by Eric Martin
Marc Lynch makes a very good point:
Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things). So what? Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, into Africa — into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments. Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world? On whose budget? To his credit, McChrystal adviser Steve Biddle raises all of these questions in his excellent American Interest article from last month — but in my view goes wrong by limiting the policy options to either full withdrawal or full commitment to COIN.
Right. It's not like al-Qaeda is confined to this little sliver of land in South Asia such that, once that narrow stretch of land is magically pacified and completely reordered, al-Qaeda will cease to exist. Thus, as Lynch points out, the game of nation build-a-mole will have to continue in a new setting. And at a couple trillion dollars a pop, we don't have the money. Further, al-Qaeda (and its viral ideology) has penetrated Western Europe and other regions not in need of nation building. So even if at the end of a century and $50 trillion dollars or so, we managed to purge the globe of potential havens, the problem would persist.
This, for my money (taxpayers too), is the right approach:
Another option which used to be on the table, as I understood it, was a much more narrowly focused policy of keeping the pressure on al-Qaeda while letting Afghan politics sort itself out. But from my distance, at least, it seems that this approach is being overwhelmed by those arguing for a much more expansive mission (as Michael Cohen has been documenting for a while under the category title "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch"). And that worries me. I see why keeping al-Qaeda on the ropes matters. But I just don't really see why trying to build an Afghan state is a significant American national interest, or that it can be done at a price commensurate to its significance.
I fear that the escalation of the war in Afghanistan is following a dangerous path of least resistance. Given the assignment to win the war in Afghanistan, of course a military which has been reshaped by its experience in Iraq will turn to COIN doctrine. Once the decision is made to apply a COIN approach, of course the military is going to ask for more troops there, and a long commitment, since it's always been obvious that really doing COIN in Afghanistan would require vastly more troops than are currently deployed. And then, at each step of the way, there will be a strong tactical argument for expansion and a very difficult sell for any attempt to argue for restraint. Once that iron logic has been accepted, all else follows — and it becomes extremely difficult to reverse course.
But I remain far from convinced that COIN is the right approach, especially when compared not to total U.S. withdrawal but to a more minimalist strategy. The attraction of COIN seems to derive from learning only partial lessons from Iraq — conveniently forgetting that the "surge" and COIN were only one of a number of factors contributing to the changing conditions there, along with the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda which long predated the "surge" and the near-completion of sectarian cleansing in many urban areas, and that its long-term success in Iraq is far from guaranteed. And Afghanistan, as should be obvious, is very different from Iraq. Its advocates argue that this simply means that the approach needs to be adapted to the local conditions and the mission adequately resourced. I'm not at all convinced.
No, neither am I. This is something to think about given a couple other pertinent news items of the day. First, Anthony Cordesman (who is acting as one of McChrystal's advisors) is recommending a substantial escalation:
Anthony Cordesman, an influential American academic who is a member of a team that has been advising General Stanley McChrystal, now in charge of Nato forces in Afghanistan, also said that to deal with the threat from the Taleban the size of the Afghan National Army might have to increase to 240,000.
If Mr Cordesman’s recommendation reflects the view of General McChrystal, who recently presented the findings of a 60-day review of Afghanistan strategy to Washington, it would mean sending another nine combat brigades, comprising 45,000 American troops, in addition to the 21,000 already approved by President Obama. This would bring the total American military presence in Afghanistan to about 100,000, considerably closer to the force that was deployed for the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq.
Here's Steve Hynd on another:
Forty more years of occupation – that's what the next head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, is predicting. And he also predicts that US and British troops will be actively fighting there for "the medium term", i.e. about 15-20 years…
Before American readers dismiss Richards' prediction as "not invented here", I'll remind them that back in 2004 everyone in the U.S. was talking about a possible pullout from Iraq after elections in 2005 – but that the British Army said it was planning to be there until at least late 2008. They turned out to be more honest about prospects then than any American politician, pundit or general. The British Army finally left Iraq in mid-2009.
I expect the same on current timelines for Afghanistan, where American officials have been notoriously averse to estimates of how long the "long war" will actually take. Even now, they're hedging their bets – but the estimate of David Kilcullen…that the U.S. will be enmired for at least a decade at a cost that will eventually eclipse even the trillion-plus spent on Iraq has become one they cannot ignore.
Imagine how much more incredibly costly in both blood and treasure FORTY years will be. And for what?
And then imagine what it will cost when we have to do it all over again in Somalia, Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, other parts of Africa, etc. This is not an efficient or effective way to fight terrorism. But it is what Osama bin Laden had in mind when he set out a strategy to bleed America dry and induce our decline. Maybe we should consider an alternative to Osama's playbook?
For a long time now i had an idea that only effective counter against guerilla tactics is strategic guerila tactic. Afganistan as country where most of the fighting occurs with civilians that retreive to their villages after the fight and pretend to be on the side of the US untill the next chance is impossible to win. Only way is to completely abandon Afganistan and gather inteligence while Taliban and AL-Queda reorganize and feel comfortable to show their faces. Then attack again in full force and disasemble the terorist organisation alone, not fighters. Retrieve and repeat. Strategic guerilla tactic
This post deserves more, but I’m a little stretched for time. So at the risk of sounding trite or blunt:
When Somalia, Yemen, or the Caucases not only give AQ sanctuary, but serve as the base for a successful massive terrorist attack* — and then refuse to cooperate with the US in apprehending them — then we can both overthrow them and rebuild the nation so that they do not return to power.
We’re a rich country, so we can find the money; and I seriously doubt we would lack the political will.
Again, sorry if this isn’t up to standard — like I said, strapped for time.
*I believe we’ve talked about this term before.
When Somalia, Yemen, or the Caucases not only give AQ sanctuary, but serve as the base for a successful massive terrorist attack* — and then refuse to cooperate with the US in apprehending them — then we can both overthrow them and rebuild the nation so that they do not return to power.
We’re not that rich.
i love the phrase “nation build-a-mole.” captures the problem pretty well
I guess the politics is what worries me. Seems like the GOP has Obama in a tough spot (and Obama has put himself in a tough spot through campaign rhetoric).
If he stays and things keep getting worse (which they inevitably will), he can criticized. But if he pulls out, he can be criticized. There’s really no good answer, politically.
In an ideal world, we wouldn’t think about this stuff. But you have to expect he will
I guess the politics is what worries me.
That’s actually my biggest concern.
“If he stays and things keep getting worse (which they inevitably will), he can criticized. But if he pulls out, he can be criticized. There’s really no good answer, politically.”
Maybe, as I remember it, Gary’s description of the general task becomes a very expensive “Where’s Waldo” game. If so, and I agree strongly, the President should spend some political capital and exit.
More important, he shouldn’t increase troops. He should descope the task to current troop levels to protect those that are there and then plan the exit.
Andrew Bacevich has an article in “Commonweal” pursuing a similar argument — let’s be realistic about our interest in Afghanistan. If we really want to try nation-building, there are other, better candidates.
Eric, I ask this as a serious question. Most of your recent posts on Afghanistan have been saying that we need to get out of Afghanistan and that we need to get out yesterday. There seems to be an assumption in all of these posts that once U.S. troops are out of Afghanistan, it will no longer be our problem.
But I’m really, really failing to see how leaving a country to an organization that is joined almost at the hip with AQ is sustainable in anything but the short run. Do you just seal off the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan? Pull out and drop bombs on the AQ sanctuaries that form? Or just leave and assume that things will somehow work themselves out?
When Somalia, Yemen, or the Caucases not only give AQ sanctuary, but serve as the base for a successful massive terrorist attack* — and then refuse to cooperate with the US in apprehending them — then we can both overthrow them and rebuild the nation so that they do not return to power.
Let me see if I’ve got this straight: any time some tiny group of losers anywhere in the world decides to launch a nontrivial terrorist attack that kills a bunch of Americans, assuming they live someplace where the government does not fully cooperate with us, we’re going to invade and spend one or two trillion dollars. In other words, for every group willing to blow $500K killing Americans, we’ll blow $1T “improving” their country.
Do I have it right? If so, this is a great illustration of the perils of asymmetric warfare, but I don’t think it really helps your point. Also, this strikes me as kind of…insane. Like Eric said, we don’t have enough $1T piles of money lying around to play this game very often, if indeed, we can even afford it once.
We’re a rich country, so we can find the money; and I seriously doubt we would lack the political will.
There is lots of political support for kicking ass, but that’s not the same thing as political support for a decade(s) long commitment that costs over $1T. I mean, my wife happily supported my ‘let’s eat ice cream’ plan last night, but I don’t think she’d be so supportive if I offered that plan for every meal every day for the next 30 years.
But I’m really, really failing to see how leaving a country to an organization that is joined almost at the hip with AQ is sustainable in anything but the short run.
This overstates the case in at least a couple of ways. We could and would continue to support the Afghan government, and it is entirely feasible that they could play the Taliban to a stalemate, with each retaining certain territory.
Second, the Taliban are a heterodox amalgamation of elements, and not all are “joined at the hip” with al-Qaeda. In fact, very few – if any – are. Historically, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have had a tenuous and contingent relationship, marked by what were, in essence, bribes from Bin Laden to stay in the Taliban’s good graces.
Recently, these groups have made common cause which increases interdependence and relations, but without us pushing them closer together, that would wane. Especially if the Taliban believes life would be made easier for them without al-Qaeda around.
Pull out and drop bombs on the AQ sanctuaries that form
If AQ sanctuaries form, then you strike at them with the most efficient means available.
Put another way, currently, Petraeus says there is no real AQ presence in Afghanistan. Rather, that presence is in Pakistan. So let me ask you: what are we doing to disrupt the AQ sanctuaries in Pakistan? Has it been effective – if not, how many attacks have we suffered as a result? If so, we could do the same in Afghanistan where we would enjoy even freer range of motion/action.
If I can interject (all too briefly) —
The reason I had a asterix next to “major terrorist attack” is that I’ve talked about it before (I think on this blog — but unsure), coming to the conclusion that this level of attack is very rare.
It has happened only once in a developed nation — arguably only once, ever — on September 11, 2001.
Again, sorry I can’t spend more time on this. But to the point of cost concern, I would say this only becomes a problem if we’re seeing thousands of Americans murdered by these organizations every decade or so.
And if we ever get to that point, we’ve got bigger problems than spending too much on nation building.
I love the normative assumption that Afghan lives don’t matter at all. It’s all about Americans. It always is.
Substitute “war on drugs” for “war on terror” and you have another important post about US foreign policy failures.
And if we ever get to that point, we’ve got bigger problems than spending too much on nation building.
Really? So spending $50 trillion on nation building – which we’re not very good at anyway, and may not work regardless – and suffering the deaths of many thousands of US soldiers over the next couple of decades is worth it if it means that we can save the lives of 6,000 Americans that aren’t soldiers?
Such that we shouldn’t consider those costs because they’re not even a factor when compared to the possible loss of 6,000 Americans that aren’t soldiers?
I disagree.
What the US needs is to consider the mistakes of 2001-before and after 9/11, and how to redress them.
Bush misunderestimated the importance of acting on his daily intelligence briefings as the American people/ US Supreme Court had misoverestimated the capacity of George Bush to serve as President.
In 2001 Osama won the lottery. Ever since America has behaved as if there is a high likelihood of Osama repeating. While recognizing the terrible potential consequence, the real problem is that US has not focused on reducing risk. Instead in the homeland feel good efforts of screening shoeless grandmothers and forcibly discarding water bottles numb the public without addressing the greater potential risks (eg container ships).
Abroad Bush was so cowboy eager to bomb something that the Taliban government wasn’t given time to figure out how to violate their cultural norms of hospitality and encourage Osama to leave. They might have if given a chance.
Much of the subsequent terrorist activity can be seen as the unintended consequences of Bush’s crusade against predominantly Muslim countries.
Getting involved in other people’s civil wars is not a good idea (how can you forget Viet Nam so quickly?)
I find myself in agreement with Marty: “More important, he shouldn’t increase troops. He should descope the task to current troop levels to protect those that are there and then plan the exit.”
The real problem is finding a facesaving way to do it.
The reason I had a asterix next to “major terrorist attack” is that I’ve talked about it before (I think on this blog — but unsure), coming to the conclusion that this level of attack is very rare.
You can’t know that it is very rare going forward. Technological development favors the attackers, not the defenders.
The last time you brought this up, I presented a couple of terrorist attacks that would be cheaper and easier than 9/11 and would result in similar death tolls.
And if we ever get to that point, we’ve got bigger problems than spending too much on nation building.
Not really, no. Over a decade, something like 4M people will die from smoking related illnesses. If we’re losing an extra 3K due to terrorism, that’s tragic, but it does not significantly change the death rate for Americans.
I love the normative assumption that Afghan lives don’t matter at all. It’s all about Americans. It always is.
I love the normative assumption that Bangladeshi lives don’t matter at all. I mean, if you’re going to insist that the US has to blow a few trillion dollars nation building in Afghanistan, you’re also implicitly insisting that the US not blow that cash helping people in places where we can get far more bang for the buck.
Wanting to spend money to help suffering people in foreign countries is a noble thing. Insisting that it be done in the least cost effective way possible is morally problematic. To say the least.
Well, Eric, I think that the current strategy for Waziristan, viz., dropping bombs into the living rooms of the bad guys while leaning on Pakistan to at least keep the Taliban from expanding out of Waziristan, is the least bad option. But having (Pakistani or “flipped” Pashtun) boots on the ground would be much better.
And I suspect that in the event that the Taliban took over southern Afghanistan a similar strategy might at least keep the bad guys underground. But if you think that the civilian casualties in Afghanistan make the U.S. unpopular now, how much worse would it be to say, “The nation building ends now. From here on out it’s bombs.”
