other support.
So, they’ve got “some” type of appeal.
Any argument that calls for removal of foreign troops, I think, has to ignore both the overall wishes of the Afghan people and their welfare.
Not so sure about this. The BBC poll you are solely relying on is pretty dated. And enough Afghans want us gone that they keep shooting at us/setting bombs to blow us up.
If you’re going to argue for removal of foreign troops, you have to do it on a resources and realpolitik standpoint.
Yes, that is the main argument, that and a plausibility of goals. But there is also the fact that we are killing thousands of Afghans under the ostensible rationale of…keeping those dead Afghans safe.
The best way to combat terrorism is through law enforcement, intel and targeted, precision use of military force.
Which are not what drones are. Targeted, yes, precision, no.
Thus, regardless of our decision to occupy Afghanistan for the next quarter century, we will NOT, NOT, NOT return to a pre-9/11 footing. Because with respect to the most effective and most efficient means to combat terrorism, we have improved greatly (with the combination of focus, resource attribution and prioritization).
Leaving failed states in our wake seems like deja vu all over again.
Also, as a procedural recommendation, I’d suggest that you be careful combining comments from different commentators without attribution. While tequila and I share some points of view in common, some others who are arguing for the McChrystal plan are going from assumptions that I do not share at all.
The obvious solution would be a federal state where each minority gets a place of its own. But there was no way in hell the US could have overseen that, and I don’t see how the Taliban (Af or Pak versions) would accept that. I mean, Kashmir is a tinderbox precisely because it is claimed that Muslims are being oppressed by a foreign state there. While the Kasab confession is now under question, the motivating encouragement has not been dismissed and that has been and continues to be the argument that it is the persecution of the Umma, and that is not simply Kashmir or Nuristan, but extends over all of Afghanistan. That Karzai will be placed in that same box of persecuting the Umma does not mean that the Taliban should be the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
The Washington Post has a series of must read pieces on the Battle of Wanat. Unfortunately, what I see as an argument for a withdrawal from the less populated regions (already ordered by McChrystal) to create a secure environments in more populated areas will probably be taken by you and others as an argument for withdrawal. However, I take this as illustrating a point.
The elder Brostrom weighed his words carefully before he spoke. “How do you know those people dragging the bodies away weren’t villagers coming to get their relatives?” he asked.
“They are all [expletive] Taliban up there,” the son replied.
The father continued to press his doubts. The son maintained that the hard-nosed approach was the only thing keeping him alive in a hopeless corner of Afghanistan. Finally, the young lieutenant snapped. “You don’t understand,” he said.
“You’re right, son. I don’t,” the father replied. “I don’t understand it. But I am worried. I am really worried.”
We will have a footprint in Afghanistan, there will be a residual force there. You have acknowledged a withdrawal period of some time. (I’m not sure exactly how long, but it seemed rather lengthy) As you reduce the number of troops, you encourage these kind of attitudes. Afghanistan is the way it is because it was the second front, an afterthought, and was never examined as a problem to be solved, but simply a place to be kept on the back burner. If you agree with this, you may understand why I think that it deserves our full attention rather than a withdrawal and cruise missiles and Special forces dropping in whenever we get some hot info. The pre 9/11 mindset I refer to is not that we are better able to catch such threats, but that we again ignore the structural reasons for why they arise.
Which are not what drones are. Targeted, yes, precision, no.
Well, I’m open debate as to the wisdom of using drones. But we don’t need drones necessarily. We can use JDAMs fired from other platforms. So, sure. JDAMs are quite precise. And have been used to great success in the battle against al-Qaeda.
Leaving failed states in our wake seems like deja vu all over again.
I’m not sure what this means in terms of terrorism. al-Qaeda was formed by a group of Egyptian and Saudi (mostly) ex-pats that had been largely exiled from their homeland for their extreme political/religious beliefs. They did not come from failed states.
Many had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, many had not. After the Soviets were expelled, they had nowhere to go. al-Qaeda did not recruit from Afghans at the time, as most Afghans cared little for their grand designs. Most al-Qaeda recruits come from non-failed states in the Middle East/Maghreb and Western Europe.
Query: if we had dedicated large amounts of money and resources to Afghanistan at the time, how would this have alleviated the terrorist threat? Would that money have even bought stability in Afghanistan, or more conflict because of the factions we would have likely supported?
Regardless, after the Soviets were kicked out, bin Laden and a coterie went on to Sudan, and then back to Afghanistan when it got too hot for him there.
Summation: al-Qaeda was not formed because of a failed state. It’s ideology is spreading fastest in Western Europe – which is not comprised of failed states. Most of the planning and logistics for all recent terrorist attacks took place in either the US or Europe.
Further, Afghanistan was not a failed state “we left behind” – it was a failed stated because of other factors. Ditto now.
Eric,
I think this–“Which are not what drones are. Targeted, yes, precision, no.”–refers to the tendency to cause civilian casualties through collateral damage, so JDAMs wouldn’t solve the problem. At least that’s what I think. I’m not aware of any problems with the accuracy of Hellfire missiles.
I think this–“Which are not what drones are. Targeted, yes, precision, no.”–refers to the tendency to cause civilian casualties through collateral damage
Well, then we’re in semantic land. Either way, limited application of military force when necessary and justified is what I’m getting after.
We have used these (and commando units) in places like Yemen, most recently Somalia, and even in places like Pakistan to get KSM.
These are appropriate uses of military force. Large armies occupying nations for 20-30 years…less so.
“Query: if we had dedicated large amounts of money and resources to Afghanistan at the time, how would this have alleviated the terrorist threat?”
And now we’re back to the question of how important safe havens are to carrying out 9/11 level* attacks.
*After some thought, I think this is the closest and clearest term available. (I had been leaning more toward “massive terrorist attacks”, but that caused some confusion.)
And now we’re back to the question of how important safe havens are to carrying out 9/11 level* attacks.
Given that I’ve already described several 9/11 level attacks that need no safe haven at all, I think we already know the answer to this question. In any event, the financing for 9/11 did not come from Afghanistan. The people did not come from Afghanistan. The training needed to execute the operation was not done in Afghanistan (indeed, the only training that mattered was flight training done in the US).
You keep writing comments implying that the necessity of safe havens to carrying out significant terrorist attacks is some big unsettled question, but it really is not. A safe haven was not needed for 9/11. A safe haven is not needed to execute comparable attacks now.
McChrystal should be fired immediately for insubordination . I have absolutely no confidence in this nut.
Point: I am curious as to your responses to Turbulence’s point.
What about a safe haven was necessary for a large scale attack?
Further, as I’ve pointed out several times, there are other suitable “safe haven” options if such space is necessary. Including locations in Europe.
Again, I ask, are we to embark on a millenia long campaign to rid the globe of “failed states”? And even then, would the threat of major attacks thus have disappeared because failed state safe havens are the sine qua non of large scale attacks?
Doesn’t add up.
My point was brief because:
1) This thread has already gone to nearly 150 comments,
2) we’ve had this conversation before and
3) technically, I’m at work, and likely to get busy.
So: I would suggest, if you would like to consider continuing the conversation along these lines, doing a thread on the specific subject of safe havens and large scale attacks.
Yeah, I know. But I guess I’ve never really felt satisfied with the answers.
1) This thread has already gone to nearly 150 comments,
2) we’ve had this conversation before and
3) technically, I’m at work, and likely to get busy.
So: I would suggest, if you would like to consider continuing the conversation along these lines, doing a thread on the specific subject of safe havens and large scale attacks.
Why does the thread length matter? We are all in this thread now discussing this topic. And while we’ve discussed some of these issues before, you’ve never responded convincingly. I’m sorry you’re at work, but so am I. I don’t see why we need a new thread. I’ve asked you to address an issue. So has Eric. If you don’t want to do that, just say so, but don’t hide behind the need for a new thread.
al-Qaeda was formed by a group of Egyptian and Saudi (mostly) ex-pats that had been largely exiled from their homeland for their extreme political/religious beliefs. They did not come from failed states.
But they gravitated to failed states. And failed states provide the raw material.
Query: if we had dedicated large amounts of money and resources to Afghanistan at the time, how would this have alleviated the terrorist threat? Would that money have even bought stability in Afghanistan, or more conflict because of the factions we would have likely supported?
By making Afghanistan a stable state that could internally police itself, we would have alleviated the terrorist threat, I believe. But it is difficult to imagine the previous administration doing this competently. However, does this mean that all administrations should be assumed to have the level of competence of the Bush the Younger?
We have used these (and commando units) in places like Yemen, most recently Somalia, and even in places like Pakistan to get KSM.
Yemen and Somalia are akin to burnt out houses. Pakistan, well, I’m pretty sure that with the KSM, either someone let us in the door, or Pakistan ISI brought him out after we knocked. All of the criticisms that you raise about information and intelligence increase by some multiplier if we imagine a failed state, or a state with multiple factions fighting it out when Special Ops comes to call.
To continue with houses, Afghanistan was, before the Soviet invasion, a relatively stable government, a rundown but definitely livable house in a bad neighborhood. However, the US engaged in block busting by funding the mujahdeen, many of whom became the Taliban that we are now fighting.
Your “limited application of military force when necessary and justified” is judged appropriate whenever the US decides. Why is the US military incapable of dealing with the various factions in Afghanistan, but somehow has some corner on correctness when the military force is a cruise missile or a JDAM? It is precisely the same military that is doing the targeting in both cases, so why are they killing civilians in one case and only doing what is necessary and justified in another?
