by hilzoy
Bill Roggio has a story today called “Released Guantanamo detainee behind March suicide truck bombing at Combat Outpost Inman in Mosul”. The bombing itself is a few months old, and got some press at the time. From the Boston Globe:
“Pentagon officials yesterday said Ajmi, who was among more than 500 former Guantanamo inmates who have been released or transferred to other countries, was a dramatic reminder of the danger in releasing those who are avowed terrorists – even to US allies who promise to ensure they will not pose a future threat.”
Several months ago, I hadn’t just read the Seton Hall report on released detainees. But now that I have, I recognized the story. It’s a bit more complicated than those Pentagon officials make it sound.
“While Justice Scalia is clearly wrong about the number of detainee recidivists, his larger point seems to be that the Government, not the courts, should be trusted with separating the sheep from the goats. However, one of the greatest ironies of the whole recidivism debate is that not a single detainee has been released as a result of habeas corpus. All recidivists have been released by the Department of Defense, which has never explained why it released such individuals to “return to waging war” against us. Any assessment of the relative strengths of judicial and political processes should be made with full awareness of the story of ISN 220 [Ajmi], who “returned to the fight” not as the result of any judicial ruling but rather because of a decision made by the political appointees at the Department of Defense who released him despite the objections of the military. (…)
The Combat Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) declared ISN 220 to be an enemy combatant. See Appendix 2. The Tribunal held that he was a “fighter for” the Taliban who engaged in “hostilities” against either the United States or its coalition partners. The Tribunal based its first finding that ISN 220 was a Taliban fighter on two incidents. First, he went AWOL from the Kuwaiti military so that he could travel to Afghanistan to participate in the Jihad. Second, the Taliban issued ISN 220 an AK-47, ammunition, and hand grenades. With respect to the latter finding, the Tribunal considered allegations of five events to conclude that ISN 220 engaged in hostilities: he admitted that he fought with the Taliban in the Bagram area of Afghanistan; the Taliban placed him in a defensive position to block the Northern alliance; he spent eight months on the front line at the Aiubi Center in Afghanistan; he participated in two or three fire fights against the Northern Alliance; and he retreated to the Tora Bora region, and was later captured while attempting to escape to Pakistan.
Less than a year after ISN 220’s CSRT, on May 11, 2005, the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Defense affirmed the CSRT assessments and decided that ISN 220 should be further detained. See Appendix 3. Even with the extraordinary redaction of the Review Board’s report, ample evidence apparently existed for these assessments and the recommendation for continued detention. Specifically, a Government memorandum prepared for the ARB identified three factors that favored continued detention for ISN 220: (1) he is a Taliban Fighter; (2) he participated in military operations against the coalition; and (3) he is committed to Jihad. Moreover, the ARB primarily relied upon two factual bases for its conclusion that ISN 220 was committed to Jihad:
1. [ISN 220] went AWOL [from the Kuwaiti military] because he wanted to participate in the jihad in Afghanistan but could not get leave from the military.
2. In Aug 2004, [ISN 220] wanted to make sure that when the case goes before the Tribunal, they know that he is a Jihadist, an enemy combatant, and that he will kill as many Americans as he possibly can. (Emphasis added). (…)
While the documents which have been released strongly suggest that ISN 220 should still be detained, there are no available records indicating why he was released or who is responsible for the release. The only thing that can be said with assurance is that, Justice Scalia to the contrary notwithstanding, no federal judge is responsible. Perhaps if the process were more transparent, such a grave mistake would not have been made.”
So: Ajmi was captured on a battlefield. He said he was there because he wanted to join the jihad. He also said that if released, he would kill as many Americans as possible. That means that the government had plenty of evidence that he was an enemy combatant, as alleged. And this evidence wasn’t somehow suspect; it was his very own statements.
All that habeas motions give a detainee is the right to ask: is the government holding me for a good reason? If the answer is ‘yes’, then the detainee goes back to jail. (That’s why there’s no problem with allowing Osama bin Laden habeas rights: there’s more than enough evidence to hold him either as an enemy combatant or on any number of straightforward criminal charges, like murder.) In Ajmi’s case, the military seems to have had excellent reasons for thinking that Ajmi was an enemy combatant. Had he been allowed to file a habeas motion, he would probably have been sent back to jail.
The only reason why he might have been released is if all the evidence against him was produced under torture. That seems unlikely, given that some of the evidence that he was an enemy combatant was his having been captured at Tora Bora. But even if that were true, it would indicate not a problem with our legal system, but with this administration’s use of torture, which defied not only basic moral norms, but also the requirements the government should have followed if it wanted to convict actual terrorists in a court of law.
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