And it’s mighty optimistic to assume that the Taliban and AQ would split in the absence of NATO forces. The Taliban and AQ are heavily intermarried by this point, and, when a Pashtun war leader does turn against AQ or the centralized Taliban leadership, he and his whole family are generally killed in pretty short order (look at how successful the hopefully late Mehsud was over the last few years in Waziristan).
And you know, for all the differences between Haqqani, Hekmatyar, the Taliban proper, and random groups like the disaffected lumberjacks of Korengal, there’s still a strong ideological core to the Taliban and nothing suggests that they wouldn’t be the ones calling the shots if they ruled southern Afghanistan.
“far more bang for the buck.”
Turbulence, what a warmongering metaphor!
“Such that we shouldn’t consider those costs because they’re not even a factor when compared to the possible loss of 6,000 Americans that aren’t soldiers?”
Eric
I think we may be talking past each other here — you refer to “possible losses” and “saving thousands of lives”. I’m not talking about that. I apologize if I gave you that impression.
Rather, I refer only to those regimes whose relationship with organizations like AQ have already cost a large number of American lives (say 500 or more) — in other words, I am not supporting any kind of pre-emptive nation building.
My point — when saying that a country can be militarily overthrown and rebuilt if it serves as the basis for a successful massive terrorist attack on the US — was primarily to point out the unique position of the Taliban, as opposed to potential sanctuaries in Somalia and the like.
I love the normative assumption that Afghan lives don’t matter at all. It’s all about Americans. It always is.
What on Earth does this mean?
Do you not realize that the US is currently killing Afghans – lots and lots of them.
Further, the point of sending more troops to Afghanistan is so that those extra troops can kill even more Afghans. By the thousands.
But to oppose that is to disregard the value of Afghan lives?
During the Bush administration (an administration that clearly “cared” about Afghan lives, unlike me), they had a rule that a military in the field could authorize any airstrike that would kill up to and incluind 30 innocent Afghan civilians. They could still conduct airstrikes that would result in the loss of more innocent Afghan lives, but they’d need to get upper level sign off.
Such tender compassion.
I doubt the ROE are any different now. Because we care.
But if you think that the civilian casualties in Afghanistan make the U.S. unpopular now, how much worse would it be to say, “The nation building ends now. From here on out it’s bombs.”
I’m not sure our popularity is the most important concern considering how unpopular we are already (59% of Afghans consider us the biggest threat). But our nation building exercise will end one way or the other – either after a long expensive failure, or sooner. After that, there’s a good chance we’ll have to strike at terrorist groups/camps. It’s not ideal, but it’s the best path available.
And it’s mighty optimistic to assume that the Taliban and AQ would split in the absence of NATO forces.
I don’t assume this necessarily. It’s possible, and if not, we take action as needed.
Eric, so am I correct in reading your prescription of pulling out and then dropping bombs when and were AQ appears to be setting up shop? Because while that is a pretty efficient way of killing bad guys, it’s absolutely awful to every single Afghan who’s going to have the video recording of his head getting sawed off distributed throughout the Islamic world. That’s a lot of Afghans to write off to being tortured to death. I as a voter and taxpayer am not terribly keen on dealing with our Afghan allies in the same way we dealt with the Hmong and with the Iraqi Shi’ites of 1991.
Moving back to the issue of the pragmatic, making war on the bad guys from the sky is, in general sub-optimal. You can’t really capture folks to interrogate, it’s much harder to verify who’s dead and not dead, and the ability to hit them is contingent upon American SigInt and HumInt. The more real estate over which AQ has free rein, the harder it is to hit them. We’ve had the devil’s own time with AQ in Waziristan–do you think they’d be easier to hit if they had several thousand square miles more of territory in which to stay out of sight?
That’s a lot of Afghans to write off to being tortured to death.
So, do you believe we have an open ended commitment to ensure that no one anywhere on Earth ever gets tortured to death by their government? If not, why should we start by helping the people in Afghanistan rather than those in, say, Burma? Or the Uigers? Or the Egyptians?
We could help a lot more people for a lot fewer dollars if we were willing to do so in parts of the world that weren’t Afghanistan….
I as a voter and taxpayer am not terribly keen on dealing with our Afghan allies in the same way we dealt with the Hmong and with the Iraqi Shi’ites of 1991.
Well, if they’re getting their heads sawed off on video specifically because they allied with America, then yes, as a country, we do have a pretty strong obligation to make sure that doesn’t happen.
Why should *anyone* work with the U.S. if they know that at the first sign of difficulty they’ll get thrown overboard?
Well, if they’re getting their heads sawed off on video specifically because they allied with America, then yes, as a country, we do have a pretty strong obligation to make sure that doesn’t happen.
Are there any limits on that commitment? Are you saying that because Bush invaded a country, we have to remain there no matter how much time, money, and manpower are needed to secure it?
Why should *anyone* work with the U.S. if they know that at the first sign of difficulty they’ll get thrown overboard?
I don’t know. Why do you think *anyone* should work with the US if they know that the US goes around starting pointless wars that kill a million people? I can’t think of a good reason, can you?
Well, Turbulence, I’m glad you’re willing to look into the question of how many people the U.S. should accept will be tortured to death. My counter-question to you is what the maximum number of people tortured to death you’d be willing to accept in order to undo Bush policies. Because you’ve acknowledged that there is such a number. Is it less than 100? Less than a thousand? Or whatever it takes?
Moving back to the issue of the pragmatic, making war on the bad guys from the sky is, in general sub-optimal.
Yes. Counterinsurgency is also sub-optimal – and it costs exponentially more.
You can’t really capture folks to interrogate, it’s much harder to verify who’s dead and not dead, and the ability to hit them is contingent upon American SigInt and HumInt.
Yes, and yet this sub-optimal approach is being used where AQ is now, and we haven’t been attacked again.
do you think they’d be easier to hit if they had several thousand square miles more of territory in which to stay out of sight?
But if they’re staying out of sight, isn’t that the goal? I mean, the whole point of denying them real estate is so they can’t form training camps. Well, if they’re hiding from us, no camps. If they come out of hiding to build a camp, then we bomb the camp.
it’s absolutely awful to every single Afghan who’s going to have the video recording of his head getting sawed off distributed throughout the Islamic world.
Two thoughts:
1. It’s also absolutely better for all the Afghans that we don’t kill by continuing the occupation.
2. Given your position, is there ever a point at which it would be appropriate for the US to leave? What if it cost us $10 trillion over the next three decades? Would you make the same argument to me then?
If, on the other hand, you have a limit, what is it?
it’s absolutely awful to every single Afghan who’s going to have the video recording of his head getting sawed off distributed throughout the Islamic world
I also did not say abandon the Afghans that have allied with us. I’ve endorsed providing them with aid, arms, training and other support so that they are not overrun. As I mentioned upthread, it is feasible to think they can fight the Taliban to a standoff.
Also: Afghans are, right now with us in country, being killed by the Taliban for siding with us. We are not preventing this from happening by being there. We do not have that much power/control, and we never will.
Eric, I’d be more than happy for the U.S. to leave Afghanistan if we had an Afghan National Army and Police force sufficient to keep control of the country and more or less keep the Taliban east of the Durand line. And even all of NATO’s work at nation building is also dedicated to that end, with the assumption that it will be easier to keep the Taliban from taking control of Afghanistan if the people of the country are invested in their government.
Now, it may prove impossible to form an ANA and police force that aren’t so mind-bendingly corrupt that they send people into the arms of the Taliban. But most of your posts seem to assume the impossibility of doing this has been proven.
Likewise, by any metric there were too few troops in Afghanistan from 2002 to present. It doesn’t follow from that that Afghanistan can’t be won and so there should be no troop increases.
Well, Turbulence, I’m glad you’re willing to look into the question of how many people the U.S. should accept will be tortured to death.
Well, what can I say: I’m a grownup.
My counter-question to you is what the maximum number of people tortured to death you’d be willing to accept in order to undo Bush policies.
I’d be willing to pay an awful lot in order to undo the killing of a million plus Iraqis. I’d probably be willing to see at least half a million people tortured. Doesn’t that seem like a fair trade to you? I’d rather see no one tortured.
Because you’ve acknowledged that there is such a number. Is it less than 100? Less than a thousand? Or whatever it takes?
Since I’m not the one suggesting that the US must stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, I don’t think the burden is on me to explain my moral commitments. I think the burden is on you. So how about, instead of asking me more questions, you answer the ones I asked you at 5:07? Would that be too much to ask?
I’m a grownup…I’d probably be willing to see at least half a million people tortured.
Nice.
But seriously, if you’re going to claim that it’s impossible ever to put together Afghan Security Forces capable of maintaining control of the government, I’d like to see some evidence of that before simply throwing everyone associated with us overboard.
Now, it may prove impossible to form an ANA and police force that aren’t so mind-bendingly corrupt that they send people into the arms of the Taliban. But most of your posts seem to assume the impossibility of doing this has been proven.
What we are talking about is a gamble. On the one hand, we’re gambling on an army/police structure that has never existed in the country. An army under centralized control that will, in the process, upend Afghanistan’s traditional decentralized, tribal societal alignment.
And we’ll be gambling on that army’s ability to completely eradicate a movement that is closely identified with, and championed by, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan (with numbers on the other side of the Durand Line as well). As if it is possible to push that many Pashtuns into Pakistan, as if that wouldn’t create unthinkable human hardship and as if it wouldn’t massively destabilize Pakistan.
This is a goal that we, the US army, has not been able to achieve. Not by a long shot.
All this, while Pakistan prefers the Taliban and will be supporting them in order to keep a proxy/ally in Afghanistan. Even though we have scant success – if any – at such projects historically speaking. And nothing over the past 7 years of occupation has indicated our ability has improved.
And this gamble will cost at least $1 trillion dollars. At least.
Let’s just say I’m very skeptical, and at that price tag and duration of commitment, it doesn’t add up.
Andrew R, does this mean that you’re unwilling to answer the questions I asked you at 5:07? I mean, I took the time to answer your questions, so is there some reason you can’t answer mine?
Well, Turbulence, if someone could show rather than assert that beating the Taliban is impossible, yes, I’d be willing to admit that there are better uses of U.S. resources. But no one has shown that yet.
Andrew, my questions at 5:07 do not depend in any way on whether or not the Taliban can be beaten. I’ll just assume that you’re not willing to engage meaningfully in discussion and act accordingly.
Eric, there has in living memory been a pretty decent Afghan Army. Prior to 1979, the country had a military that was pretty strong (and also tended to lean Communist for a variety of reasons).
This Afghan military was eventually beaten fighting a force that was funded and equipped not by some opium growers and Saudis with fat checkbooks, but by the wealthiest nation on the planet earth (and the PRC, and the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, and most of the rest of the Islamic world as well).
And the U.S. military has shown that it can train and professionalize militaries pretty well. To give just one example, Eritrea’s military was able to fight Ethiopia’s to a standstill in the recent unpleasantness, which, as someone I know once pointed out, is like Canada holding off an invasion by the U.S.
Seriously, Turbulence, you asked if there were limits that I would want to see placed on the U.S. commitment and I gave them. There are all kinds of reasons I could think of to place limits on the commitment to Afghanistan. Karzai or his successor could ask us to withdraw, we could see a deep and truly popular support of the Taliban manifest, the ANA could be showing itself to fight competently, or, I don’t know, a North Korean invasion or war with Iran could require all available U.S. troops.
But you seem to prefer to engage the straw man of “indefinite commitment.”
Seriously, Turbulence, you asked if there were limits that I would want to see placed on the U.S. commitment and I gave them. There are all kinds of reasons I could think of to place limits on the commitment to Afghanistan.
We’ve spend the better part of a decade and a few hundred billion dollars trying to pacify Afghanistan with no end in sight. I’m asking you to explain how long we should continue this campaign and how much we should be willing to spend before we say “this isn’t worth it”; I mean, if still hadn’t “succeeded” after another 12 years and 2.3 trillion dollars, would you insist that we still had to keep trying? What exactly is the threshold in time and dollars after which we say “no more”? Or is there no such threshold?
If you’ve explained the answer to this question above, my apologies, I didn’t see it, so please humor me and repeat it. But I don’t think you have. But if you can’t describe a threshold, then I don’t see how your proposal differs from “stay in Afghanistan indefinitely”. Training an army is not the same thing as building major state institutions or seriously reducing corruption in a desperately poor country with no real tradition of not-massively-corrupt governance.
Why is nation-building in Afghanistan (as opposed to any of the other places which might be able to use it) a critical American priority?
nous caught a hint at 4:07. Essentially:
war on terror + war on drugs = massive mission creep.
If it were not for the insane American drug policy, combined with the fact that opium is one of the few economic export products of Afghanistan, something a whole lot more like the hit and run we did on bin Laden’s folks when they were headquartered in Africa would have been done here. As it is, I suspect we will be stuck there until our drug policy comes to its senses. Unless an absolute miracle occurs, of course.
Just FTR, I have some time now
The most sad aspect to this article is that Al Qaeda has been aware of the Build a Mole strategy AND is baiting our government into bankruptcy chasing them across the four corners of the Earth. The more often we throw our military into these meat grinders, the harder it will be for any president to justify delaying an attack against Iran. And the Beat goes on…..
Why should we care if rich Americans have to pay a few bucks more in taxes and a volunteer American military faces relatively small risks of bodily harm compared to every woman in Afghanistan enslaved? Frankly, I don’t think the moral calculus is even close.
There’s going to be a lot of Afghan death either way.
“Why should we care if rich Americans have to pay a few bucks more in taxes and a volunteer American military faces relatively small risks of bodily harm compared to every woman in Afghanistan enslaved?”
How much of the world do you want to save?
What if they don’t want saving?