Afghanistan has now become a house that we can walk into anytime we feel like, just because. If you are going to scoff at the military’s ability to deal with insurgents, you can’t claim a magical exception just because it’s a JDAM.
Point’s point about safe havens is accurate, but the name ‘safe havens’ suggests that it is simply a physical space, like fixer-upper duplexes, which invites ridicule. It’s actually more than that. It is the ability to move money and assets around, it is the ability to hire an army of bodyguards to protect themselves, it is the ability to very very quickly sniff out the newcomer, it is the ability to toss money out to the civilian masses and have them say ‘gee, he gives us money, what did the West ever do for us?’ I don’t think these are insubstantial advantages. The ‘safe haven’ also provides a motivating factor for people who want to drop out. It’s a lot harder to hold on to the fixed mental image of death to the west when you are living and working there than if you can compare and contrast. Would Atta and the others have been able to go thru with the plot if they had to spend all their time in the West whle they were preparing? Would Richard Reid have become the shoe bomber if he were not able to make multiple trips to Pakistan?
And the aim is not necesarily a 9/11 attack, it would be something on a lower, but wider scale, something that would put enough sand in the wheels.
But emphasizing the ‘safe havens’ emphasizes that the US is protecting itself against bad actors, and the argument I’ve tried to make is that we need to deal with the pre 9/11 structural problems that made the attacks seem inevitable. How exactly is Special Ops and JDAMs dealing with these structural problems?
Dunno how that link got in there, thank god it wasn’t an unclosed tag.
Why does the thread length matter? We are all in this thread now discussing this topic. And while we’ve discussed some of these issues before, you’ve never responded convincingly. I’m sorry you’re at work, but so am I. I don’t see why we need a new thread. I’ve asked you to address an issue. So has Eric. If you don’t want to do that, just say so, but don’t hide behind the need for a new thread.
That assumes that Point wants to hide. With the problem of paged threads and the fact that this post is actually well down the list, it would be nice to have a restatement of ideas with the hope of identifying what we agree on and what we disagree. But accusing someone of not wanting to answer because they suggest a new thread is silly.
Thanks LJ — as it happens I’m starting on a (work) project just about now, but I’ll pop in when I can…
But they gravitated to failed states. And failed states provide the raw material.
But now they’re gravitating toward Western Europe. Also, what do you mean by “raw materials”?
It is precisely the same military that is doing the targeting in both cases, so why are they killing civilians in one case and only doing what is necessary and justified in another?
I’m not exactly sure what you’re getting at here, but I can speculate that the confusion comes from weaving in and out of normative and pragmatic arguments.
In both scenarios, civilians are killed. However, the use of airstrikes will be vastly reduced in counterterrorism ops alone. For example, we won’t be targeting so many Taliban/tribal groups that we oppose on that given day for purposes of Afghanistan’s internal sturm and drang of a civil war.
So, less civilian casualties overall at the hands of the US, but still dead civilians at the hands of the US. As for being justified, well, if you want to debate completely abstaining from using force because of what is justified and not, we can have that debate.
But if the argument is for a 30 year occupation with over 100,000 troops and a wide range of targets (terrorist and not) for air strikes and other ordnance vs. no such occupation and limited application of air strikes (terrorist only), then I don’t know if it matters much why one is justified and the other isn’t. Let’s agree that neither is justified (or that both are), and then talk about what we should adopt as policy.
Afghanistan has now become a house that we can walk into anytime we feel like, just because. If you are going to scoff at the military’s ability to deal with insurgents, you can’t claim a magical exception just because it’s a JDAM.
What does this mean?
Point’s point about safe havens is accurate
Which point?
It is the ability to move money and assets around
It is much harder to move money around in Afghanistan than Western Europe. But either way, finances have been disrupted massively by…intel and law enforcement! In other words, its much harder to move money around…period. And if anything, it’s considerably harder in Afghanistan.
it is the ability to hire an army of bodyguards to protect themselves
What value do these bodyguards have?
it is the ability to very very quickly sniff out the newcomer
Why is this easier in Afghanistan? Even though most recruiting is done in Europe? Help me out here.
I don’t think these are insubstantial advantages.
But how are any of them substantial?
Further, how are they substanitial if al-Qaeda isn’t even in Afghanistan anymore, but rather Pakistan.
Why is the Afghan haven so much more advantageous to the Pakistani haven such that we should spend a few trillion dollars and a few decades and a few thousand American lives and a few score Afghan lives?
Would Atta and the others have been able to go thru with the plot if they had to spend all their time in the West whle they were preparing? Would Richard Reid have become the shoe bomber if he were not able to make multiple trips to Pakistan?
Why not? Other terrorists have gone through with their plots while never visiting Pakistan or Afghanisan.
See, ie, the Madrid Bombings and the London Bombings. Further, what is magic about the “non-western experience” in Pakistan that can’t be recreated in, say, Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Morocco?
But emphasizing the ‘safe havens’ emphasizes that the US is protecting itself against bad actors, and the argument I’ve tried to make is that we need to deal with the pre 9/11 structural problems that made the attacks seem inevitable. How exactly is Special Ops and JDAMs dealing with these structural problems?
But that’s MY POINT!!!!
Look, al-Qaeda has zero-to very few recruits from failed states. Most al-Qaeda recruits are from Western Europe, the Maghreb and the Levant/Gulf region.
Eradicating all failed states would not address the structural problems of al-Qaeda. The fastest growing al-Qaeda threat is in Western Europe. Read Marc Sageman.
al-Qaeda recruits tend to be: middle class to lower middle class, well-educated, not very religious (as youth and most of their lives), psychologically healthy (by all accounts), and removed from their homeland (second generation Muslims living in Europe).
Most are motivated by: anger at the West for waging war on Muslims (or what they perceive as a war with Muslims) and a romantic idea of joining the knights of the Prophet.
How does waging war on more Muslims (radicalizing more of the youth) in order to eradicate one of dozens of failed states (when most of those youth are joining up in Europe) address the structural problems of terorrist threats like al-Qaeda?
Dunno.
Eric,
Why do keep citing Marc Sageman? His work has been thoroughly discredited.
Eric already asked all the questions I wanted to ask regarding LJ’s most recent comment. Regarding this though:
That assumes that Point wants to hide. With the problem of paged threads and the fact that this post is actually well down the list, it would be nice to have a restatement of ideas with the hope of identifying what we agree on and what we disagree. But accusing someone of not wanting to answer because they suggest a new thread is silly.
What problem with paged threads are you talking about? Paging works fine now. You can always click on links in the upper right recent comments bar and they’ll work fine. And why do we need a restatement of ideas? We’ve asked Point some very simple questions.
And I’m not accusing Point of anything. I’m trying to figure out why he insists that other people have to do pointless time consuming things before he can answer some simple questions. I don’t see any reason why a new thread is needed and you haven’t provided one.
Why do keep citing Marc Sageman? His work has been thoroughly discredited.
By whom? Where?
Eric,
Why do keep citing Marc Sageman? His work has been thoroughly discredited.
An academic slap-fight != ‘thoroughly discredited’, unless you have further info to bolster your assertion.
I’ve tried to be pretty clear that I am arguing from both a normative and pragmatic viewpoint. Normative because we need to reestablish those in the wake of the Bush admin, pragmatic because Afghanistan isn’t the locus of the Grand Game for nothing. I wish that everything could be clearly labeled normative or pragmatic, but that doesn’t mean it is going to happen.
To take your questions in order, you argue that we will be able to correctly use military force if they are Special Ops and drones. Yet you argue that it is clear that the military is not up to the task of dealing with the Afghanistan population now. How do we suddenly know where to send our Special ops in or aim our cruise missiles?
Point’s raising of the safe haven issue is what I meant, not any particular aspect of it.
You then argue that it is more difficult to move money around Afghanistan than Europe. However, money leaves a trail in Western countries, but it is going to be a lot harder to follow in Afghanistan. This article contradicts your assertion that we are getting better at tracking money. Some key grafs
Afghanistan, which has only a handful of banks, lacks a modern financial system. Tools commonly used to combat money laundering, such as freezing bank accounts or monitoring electronic wire transfers, are largely useless, U.S. officials said.
Most money transfers in Afghanistan are made under the hawala system, an informal network of money brokers who traditionally keep few, if any, records about their customers. With help from U.S. officials, the Afghan government has begun to regulate its hawala brokers for the first time. Brokers in seven provinces are now registered with the government and are required to report all transactions each month to the central bank, which conducts audits to ensure compliance.
Some hawala brokers have become informants, notifying authorities of suspicious or unusually large transfers. Accustomed to the traditional anonymity of hawala networks, Taliban supporters sometimes fill out their customer slips by plainly stating that the payment is for “heroin” or “five vehicles for Taliban commander so-and-so,” said a senior U.S. law-enforcement official.
The government that is monitoring the hawala system is the same government that you think we should leave it to its own devices.
As far as an army of bodyguards, when the top 5 have 30 or 40 people in their entourage from the locals, dropping a cruise missile to kill the group is going to piss off the locals, just as you argue. If your well financed black sheep Saudi prince comes along and pays sympathy money to the widows and parents, who comes out looking better? And how much more problematic is this when it is in downtown Kandahar rather than sparsely populated Nuristan? Given your previous arguments, this seems like a substantial advantage.
As for newcomers, I’m not sure how I can explain it any more simply, but I would wager that it is easier to get an informant into a radical mosque in the UK or Europe than it would be to get them into a tribal village in Afghanistan. I’m not sure why that is controversial.
