by Eric Martin
In October 2005, I first plagiarized borrowed from publius the concept of "vectors" to describe the sought after cross-sectarian/ethnic political alliances that could be formed by the Iraqi electorate. These vectors are desirable because they would indicate that the Iraqi electorate was eschewing communal-based, factional politics that almost inevitably leads to instability or democratically enabled tyranny – a heavy-handed rule of the majority. Unfortunately, the Iraqi people have done just the opposite: they have tended to vote communally, with each sectarian/ethnic constituency voting for similar parties/blocs with little, if any, crossover. This voting pattern has reinforced and exaggerated the sectarian/ethnic identification which has fueled certain of Iraq’s multiple insurgencies and civil wars.
There are several causes for the centrifugal forces pulling voters into electoral enclaves: First, it is a typical human reaction to fear, anxiety and lawlessness (each available in ample amounts during and after the US invasion). This is especially true in, though not exclusive to, a society that still has a vital tribal component. Second, political/social/religious developments in Iraq in the decades preceding the invasion had exacerbated sectarian/ethnic divisions while empowering resistance movements and groups that tended to organize around such totems, and so these groups were best positioned to fill the vacuum post-invasion. Finally, decisions by the Bush administration to organize the Iraqi government around a confessional power sharing arrangement, aka the "Lebanon Model," further entrenched these modalities.
Nevertheless, there have been recurring predictions that a new political consensus would emerge, one organized around the principle of Iraqi nationalism rather than religion or ethnic identity. Thus far, however, those predicting the imminent emergence of such a cohesive, non-sectarian, nationalist vector have been disappointed. Nevertheless, there are signs that a recent coalescence of disparate groups could establish the framework for such a conglomeration going forward.
As Reidar Visser argues, the recent scuttling of the provincial elections law represented a victory for a nationalistic, cross-sectarian bloc (with Sunni and Shiite groups – including the Sadrists and even some Badr!) prevailing over the entrenched powers most committed to the fragmentation of Iraq into semi-autonomous regions (ISCI, the Kurds and some of Dawa). Recall, the law could not be passed largely because the Kurds (and their staunch allies, ISCI) would not agree to a Kirkuk power-sharing arrangement inserted into the elections law. Visser:
Yesterday’s failure of the Iraqi parliament to pass the provincial elections law before the summer recess may well end up being blamed on Sadrists and other “recalcitrants” who refused to give up their principles and adopt a more “businesslike” attitude. Or, alternatively, as an AP headline puts it today, “Iraqi election bill falls to ethnic rivalry.” However, quite apart from issues related to Islamic radicalism or ethnic identities, first and foremost the parliamentary deliberations of the elections law exposed some of the fundamental weaknesses and contradictions of Pax Americana in Iraq. […]
…On the one hand, there was a broad alliance of parties that pushed the elections agenda forward, and insisted on the insertion of a timeline in the legislation that was adopted in February this year. This group featured cross-sectarian cooperation and participation by secularists as well as Islamists, with the key parties being the Sadrists (Shiite Islamist), Fadila (Shiite Islamist), Tawafuq (Sunni Islamist), al-Hiwar al-Watani (Iraqi nationalist, mostly Sunni) and Iraqiyya (nationalist, secular-leaning). Those who opposed the prospect of early elections [and the power sharing provision] were primarily the Kurdish parties and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, Shiite Islamist), with some support from the Daawa party of Iraqi premier Nuri al-Maliki.
So, with the fault lines established (more on those fault lines here), Visser examines the common platforms:
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