And last but not least, what makes you think guns are going to solve the problem?
Judging by the massive deterioration in the rights of women in Iraq since our arrival there, you’ll forgive my skepticism regarding our magical abilities to transform societies with our magical military men. Looking there, it certainly seems like everything we touch turns to ash.
Look, I would love to believe that given the vast piles of money we funnel into our “defense” department and given the unbelievable sacrifices our soldiers make, we should be able to do damn near anything, but our military really isn’t good for much besides destroying large concentrations of enemy weaponry. They’re not good at creating governmental institutions or at building a civil society.
Bacevich:
“why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude.
If one believes that moral considerations rather than self-interest should inform foreign policy, Mexico still qualifies for priority attention. Consider the theft of California. Or consider more recently how the American appetite for illicit drugs and our liberal gun laws have corroded Mexican institutions and produced an epidemic of violence afflicting ordinary Mexicans. We owe these people, big-time.
Yet any politician calling for the commitment of sixty thousand U.S. troops to Mexico to secure those interests or acquit those moral obligations would be laughed out of Washington—and rightly so. Any pundit proposing that the United States assume responsibility for eliminating the corruption that is endemic in Mexican politics while establishing in Mexico City effective mechanisms of governance would have his license to pontificate revoked. Anyone suggesting that the United States possesses the wisdom and the wherewithal to solve the problem of Mexican drug trafficking, to endow Mexico with competent security forces, and to reform the Mexican school system (while protecting the rights of Mexican women) would be dismissed as a lunatic. Meanwhile, those who promote such programs for Afghanistan, ignoring questions of cost and ignoring as well the corruption and ineffectiveness that pervade our own institutions, are treated like sages.
The contrast between Washington’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and its relative indifference to Mexico testifies to the distortion of U.S. national security priorities induced by George W. Bush in his post-9/11 prophetic mode—distortions now being endorsed by Bush’s successor. It also testifies to a vast failure of imagination to which our governing classes have succumbed.
This failure of imagination makes it literally impossible for those who possess either authority or influence in Washington to consider the possibility (a) that the solution to America’s problems is to be found not out there—where “there” in this case is Central Asia-but here at home; (b) that the people out there, rather than requiring our ministrations, may well be capable of managing their own affairs relying on their own methods; and (c) that to disregard (a) and (b) is to open the door to great mischief and in all likelihood to perpetrate no small amount of evil. Needless to say, when mischief or evil does occur—when a stray American bomb kills a few dozen Afghan civilians, for instance—the costs of this failure of imagination are not borne by the people who inhabit the leafy neighborhoods of northwest Washington, who lunch at the Palm or the Metropolitan Club, and school their kids at Sidwell Friends.
So the answer to the question of the hour—What should the United States do about Afghanistan?—comes down to this: A sense of realism and a sense of proportion should oblige us to take a minimalist approach. As with Uruguay or Fiji or Estonia or other countries where U.S. interests are limited, the United States should undertake to secure those interests at the lowest cost possible.”
I think that about covers Andrew R’s questions.
Regards, Steve
Turbulence, my thoughts on the Afghan war effort can be summed up by Ben Kingsley’s answer to the question of what he thought of western civilization, namely, that it would be a good idea. If a genuine, non-half-assed effort is made to secure Afghanistan and put an Afghan National Army in place and fails after a few years, I’d be more than happy to concede that it’s probably not worth doing. But up until very, very recently, Washington and Brussels haven’t been putting much effort into doing much beyond barely holding in Afghanistan.
Andrew, so, are you suggesting that we ignore Afghanistan until we find some way to radically remake Washington and Brussels? I believe the old man said, you go to war with the political-military-institutions that you have, not the political-military-institutions that you wish you had….
More to the point, I’m sure you have all sorts of fascinating ideas for how we should transform government institutions in DC and in Europe. However, I can’t help but notice that it is extraordinarily unlikely that the changes you seek will be made, so we’re going to be stuck the same institutions we have in place now. And since you seem convinced that those existing institutions aren’t up to the task, I really don’t see why we’re wasting our time in Afghanistan.
But hey, maybe you have a feasible plan for this radical transformation of Washington and Brussels: do tell!
Well, Turbulence, unlike many on the intertubes, I don’t actually think that I can see more clearly than the experts. I do, however, think that the folks currently in the White House know what they’re doing. I’m curious as to why you don’t.
Well, Turbulence, unlike many on the intertubes, I don’t actually think that I can see more clearly than the experts.
Really? You just said that these same experts have failed to effect a genuine non-half-assed effort to secure Afghanistan. Clearly you can see more clearly than many of these experts, not just in Washington, but Brussels too! Or am I misreading you?
I do, however, think that the folks currently in the White House know what they’re doing. I’m curious as to why you don’t.
I’m sure they know what they’re doing, and what they’re doing is not committing political suicide by withdrawing right away.
I’m sure they know what they’re doing, and what they’re doing is not committing political suicide by withdrawing right away.
I’m glad to see you’re confident that Obama is lying to America.
If I have any claim to see more clearly than anyone it’s that I’m not looking at Afghanistan in terms clichés about invincible third-world guerrillas and the graveyard of empires. You should try it sometime.
The house router has been down all day, so I’m catching up late again.
Bacevich and Marc Lynch make good points.
“But I’m really, really failing to see how leaving a country to an organization that is joined almost at the hip with AQ is sustainable in anything but the short run.”
This was true in 2001; it doesn’t seem particularly true or relevant today. The leadership of AQ is disrupted, and shows no signs of being able to organize major attacks; what’s left are its inspirational effects, and the brand name, and franchises, and occupying Afghanistan does nothing positive to restrict those; if anything, it’s counter-productive.
Bacevich argues for maintaining pinpoint attacks, and forgetting about nation-building.
We can continue to supply humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, as desired, and we can even offer minimal military aid, if the government warrants it, without attempting to rebuild a working nation there.
Eric: “Second, the Taliban are a heterodox amalgamation of elements, and not all are ‘joined at the hip’ with al-Qaeda. In fact, very few – if any – are. Historically, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have had a tenuous and contingent relationship, marked by what were, in essence, bribes from Bin Laden to stay in the Taliban’s good graces.”
Eric is correct.
Turbulence: “this is a great illustration of the perils of asymmetric warfare”
Turbulence is correct.
Andrew R: “Pull out and drop bombs on the AQ sanctuaries that form?”
That.
Pithlord: “It’s all about Americans. It always is.”
Yes, isn’t it?
You weren’t around when I made this point here to Charles Bird approximately 1000 times.
“That’s a lot of Afghans to write off to being tortured to death. I as a voter and taxpayer am not terribly keen on dealing with our Afghan allies in the same way we dealt with the Hmong and with the Iraqi Shi’ites of 1991.”
But how is this logic different from saying we should still have 500,000 troops in Vietnam?
Eric: “I doubt the ROE are any different now.”
Supposedly they are, according to articles I don’t feel I have the time to google to link to just now. FWIW.
Andrew R.: “Why should *anyone* work with the U.S. if they know that at the first sign of difficulty they’ll get thrown overboard?”
This is hardly the first time anyone’s asked this question, with good reason. People around the world will continue to answer it in the future as they see fit. It’s not, itself, sufficient reason to keep fighting a major war.
That was the Soviet Army, not the Afghan Army; the Afghan Army had already essentially collapsed prior to significant American and Pakistani and Saudi Arabian money and arms; America had given a trivial amount of money to insurgents prior to the Soviet invasion; it wasn’t until considerably after the Soviet invasion, and essentially a Soviet take-over, that America, matched by Saudi Arabia dollar for dollar, supplied the Pakistanis the money and arms to give some of to Afghanis after the Pakistanis skimmed off as much as they thought they could get away with (which was a lot, because we were in no position to audit them, and even so there was a lot of fraud we were aware of).
It has happened only once in a developed nation — arguably only once, ever — on September 11, 2001.
Not sure how this affects the argument either way, but for the record:
Madrid March 11, 2004, 190 dead, more than 1400 injured.
London July 7, 2005, 56 dead, 700 injured.
Oklahoma City April 19, 1995, 166 killed, hundreds more injured.
Tokyo March 20, 1995, Aum Shinri-kyo sarin attack, 12 killed and 5,700 injured.
NYC February 26, 1993, WTC bombing #1, only 6 dead but 1,000 injured.
All of this is just developed countries. It also excludes the more or less constant back-and-forth in the middle east, and also excludes IRA activity in the UK.
If also excludes more minor acts, where victims number in the single or double digits, as well as attacks on aircraft.
Seriously, this stuff goes on pretty frequently. And Yemen, Somalia, and the Caucasus are home to lots of the folks involved. Along with lots of other places.
I’m not saying we should rush into any of those places, I’m just saying that Afghanistan is not that unique.
“As it is, I suspect we will be stuck there until our drug policy comes to its senses.”
We’ve at least renounced the insane poppy eradication program in Afghanistan.
I think a problem between Turbulence and Andrew R’s arguments is that it’s quite possible the Best Answer lies somewhere in the middle ground between their perspective, but if so, it’s not really knowable by us at present where that might be, were this so. This is just a hypothesis.
Turbulence: “Judging by the massive deterioration in the rights of women in Iraq since our arrival there”
It doesn’t seem fair to mention this and neglect the improvement, overall, in women’s rights in Afghanistan.
And having come to this thread late, I’d suggest — yes, me, of all people — a dialing down of sarcasm all around is probably in order. Also demands that questions be answered, etc.
Gary, my brief brief response is that at the siege of Jalalabad, the Communist Afghan Army held on for longer than anyone thought they would, and they were only beaten decisively when the Soviets pulled the plug. And the Mujahedin were riding a wave of success and at the top of their power.
The Taliban has much less strength than that. Building a military that can hold them off is not an insurmountable obstacle.
It doesn’t seem fair to mention this and neglect the improvement, overall, in women’s rights in Afghanistan.
Right now, we believe that the massive changes we’ve started introducing in Afghani society will improve the status of women in the long term. For many years, we believed the same thing about Iraq. We were wrong about Iraq. And yet Iraq was a society that we had more insight into than Afghanistan: consider the number of Arabic speakers in the US compared to the number of Pashto. Alternatively, recall that Iraq is a largely industrial society with an educated urban population while Afghanistan is a largely rural country where adult literacy is well under 40%.
Americans certainly think they know how to mold and remake societies in radical ways. I mean, they’re generally not willing to countenance social engineering on such a vast scale when the targets are Americans. And Americans have no real record of successfully effecting such massive change in societies that differ so much from our own.
But hey, maybe, even though (1) we’ve never done this successfully before and even though (2) we’d never have the confidence to engage in social engineering half as massive on ourselves and even though (3) we thought we had successfully done such engineering in Iraq but our perceptions were so fracked that we were completely wrong, maybe, in spite of all that, this time we’ll get it right. Maybe this time our perceptions are not as fracked as they were before. Perhaps we as a society have suddenly become far more perceptive and capable of massive social interventions.
Anything is possible. We might as well gamble. After all, neither our society nor our lives are on the line. Other people, generally browner people, will pay the price if our gamble fails. As it usually does.
Sorry, this is a little late, I forgot the captcha, so I hope I’m not throwing gas on the fire.
=====
The argument against US forces in Afghanistan given by Turbulence seems to be similar to Sebastian’s against government health care: we’ve screwed it up before so we can’t be trusted to do it right this time. Admittedly, there are a few more data points supporting the take here, but it’s not really addressing the situation.
I made a comment in an earlier thread that might have been missed. I had asked about info on mercenary deployment in Afghanistan and then wrote
“Eric has strongly argued how we should get out of Afghanistan with all due speed, but the differing deployment points to differing motivations behind the two fronts. Eric has argued that the ‘denying terrorists a base’ is a mistaken motivation, and I’ve argued that while that is presented for domestic consumption, the reality is that the US commitment in Afghanistan is predicated on perhaps two basic realities, which are domestic public opinion viewing a withdrawal as a defeat, the necessity of maintaining operations in Afghanistan in order to pressure Pakistan to deal with the various fundamentalist forces. This suggests a third, which is that NATO allies, while not deeply invested in Afghanistan, will view a US withdrawal as evidence of an inability to provide true follow thru on foreign policy goals, a point on which Obama has to distinguish himself from the previous administration.”
Of course, this kind of argument can descend into one where I’m accusing you of advocating bugging out of Afghanistan and you accuse me of wanting a McCain like 1000 year occupation, but between those two poles, there seems to be some room. At some point, developed nations are going to have to develop better COIN capabilities because the gap between the haves and the have nots will not be changing very quickly in the immediate future, and rather than putting that off to some future, afghanistan seems like as good a place as any.
In this regard, the comparison to Mexico is a bit misleading. We have a range of contacts with various levels of the Mexican government and the meetings are basically equals meeting. I don’t think we have anything like that in Afghanistan (Would anyone mistake a meeting of Obama, Karzai and Soomro for the current 3 amigos meeting?) I don’t believe that Afghanistan has the structure in place to imagine the type of meetings that routinely take place between Mexico and the US)
My own views are influenced by my cousin, who served two tours of duty with the SAS in Afghanistan. He felt that there were a lot of possibilities for making a difference in Afghanistan. Of course, that was quite a while ago, and it may be that we can’t uncrap the bed, which I think is a valid objection.
However, I believe a piece of evidence Eric cited was McChrystal appointment as he was a ‘hunter-killer’ rather than a COIN based strategist. However, recently, even he has changed strategies, suggesting that, hopefully, those planning the strategies are not so tied to their previous reputations that they are unable to change. Of course, the title of the above WSJ link may support your take.