As for the Pakistan question, in the period before 9/11, the ISI encouraged the Taliban to focus its anger against the West, which is why there was less problems with them in Pakistan. Withdrawing from Afghanistan will encourage the Taliban sympathetic elements in the ISI to restart that policy. And explain to me how the Saudis and others will be encouraged to deal with their radicals. Again, I’m not sure why that would be something impossible to imagine.
We talk about the logistical tail of a military operation, but a terrorist group has a similar logistical tail. If that tail is in Western Europe, it is going to be a lot easier to see traces of it than in Afghanistan.
As far as the failed state, the failed state provides the location, the logistical tail and the ‘dream’ of fighting the West in a club med like atmosphere to recharge your batteries. To go there as a western educated jihadi, I imagine, lets you be like some demigod, which is much easier when the daily wage is maybe a $1 a day if there is work.
And this profile is not something that is limited to radical Islam. The members of the AUM sect (of Tokyo sarin fame) were largely the same profile, with many of them from engineering and science departments. Ironically, AUM had a similar relationship with Russia, where the same sort of dynamic took place.
‘Eradicating failed states’ would be nice, but to do so, we have to take concrete steps (something more substantial than buying mosquito nets) to deal with these states rather than putting them in a box marked ‘only to be opened by Special ops’. And somehow, watching Afghanistan collapse under the weight of factional fighting is somehow going to have our would be jihadists say ‘hey, maybe it isn’t the West’s fault’, seems just as unrealistic.
MB: Exactly.
A few thoughts on the Sageman/Hoffman back and forth…
1. I have read both of them, and find much value in each of their work (also Kepel, Bergen, Roy, etc).
2. Each of Sageman’s books is rather informative, but for different reasons. Understanding Terror Networks provides psych profiles of known terrorists and challenges conventional wisdom re: what candidates join terrorist groups. Hoffman doesn’t challenge his scholarship in that respect. In fact, he compliments it frequently.
3. Their argument is more of a fine point than a “thorough discrediting.” In Sageman’s second book, Leaderless Jihad, Sageman argues that the threat from bin Laden and AQ Central is pretty much gone – replaced by a new “Leaderless” swirl of wannabes (congregating on the Internet before meeting in the flesh world). Hoffman says, actually, AQ Central is resurgent and still a threat and can’t be written off that easily.
That’s basically it. More a matter of degree than anything (in fact, Sagemen argues that Hoffman is reading him as overly categorical, and they go back and forth on the proper grade of each threat)
My take: They’re both right! AQ Central is still a threat AND the most dynamic, burgeoning threat now comes from the Leaderless set. Neither should be ignored.
Just like Sageman and Hoffman themselves.
But, um, yeah. No thorough discrediting of either side here.
Ok, Ok, I may be guilty of some cranky hyperbole.
Turb,
If you don’t want to do that, just say so, but don’t hide behind the need for a new thread.
seems like an accusation to me. Also,
I’m trying to figure out why he insists that other people have to do pointless time consuming things before he can answer some simple questions.
Try as I might, I don’t see Point as ‘insisting’.
As far as ‘pointless time consuming things’, I just get tired of clicking on next comment, scrolling down to the bottom, clicking on the next link and then scrolling down again to find out the next comment. And I think that the question of safe havens is far enough from the content of Eric’s post and it might benefit from a restatement. Sure, I could just reload the second page of the comments constantly, but I hold out a hope for other regulars to post something interesting in another thread or perhaps a new post. I also don’t like posting multiple comments consecutively (as I may have mentioned) it’s like someone who talks right thru pauses and doesn’t let others get in edgewise, so I like to go back to the original thread to give some conversational space. It also makes one’s reply, when there are intervening comments, seem much more aggressive and lead to more heat and less light. I’m sorry if this doesn’t provide you with a reason to consider that Point actually had a point about this, but that’s the way I read Obwi and I’m not going to change.
LJ is right. This thread is getting stale. I’m probably the only person bothering to follow your discussion because it’s annoying to reach.
Normative because we need to reestablish those in the wake of the Bush admin, pragmatic because Afghanistan isn’t the locus of the Grand Game for nothing.
I’m very confused as to why you see the Bush admin as a singular event in this regard. American foreign policy has rarely concerned itself with normative matters. This is not some aberration that Bush introduced.
You then argue that it is more difficult to move money around Afghanistan than Europe. However, money leaves a trail in Western countries, but it is going to be a lot harder to follow in Afghanistan.
Criminal organizations operate in every single wester country These organizations move substantial amounts of money within and between every western country. They do this even though “money leaves a trail in western countries”; in fact, moving dirty money around isn’t particularly difficult.
you argue that we will be able to correctly use military force if they are Special Ops and drones.
What does this mean, “correctly”?
Yet you argue that it is clear that the military is not up to the task of dealing with the Afghanistan population now.
What does this mean “up to the task of dealing with the Afghn population”?
How do we suddenly know where to send our Special ops in or aim our cruise missiles?
I’m missing this entire response/question. I would only like to point out that we were pretty good at targeting AQ camps before we invaded, and have been even better since – across the globe, through various intel means. Is that what you’re asking?
The government that is monitoring the hawala system is the same government that you think we should leave it to its own devices.
First of all, this is a repeated and, quite frankly, annoying falsehood.
I DO NOT want to “abandon” Afghanistan. I do not want to “leave it to its own devices.”
To repeat, AGAIN, I want a gradual withdrawal of most military personnel, a residual force and the continuation of aid/support.
Further, I’ve read arguments about moving money to and from Afghanistan presenting hardships, especially for bin Laden whose money is tied up in Western institutions, but I’m not tied to that point.
As for newcomers, I’m not sure how I can explain it any more simply, but I would wager that it is easier to get an informant into a radical mosque in the UK or Europe than it would be to get them into a tribal village in Afghanistan. I’m not sure why that is controversial.
Why? Either way, the informant is likely from that Western country, and not the Afghan village. Explain if you can.
As far as an army of bodyguards, when the top 5 have 30 or 40 people in their entourage from the locals, dropping a cruise missile to kill the group is going to piss off the locals, just as you argue. If your well financed black sheep Saudi prince comes along and pays sympathy money to the widows and parents, who comes out looking better? And how much more problematic is this when it is in downtown Kandahar rather than sparsely populated Nuristan? Given your previous arguments, this seems like a substantial advantage.
But under your preferred course of action this would continue. It’s important to recall that the options being debated are counterT and counterT plus occupation. The latter option actually leads to MORE airstrikes, not less. So any argument in favor of the latter approach based on the unpopularity of air strikes seems weak to me.
As for the Pakistan question, in the period before 9/11, the ISI encouraged the Taliban to focus its anger against the West, which is why there was less problems with them in Pakistan.
Don’t agree with this. There weren’t problems with them in Pakistan because they weren’t in an adversarial relationship. After the US and Pakistani forces started bombing them, they lashed out. Less about “encouraging” anti-Western attitudes than actual bombs.
Withdrawing from Afghanistan will encourage the Taliban sympathetic elements in the ISI to restart that policy.
What does this mean “restart”? Are you suggesting that the ISI hasn’t been funding the Afghan Taliban since we invaded?
And explain to me how the Saudis and others will be encouraged to deal with their radicals.
What does this mean? If the US doesn’t occupy Afghanistan for the next 30-50 years, the Saudis won’t want to deal with their radicals. But if we do, they will?
Why?
As far as the failed state, the failed state provides the location, the logistical tail and the ‘dream’ of fighting the West in a club med like atmosphere to recharge your batteries.
Except London and Madrid didn’t involve that experience. And yet…
And somehow, watching Afghanistan collapse under the weight of factional fighting is somehow going to have our would be jihadists say ‘hey, maybe it isn’t the West’s fault’, seems just as unrealistic.
If the Taliban take power, the would be jihadis will not “blame the west” because they won’t see that as a negative outcome.
If the US stays fighting in Afghanistan for the next 30 years, then young Muslims will blame the US for staying and fighting in a Muslim country for the next 30 years.
Which, by the way, is why many young Afghans join the “Taliban”- to expel the foreign non-Muslim crusader.
I’m gonna go out on a limb and assume that wasn’t really Eric. I don’t get that “meme” or whatever. If it’s supposed to be funny because black people look monkeys or aids is funny, that’s not cool as far as I’m concerned. The president got aids from a monkey? WTF?
Yes, it’s our resident troll.
He/she is hilarious.
lj — it’s not entirely clear from what you wrote, so… Do you know that you don’t have to load the first page of a post, scroll down to the Next link, and scroll down again to see the most recent comments?
If you click on a commenter’s name under Recent Comments, instead of on the name of the post being responded to, you get taken directly to a specific comment. There’s no scrolling and Next-ing necessary.
Sorry, I didn’t mean to type in bold..
Try as I might, I don’t see Point as ‘insisting’.
Then reread his comment here. He says quite clearly that he’s not able to explain himself because the thread is too long and that if we want him to participate in the discussion (in a way that involves more than drivebys), Eric will have to create a new thread.
As far as ‘pointless time consuming things’, I just get tired of clicking on next comment, scrolling down to the bottom, clicking on the next link and then scrolling down again to find out the next comment.
Is it really so hard to use the recent comments bar in the upper right? Is it really so difficult to keep a browser tab open to the last page of the discussion and then refresh as needed? I don’t see why you need to click on the next link at all: links to the last page of this discussion are on the front page.
And I think that the question of safe havens is far enough from the content of Eric’s post and it might benefit from a restatement. Sure, I could just reload the second page of the comments constantly, but I hold out a hope for other regulars to post something interesting in another thread or perhaps a new post.