I will say that if the US turns to mercenaries because we can’t increase the number of troops on the ground, and/or is unable to get more support from NATO allies in the coming year or so, I think it will argue against this take, but it seems to me that at some point, we have to reconfigure our force structure to do COIN and do it well. Withdrawal at the speed and volume that is argued for basically kicks that can down the road.
Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasas, into Africa — into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments. Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world?
But we’re not doing that in Afghanistan for our health — ie to fight Al Qaeda. Yes, we’re fighting Al Qaeda (or that which we perhaps don’t even bother to call Al Qaeda) while we’re there, but that’s not what’s keeping us there. What’s keeping us there is the responsibility we took for the country after overthrowing its government in 2001, and the fact that we never fully undertook to rebuild a minimally functioning state, something that is the fiduciary duty of a country that chooses to invade another country, depose its leadership, and occupy it militarily. We are continuing to try to achieve that goal in order to further the rehabilitation of our nation in the international community’s eyes as a responsible global power. Perhaps we shouldn’t have invaded, but since we did, we are fulfilling the responsibilities incurred by that decision. That’s what we’re doing there.
So no, of course we won’t be undertaking nation building in all of the places that could still serve as the launching ground for terrorism. Such terrorism we will combat using the means rejected by the Bush doctrine and resulting actions: diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, police/security service cooperation, military force far short of invasion/regime change as a very last resort. Surely it is somewhat curious to suggest that we would be engaging in nation building in countries with a functioning authority that is not us — our options there are restricted to that which flows from interface with those authorities. In some cases, to be sure, we may well find it in our interest to offer assistance to various states (or the closest thing that exists in teh territory in question) to help build counterterrorism capabilities –something that might be very much in our interest in a place like Somalia if a suitable partner could be found, or, as we have done, in Pakistan. But it is incoherent rhetoric to pose the question of why we wouldn’t engage in nation building in all the places where Al Qaeda could operate from since we are also engaged in nation building in Afghanistan. This confuses our interests in Afghanistan (fighting terrorism among a few others) with our obligations incurred to to invasion and overthrow of the government (rebuild a functioning state).
“the improvement, overall, in women’s rights in Afghanistan.”
Doesn’t exist.
8 July 2009 – Violence against women, including rape, is widespread in Afghanistan, according to a new United Nations report, which details the extent of the problem against a backdrop of impunity and a failure by authorities to protect women’s rights.
“This report paints a detailed and deeply disturbing picture of the situation facing many Afghan women today,” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said of the 32-page report issued jointly by her office (OHCHR) and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
“The limited space that opened up for Afghan women following the demise of the Taliban regime in 2001 is under sustained attack, not just by the Taliban themselves, but by deeply engrained cultural practices and customs, and – despite a number of significant advances in terms of the creation of new legislation and institutions – by a chronic failure at all levels of government to advance the protection of women’s rights in Afghanistan.”
…It focuses on two principal issues – the “growing trend” of violence and threats against women in public life, and rape and sexual violence.
…Although the Afghan Constitutions includes a 25 per cent quota for female members of parliament – one of the highest such quotas in the world – the report also notes that “a number of female MPs have already indicated that due to the prevailing security situation and death threats they repeatedly receive, they will not be contesting the next national assembly elections in 2010.”
The report also details numerous attacks on girls’ schools, and on girl students – including gas and acid attacks – by “anti-government elements.”
When it comes to sexual violence, the report states that rape is both widespread and taboo, and it is the victims that are more likely to be punished than the perpetrators. “Only in a few isolated cases have public institutions taken appropriate action. In many instances, victims seeking help and justice are further victimized… Government action to address rape is woefully inadequate.”
The report notes that there is no explicit provision in the 1976 Afghan Penal Code criminalising rape, and a survey of convicted rapists in one Afghan prison indicated that they did not know that rape was a criminal offence.
In addition, police and judicial officials are often not aware or convinced that rape is a serious criminal offence, the report states, and “investigating a rape case is rarely a priority.”
The happy talk about women’s rights in Afghanistan is just PR.
Regards, Steve
“Right now, we believe that the massive changes we’ve started introducing in Afghani society will improve the status of women in the long term.”
We do? I hate it when people do this. The idea of speaking in the first person plural without specifically naming which people you’re deputized to speak for has long been mocked on Usenet.
Either you’ve actually been deputized by specific people, or you’re self-appointing yourself.
Typical responses include “do you have a mouse in your pocket you’re speaking for?” or “which organization appointed you?” And so on.
And people do this because it’s a way of accusing people without specifying who you’re accusing, and lumping together people who don’t deserve to be lumped, regardless of whatever your intentions are in choosing to claim you’re speaking for a bunch of unspecified people.
In any case, I urge you to quit this habit unless, of course, you are speaking for a named organization or named group of people.
Because I don’t believe what you say “we” believe, and I’m standing right here, and I object to your claiming to speak for me, and since you haven’t narrowed down who “we” are, you appear to be claiming to speak for me, and I object.
Anyone who wants to say you’re speaking for them, more power to them and you. But please try to be specific if you’re being plural as to who the “we” are that you’re spokesperson for. Thanks.
Alternatively, name a bunch of people, or groups, in the third person, you wish to characterize: this technique works quite well, honest.
Also here:
Really? So spending $50 trillion on nation building – which we’re not very good at anyway, and may not work regardless – and suffering the deaths of many thousands of US soldiers over the next couple of decades is worth it if it means that we can save the lives of 6,000 Americans that aren’t soldiers?
Such that we shouldn’t consider those costs because they’re not even a factor when compared to the possible loss of 6,000 Americans that aren’t soldiers?
I disagree.
You’re completely missing Point’s point. He’s not advocating invading someplace every time we get attacked. He’s saying that our modus operandi, and only for one attack, seems to be to invde and occupy only after we are attacked. So we’ll be rebuilding Somalia, Yemen, etc., if at all, only after we’ve experienced a devastating attack launched from one of those places — and hopefully such invasion would be subject to much greater debate and a higher standard of expected efficacy because of what we learned in this decade. So he’s saying you’re setting up a straw man by saying somehow that staying in Afghanistan means we’ll be rebuilding other places inevitably too. He’s saying it would take a 9/11-style attack to even raise the possibility, and even then I’d wager the scales would be tipped against, certainly more so than in 2001. You’re acting like he’s advocating for such things; you’ve completely missed his point.
There is of course the economy of scale. It’s obviously unfair to judge by the price tag if there are only 1 or 2 nations built at the same time. If the US would expand, the cost per nation would go significantly down. My estimate is that the break-even point would be closer to 15 than to 50. A proper market analysis would have to determine, whether there are enough nations in need of proper rebuilding and in how many a partial rebuilt would do. How many competitors to the US are there that could take away parts of that market? And since outsourcing is the secret to all success, the nation-building should be first delegated to trusted subcontractor states and in those to private entities with the US as general supervisors.The only thing that could go wrong is with too many regulations on the private subcontractors (or attempts to include universal healthcare as part of the package).
Russell
Glad you brought up the death and injury tolls of other recent terrorist attacks.* I’ll admit, when I looked at other attacks by non-state actors, to see how often this level of attack happened, I wasn’t looking at the injury numbers — those don’t psychologically affect the population in nearly the same way, doesn’t “terrorize” them, if you will…
When Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirator(s) killed 166, there wasn’t even an overwhelming push to stamp out the survivalist militia movement. When over 200 were killed in American embassies in 1998***, there was no push to declare on AQ then. But when over a dozen times that number were killed on 9/11, it became inevitable.
And, looking at the death tolls of other terrorist incidents, only one other event made me think “If this kind of thing was done to Americans on our soil” — and I want to emphasize that phrase — “it might justify another Afghanistan”. No other terrorist incident, other than 9/11, had a death toll of more than 500; this killed 796. It was the 2007 bombings in Qahtaniya targeting the Yazidi population.**
*Weird thing to say, I know…
**And, FTR, yes, I do see the irony. If I haven’t already said so (which I somehow doubt) Iraq was a stupid, immoral war.
***Not in a developed nation, I know, but on their soil, technically…
“So he’s saying you’re setting up a straw man by saying somehow that staying in Afghanistan means we’ll be rebuilding other places inevitably too. He’s saying it would take a 9/11-style attack to even raise the possibility, and even then I’d wager the scales would be tipped against, certainly more so than in 2001. You’re acting like he’s advocating for such things; you’ve completely missed his point.”
Mike
I’m appreciate that you wanted to better clarifty my point (seriously), but I feel now that I have just made a mesh of it.
But, in a sense, I am advocating in this post for the modus operandi — but almost entirely for the purpose of defending the invasion and rebuilding of Afghanistan.
But you’re absolutely right that it would take a 9/11 style attack to even raise the possibility of applying this to other nations, and this application seems to be a “straw man” (if it weren’t, we’d have bigger problems, etc.).
One way of clarifying my position — and, TBC, I don’t say this at all lightly — is that I agree with the first incarnation of the Bush Doctrine:
“we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them”
And to be further clear — I take a narrow definition of “harbor”, and see only a major attack as warranting a state of war*. (see last post)
* And essentially every further development of the doctrine was negative (it just got crazier and crazier).
Americans certainly think they know how to mold and remake societies in radical ways.
True dat.
Hey, it worked in Germany and Japan post WWII. All we (and a handful of our friends) had to do was reduce both nations to utter and complete rubble first.
And, of course, it helped that the governments we replaced were hideous violent authoritarian fascist militarist dictatorships. That stuff is only popular as long as you keep winning. Once you start losing and bombs begin to fall, folks are open to a change of management.
I wasn’t looking at the injury numbers — those don’t psychologically affect the population in nearly the same way
I don’t agree. It depends.
IMO what puts the fear in terrorism is less whether everyone dies or is merely injured, and more the randomness of it — the undermining of the sense that you can engage in everyday life safely.
I’d also call your attention to the response of Spain and the UK to the train system attacks in their countries. Although a smaller number of people were killed, those were brutal, savage attacks by any measure.
Neither country responded by going to war. Both nations treated the attacks as, basically, the actions of a criminal organization. A military response to terrorism, at any scale, is not inevitable nor is it a necessity.
One of the unique things about 9/11 was the clear alignment of Al Qaeda with the Taliban government of Afghanistan. It meant that there was an actual national government that was clearly at least partially culpable. That’s actually kind of unusual.
Finally, I note that there was a military response to the African embassy bombings. The military response was generally condemned by folks who thought Clinton’s sex life to be a much more pressing issue than Al Qaeda.
Building a military that can hold them off is not an insurmountable obstacle.
Well then, what are we waiting for?
Why should we care if rich Americans have to pay a few bucks more in taxes and a volunteer American military faces relatively small risks of bodily harm compared to every woman in Afghanistan enslaved?
Aren’t you a Canadian?
We do? I hate it when people do this. The idea of speaking in the first person plural without specifically naming which people you’re deputized to speak for has long been mocked on Usenet.
Gary, I was speaking only for people like Pithlord who believe that continued American military involvement in Afghanistan is vital to protect the status of women in that country.
I am not very interested in hearing about social norms on usenet, given that usenet as an institution was completely unable to sustain itself as a medium for discussion. Completely failing at one’s purpose is not a ringing endorsement.
In the case of Germany and Japan it also helped that people were used to a centralized and on average (non-rabid)conservative government. Both contries were industrialized quite some time. They were also needed by the US as allies against the new enemy, the Soviets.
As for the UK, van Crefeld has an interesting comparision between the UK vs. the IRA and the US vs. the Iraq/Afghan insurgents (with Assad vs. the Muslim Brotherhood as tertium comparationis) in his book The Changing Face of War (new 2005 edition). Clue: the prospects for the US in that field are not actually promising.
But you’re absolutely right that it would take a 9/11 style attack to even raise the possibility of applying this to other nations, and this application seems to be a “straw man” (if it weren’t, we’d have bigger problems, etc.).
You keep talking about a 9/11 style attack as a threshold for future action, but I don’t think this concept means much. The impact of a terrorist attack on the population depends on many factors. Sending anthrax, or even backing soda through the US mail can paralyze the mail system and make lots of people and businesses stop functioning. Two guys shooting random people in the DC area can have a massive effect. The right attack, even if much smaller and cheaper than 9/11, can easily create political conditions where the government “needs” to invade a country.
I’d suggest you define precisely what you mean when you use “a 9/11 style attack” as a threshold: does that mean no less than 3000 dead? Financial damage no less than $100B? What? Would synchronized car bombings in 10 different cities count?
“we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them”
The United States is harboring known terrorists. Do you think we should invade the US? Or at least bomb Washington?
If not, why not? Is it because non-American lives are inherently less worthy than American lives? Or is it just that the terrorists we’re holding haven’t managed to pull of attacks that exceeded the 9/11 threshold yet?
These Afghan women are telling us to leave. Pithy, how can that be?
http://bravenewfilms.org/blog/?p=71606
“I don’t agree. It depends… Although a smaller number of people were killed, those were brutal, savage attacks by any measure. Neither country responded by going to war.”
I think we may have to agree to disagree on this; just to reiterate, I think that 9/11 was a whole different category of attack from the Madrid or London bombings. (I’ve been calling this caliber a “massive terrorist attack”, though I’ve also seen it referenced as a “9/11 style” or “9/11 level attack”.)
“One of the unique things about 9/11 was the clear alignment of Al Qaeda with the Taliban government of Afghanistan. It meant that there was an actual national government that was clearly at least partially culpable. That’s actually kind of unusual.”
This is a very good point.
“Finally, I note that there was a military response to the African embassy bombings.”
Well, I’d offer my apologies and thank you for pointing out my error, but I didn’t remember that. What was the military response again?
What was the military response again?
A series of cruise missile attacks in Africa and Afghanistan.
Turb
My 7:59 alluded to a definition of an MTA — 500 dead or more is a very good indication. Injuries and financial damage are certainly not as central to the question of whether regime change level military action is warranted.*
Another way of thinking about this: a nation that actively provides sanctuary to an organization is, to at least some extent, culpable for that country’s actions. For me, that means that if a power protections something like AQ, and that something like AQ carries out an attack, that protector country shares the culpability. From there, it’s just a question of whether the attack warrants a war. 9/11, I believe, did; a backpack bomb on a subway probably wouldn’t.
*FTR, attributes of the attackers themselves also matter in this — I’m just talking definition of the attack itself.
Thank you Eric.
The United States is harboring known terrorists. Do you think we should invade the US? Or at least bomb Washington?
Seriously? You’re asking if we should bomb ourselves? Even if we stipulate that our government is responsible for the deaths of those who terrorize overseas —
If not, why not? Is it because non-American lives are inherently less worthy than American lives?
So… our government doesn’t have a particular obligation to protect the lives of its citizens? To do that is to make some kind of category error?
Quent: I think the point being made is that there are terrorists in several countries/territories. Such as England, France, Germany, Spain, Saudi Arabia and, even and including, the United States.
However, using the military to strike at these terrorists is an option that is reserved for only “certain” countries. Never Western Europe. Never Canada. Never close allies.
(Turb, Quent, Eric thread)
Right, but that gets back to what “sanctuary” is (as opposed to just being located there).
Russell made a good point at 8:44, and I think it bears some repeating at this p– er, juncture:
“One of the unique things about 9/11 was the clear alignment of Al Qaeda with the Taliban government of Afghanistan. It meant that there was an actual national government that was clearly at least partially culpable. That’s actually kind of unusual.”
Also, just want to say how much I’m enjoying this.
Right, but that gets back to what “sanctuary” is (as opposed to just being located there).
Point, the US is providing sanctuary to a wanted terrorist who has killed many people. The US government refuses to deport him to the countries whose citizens he viciously murdered.
Just so we’re clear, are you trying to say that provided that Carriles managed to rack up a body count over 500, either Cuba or Venezuela would be justified in bombing Washington until they stopped giving him “sanctuary”? Or would that only occur if Carriles managed to kill over 500 people in one terrorist act rather than spreading the killings across a campaign of terrorism?
“I am not very interested in hearing about social norms on usenet, given that usenet as an institution was completely unable to sustain itself as a medium for discussion. ”
I’m not very interested in hearing about “Usenet as an instititution,” since each newsgroup and sub-hierarchy functioned and functions on its own, with its own norms and subcultures; like blogs, each is about its own thing and has its own culture; some are successful, some are failures; some ran their course, some continue today; generally that depended on whether people chose to take responsibility for maintaining their own culture when they were under threat; I’m interested, as always in taking away any lessons that work from anywhere appropriate.
I’m particularly interested in lessons as regards what does and doesn’t work well, or badly, in maintaining a non-toxic culture of reasonably courteous, reasonably friendly, space for online written discussion. One can find these lessons from not just Usenet, but from the history of emailing lists, moderated and unmoderated, from early BBS, and even from the culture of earlier printed fanzines, and their interaction. One can find lessons for all manner of written interaction, and, of course, even some from in-person culture, though written interaction has its own, unique, flaws, problems, solutions, and aspects.
Being clear about whom we are or are not speaking for, and not claiming to speak for other people without a clear proxy, is one of those practices that help.
It meant that there was an actual national government that was clearly at least partially culpable.
I’m not sure I believe this. Culpability generally requires knowledge, right? Now, if the US government (1) negotiated in good faith, (2) provided convincing evidence to the Taliban that OBL was guilty, and (3) refrained from threatening the Taliban with death and destruction unless they complied, I’d agree that a war might be justified. But given the quality of American governance at the time and given the desperate need that Americans had for a war, to say nothing of the desperate need the President had for a war (gotta be a war time preznit to be truly great dontcha know), I’m skeptical that conditions (1), (2), and (3) actually held.
Another way of thinking about this: a nation that actively provides sanctuary to an organization is, to at least some extent, culpable for that country’s actions.
So, is the US culpable for various atrocities committed by sociopaths that we actively supported, funded, trained, and sheltered in the the civil wars in Latin America during the 1980s? Right wing paramilitary organizations that we supported killed a whole lot more than 500 people, usually by slaughtering. Does that entitle Nicaragua or Guatemala to bomb Washington? I mean, why should it matter whether the killers murder people on airplanes or raze entire villages? Either way, they sought to accomplish political goals through violence and intimidation of the population.
So, is the US culpable for various atrocities committed by sociopaths that we actively supported, funded, trained, and sheltered in the the civil wars in Latin America during the 1980s?
FWIW, my opinion on this is “yes”.
And by our own standard, were Nicaragua, Costa Rica, etc etc etc capable of mustering a credible military response at the time, they would have been justified in employing it.
But they were small, so we could feel free to push them around.
“I’m not sure I believe this. Culpability generally requires knowledge, right?”
In a word, no. It requires foreseeable outcomes.
Also, FWIW, I agree with Russel’s last post.
In a word, no. It requires foreseeable outcomes.
Are you claiming that the Taliban foresaw the 9/11 attacks? Attacks that were planned in Germany and executed in the US? By people who were not from Afghanistan? The same attacks that the US government did not foresee?
“Are you claiming that the Taliban foresaw the 9/11 attacks? Attacks that were planned in Germany and executed in the US? By people who were not from Afghanistan? The same attacks that the US government did not foresee?”
The overall theme here is that people are individuals. In the “U.S. government” there are many individuals with some knowledge of what was coming. In Afghanistan, there were some individuals that knew what was coming, and helped the plan come into being.
The September 11th Commission Report is helpful on details. Chapter 5 in particular goes to your first two questions.
To attempt to pull some relevant quotes without running overlong:
Who in the Taliban did or didn’t know what remains, so far as I know, unclear from the public record. Certainly knowledge of the specific targets would have been as tightly held as possible.
But that’s not really the point. We don’t blame only those with knowledge in advance of which wedding party in Afghanistan/Pakistan is to be struck for the strike.
Gary, I’m trying to tease out what you’re claiming (that is relevant to the discussion at hand). Can you tell me if this is what you’re saying?
(1) There is no evidence in the public record that the Taliban knew that AQ was going to launch the 9/11 attack.
(2) However, there is evidence showing that the Taliban knew AQ engaged in terrorism, and therefore, the Taliban should be held responsible for whatever acts of terrorism that AQ committed.
Is that what you’re saying? Or are you trying to say something else?
With respect, your comments would be clearer if you included less verbatim copying of material that can be easily linked and more explicit explanation. Your closing allusion to wedding parties is unclear to me.
I think it’s reasonable to argue that a government that is harboring a terrorist outfit that is committing ongoing terrorist attacks against another nation shares in some of the responsibility for those attacks.
I mean, what could the Taliban say: sure, we knew they were blowing up the embassies and the Cole, but we never thought they’d kill more than a couple hundred a pop? That was the tacit agreement?
I think it’s reasonable to argue that a government that is harboring a terrorist outfit that is committing ongoing terrorist attacks against another nation shares in some of the responsibility for those attacks.
Sure, shares in some responsibility, but not necessarily enough to justify invasion unless the conditions I described here hold.
“Sure, shares in some responsibility, but not necessarily enough to justify invasion unless the conditions I described here hold.”
Well Turb, it seems we’ll just have to agree to disagree on this.
I tend to disagree as well turb. On that issue at least. I just think that the invasion/nation building exercise has drifted and crept from an achievable mission to an unrealistic one without a terminus and without a cap on expenditures.
Point and Eric, which bit are you disagreeing with? Are you claiming that the criteria I suggested are not an acceptable threshold for invasion? Or are you claiming that such criteria are a reasonable threshold but you have confidence that the US government met them?
If you disagree with the criteria I suggested, can you explain why? As in, which elements do you feel are inappropriate or what elements should be added?
Turb
I am claiming that your additional criteria for invasion (in particular the 3rd) are not only unrealistic, but not morally required.
If a country is morally permitted to invade, overthrow, and rebuild another in a set of given circumstances, it can absolutely (and probably should) make their intentions clear.
And given, as it’s been pointed out, that AQ had a history of violence against the US, the level of evidence needed to be “convincing” shouldn’t have been that high — though, FWIW, we had OBL, on tape, celebrating the 9/11 attacks, and implicating himself.
Turb,
If a group is harboring a terrorist organization that is openly taking credit for attacks on the US, and then that group attacks the US again – then we don’t need all of these steps:
Now, if the US government (1) negotiated in good faith, (2) provided convincing evidence to the Taliban that OBL was guilty, and (3) refrained from threatening the Taliban with death and destruction unless they complied, I’d agree that a war might be justified.
We need #1 only.
#2 is not necessary since Osama took credit openly and to the media for past attacks, and that should be enough – especially given the amount of evidence linking AQ to the attacks that was available. Incidentally, shortly after the US attacked he took credit for 9/11 too!
Point being, when you start harboring terrorist groups attacking foreign nations, you don’t get to demand proof of each such attack when there is already a track record of attacks and a good amount of evidence readily available. That’s one of the things you sacrifice by your choice of houseguests.
As for #3, same deal. You actually deserve to be threatened, and if you don’t like being threatened, don’t harbor terrorist groups that are openly touting their ongoing campaign of attacks against another country.
Just TBC, I’ve been talking about what I see as the criteria for invasion and rebuilding are since the beginning of this thread.
“Can you tell me if this is what you’re saying?”
I’m offering information; frequently I prefer to do that, rather than tell people what conclusions I think they should draw.
I will, however, repeat that “the Taleban” is no more a group mind than “Obsidian Wings” is, or “the US government” is; different individuals get informed of different things, some overlapping, and come to different conclusions, some overlapping. Individuals take actions, some under “orders,” some more voluntarily, and some less.
How individuals wish to accord responsibility, and to what degree they think it wise to lean towards individual responsibility, or collective responsibility, on the part of othters, is a matter for individuals to draw their own conclusions about. People, I’ve noticed, have different tendencies in this regard; some people are more consistent, and others less so.
“Your closing allusion to wedding parties is unclear to me.”
There have been cases of what turned out to be wedding parties in Afghanistan, and Iraq, struck my air strikes from U.S. forces of one sort or another; debate then typically ensued as to whether they were the terrorist gatherings originally alleged by the U.S. Air Force or military, or not, or maybe only a little bit; or were they purely massacres of innocent civilians, or maybe just largely?; more often than not, evidence in the public record, plus admissions from U.S. investigations often tended to reveal that Errors Had Been Made and innocent civilians killed after all.
My point was that people generally don’t just hold those in the U.S. military who made the targeting choices, or pushed the buttons, as responsible for those killings, but instead hold “the U.S. military” as a whole as responsible, or “the U.S.” as responsible; whether this is right or wrong seems to me comparable to whether or not “the Taliban” should be held responsible in general, rather than the exact individuals who did certain exact things in the September 11th attack.
Regarding exactly what conclusion one should draw in either case is not something I’m making a pronouncement about. I’m merely making an argument in favor of some consistency in one’s conclusions and attitudes about individual responsibility versus collective responsibility.
I don’t think there’s A Single Correct Answer to the questions that arise from these issues.
I’m instead all about corrupting the children.
I just think that the invasion/nation building exercise has drifted and crept from an achievable mission to an unrealistic one without a terminus and without a cap on expenditures.
Eric, a sincere question here: what was, in your view, the original “achievable mission”? You seem to suggest that it was something short of outright invasion and regime change–so just what was it?
UK: Disrupt al-Qaeda, kill its members, scatter them, and break down its command and control. Topple the Taliban and make them pay a price for hosting al-Qaeda. Support an alternative Afghan government within reason and means, and subject to local exigencies.
OK–thanks, Eric. I’m still left wondering how “toppling the Taliban” in a country with so little history of centralized, national authority wouldn’t leave us on the hook for a good long (and expensive) bout of nation-building.
As time goes on I’m moving closer to thinking that once we went for regime change, we were good and stuck, and if we didn’t want to get bogged down we should have stopped well short of any toppling. (NB: I’m not addressing whether the Taliban deserved to be toppled here, only whether there was any real possibility of it happening without a quagmire.)
Osama took credit openly and to the media for past attacks, and that should be enough
He did that openly in the time period after the attacks and before negotiations began? Really? My memory might be fuzzy here, but that’s not what I recall.
I checked Wikipedia and it confirms that OBL publicly denied responsibility for the attacks in mid september. On December 13, a tape was played in the media showing OBL claiming responsibility (or at least foreknowledge). The US invasion started about a month after the attacks.
especially given the amount of evidence linking AQ to the attacks that was available.
At the time, I don’t recall there being a lot of publicly available evidence linking AQ to the attacks. Especially since much of the publicly available evidence was sourced from the US government. Again, my memory might be completely wrong here. I’m sure there was a strong case inside the US government from day one, but I doubt the US was willing to share sources and methods so I imagine any evidence presented would have been based on public knowledge.
More to the point, there are lots of countries that believe the US government lies a lot about, well, everything. This does not strike me as an insane absurd notion. Certainly, I’d want to have some evidence if the US government told me something. And I have trouble believing the US government was all that willing to share said evidence with the Taliban.
Well, I think we could have toppled them and then bugged out (leaving behind a certain amount of assitance/trainers/etc).
At the very least, it would let the Taliban know that if they harbored AQ again, they would pay a price. Seeing as how the Taliban doesn’t care much for international matters, it is quite feasible that they would have chosen to ditch the troublesome foreign interlopers. At which point, we could live with their resurgence, as long as it was AQ free.
He did that openly in the time period after the attacks and before negotiations began? Really? My memory might be fuzzy here, but that’s not what I recall.