Do you not have a tabbed browser?
I also don’t like posting multiple comments consecutively
What does this have to do with anything?
JanieM,
When I try that it still takes me to the first page.
If the US stays fighting in Afghanistan for the next 30 years, then young Muslims will blame the US for staying and fighting in a Muslim country for the next 30 years. Which, by the way, is why many young Afghans join the “Taliban”- to expel the foreign non-Muslim crusader.
LJ, it would really behoove you to at least acknowledge this part of Eric’s argument. He’s made it at least a half-dozen times at this point and you have yet to respond to it.
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LJ is right. This thread is getting stale. I’m probably the only person bothering to follow your discussion because it’s annoying to reach.
You’re not the only one following the discussion; the troll is, and I am too. I dispute the suggestion that it’s annoying to reach, though; if the discussion continues, the most recent comment is linked in the easy-to-reach sidebar. In fact, since I’m sure the troll isn’t actually following the discussion, I expect it’s that selfsame ease of access that brought it in to pollute this old stale thread.
Well, this is my last too, it’s early AM here
Criminal organizations operate in every single wester country These organizations move substantial amounts of money within and between every western country. They do this even though “money leaves a trail in western countries”; in fact, moving dirty money around isn’t particularly difficult.
Perhaps if criminal organizations were going to conduct a Mumbai style attack, perhaps it would be worth our while to follow that money more closely. The moving of money by criminal organizations is tied with those criminals wanting to live in a style they feel is appropriate. For a better example, you might want to consider the Mexican drugpins. This Tom Russell piece about Cuidad Juarez is worth a read. You may argue that this is different because their is no Mexican jihad (unless you are Lou Dobbs), but it is because there is a nominal government there we are shielded from some of the consequences. This is not to suggest that my motto is ‘just as good as Juarez’, but I wouldn’t like us to withdraw and claim that we did a good thing because Kabul is a Middle East Juarez.
BTW, LGM has a review of the new biography of Rumsfeld. Some clips that might be relevant
4. Did Rumsfeld’s administrative style and substantive focus make the war in Afghanistan worse?
Yes. Rumsfeld had little interest in the war in Afghanistan, seeing it as a sideshow. He devoted his attention to Iraq and to transformation, leaving the Afghan mission under-resourced and under-appreciated. Afghanistan did not, in Rumsfeld’s view, present a good case for the kind of war that Rumsfeld wanted to wage, even though the initial invasion and early occupation would represent a best case scenario for execution of a swift campaign of conquest and regime change. Rumsfeld also had contempt for most US allies, and devoted minimal attention to the development of a coalition to support either US operations or the Karzai government. Finally, Rumsfeld was uninterested in either nation or state building; these are difficult tasks in the best of times, and Rumsfeld’s hostility towards the notion of using American soldiers to construct Afghan institutions made the mission extremely difficult.
and
In Rumsfeld’s case, the direction that the US military has gone since his tenure began is the precise opposite of what he wanted; an organization focused on COIN, on long-term occupations, and on state building is the last thing that he wanted. Moreover, he played a key role in the decisions that forced the US military to engage in this transformation. He allowed the United States to be humiliated through his insufficient attention to detainee policy, an inattention that can be characterized as either egregious oversight or intentional ignorance. Finally Rumsfeld helped slow the federal government’s response to Katrina through being slow on the trigger to allow the use of even non-military DoD assets.
So yes, I feel that the Bush administration was a singular event.
And to finish this comment on a high note, I am usually reading and commenting on student blogs, so I have upwards of 20 tabs at any given time, and I pop back to the single ObWi tab when I’ve had enough student blogs.
Heh. Long since beat to the punch. Serves me right for neglecting to refresh immediately before posting…
NV,
When I clicked on your most recent comment, it just took me to the first page and I had to click “next.” I thought it was like that for everyone. If you can go straight here from the sidebar, then I see your point. I don’t know why I can’t do that. LJ seems to have the same problem, though.
Back to the actual discussion. A lot seems to turn on this:
If the US stays fighting in Afghanistan for the next 30 years, then young Muslims will blame the US for staying and fighting in a Muslim country for the next 30 years..
I agree that this will radicalize some people. It will particularly attract indigenous Afghans looking to avenge the deaths of their relatives. But this has to be balanced against the PR victory the jihadis score by claiming that they defeated the U.S. and drove them out of Afghanistan. Reagan’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon is analogous. It seemed correct in the short term, but the U.S. withdrawal emboldened our enemies. Weakness is more provocative in the long run. Oderint dum metuant. .
Perhaps if criminal organizations were going to conduct a Mumbai style attack, perhaps it would be worth our while to follow that money more closely.
Criminal organizations rack up much larger death tolls in most western countries. They don’t necessarily do it in massive terrorist attacks, but in terms of public safety, the fact that criminals kill thousands of people in groups of 1 and 2 does not differ much from killing thousands of people in much larger groups. Tracking illicit financial flows in western countries is actually really hard.
The moving of money by criminal organizations is tied with those criminals wanting to live in a style they feel is appropriate.
No. All organizations move money around. Because that’s what you have to do if you want to conduct business operations. Even if your staff live like beggars.
BTW, LGM has a review of the new biography of Rumsfeld. Some clips that might be relevant
I’m glad you read LGM. Really, I am. I read it too. I read that post this morning. And I have no idea why you think it is relevant to this discussion.
So yes, I feel that the Bush administration was a singular event.
You feel that the Bush admin was a singular event in terms of failing to apply normative considerations to foreign policy decisions? Eh? Do you really think that normative considerations have dominated American foreign policy thinking between 1950 and 2001?
Pericles — I’m using Internet Explorer 8.
I don’t know enough about different browsers or settings to know whether it’s possible to change settings to make the clicking through work right.
Maybe someone else has some advice? It sure makes it easier to follow these long threads.
FWIW, I’m using Firefox 3.5.3.
Reagan’s decision to withdraw from Lebanon is analogous. It seemed correct in the short term, but the U.S. withdrawal emboldened our enemies.
How did it embolden them? What is the evidence? Cause/effect?
Weakness is more provocative in the long run. Oderint dum metuant.
Two thoughts:
1. These are mostly suicide attackers that we’re talking about, so “weakness” or “strength” don’t really enter into it. In other words, what are you going to do, threaten to kill them if they try to kill themselves attacking you? And the fear of death would lead them to…not kill themselves?
2. Osama bin Laden has stated many times – both before and after 9/11 – that he could bait the US into lashing out wildly at a terrorist threat, and in the process commit to several costly, time consuming military campaigns. He hoped to bleed us dry of resources, tarnish our image, lessen our influence and leave us less potent afterward. Then, he argued, AQ could go about reshaping the Middle East into a more pious, autonomous entity.
Some would argue that we should stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for the next 100 years if we must, regardless of the many, many trillions in costs because if we don’t, then some jihadists will claim victory. Even though Osama had hoped for just that (even now he intentionally pricks our pride with respect to this).
By the way: Osama also claims victory every day that we are “stuck” in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for every casualty we suffer in either locale. It is his primary recruiting tool.
When I clicked on your most recent comment, it just took me to the first page and I had to click “next.” I thought it was like that for everyone. If you can go straight here from the sidebar, then I see your point. I don’t know why I can’t do that. LJ seems to have the same problem, though.
Would you mind if I ask what country you’re reading from? Some web companies deploy bug fixes to different countries on different schedules and if Typepad was doing that, it is possible that they haven’t pushed out fixes that people in the US have been relying on to servers hosted outside the US.
How did it embolden them? What is the evidence? Cause/effect?
Bin Laden himself has cited it. I’m not the first to bring it up.
I don’t understand your point about suicide bombers. I never said anything like that. It’s not about threatening to kill an individual suicide bomber, which you are quite right is pointless. It’s not about the strength or weakness of that particular individual. The point is that people are naturally more willing to die for a cause they think can succeed. If there is precedent for the belief that Americans can be defeated by a suicide bombing campaign, then suicide bombings appear more attractive. Nobody wants to die for a lost cause. (Admittedly, if you think the US position in Afghanistan is irretrievably lost this statement cuts both ways.)
As to your second point, I think OBL wanted to start a war with the US because he thought he could win . He thought he could win based on Vietnam, Lebanon, and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
I’m not necessarily claiming that what you wrote was incorrect, and if you show me the precise wording I may be persuaded, but it’s not my understanding that Bin Laden intended to bait the US into a series of Pyrrhic victories.
I fully agree that “Osama also claims victory every day that we are ‘stuck’ in Iraq and Afghanistan.” But it seems to me his claims would be not just louder but better received if he could claim not merely that we were “stuck” but that we had been driven out. It seems the solution is to become “unstuck.” If we attain a situation that we can credibly call “victory” then the PR for al-Qaeda would be disastrous. (Victory, in this sense, is anything we can spin as victory. Of course, our enemies will try to spin things as a victory for them. So I agree that no matter what we do, “some jihadists will claim victory.”)
Also, it’s hard to figure exactly what we’re spending in Afghanistan now, but it’s not “trillions.” If you’ve got better figures I’ll change my mind, but that strikes me as hyperbole.
Nevermind, I’m an idiot. I didn’t realize that the link under the commenter’s name in the sidebar was different from under the article’s name. I was just being careless about which one I clicked. Doh. Facepalm.
Also, it’s hard to figure exactly what we’re spending in Afghanistan now, but it’s not “trillions.” If you’ve got better figures I’ll change my mind, but that strikes me as hyperbole.