He had already taken credit for the Cole and Embassy bombings. Many, many months before.
At the time, I don’t recall there being a lot of publicly available evidence linking AQ to the attacks.
There was. And it certainly wasn’t exclusively from the US govt. Germany was providing info. Pakistan was providing info. Hell, Libya was providing very valuable stuff!
And like I said, if you harbor a known terrorist that has taken credit for a series of attacks against a foreign power, and then another attack occurs that points to that same terrorist, sorry, you don’t get to demand the same level of proof as you would under normal circumstances.
Eric
I just wanted to say thank you (again?). I believe that your threads (on this blog) in particular have not only helped me to better understand the rationale behind recent concerns on the Afghanistan war (as distinguished from general opposition to the war), but to better clarify my own position.
Our disagreement seems to come down to something rather simple: on the original mission of the war, I would say “make sure Taliban doesn’t return to power” would be a central corollary of “supporting an alternate government within reason”.
Does this seem right? If so, I look forward to when I can hopefully give some defense to it.
Point being, when you start harboring terrorist groups attacking foreign nations, you don’t get to demand proof of each such attack when there is already a track record of attacks and a good amount of evidence readily available. That’s one of the things you sacrifice by your choice of houseguests.
But of course you do. That’s why the US hasn’t surrendered all manner of violent terrorists to other countries. If you’re suggesting that this is a norm that other nations must adhere to which we will ignore, that’s fine, but you need to be explicit about that.
Well, I think we could have toppled them and then bugged out (leaving behind a certain amount of assitance/trainers/etc).
Do you think that outcome was ever politically feasible? I mean, do you think that Republicans circa early 2002 were confident that if the US military bugged out and the Taliban retook the country, they would not pay a serious political price? That would not be subject to demagoguery about ‘losing Afghanistan’?
It seems that if the Taliban were able to retake the country, there would be some bragging in the international media that our own media would find difficult to ignore, which would raise the political pressure to “do something”; after all, our brave soldiers being forced to come home before the job is done by cheese-eating-surrender-monkeys makes a nasty campaign ad, don’t you think?
In my experience, Americans don’t like having their nose rubbed in the fact that they’re not militarily capable of permanently extinguishing a rag tag group of losers like the Taliban. But perhaps Americans would have quietly accepted that.
My only point here is that if the policy you advocated was never politically feasible, then your only choices are no-invasion or quagmire. Right?
He had already taken credit for the Cole and Embassy bombings. Many, many months before.
Are you saying that either of those justified an invasion? Or are you saying that because OBL claimed responsibility for those attacks, that was sufficient evidence to assume that he was responsible for 9/11?
There was. And it certainly wasn’t exclusively from the US govt. Germany was providing info. Pakistan was providing info. Hell, Libya was providing very valuable stuff!
They were providing publicly available information in the month right after the attacks but before the invasion? I don’t remember any of that. I’m sure they provided such evidence eventually, but in less than 4 weeks after 9/11?
And like I said, if you harbor a known terrorist that has taken credit for a series of attacks against a foreign power, and then another attack occurs that points to that same terrorist, sorry, you don’t get to demand the same level of proof as you would under normal circumstances.
“Points to” is doing a lot of work in that sentence. Points to in whose eyes? The US?
I’m not saying the Taliban are innocent of anything. I’m just suggesting that maybe there was not sufficient publicly available evidence from neutral parties publicized within the first month immediately after the attacks to justify the requirement that the Taliban had to accept that OBL was responsible.
Our disagreement seems to come down to something rather simple: on the original mission of the war, I would say “make sure Taliban doesn’t return to power” would be a central corollary of “supporting an alternate government within reason”
Sounds like a decent distillation, but the essential backdrop is the cost/benefit analysis applied to those objectives.
I’d rather the Taliban never come back to power. Am I willing to spend $1 trillion and multi-decade occupation on the gamble that we can set Afghanistan up such that this doesn’t happen?
Different answer.
“I’d rather the Taliban never come back to power. Am I willing to spend $1 trillion and multi-decade occupation on the gamble that we can set Afghanistan up such that this doesn’t happen?”
The million dollar question (or the trillion dollar one, rather).
And just as we get to it, I start getting swamped (ugh!). I look forward to discussing it more fully when I have the time, or possibly in another thread.
Point-
Point taken. I used our agreement that raising the spectre of having to build states all over the globe to fight terrorism based on our obligation to do so in Afghanistan is a non-sequitur in the absence of another major attack as a jumping-off point for my own view that even if such an attack occurred, debate about whether we would again respond by toppling regimes, with the attendant responsibilities and our budget the way it is, would be far more contentious than it was when we were in shock at being sucker-punched in 2001. That is my hope and belief in any case. But perhaps we’d lash out with even less forethought.
In any case, we agree that fulfilling our responsibilities in Afghanistan does not logically lead to our spontaneously deciding to undertake similar efforts in countries where attacks have not originated and whose regimes we have not taken it upon ourselves to change.
But of course you do. That’s why the US hasn’t surrendered all manner of violent terrorists to other countries. If you’re suggesting that this is a norm that other nations must adhere to which we will ignore, that’s fine, but you need to be explicit about that.
First, I’ve argued for deporting the Cuban terrorists to Cuba or Venezuela, so I’m consistent (argued in multiple posts on the subject). Second, those Cuban terrorists are not active anymore, and were under house arrest for some time. Not unlike the al-Qaeda ops held in Iran. Not that this changes everything, but a slight differentiation.
Do you think that outcome was ever politically feasible?
More feasible than not invading/toppling the Taliban in the first place.
Are you saying that either of those justified an invasion? Or are you saying that because OBL claimed responsibility for those attacks, that was sufficient evidence to assume that he was responsible for 9/11?
First, yes, they probably justified some form of military incursion in their own right. They are acts of war. Second, because he claimed responsibility, the evidentiary standard is lowered. So, no, that alone was not sufficient evidence. But that, coupled with the readily available evidence, and what we did include in our communiques, suffices because of the lower standard which attaches to an admitted and active terrorist.
I’m just suggesting that maybe there was not sufficient publicly available evidence from neutral parties publicized within the first month immediately after the attacks to justify the requirement that the Taliban had to accept that OBL was responsible.
Doesn’t even matter because we already had the right and moral ground to demand his extradition based on the Cole and Embassy bombings. The ones he had already taken credit for. After that, 9/11 evidence was icing. And it wasn’t really in such short supply.
Second, they could have asked Osama. But they weren’t really looking for evidence, now were they?
“I’d rather the Taliban never come back to power. Am I willing to spend $1 trillion and multi-decade occupation on the gamble that we can set Afghanistan up such that this doesn’t happen?
Different answer.”
There is a place, at the intersection of our national security, the security of our international partners and the desires and needs of the individuals in a nation, where it becomes difficult not to say we should act. I believe Afghanistan was one of those instances, both previously and from the facts cited here.
The criteria is different each time based on those interests competing with the domestic interests, monetary constraints and military constraints in place at the time.
I believe we need to, working with the local government, define a specific set of achievable goals that, once achieved, allows us to turn full control and responsibility back over to a local government.
We have not set achievable goals in Afghanistan and, it seems, we have assumed eternal responsibility. Those goals should not include ensuring the safety and tranquility of Afghanistan forever. Nor should these goals include chasing down terrorist groups we can’t effectively find or fight.
The last lesson we learned from Vietnam, or I thought we had, was that we should not pretend to represent the “people” in a country we have invaded. They see us as the cause of the ravages of war, no matter how high mindedly we think of our goals.
In the end, their most fervent hope is that we will go away. Perhaps preferably when they can defend themselves, but, even if they can’t, the war might end.
Setting specific criteria for when we might have the confluence of events that creates the decision to use that power again is challenging in this regard: We are trying, as evidenced here, to determine “What” might happen, what we will know publicly versus what the government might know, and the strategic and tactical weighting, at the time, of those drivers.
I prefer to start with the assumption that it is always a bad idea and hope that we are never faced with a reason that is important enough to override that assumption.
“I would say ‘make sure Taliban doesn’t return to power’ would be a central corollary of ‘supporting an alternate government within reason’.”
Two points:
a) “within reason” plays a key role in this sentence, and more closely defining what “within reason” means is the center of the whole debate.
b) I’d narrow “make sure Taliban doesn’t return to power” to “make sure a Taliban government willing to support attacks outside its bordersdoesn’t return to power” is closer to what our goals should be, if “within reason” for the larger goal isn’t very much within reason.
Otherwise, sucky as it is for Afghanis, they’re not in a much different place than the Burmese or Zimbabwese, or Somali, or a lot of other people around the world who live in terrible situations under terrible governments, or lack of them, are, but which we don’t propose to go in, occupy, and attempt to spend decades and trillions of dollars to nation-build.
Yes, we bear some special responsibilities in Afghanistan that we don’t in these other places. But there remain those “within reason” limits.
“I mean, do you think that Republicans circa early 2002 were confident that if the US military bugged out and the Taliban retook the country, they would not pay a serious political price?”
As Bush said, he had lots of political capital, and he intended to spend it. I don’t think fear of domestic political response had much to do with Bush administration decisions about Afghanistan; if they did, they would have been more of a factor when that administration began to shift resources out of Afghanistan to prepare for Iraq, and as they continued that process.
So I think that, yes, they could have withstood that political price, if they were of a mind to, which isn’t particularly relevant since they weren’t.
Since we’re talking hypotheticals, suggesting that another reasonable part of the hypothetical be part of the overall hypothetical is, um, reasonable. YMMV.
I think there’s an excluded middle in there.
“…My only point here is that if the policy you advocated was never politically feasible”
That’s your own conclusion. So, no, I don’t agree that “then your only choices are no-invasion or quagmire. Right?” follows. Sorry.
“Or are you saying that because OBL claimed responsibility for those attacks, that was sufficient evidence to assume that he was responsible for 9/11?”
I think that that, combined with plenty of other evidence in the public sphere, was sufficient for a reasonable person to give reasonable credibility to the then governmental claims regarding al Qaeda’s responsibility. As the facts, I think, turn out to have indisputably (in my view) proven that these claims were, in fact, true, I think such a conclusion was, in fact, reasonable, even if you either didn’t agree so then, or if you do not agree now.
“I’m just suggesting that maybe there was not sufficient publicly available evidence from neutral parties publicized within the first month immediately after the attacks to justify the requirement that the Taliban had to accept that OBL was responsible.”
Or maybe there was. Probably one of those things some people will have to agree to disagree about.
“Am I willing to spend $1 trillion and multi-decade occupation on the gamble that we can set Afghanistan up such that this doesn’t happen?”
I suppose I’m willing to support somewhere between $1 and $5 billion a year on the gamble, off the top of my decision-making input into Treasury decisions.
As the case for spending more cash, and more American troops, goes up, my skepticism rises in proportion.
Mind, those figures are off the top of my head; I’m willing to listen to arguments about other numbers, and am apt to back away when the discussion turns to general recommendations as to how the overall U.S. budget should be allocated, although, yes, I do think we could do with a tad less military spending.
General cite.
Marty, your 03:48 PM was very good. Kudos.
First, I’ve argued for deporting the Cuban terrorists to Cuba or Venezuela, so I’m consistent (argued in multiple posts on the subject).
Do you agree that Venezuela or Cuba would be justified in bombing the US for refusing to deport him?
First, yes, they probably justified some form of military incursion in their own right. They are acts of war. Second, because he claimed responsibility, the evidentiary standard is lowered.
I’m sorry, I still don’t understand what you’re saying here. OBL claimed responsibility for the Cole/Africa attacks. He disclaimed responsibility for 9/11. So, are you saying that because he claimed responsibility for the Cole/Africa attacks, we must assume that he’s guilty of any later attacks? And we must demand that other nations accept this presumption and bomb them if they don’t? Isn’t that…ridiculous?
This logic would never fly in criminal law. It seems kind of insane that we would have a much lower standard for arresting someone than for bombing and invading a country. I mean, shouldn’t sane people require high standards before going to war?
But that, coupled with the readily available evidence, and what we did include in our communiques, suffices because of the lower standard which attaches to an admitted and active terrorist.
Have you seen these communiques? I have not. Can you tell me where I can find them? I thought such things were still classified.
You keep talking about readily available evidence, but I don’t recall any at the time. Can you tell me what specific evidence you’re talking about that was (1) not sourced by the US government and (2) made available to the public within 4 weeks of the attacks?
Doesn’t even matter because we already had the right and moral ground to demand his extradition based on the Cole and Embassy bombings. The ones he had already taken credit for. After that, 9/11 evidence was icing. And it wasn’t really in such short supply.
So, any country has the right to bomb any other country in the world that refuses to deport a terrorist that has killed people? Is that right? That sort of thinking is appealing, but I’m not sure why you think it is compatible with international law.
Second, they could have asked Osama. But they weren’t really looking for evidence, now were they?
This is a non-sequitur. First, why do you think they didn’t. Secondly, even if they did, what does that tell us about anything? Do you have evidence proving that they did ask and that OBL told them the truth?
Do you agree that Venezuela or Cuba would be justified in bombing the US for refusing to deport him?
If he was actively planning further attacks on Cuba, and broadcasting that intention in the media, then yes. Not Venezuela because they have no moral privity.
I’m sorry, I still don’t understand what you’re saying here. OBL claimed responsibility for the Cole/Africa attacks. He disclaimed responsibility for 9/11. So, are you saying that because he claimed responsibility for the Cole/Africa attacks, we must assume that he’s guilty of any later attacks? And we must demand that other nations accept this presumption and bomb them if they don’t? Isn’t that…ridiculous?
No, I’m saying there was a lower standard, not that we “must assume” that he’s guilty. Or that “we must demand” that another nation accept such an assumption (which we shouldn’t make in the first place).
But that’s not even close to describing the situation. There was no paucity of evidence. Really.
So, any country has the right to bomb any other country in the world that refuses to deport a terrorist that has killed people? Is that right? That sort of thinking is appealing, but I’m not sure why you think it is compatible with international law.
It is compatible with international law! And no, not any country and any other country. A country that was attacked does have the right to attack militants in another country if and when those militants claim credit for the attack, and vow future attacks. It’s called self defense.
Can you tell me what specific evidence you’re talking about that was (1) not sourced by the US government and (2) made available to the public within 4 weeks of the attacks?
There was substantial evidence about Atta and the Hamburg Cell’s activities that was provided directly by the German govt. Actually, the US had scant evidence itself on these activities in Germany, and most of it came from the Germans. The Pakistanis also provided reams of evidence on the activities of al-Qaeda and the passing in and out of Af/Pak of the hijackers, as they were the ones most in the know. The Yemenis also cooperated with some info on those same comings and goings. You can do the research to see how much made it into the public sphere as specifically sourced to those countries. But either way, it’s not like the Taliban were fools. And that every other intel shop (even the Libyans!) in the world was swapping info on how AQ did it, but the Taliban couldn’t catch wind of it from anyone.
Really, it wasn’t a big mystery at the time. You make too much of this chin scratcher of a “whodunit.” It was obvious. And the obvious turned out to be obviously true.
Gary:
I’d narrow “make sure Taliban doesn’t return to power” to “make sure a Taliban government willing to support attacks outside its borders doesn’t return to power” is closer to what our goals should be, if “within reason” for the larger goal isn’t very much within reason.
Agreed.
I think that that, combined with plenty of other evidence in the public sphere, was sufficient for a reasonable person to give reasonable credibility to the then governmental claims regarding al Qaeda’s responsibility.
AQ was responsible. I assume we all agree on this point.
However, I’m not sure that there was sufficient credible evidence in the public sphere immediately after 9/11 to justify invading the Taliban. Can you point to any?
Again, the question is not: should a rational American believe that AQ was responsible for 9/11. The question is: did a rational non-American who distrusted the US government have such overwhelming evidence available to them publicly within 4 weeks of 9/11 that they would have to conclude that AQ was responsible for 9/11. So far, you and Eric have insisted this must be true without actually explaining why. If you have any evidence, I’d like to see it.
As the facts, I think, turn out to have indisputably (in my view) proven that these claims were, in fact, true, I think such a conclusion was, in fact, reasonable, even if you either didn’t agree so then, or if you do not agree now.
The fact that we now know that AQ was responsible does not prove that the Taliban acted irrationally or in bad faith for refusing to believe that in October 2001.
Or maybe there was. Probably one of those things some people will have to agree to disagree about.
Or, we could agree to believe in claims that have evidence behind them. Now, since I’m a pretty conservative sort who thinks that wars should not be waged when reasonable efforts can prevent them, I’d suggest that the onus is on those insisting that war is justified.
Now, since the evidence was so overwhelming, if the US had acted reasonably, it would have only had to wait a month or so before launching the war. Then again, if it waited a month so that the Taliban could see OBL’s taped confession, there might not have been a need for a war. I’m not sure why it was so vitally important that the war begin precisely when it did (rather than a month later). I would think that avoiding unnecessary wars is so important that even a small chance of doing so would justify waiting a month in what turned out to be a decade long effort.
I believe we need to, working with the local government, define a specific set of achievable goals that, once achieved, allows us to turn full control and responsibility back over to a local government.
Doesn’t this sound awfully familiar? Weren’t there all these targets about how many units of the Iraqi army were going to be combat ready, and then we’d find a month after the target had nearly been met that actually they were just paper numbers?
The brutal fact is that a competent and non-corrupt government/military is not an achievable aim in Afghanistan. If you look at how long it has taken any country in the world to evolve a non-corrupt government system, we’re talking decades if not centuries. You’ve got to change an entire ruling class ethos.
I don’t know whether you could even get a reasonably competent (if brutal and corrupt) national army functioning in Afghanistan in the short term. How long did it take to build the Pakistini military, for example?
If you set targets for withdrawal it seems to me you then have three options: you can fake that you’ve achieved targets, you can set goals so minimal that you can pass them trivially (a ‘successful’ election, a paper-strength army) or you can prepare to stay there for decades.
The question is: did a rational non-American who distrusted the US government have such overwhelming evidence available to them publicly within 4 weeks of 9/11 that they would have to conclude that AQ was responsible for 9/11.
With those non-Ameircan’s being well aware that AQ had already:
1. Claimed responsibility for two terrorist bombings of US embassies in Africa
2. Claimed responsibility for bombing the USS Cole.
3. Vowed, publicly and repeatedly, to continue attacking the US.
4. Were training terrorist in training camps on Afghan soil with the blessing of the Taliban.
That changes a lot. It wasn’t an incident that occurred in a vaccuum. The allegations didn’t come out of left field. The Taliban knew they had a terrorist org committed to attacking the US training on their soil.
So, there was an Islamic terrorist org that had been attacking the US, vowed to keep attacking the US and then, a group of 19 Muslim hijackers attacked the US – hijackers that the Pakistanis, Yemenis, Germans and US all say passed through AQ camps in Af/Pak.
The Germans provided evidence that the hijackers were based in Hamburg and had contact with AQ.
And…what? We’re gonna quibble on the right evidentiary standard that applies to this? Feh.
Now, since the evidence was so overwhelming, if the US had acted reasonably, it would have only had to wait a month or so before launching the war.
There is credible evidence and argumentation that the US waited too long as is, and that in the process, key AQ members were able to escape. Time was most certainly of the essence.
Then again, if it waited a month so that the Taliban could see OBL’s taped confession, there might not have been a need for a war.
This, of course, operates under the very heavy assumption that the Taliban were perfectly willing to turn over bin Laden IF ONLY they felt comfortable with the evidence.
I’m not sure why I should believe this. After all, the Taliban already knew that AQ had attacked the US, was planning on attacking the US again, and was training and equipping on their soil in order to attack the US again.
But all that was OK until AQ actually did attack (again). And then they would have willingly turned them over?
“Now, since I’m a pretty conservative sort who thinks that wars should not be waged when reasonable efforts can prevent them, I’d suggest that the onus is on those insisting that war is justified.”
I’m not insisting. (I’m assuming we’re still talking about the decision in 2001 to invade Afghanistan.) I think you’re entitled to believe what you like. And you are entitled to think what you like about onus, too.
Allow me to dramatize the scenario:
US Govt: Hey, Mr. Taliban, you know that terrorist organization that has set up training camps in your country?
Taliban: You mean al-Qaeda?
US: Yeah. Well, you know how they’ve already conducted a series of terrorist attacks on us?
Taliban: Yeah. They brag about it all the time.
US: Using those same training camps that you’ve let them operate.
Taliban: Yeah, well, they put them to good use at least.
US: Well, it looks like they’ve done it again, on a massive scale, and now we’d like you to extradite the leaders of that terrorist group that’s been attacking us while training on your soil.
Taliban: Ah, but what evidence do you have that al-Qaeda was behind this terrorist attack against you?
I mean, Uncle Sam, I know they’ve done this to you before on multiple occasions in the past few years, and I know they’ve vowed to keep attacking you, and I know they’ve been training to attack you again in our country with our blessing…but…how can we be sure?
US: ?
There is credible evidence and argumentation that the US waited too long as is, and that in the process, key AQ members were able to escape. Time was most certainly of the essence.
I would prefer to occasionally let a few AQ members escape in exchange for reducing the probability of engaging in warfare. Our bungling of the war lead to many more AQ members escaping, so I’m not sure waiting would have constituted a significant loss compared with rushing to war and being incompetent.
This, of course, operates under the very heavy assumption that the Taliban were perfectly willing to turn over bin Laden IF ONLY they felt comfortable with the evidence.
As I said, this was a possibility not a certainty. I think that avoiding unnecessary wars is a sufficiently important goal that we should be prepared to make reasonable sacrifices in order to secure the possibility of avoiding a war. Don’t you agree in principle?
I’m not sure why I should believe this. After all, the Taliban already knew that AQ had attacked the US, was planning on attacking the US again, and was training and equipping on their soil in order to attack the US again.
Well, I imagine that the US might be perfectly willing to shelter Carriles so long as he kept his terrorism to small scale activities but might be willing to hand him over if he started playing in the big leagues. Does that seem strange to you?
But all that was OK until AQ actually did attack (again). And then they would have willingly turned them over?
I mean, the US was not so perturbed by the Cole/Embassy bombings as to cut off the Taliban from their opium eradication funding, were they? Or do I have the dates mixed up?
Eric, why are the training camps relevant at all? So far as I know, the training camps were not needed for 9/11. I’m not even sure they were used. Now if AQ members engaged in a bunch of gun fights in the US using weapons skills they practiced at the camps, I could see the relevancy, but that didn’t actually happen.
Turbo: the camps are useful for providing a central location for networking, collecting money, indoctrination, testing loyalty, testnig commitment, further radicalization. They are not essential, but they help.
But I don’t get your point anyway. Should we not be bothere by countries allowing AQ to set up camps in their country because 9/11 could have been pulled off without a training camp?
Well, I imagine that the US might be perfectly willing to shelter Carriles so long as he kept his terrorism to small scale activities but might be willing to hand him over if he started playing in the big leagues. Does that seem strange to you?
The embassy bombings were the big leagues. And Carriles played in the big leagues too.
Our bungling of the war lead to many more AQ members escaping, so I’m not sure waiting would have constituted a significant loss compared with rushing to war and being incompetent.
I don’t think waiting would have helped at all. What would have happened? Those that escaped would have escaped anyway, only more. We didn’t lose some because we rushed, we lost some because we didn’t want to commit too many ground forces at Tora Bora, and so we trusted the Pakistanis. Not rushed, just poor judgment.
I’d also point out that the Taliban government, 6 months before 9/11, had destroyed the Bamiyam statues of Buddha. Recalling that there were only 3 governments that recognized the Taliban, Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, if the Taliban were simply innocent bystanders, they left themselves in a pretty bad position.
“we lost some because we didn’t want to commit too many ground forces at Tora Bora”
As I recall. there was debate as to how many U.S. ground forces were practically available to deploy then and there. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen an absolutely definitive answer to that point. (And I’m about to go out to pick up prescriptions and do other shopping, so won’t be looking for one at present.)
Allow me to dramatize the scenario:
Bush: We need to bomb the @#$!@ out of someone. How about Afghanistan?
Cabinet: OK
Powell: Um, shouldn’t we make a pretense of negotiation before we start bombing…you know, just to help get international support and shut the Pope up?
Cheney: No. The last thing we want is for them to give us Osama. We need to send a message.
Rummy: Also, I’ve got these awesome theories about how we can crush any country in the world using only a toothpick, some tin foil, a silver dollar and my own brilliance. We gotta put that @#% on display. How else will people recognize my brilliance?!
Powell publicly offered to give the Taliban a dossier proving that OBL was responsible for 9/11 but then publicly backed away.
Really Eric, we could both write cute little made up dramatizations all day, but I don’t think it advances the discussion.
Really Turbo?
But yours is not based at all in fact, whereas nothing I wrote departed from known facts. For example:
1. al-Qaeda had camps in Afghanistan.
2. The Taliban knew and permitted that.
3. al-Qaeda had attacked the US on multiple occasions while using those camps.
4. The Taliban knew and permitted that.
5. al-Qaeda vowed to continue attacking the US, while using those training camps.
6. The Taliban knew and permitted that.
What material facts, exactly, did I make up? None actually. I advanced the discussion by illustrating just how absurd it is to think that we would need to provide beyond a reasonable doubt type evidence to the Taliban given the circumstances.
Yours, on the other hand, makes several assertions that are either known to be false, or not supported by any known facts. Thus, not very helpful.
For example:
1. Bush didn’t want to bomb Afghanistan first, he and his cabinet were interested in Iraq. Tony Blair convinced them of the need to take on al-Qaeda first.
2. Cheney was never frightened that they would hand over Osama. This is a complete fabrication – unless you’re privvy to some intel that is not commonly known.
In fact, the only thing you got right was Rummy’s theory on war, but that wouldn’t have mattered since Rummy was going to be in charge regardless of the steps taken before the war.
But other than that, yeah….good, um, point.
Gary:
One of them was Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis, the commander of some 4,000 marines who had arrived in the Afghan theater by now. Mattis, along with another officer with whom I spoke, was convinced that with these numbers he could have surrounded and sealed off bin Laden’s lair, as well as deployed troops to the most sensitive portions of the largely unpatrolled border with Pakistan. He argued strongly that he should be permitted to proceed to the Tora Bora caves. The general was turned down. An American intelligence official told me that the Bush administration later concluded that the refusal of Centcom to dispatch the marines – along with their failure to commit U.S. ground forces to Afghanistan generally – was the gravest error of the war.
link
“Allow me to dramatize the scenario”
Except that we have a bunch of accounts of what actually happened from people who were entirely unsympathetic to most everything else Bush did, such as Richard Clarke, Lawrence Wilkerson, the folks who talked to Ron Suskind, Steve Coll, Jane Mayer, and so on, so I’m not following why we should ignore a well-documented set of matching accounts from a variety of people who seem unlikely to have colloborated in a false account that’s overall incredibly unflattering to Bush.
Eric, although I’m inclined to dispute a number of your statements regarding my little dramatization, I don’t think arguing about fictional plays advances the discussion. As I explained earlier.
To move the discussion back to something both concrete and relevant, would you mind answering the questions I raised earlier, specifically:
I am indeed very curious about your sources for information on these mysterious communiques.