No, and if we cut off the spigot right now, it might not reach trillions. As it stands, we’re debating policies that either will, or won’t, cost trillions depending on how long we stay (ftr: the combined price tag for Iraq and Afghanistan is estimated to be about $1-3 trillion at the moment (according to Joseph Stiglitz) but most of that is attributable to Iraq).
Bin Laden himself has cited it. I’m not the first to bring it up.
Both are true, but I never suggested you were the first. I just don’t see the ultimate point. This is why:
Every powerful regime/entity in the history of the world has to make choices on international commitments based on cost/benefit. When the costs exceed the benefits, the smart, durable regimes withdraw/liquidate their commitments.
In the example of Reagan, would the US have been better off had it increased its garrison in Lebanon during the 1980s? Highly doubtful. I think Reagan was right.
Bin Laden has cited that event, but he cited several other events from our history. It’s unlikely that he would have been deterred had we stayed in Lebanon until…well, until what isn’t exactly clear.
Further, people like Zawahiri were already radicalized and committed prior to events in Beirut. So I don’t see these symbolic events as overly important – and besides, we have to make choices based on costs/benefits and sound strategy regardless of some minor PR victory.
If we attain a situation that we can credibly call “victory” then the PR for al-Qaeda would be disastrous. (Victory, in this sense, is anything we can spin as victory. Of course, our enemies will try to spin things as a victory for them. So I agree that no matter what we do, “some jihadists will claim victory.”)
I think your latter point, valid as it is, belies the point made in the preceding sentence.
Nobody wants to die for a lost cause.
I’m not sure this really enters into it with suicide bombers seeking martyrdom. Heck, even the Japanese circa WW II likely knew they were going to lose anyway.
I’m not necessarily claiming that what you wrote was incorrect, and if you show me the precise wording I may be persuaded, but it’s not my understanding that Bin Laden intended to bait the US into a series of Pyrrhic victories.
Generally speaking, I have come across such references and citations in the works of Marc Sageman, Gilles Kepel, Steve Coll and Peter Bergen.
David Kilcullen referenced this strategy in his latest book, The Accidental Guerilla, as well.
It is conventional wisdom amongst al-Qaeda analysts/watchers. I’ll check the applicable footnotes for sources/citations when I get home and access to my library.
Otherwise, google has yielded the following most recent example:
“The Arabic-language network Al-Jazeera released a full transcript Monday of the most recent videotape from Osama bin Laden in which the head of al Qaeda said his group’s goal is to force America into bankruptcy.
Al-Jazeera aired portions of the videotape Friday but released the full transcript of the entire tape on its Web site Monday.
“We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah,” bin Laden said in the transcript.
He said the mujahedeen fighters did the same thing to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, “using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers.”
“We, alongside the mujahedeen, bled Russia for 10 years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat,” bin Laden said.
He also said al Qaeda has found it “easy for us to provoke and bait this administration.”
“All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving anything of note other than some benefits for their private corporations,” bin Laden said. […]
As part of the “bleed-until-bankruptcy plan,” bin Laden cited a British estimate that it cost al Qaeda about $500,000 to carry out the attacks of September 11, 2001, an amount that he said paled in comparison with the costs incurred by the United States.
“Every dollar of al Qaeda defeated a million dollars, by the permission of Allah, besides the loss of a huge number of jobs,” he said. “As for the economic deficit, it has reached record astronomical numbers estimated to total more than a trillion dollars. […]
As for President Bush’s Iraq policy, Bin Laden said, “the darkness of black gold blurred his vision and insight, and he gave priority to private interests over the public interests of America.
“So the war went ahead, the death toll rose, the American economy bled, and Bush became embroiled in the swamps of Iraq that threaten his future,” bin Laden said.”
From a New York Times review of Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower:
Mr. bin Laden’s goal in striking the American embassies and bombing the American destroyer Cole in 2000, says Mr. Wright, was to “lure America into the same trap the Soviets had fallen into: Afghanistan”: “His strategy was to continually attack until the U.S. forces invaded; then the mujahideen would swarm upon them and bleed them until the entire American empire fell from its wounds. It had happened to Great Britain and to the Soviet Union. He was certain it would happen to America.” When neither the embassy bombings nor the Cole bombing was enough to “provoke a massive retaliation,” Mr. Wright suggests, Mr. bin Laden decided “he would have to create an irresistible outrage.”
That outrage, of course, was 9/11. Though American forces would not become bogged down in Afghanistan — at least not immediately in the fall of 2001 — another, longer war was on the horizon. On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush ordered the start of the war against Iraq; more than three years and more than 2,500 American deaths later, the United States is still there, fighting just the sort of asymmetrical war Mr. bin Laden so fervently desired.
Radley Balko discussing Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower:
Wright explains that Bin Laden’s goal was to goad the United States into a long, drawn-out war with Isalmic mujahadeen, the same way he did with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Soviets left a decade-long war battered, dejected, and demoralized, and though the real victors were the Afghan resistance fighters themselves, Bin Laden was able to claim credit for helping to stave off a world super-power, despite being outmanned and outgunned.
He had hoped to lure the United States into the same sort of protracted quagmire, where U.S. troops would have no choice but to occupy a tattered, dangerous country, while—as in the Soviet-Afghan war—radical Muslims would come from all over the world to help humiliate another world power.
The thing is, Bin Laden thought this second war would also be in Afghanistan. He hoped first to lure the U.S. through the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. When President Clinton didn’t react, Bin Laden went about planning the Sept. 11 attacks. The U.S. had to act after Sept. 11. And we initially thwarted Bin Laden’s plan with a decisive, overwhelming victory in Afghanistan.
Wright writes that Bin Laden was dejected at the ease with which U.S. military power dispatched with the Taliban, which then sent him into hiding. But instead of seeing that operation through to its logical conclusion—the capture of Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri and the rest of the Al-Qaeda leadership—we turned our attention to Iraq.
We have created in Iraq the exact type of scenario Bin Laden was hoping (but failed) to lure us into in Afghanistan—an unwinnable war where we’re isolated from the world, our troops are walking targets for guerilla terrorists, and our only options are bad (pull out and hope for minimal carnage) and worse (stay in, where our troops will continue to die, and where there’s no prospect for stability in the near future).
The following is from Steve Coll’s book, The Bin Ladens:
Osama seemed to regard [his son] Mohamed’s wedding as an opportunity to create a video postcard that could be enjoyed by relatives unable to attend, and at the same time, as a chance to contribute a new propaganda piece for the Arab television audiences. His aides telephoned the Al-Jazeera bureau chief in Pakistan, Ahmad Zaidan, and invited him to Kandahar. When he arrived, they promised him a copy of the wedding video, so he could arrange for its broadcast by satellite…
Osama was in an expansive mood. Three months earlier, Al Qaeda suicide bombers in Yemen had piloted an explosive-laden skiff into the hull of the USS Cole, an American guided-missile destroyer; when the two attackers blew themselves up, they killed seventeen sailors and wounded more than thirty others.
“I will tell you one thing,” Osama told Zaidan afterward, as the latter recalled it. “We did the Cole and we wanted the United States to react. And if they reacted, they are going to invade Afghanistan and that’s what we want…Then we will start holy war against the Americans, exactly like the Soviets.”
[Zaidan recalled this meeting, and Osama’s statements, to Peter Bergen who included the recounting in his book, The Osama Bin Laden I Know]
Every powerful regime/entity in the history of the world has to make choices on international commitments based on cost/benefit. When the costs exceed the benefits, the smart, durable regimes withdraw/liquidate their commitments.
Right. But it’s not a simple cost-benefit analysis; there are game theory type considerations at play. If you establish a reputation such that you will withdraw at the first sign of greater than expected costs, you provide an incentive for opponents to challenge you in the expectation that you’ll back down, and as a result the costs will often end up being greater than expected because of it. It’s like being a poker player who folds every time he gets re-raised.
I think your latter point, valid as it is, belies the point made in the preceding sentence.
I think it complicates the point, but it doesn’t belie it. Every side is going to spin every war their own way, that’s to be expected. But not all spin is created equal. For example, Saddam’s contention that he won the first gulf war never got very far. The same goes for those who contend that we actually “won” Vietnam. My point was only that there’s a complicated PR game going on, and how credibly we can claim success in Afghanistan relative to al-Qaeda will have effects down the road in other places.
I’m not sure this really enters into it with suicide bombers seeking martyrdom. Heck, even the Japanese circa WW II likely knew they were going to lose anyway.
I think martyrs get more martyrdom for dying in victorious causes. People who sacrifice themselves for a cause want to be remembered; people tend to remember causes that were successful. That being said, I really don’t know much about kamikazes, so I can’t comment directly on your example. There might be a difference between those seeking glory through conquest and those wanting to go down with the ship so to speak. (I’m sure the Maccabees had no illusions of toppling the Roman empire, for example.) Also, I think a lot of kamikazes were conscripts. If you have to attract volunteers, a doomed cause does seem like a detriment.
Right. But it’s not a simple cost-benefit analysis; there are game theory type considerations at play. If you establish a reputation such that you will withdraw at the first sign of greater than expected costs, you provide an incentive for opponents to challenge you in the expectation that you’ll back down, and as a result the costs will often end up being greater than expected because of it. It’s like being a poker player who folds every time he gets re-raised.
But America, like other powerful regimes, has a tendency to stick it out when the stakes are important enough, and leave when not.
WW II: worth it. Vietnam: less so.
Further, Vietnam and now Afghanistan and Iraq are proving that we’ll often stay around much longer than prudent. So, it kind of offsets (especially considering the damage done to AQ already).
To use your analogy, when you’re playing poker, and you have the big stack by a lot, it behooves you to fold when smaller stacks go all in, the pot is relatively small, and all you’re holding is a pair of deuces.
Even if you have to do this a few times before you catch a hand, or the pot’s big enough to keep you in.
I didn’t see your other posts, Eric. Good stuff. It seems that there are two slightly different takes on it though. I don’t at all dispute that Bin Laden wanted the US to invade Afghanistan. But I think he wanted it because he believed he could win, i.e. repeat the experience with the Soviets. That’s why he was dejected when the Taliban were overthrown so easily.
I guess the difference between our reads on it is this: you seem to imply that OBL would be content with a permanent US occupation of Afghanistan as long as it cost the US a lot of money. I think he would be satisfied only with a humiliating American retreat. Thus, you seem to think that by staying in Afghanistan and spending lots of money we are giving Bin Laden what he wants. I think that by leaving we would be giving him what he wants.
Of course, you also seem to be saying that the war is unwinnable and we’ll have to give him the humiliating withdrawal one way or another. In that case, I agree we should cut our losses now. But I don’t yet accept that the war is unwinnable. By win, I don’t mean some neocon fantasy of turning Afghanistan into Switzerland. I just mean that, with the right strategy, the situation can progress to the point where our withdrawal is not humiliating, and al-Qaeda cannot effectively spin it as a defeat. (They will try in any event).
Of course, you also seem to be saying that the war is unwinnable and we’ll have to give him the humiliating withdrawal one way or another. In that case, I agree we should cut our losses now. But I don’t yet accept that the war is unwinnable. By win, I don’t mean some neocon fantasy of turning Afghanistan into Switzerland. I just mean that, with the right strategy, the situation can progress to the point where our withdrawal is not humiliating, and al-Qaeda cannot effectively spin it as a defeat. (They will try in any event).
Well, that’s the trillion dollar question so to speak.
Incidentally, I’m open to strategies that are short term (trying to creat optimal conditions for withdrawal), but I bristle at the talk of long term COIN ops when even Nagl, Kilcullen and Exum say that there is only a slim chance for success, it will take 10-15 years more (on top of the 8 already) and cost $1 trillion more (on top of what’s already been spent) and will only succeed if we eliminate redoubts in Pakistan at the same time.
And then given the fact that the election (and ongoing corruption) has rendered the Karzai government not worth defending/rallying around in the eyes of the Afghan people.
morning all,
A lot of water under the bridge, but to address the two points that I left unanswered
Dr Kvetch asks me to address Eric’s
If the US stays fighting in Afghanistan for the next 30 years, then young Muslims will blame the US for staying and fighting in a Muslim country for the next 30 years. Which, by the way, is why many young Afghans join the “Taliban”- to expel the foreign non-Muslim crusader.
This is why we have had to fight the Afghan people tooth and nail since we invaded Afghanistan. The taking of Kabul, the paratroopers landing in Kandahar, no beach so we can’t redo Normandy. I’ve said multiple times that perhaps we have gone too far in time, but I would like Eric and others to say when was the turning point. Some suggest that it was Karzai’s first election. Others suggest that their long history of watching the US military from afar means that as soon as we tasked them with the job we were screwed, the same military that is going to use precision surgical strikes after withdrawal to stop attacks before they happen.
To Turb, the LGM excerpt was to reply to this
I’m very confused as to why you see the Bush admin as a singular event in this regard. American foreign policy has rarely concerned itself with normative matters. This is not some aberration that Bush introduced.
That we had the worst SecDef, the worst President, a paranoid VP. So yeah, I will go with a singular event.
But you are right, US foreign policy rarely concerns itself with normative matters. My point has been if we simply feel content to deal with this on a pragmatic basis, we will have the worst of both worlds, an out of sight, out of mind campaign against the terrorist soup du jour, with the urge to support whatever strongman will have us. This would be coupled with a military that has again thrown COIN insights bought with American lives in the trash, unless the insight is ‘COIN is so hard, don’t even think about doing it’.
If we don’t start injecting normative thinking in the most important of situations, how can we even pretend that it is normative?
Eric explains the pricetag and suffers sticker shock. There is a reason why it is called asymmetric warfare. And there is a reason it won’t be going away.
I appreciate that you (Eric) want a gradual withdrawal, though others arguing your side don’t. But you have argued for just as many normative notions as I have (take a look at the title of this post), so complaining that I am mixing them doesn’t really stick. And you argue for your normative notions (stop the killing) with pragmatic reasons (because we have to stop radicalizing a generation of Afghani youth).
The McChrystal plan argues for a withdrawal from the outerlying provinces and an increase in population centers and places where we can hopefully create some security. When he argues that US troops get out of their armoured vehicles, he’s not advocating that take place on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
WW II: worth it. Vietnam: less so.
Vietnam was totally not worth it because, if we had backed Ho Chi Minh (like his OSS handlers begged us to do) there would have been no war. Do you see our kids, in 25 years, wanting to visit the Taliban equivalent of Halong Bay? Is the Taliban an indigenously based popular movement that will be participating in international agreements? The previous go round, it wasn’t. Do we just need to give them some space to work out their problems?
Turb objected to my invocation of the Khmer Rouge, but I think the parallel is a lot more precise. In Cambodia, we drop a gazillion tons of munitions and destroy the basis for civil society, which allows a revolutionary groups with fervor and a utopian scheme to come to power and enjoy some brief legitimacy (supported by China and the US against Vietnam!) In Afghanistan, we arm radical elements within the society and are shocked, simply shocked that this encourages violence and a collapse of the government. Worse yet, that has created a disaffected population in our own midst (actually, in the midst of Western Europe, as the US Muslim population has not been pushed in that way) Since we can’t put a fence around Afghanistan, failure to deal with the problem of Afghanistan and fundamental Islam just kicks the can down the road.
Finally, JanieM, I love you. You (or at least one of your family members) needs to get over here to Japan so I can buy them a beer for the link observation. I had never clicked or even toggled over the names because I just assumed they would lead to the same thing that they link to when they are in the comments.
Again, apologies if I missed any points, it was not intentional.
lj — 🙂
I am in the process of planning a China trip for this winter, but it’s already going to be so long that I don’t know if I can add any time in Japan. If I do, I will be sure to let you know. I’ll try to bring my son along, and he can drink the beer. 😉
Well, I (finally) got back to a computer, a little later than I had thought… I would like to join Pericles in commending Eric’s recent series of posts on OBL’s grand strategy — this is why I love these threads.
I apologize for not being able to get into the discussion earlier, regarding the use of safe havens*, but I would quickly note this point:
“Incidentally, I’m open to strategies that are short term (trying to creat optimal conditions for withdrawal), but I bristle at the talk of long term COIN ops…”
Where discussion of safe havens would be a great way of better understanding our differences, this strikes me as a great basis for common ground. My arguments on this blog have, to my memory, only been to the effect that preventing the Taliban (or, more precisely, the same people running the country before the invasion) from returning to power is important to our security.
That said, I don’t know if McCrystal is right about the US needing several thousand more troops to assure this. If anyone can cast doubt on this official military assessment, I’d be more than interested.
*But there’s another reason I would love to see the thread — no matter when I found time to post, I wouldn’t be off topic in engaging the point.
Whoops, there goes our targeting.
The Pakistani army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in an unusually stern reaction last week, said that missile attacks by American drones in Baluchistan, as implied by the Americans, “would not be allowed.”
The Pakistanis also complain that they are not being sufficiently consulted over the pending White House decision on whether to send more troops to Afghanistan.
The head of Pakistan’s chief spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, or ISI, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, met with senior officials at the Central Intelligence Agency last week in Washington, where he argued against sending more troops to Afghanistan, a Pakistani official familiar with the visit said.
link
This is why we have had to fight the Afghan people tooth and nail since we invaded Afghanistan. The taking of Kabul, the paratroopers landing in Kandahar, no beach so we can’t redo Normandy.
I’m not exactly sure what this means. Here’s my best guess: there was no significant resistance to the US invasion from “the Afghan people” (them again!). Therefore, Eric’s notion of US military occupation radicalizing young Muslims, and further exacerbating the problem it’s supposed to address, is nonsense. Such nonsense, in fact, that it merits nothing but dismissive snark.
Am I close, LJ?
This is why we have had to fight the Afghan people tooth and nail since we invaded Afghanistan.
It’s true, that comparitively few US soldiers are killed in Afghanistan as they kill the Afghan people. It’s only “tooth and nail” fighting for the Afghan people…
Ballpark. There was no significant resistance to the US invasion, so one could postulate that there was a period of time when ‘the iron was hot’. The notion that the Afghan people are so suspicious of outsiders (again my anecdotes of Peace corps worker friends who did stints in Afghanistan and had a wonderful time are taken as irrelevant by others, though I wonder how many people in this debate know someone who has actually lived in Afghanistan) that it doesn’t matter who went in there, they were asking for it is just as dismissive of the Afghan people as anything. Is Afghanistan a special place on the globe where COIN will never work, or is the assertion that COIN will never work anywhere? Some have suggested that the 2002 Loya Jirga provides all the proof necessary that Karzai was not to be trusted.
And all over, there are assertions that we never went into Afghanistan to rebuild the nation. However,
Afghanistan is being seen as a key test of nation-building and one which will have important lessons for Iraq.
“So much is riding on getting Afghanistan out of the swamp,” said Thomas Withington, defence analyst and former associate at King’s College Centre for Defence Studies in London.