“To move the discussion back to something both concrete and relevant, would you mind answering the questions I raised earlier….”
I’ll go back earlier in the discussion, where you asked:
“The question is: did a rational non-American who distrusted the US government have such overwhelming evidence available to them publicly within 4 weeks of 9/11 that they would have to conclude that AQ was responsible for 9/11.”
And I’ll point out that we had been demanding of the Taliban that they hand over bin Laden, and engaged in fruitless negotiations with them, since the Clinton administration.
September 11th was just the final trigger to jump ahead to the military contingency, rather than continue the combination of not-quite-engaging-in covert attacks that were planned and canceled at the last minute, and negotiating with the Taliban.
As I’ve pointed out, there are books and books and books about all this. Coll, Clarke, Suskind, and so on. Plenty of additional testimony in public by various involved figures, as well (Richard Haas is another I failed to mention). I don’t know if you’ve read any of the relevant books, but if not, I recommend you do.
“I’d narrow “make sure Taliban doesn’t return to power” to “make sure a Taliban government willing to support attacks outside its borders doesn’t return to power” is closer to what our goals should be, if “within reason” for the larger goal isn’t very much within reason.”
We may very well not do justice to this discussion*, and I don’t have as long as I’d hoped, but here’s my attempt:
First, considering the relative youth of the Taliban government and the other powers available, it’s not unreasonable to seek out making sure they don’t rise again to power. (Though, sadly, it seems it is unreasonable to expect a new government that is a huge improvement on civil rights, even if it may not be possible to do worse.)
More importantly, even if a renewed Taliban government was unwilling to repeat its mistakes, it would be a weaker disincentive to other nations who may be so inclined.
It’s the difference between saying “if your regime harbors international terrorists who attack the US, you may find yourselves fighting for its survival, and you won’t want to do it again even if you win” and “if your regime harbors international terrorists who attack the US, it will cease to exist“.
I think that it’s enough of a difference to be worth the effort, but I could certainly see points being made against them. Though I’d still enjoy reading them.*
*(for another post, perhaps?)
“First, considering the relative youth of the Taliban government and the other powers available, it’s not unreasonable to seek out making sure they don’t rise again to power.”
“Taliban” covers a wide variety of factions; I don’t think it’s helpful to consider everyone who might willingly describe themselves as “Taliban” as a unitary collective of like mind on all matters of significance.
That would be confusing the label with the reality. Everyone who is Taliban is not Mullah Omar.
I think it’s more useful to, if we’re going to, discuss which Taliban factions and individuals one wishes to refer to, rather than “the Taliban government” as if it once, let alone now, consists of a single collective mind, which it never did, let alone that they’re considerably more factionalized and divided than ever today.
The current Afghan government has been negotiating with various “Taliban” factions, tribal groupings, families, and individuals, and giving amnesties to some, and reach agreements with some, and not with others. It behooves us to differentiate at least as much as they do.
Even some of the most senior, and repellent, factions have reportedly engaged in negotiations.
Good general rule of thumb in life: whenever a discussion turns to discussion of a They or a Them, start asking specifically whom you’re talking about. It’s pretty rare to find that whomever is being referred to are Borg.
(Note: this refers to “the U.S. government” as much as any other They.)
A memorable example of a former Taliban, to demonstrate optimistic possibilities.
“It’s the difference between saying “if your regime harbors international terrorists who attack the US, you may find yourselves fighting for its survival, and you won’t want to do it again even if you win” and “if your regime harbors international terrorists who attack the US, it will cease to exist”.”
Translated point: it’s worth a trillion dollars to be this guy:
“I don’t think it’s helpful to consider everyone who might willingly describe themselves as “Taliban” as a unitary collective of like mind on all matters of significance.”
A well taken point. Wish I had time to go into it more.
“Translated point: it’s worth a trillion dollars to be this guy:”
Uh, which guy?
It’s the difference between saying “if your regime harbors international terrorists who attack the US, you may find yourselves fighting for its survival, and you won’t want to do it again even if you win” and “if your regime harbors international terrorists who attack the US, it will cease to exist”.
The US government faced a choice between a quick withdrawal that might have permitted the Taliban to retake the country and a grueling, seemingly indefinite fight to eliminate the Taliban. For the moment at least, it has chosen the latter. But the message that has been sent is not “because you attacked the US, we will make you cease to exist” but rather “because you attacked the US, we will try to make you cease to exist, but we will prove that the US government is really really really incompetent and will thus mostly demonstrate how little you have to fear.”
This is one of the problems of signaling as described in modern international relations theory. You might think your actions unambiguously signal a particular message to your adversaries, but in reality, they may interpret a very different message. Right now, non-state actors might very plausibly interpret the US as signaling:
(1) the US lacks the financial and military capability to seriously invade other countries for many years because it will be bogged down in Afghanistan for the next 5-10 years,
(2) one can easily goad the US to act in irrational ways that cause it to expend vast sums of money and resources at very small costs
Neither of these messages is really consistent with the message that you (Point) suggested we were broadcasting, namely that committing acts of terrorism that kills Americans ensures your elimination. The more we commit ourselves to staying in Afghanistan no matter the cost, the more we incentivize other actors to attack the US. Those incentives promote more attacks against Americans rather than fewer.
Right now, non-state actors might very plausibly interpret the US as signaling…
We’re talking about bin Laden and guys like him, right? Are these really “incentives” kind of guys?
the US lacks the financial and military capability to seriously invade other countries for many years because it will be bogged down in Afghanistan for the next 5-10 years
And yet we had the money and the time to fuck with Iraq on the side. Which we’re now leaving. Funny that.
We’re talking about bin Laden and guys like him, right? Are these really “incentives” kind of guys?
I meant to include “and national governments that might assist them” in that sentence.
Beyond that, Point was the one who introduced the notion of signaling and reputation effects as a justification for staying in Afghanistan. I’d suggest you take it up with him. My only point is that if you think signaling bolsters the case for staying in Afghanistan, then a serious look at IR theory should convince you that signaling bolsters the case for NOT staying there indefinitely. If you think that signaling and reputational concerns don’t make sense in this context, I respect that, but your dismissal of signaling must be symmetric: you can’t reject signaling when it suggests we should leave but accept it when it says we should stay.
And yet we had the money and the time to fuck with Iraq on the side. Which we’re now leaving. Funny that.
Not really. The Chinese government had the money to loan us to engage in that little adventure, and even then, we were unable to completely pacify Iraq. And what little we did required us to dramatically lower the standards of our own military. The sheer number of officers and NCOs that have left the military because of Iraq suggests that our “fucking with Iraq” has massive costs that we’ll be paying for years to come. Good NCOs don’t grow on trees. When you drive out the ones you have, well, you’re left with nutty ideas like automatically promoting everyone every year or two whether they deserve it or not.
Turb
I think you* may be confusing the Taliban and other state and/or quasi-state actors — which I’m talking about — with Al Qaeda and other similar non-state actors.
So TBC — at 8:33, I was not talking about dis-incentivizing terrorist organizations, but regimes that would give them sanctuary.
Now I happen to think that’s one of the more important things you can deprive ambitious international terrorist networks like AQ of. FWIW, Eric disagrees. You might also. We’ve discussed this point — the importance of sanctuaries — on previous threads.
But the point remains that I was talking about “regimes”, who are subject to the logic of international relations. Not Al Qaeda.
*Of all people! (not to put to fine a point on it…)
And as soon as I get it posted, you give a correction — damn you hypertext!
All I really have time to say right now to clarify is:
I wouldn’t lump together the incentives for AQ and those for the Taliban. These are different organizations, ISOE.
Oh well, until next time…
Point, see my previous correction at 10:07. I would appreciate it if you could explain why we should remain in Afghanistan when doing so signals other regimes and non-state actors that the US has extremely limited ability to project military power (compared to its pre Iraq/Afghanistan state) and can be easily manipulated into acting against its own interest. Or, are you willing to withdraw your claims about the benefits of signaling resulting from our spending another decade or trillion dollars trying to eliminate the Taliban?
“Signalling” is an interesting way of looking at the problem, but it also means that the ‘signals’ are not solely directed at other opposing regimes and non-state actors, but also at regimes that are undecided and allied regimes as well as signalling to domestic audience(s). The signals sent to those groups must also be taken into account. In addition, as Gary has pointed out, the signals to the opposing regimes should not be considered as going to a single receipient, but a range of recipients, with their own rationales and agendas. I’d certainly agree that if signalling meant going it alone for another decade and another trillion dollars, it is not worth it. But a decade and a Marshall plan like amount (about 100 billion in adjusted dollars?), it might be worth it.
Heretical thought: to what extent does a Taliban resurgence conflict with actual Western interests?
To the extent that the Taliban do not simply function as a tribal militia for the most numerous tribe in Afghanistan, they have a Salafist ideology. Salafism has a lot of followers in the Muslim world right now, (al Qaeda follows the Salafist line, but so do many moderate Islamic resistance movements). As long as it has a wide appeal, Salafiam has the potential to pose a serious problem for the “West”. But if the Salafists have their way and fail in an impoverished and out of the way state (Afghanistan comes to mind), the allure of the ideology, and its ability to make converts who could make themselves a serious nuisance (say in Germany) diminishes.
It may seem cold to treat a nation of human beings as a test subject in this way, but given that so many of the people of the country in question want to try the experiment, and will in fact kill (us) to try it out, I think a pretty good, rational strategic argument exists for letting the Afghanis (or at least the Pashtuns) have what they want, and letting the rest of the world, particularly the Islamic world, learn from their experiences.
Turb: Obviously, I don’t have classified communiques, but Gary provided sources that are trustworthy.
And regardless, these facts are indisputable:
1. al-Qaeda had camps in Afghanistan.
2. The Taliban knew and permitted that.
3. al-Qaeda had attacked the US on multiple occasions while using those camps.
4. The Taliban knew and permitted that.
5. al-Qaeda vowed to continue attacking the US, while using those training camps.
6. The Taliban knew and permitted that.
Then 9/11 happened. Under those circumstances, the Taliban were not in a position to demand rock solid evidence that the latest terrorist attack was an al-Qaeda attack. All the US had to do was provide a prima facie case, or none at all – just based on the Cole and the embassies, we were in a position to demand extradition.
Thems the breaks. They shouldn’t have harbored al-Qaeda and let them operate and maintain training camps while conducting numerous attacks on the US and swearing repeatedly to keep attacking the US.
That’s how you get got.
“Thems the breaks. They shouldn’t have harbored al-Qaeda and let them operate and maintain training camps while conducting numerous attacks on the US and swearing repeatedly to keep attacking the US.”
I will just throw into this conversation that it is different to:
1) harbor, or refuse to extradite, a few terrorists, or
2) to allow the terrorists to run training and international command and control from within your borders.
One of these is not like the other. Most of the comparisons I have seen in this thread seem to miss the difference. Disrupting the enemies planning, command and control is a basic tenet of effective response when attacked.
The “moral” ambiguity in this case is relatively small. It seems to be one of the few times we had the justification to go in, take out what we could, disrupt the enemy and just leave. As we should today.
Good point Marty
Marty makes a perfectly valid point here. For decade, Syria has harbored political leaders of Hamas, and has had a history of allowing other “non-working” former Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists/leaders/politicians to reside in Syria (as well as themeselves engaging in state terrorism against Lebanon, but that’s a limited and somewhat different question, and the Syrian-Hezbollah relationship should be its own topic).
Similarly, Iraq also allowed formerly active terrorists against Israel, plus members of Hamas, as well as Abu Nidal, as well as a few who acted against the U.S., such as Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was involved in the 1993 attack on the U.S. (Ramzi Yousef, another plotter of that attack, allegedly arrived in the U.S. with an Iraqi passport, but that’s a matter of dispute, particularly as to whether he ever resided in Iraq), to reside in Iraq prior to our 2002 invasion.
But in both cases of Syria and Iraq, none of the terrorists residing in those countries were themselves sufficient reason for the U.S. to go to war against these countries (setting aside the continued quasi-war against Iraq that the U.S. enaged in post-1991 through 2002, which was over other issues); we restrained ourselves to diplomatic responses of protests and sanctions and the like. We didn’t believe that harboring terrorists, or former terrorists, or people who continued politically to support terrorist, but that weren’t actively engaging in terrorism against U.S. citizens or facilities, a reason to invade. (The issues between Israel and these groups, and Hezbollah, and Hamas, are a separate issue and history.)
Then September 11th and the Bush administration Changed Everything, and the Bush Doctrine of preventive war was inaugurated, as well as Cheney’s 2% Doctrine.
These were mistakes.
And, of course, we reached diplomatic solutions with Libya, and at least half-seemed/half-mutually-pretended to have done so with Pakistan, which at least seems to have done its part in keeping their own Taliban and Islamic terrorists from striking U.S. forces, civilians, and facilities, outside the Afghan/Pakistan arena. (Though not issuing such restraint as regards India, to be sure.)
Then there’s the fascinating case of Victor Bout, arms dealer whom Thailand continues to refuse to extradite to the U.S. despite among his many dealings being some allegedly supplying the Taliban.
We’re not threatening to bomb Thailand, are we?
I’ve missed any threats to bomb Great Britain, as well.
@John Spragge:
As I brought up in the later thread: um, no. The Taliban movement is not a Salafi movement. It shares doctrinal points with Salafism, but it also includes more than a little local “innovation”. You can pooh-pooh this as nitpicking, but you’re talking about collective identity within fundamentalist religious movements. A group of “heretics” failing at a goal that others in a related movement share is hardly a sure bet to ruffle the confidence of said others.
To stretch for an analogy, it’s as if you argue that the attack on the Branch Davidians in Waco in ’93 seriously undermined Dominionist credibility regarding the illegitimacy of “secular” American government.