“The United States is genuine when it says it will not walk away. It has learned the lessons of what happens if you do.”
The conference, on Wednesday and Thursday, has been preceded by a warning in a joint report from the Afghan government and the United Nations that the country needs $27.5bn over the next few years to “avoid regressing into chaos and lawlessness”.
link
There is a reason why the international force in Afghanistan is the International Security Assistance Force. Or was it completely bonkers to assume that there were people to assist in Afghanistan?
That also pretends that there wasn’t earlier requests to expand the ISAF (calls that the Bush admin rejected). I haven’t made claims that we had a populace that welcomed us and then turned on us, I think there must be degrees. But the idea that they were against us from the get go is revisionist in the extreme.
This is why we have had to fight the Afghan people tooth and nail since we invaded Afghanistan. The taking of Kabul, the paratroopers landing in Kandahar, no beach so we can’t redo Normandy.
I suggest you read about the chatter in jihadist chat rooms and internet sites, and read counterterror reports from the NCTC, West Point’s group and other resources. The war in Afghanistan is radicalizing young Muslims around the globe, including and especially in Afghanistan. That our miltiary ops went well initially is entirely beside the point.
the same military that is going to use precision surgical strikes after withdrawal to stop attacks before they happen.
Actually, the best way to stop attacks is still intel, law enforcement and hardened targets. You should never rely on military strikes.
Eric explains the pricetag and suffers sticker shock. There is a reason why it is called asymmetric warfare. And there is a reason it won’t be going away.
The thing is, insurgencies are inward facing conflicts. They are incapable of taking territory abroad. In other words, unless the South rises up, we shouldn’t need to fight one again in any existential sense. There’s a reason why we shouldn’t volunteer so freely, and there’s a reason why our track record is so bad when we do.
But you have argued for just as many normative notions as I have (take a look at the title of this post), so complaining that I am mixing them doesn’t really stick.
I’m not complaining that you’re mixing, just pointin out that one particular response from you seemed muddled because of the combination. I’m sure I’m guilty at times to, but was trying to elicit more clarity, not blame you for anything.
Do you see our kids, in 25 years, wanting to visit the Taliban equivalent of Halong Bay? Is the Taliban an indigenously based popular movement that will be participating in international agreements?
This is meaningless as to whether the war is worth it or not. It is not our job to fight and kill all movements that don’t fit a preconceived notion of “possibly participating in international agreements in 25 years.”
Worse yet, that has created a disaffected population in our own midst (actually, in the midst of Western Europe, as the US Muslim population has not been pushed in that way) Since we can’t put a fence around Afghanistan, failure to deal with the problem of Afghanistan and fundamental Islam just kicks the can down the road.
What does this mean? You seem to have your timeline and notions of causality severely off-kilter. Islamic radicalism, and the radicalization of al-Qaeda itself, predated the fight in Afghanistan between the USSR and the mujahadeen. As a population, Afghans tend NOT to join the international jihadist movement. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was not a big contributor to radicalization or the creation of a “disaffected population in our midst.” The Taliban re-taking Afghanistan wouldn’t either.
If anything, our occupation of Afghanistan is having that affect, but really, it is much deeper and broader a problem. In other words, if the US achieved the wildest concept of total victory at this very moment, we would not solve the “problem” of fundamentalist Islam or the disaffected youth. Afghanistan is neither the cause, major contributor nor potential cure.
You’d be better off looking at Israel/Palestine, and the corrupt Middle Eastern regimes supported by the US.
Whoops, there goes our targeting.
Yeah, but, whoops, there goes our ground forces in Baluchistan as well. It’s not like keeping 100,000 troops in Afghanistan until 2050 will change the fact that Pakistan will decide if and when we can attack targets in Baluchistan. In other words, regardless of whether we follow your plan or my plan, this problem remains constant.
It doesn’t bolster either of our arguments.
Islamic radicalism, and the radicalization of al-Qaeda itself, predated the fight in Afghanistan between the USSR and the mujahadeen.
I don’t think that’s right, Eric. The Soviet invasion was in 1979. There was no al-Qaeda back then. The Iranian revolution was the same year. Al-Qaeda wasn’t founded until around 1990.
It’s true, that comparitively few US soldiers are killed in Afghanistan as they kill the Afghan people. It’s only “tooth and nail” fighting for the Afghan people…
Yeah, yeah, yeah, we get it: you hate the United States.
That our miltiary ops went well initially is entirely beside the point.
I think you should answer the question. Was the whole concept of nation building wrong, or was it just Afghanistan? Could it have been done correctly at some earlier point in time or was it always doomed?
Actually, the best way to stop attacks is still intel, law enforcement and hardened targets. You should never rely on military strikes.
Gated communities? Sorry, I disagree that it is the best way. Wouldn’t the best way be to work towards a more equitable distribution of resources?
The thing is, insurgencies are inward facing conflicts. They are incapable of taking territory abroad.
Yes, 9/11 was all about territory. You mock the neo-cons, but you revert to the old notion that capturing the high ground is what the next war is about.
I’m sure I’m guilty at times to, but was trying to elicit more clarity, not blame you for anything.
Thanks for that, I mistakenly took this as a criticism.
This is meaningless as to whether the war is worth it or not. It is not our job to fight and kill all movements that don’t fit a preconceived notion of “possibly participating in international agreements in 25 years.”
Again, I go back to what is owed to Afghanistan. I’ve also pointed out that Obama’s strategy has been to peel off elements of the Taliban that want to negotiate. This is quite different the ‘fight and kill’.
What does this mean? You seem to have your timeline and notions of causality severely off-kilter. Islamic radicalism, and the radicalization of al-Qaeda itself, predated the fight in Afghanistan between the USSR and the mujahadeen.
I don’t think that I claimed that AQ radicalism was a causative factor in Afghanistan, I’ve discussed the Taliban. Had the historical timing been a bit different, it might have been Moluccan or Puerto Rican separatists or Japanese Red Army that were doing the attacks.
In fact, I really don’t know what you mean by ‘causality’. Could you lay out what you think is the causal chain that has us tied up in Afghanistan. You suggest that Afghanistan has nothing to do with anything, except the radicalization of the population there, and they are too backward to actually be a threat if we leave, so we are better off leaving them to kill each other. So what is the causality involved?
It doesn’t bolster either of our arguments.
I’m not sure how you can argue that JDAMs are an appropriate weapon and then blithely shrug off the fact that Pakistan won’t let us use them. Perhaps the lesson that the ISI learned was better plausible deniability.
I think you should answer the question.
I actually did, on prior threads when you asked these exact questions.
Was the whole concept of nation building wrong, or was it just Afghanistan?
Nation building, even under the best circumstances, is monstrously expensive, excessively time consuming and requiring of attention, expertise, cultural knowledge, linguistic capability, etc. Ideally, there will be a cohesive society with some history of centralized control and normalcy. Afghanistan provides a harder than normal case.
Could it have been done correctly at some earlier point in time or was it always doomed?
Possibly, but the odds were never great.
I disagree that it is the best way. Wouldn’t the best way be to work towards a more equitable distribution of resources
Most terrorists that threaten us are middle class to lower middle class. Osama himself was quite wealthy, as was Zawahiri (to a lesser degree). But I wouldn’t oppose your goal for its own sake.
Yes, 9/11 was all about territory.
Actually, it was – I’ll explain in my next post. But either way, 9/11 was not an insurgency, nor was al-Qaeda an Afghan phenomenon. I was not opposed to fighting al-Qaeda, and am not now. I was not opposed to invading to disrupt al-Qaeda’s operations, and I’m not opposed to using military assets to do so now. So I’m not sure what point you think you’re making.
If the question is whether or not we need to, or should be, fighting a protracted campaign against “Taliban” in Afghanistan, that is not “9/11.”
You mock the neo-cons, but you revert to the old notion that capturing the high ground is what the next war is about.
What does this statement mean?
I’ve also pointed out that Obama’s strategy has been to peel off elements of the Taliban that want to negotiate. This is quite different the ‘fight and kill’.
I’ve gone on record supporting the peel and eat strategy. To the extent he succeeds, huzzah. To the extent it doesn’t, we have to leave either way.
I’m not sure how you can argue that JDAMs are an appropriate weapon and then blithely shrug off the fact that Pakistan won’t let us use them. Perhaps the lesson that the ISI learned was better plausible deniability.
Well, are you arguing for a land invasion of Pakistan? If not, what’s your point?
If you mean to argue that 30 year occupying/nation building in Afghanistan is a better option than a lighter military footprint in Afghanistan because we can’t use JDAMs in Pakistan, I’d have to wonder how that makes any sense.
JDAMs are not a perfect solution, and there will be times that we can’t use them. Like in certain Pakistani cities/regions. However, even if we occupy Afghanistan for the next 1,000 years, that won’t change our ability to go after terrorists in Pakistan. Unless you’re advocating for invasion/nation building in Pakistan?
If not, how is your approach to the situation in Afghanistan better given the limits of JDAM use in certain regions of Pakistan?
In fact, I really don’t know what you mean by ‘causality’. Could you lay out what you think is the causal chain that has us tied up in Afghanistan. You suggest that Afghanistan has nothing to do with anything, except the radicalization of the population there, and they are too backward to actually be a threat if we leave, so we are better off leaving them to kill each other. So what is the causality involved?
You said our actions caused a disaffected population to emerge in our midst, and that refusing to act on Afghanistan kicks the can of fundamental Islam down the road. This seemed to have causility out of whack.
I don’t think that’s right, Eric. The Soviet invasion was in 1979. There was no al-Qaeda back then. The Iranian revolution was the same year. Al-Qaeda wasn’t founded until around 1990.
Zawahiri’s outfit was implicated in the assassination of Sadat. They were already adherents to Qutbist thought, were militant, and at war with the secular regimes (al-Qaeda foundational doctrine). After Zawahiri was captured and tortured, he became even more radical.
Osama was radicalized by Muslim Brotherhood teachers in his teens. He became devout, militant and increasingly anti-American.
That is what I meant by pre-dating Afghanistan. Islamic radicalism – takfirist, Qutbist thought – and associated violence predated Afghanistan. The founders of al-Qaeda were already well on this path prior to Afghanistan.
What does this statement mean?
It means that your argument that insurgents are somehow territorially driven is the same argument that conservatives make when claiming that all women would have to wear a burka. You say you are going to explain this, but insurgents are not about territory, they are about striking a blow.
Well, are you arguing for a land invasion of Pakistan? If not, what’s your point?
It is that you have touted combinations of drones and Special Ops as the cure to what ails us. It is stupid when George Will proposes it and stupid when you do, but it becomes a lot more difficult if Pakistan says no use and no intelligence sharing. I seem to remember that you did argue for this as the substitute for ground troops, so when that ability is degraded, your argument would logically take a hit.
I never said that we couldn’t use JDAMS or drones, I said that they had to go hand in hand with a presence in Afghanistan.
This seemed to have causility out of whack
But you didn’t answer the question. You seem to view the causality as we are in Afghanistan, which thereby radicalizes middle class muslim youth, who then end up in movements that target the West. If I have that wrong, please tell me, but are you claiming that ‘hardened targets’ and increased law enforcement are going to disappear as causes once we get out of Afghanistan? Atta and the others were certainly not motivated by our presence in Afghanistan, and they weren’t some imperceptible minority. You mention Muslim Brotherhood, but that stands as a sort of example of how radicalization works. MB was a liberal organization founded by an Egyptian schoolteacher that only became radicalized with Nassar’s crackdown.
We leave Afghanistan to its own devices, so we then have to strengthen the regimes around Afghanistan by supporting the status quo that does a pretty good job of radicalizing its own youth. I’m not sure how increased law enforcement (with all that entails) and hardened targets wouldn’t be just as much an insult to the radicalized middle class as a conflict in Afghanistan.
It means that your argument that insurgents are somehow territorially driven is the same argument that conservatives make when claiming that all women would have to wear a burka. You say you are going to explain this, but insurgents are not about territory, they are about striking a blow.
Huh? Insurgents are, almost by definition and in all but the rarest circumstances, about seizing territory. They are fighting the regime in question for control of the territory in question.
Terrorists aren’t necessarily about seizing territory (though many are) – although al-Qaeda is. al-Qaeda wants to topple the “apostate” “corrupt” and “quisling” regimes in the Muslim world and replace them with purer Islamic regimes.
It is that you have touted combinations of drones and Special Ops as the cure to what ails us.
No, no, no. That is a massive distortion. I have suggested that these (when coupled with law enforcement and intel) are better counterterrorism policies than long term, massive military occupations.
It is stupid when George Will proposes it and stupid when you do
Um, every major counterterrorism outfit has suggested that my method is better in terms of counterterrorism.
but it becomes a lot more difficult if Pakistan says no use and no intelligence sharing.
Of course it does, but what is the alternative? Invading and occupying Pakistan with ground troops? Is that what you’re suggesting? If not, how is your approach to occupying Afghanistan better than my approach in terms of using airstrikes in Pakistan?
I seem to remember that you did argue for this as the substitute for ground troops, so when that ability is degraded, your argument would logically take a hit.
Yes and no. I argued as this for a substitute for ground troops in AFGHANISTAN! But our degraded ability to conduct airstrikes in Pakistan does not weaken my argument about counterT policies unless you are proposing ground troops in Pakistan.
Answer this, please: Are you arguing for ground troops in Pakistan? If not, how is your approach any different from my approach in terms of the situation in PAKISTAN
I never said that we couldn’t use JDAMS or drones, I said that they had to go hand in hand with a presence in Afghanistan.
Why? How does a ground presence in Afghanistan help you to use JDAMs in Pakistan when Pakistan says no?
But you didn’t answer the question
I’m not sure what it is.
You seem to view the causality as we are in Afghanistan, which thereby radicalizes middle class muslim youth, who then end up in movements that target the West.
Yes and no. I don’t really think too much traces back to Afghanistan, until recently – whereas radicalization has been a problem for years prior to either Afghan endeavor. And I think that Iraq did more to radicalize Muslim youth more recently. But we run the risk of reversing that order.
I’m not sure how increased law enforcement (with all that entails) and hardened targets wouldn’t be just as much an insult to the radicalized middle class as a conflict in Afghanistan.
For the record, hardened targets refers to targets in the US. Increased law enforcement refers to FBI actions to disrupt terror plots.
So I think we’re addressing different points there.
Zawahiri’s outfit was implicated in the assassination of Sadat.
To nitpick here, Sadat was killed in 1981, so that doesn’t predate Afghanistan either. Your larger point about Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, however, is well taken.
True. But he hadn’t been to Afghanistan or Pakistan yet, and was already a radical at the time of the assassination. And I think he was imprisoned for an earlier attempt, and not the actual assassination.
But you’re right, that the timelines are somewhat concurrent.
Your comments reminded of this piece about the Muslim sections of Paris. I realize that this might seem distant from your arguments, but bear with me for a moment.
When you brought up a notion of causality, you seem to have this idea that if we were to wind back the clock, there are steps that the US could have taken to avoid the state the world is in now. This is not things like ‘send cruise missiles 1 day earlier to kill OBL’, this is ‘don’t do X and this won’t befall us’. This is a great man theory of history and it ends up completely ignoring the structural conditions that give rise to such a person. Obviously, this is not something that can be settled by identifying a fact or even a series of facts. It comes down to the way you (and I) think things happen.
Obviously, as in most things, it is not either or, and there are specific events that could be changed, specific people who could be taken out or added, that would make a huge difference. But at its heart, this seems to me to be a very American form of thinking. It is like the other side of American exceptionalism, because rather than ‘if we had been there/if we had done X’, it becomes ‘if we had avoided doing X’
I think this is why there is such a confusion between normative and pragmatic. Normative becomes pragmatic when you view your actions as working towards goals of more justice and a more equitable distribution of resources. Sure, there is a point where you say ‘I didn’t have anything to do with that mess, I’m not going to get involved’. I’m not sure how one can make the case given our involvement with Afghanistan.
The temptation is great to think that we can control events just by making small, insignificant changes. It allows us to comfortably keep our perqs. I’m only seeing a small window on to popular culture, but it seems that any number of shows seem to revolve around the premise that a little extra bit of knowledge, properly wielded, is enough to make massive changes. It is not just the surfeit of movies and TV shows that have the hero able to read minds, or go back in time, or do other really superhuman feats, it is in franchises like the Bourne series. When Spielberg did the Minority Report, Tom Cruise is being pursued, and the precog he has kidnapped helps him to escape merely by having him stop walking at certain times and magically go undetected. That becomes so unremarkable that the scene is replayed in the 2nd of the Bourne series, where Jason Bourne tries to save the journalist, but Bourne is unsuccessful because the journalist panics.
I wouldn’t be surprised if the next incident is some Pacific islander, angry that his island is disappearing, ends up ‘making a statement’ because the West refuses to deal with global warning. 9/11 was about making statements. All the acts that we are worried about are not territorial, though they are couched in territorial terms, they are to make statements. Sure, jihadists talk about extending the Umma and protecting muslims around the world, but it is hard to imagine that, given the lengths they have gone, that a specific set of changes would have them say ‘hey, we’re cool now’. Their upset and rage is focussed by specific events and circumstances, it is not caused by such events.
This is why your cite of the Muslim Brotherhood is so revealing. The arc of the Muslim Brotherhood is both completely unrelated to and intertwined with the US, because the US is both separate from and intertwined in with the West. So, radicalization of middle class youths in Europe or jihadist chatter on the web or the pronouncements of OBL become data to argue your point, but you seem oblivious to the big picture, though it may seem like the big picture because you are pulling facts from an international scale. But the set of events and conditions that brought on the 9/11 attacks are not something that can be put on a scale and if 1 or enough of them is removed, we’ve avoided the problems we face.
I don’t think that we can avoid that rage, but we can make it more diffuse by actually dealing with problems, especially problems which we had a hand in creating and those where it is perceived we are maintaining the status quo that causes those problems to remain.
I have a full day of work, so I won’t return to this anytime soon, so I’ll end here.
I’m not sure you understand my point of view on this.
As for making big societal changes and distributing wealth, I’m all ears.
How a century long occupation of Afghanistan is meant to achieve that is beyond me. If we dedicated a fraction of the money we will spend in Afghanistan to attempting to alleviate poverty and improve conditions for the less well off around the globe, we could do an enormous, mind boggling amount of good.
I’d rather hear about that than more war -which isn’t really achieving the goods you seem to deem necessary to truly address the terrorism problem.
When you brought up a notion of causality, you seem to have this idea that if we were to wind back the clock, there are steps that the US could have taken to avoid the state the world is in now. This is not things like ‘send cruise missiles 1 day earlier to kill OBL’, this is ‘don’t do X and this won’t befall us’. This is a great man theory of history and it ends up completely ignoring the structural conditions that give rise to such a person.
No, completely misinterpreted me. FWIW, I have long criticized great man theory.