by publius
One other quick point about the “alternative” Iraq legislation being drafted by people like Salazar and Warner/Lugar. One of the common themes I’m seeing in the alternatives is that they would “redefine” the mission. Specifically, the early reports are that their legislation would “transition . . . the mission to training and counterterrorism.”
Sounds good at first glance. But here’s the problem. What exactly would that change? Let’s say this redefining legislation gets passed. Bush can change nothing by simply saying that all operations are already “counterterrorist.” In fact, the entire war could be (and is) justified on those grounds even today.
The larger point is that the Senators need to think through whether their legislation would actually do anything. They also need to understand that you pass legislation with the President you have. Anything short of not forcing a real change is simply endorsing endless, unchanging war.
FYI – you got this double posted.
thanks – fixed.
As commenters on this site and elsewhere have pointed out, it’s actually counterproductive to train soldiers who are going to be fighting a civil war in a sectarian militia 3 months after we leave. Unless, of course, we are willing to pick a side in that war and stick to it, but we clearly aren’t.
On second thought, I suppose a plan that involves training the security forces of a government that is de facto Shi’ite IS picking sides in the civil war. Remind me why it serves American interests to empower a Shi’ite theocracy in the Middle East? I suppose it could be useful to have some Shi’ite friends for a change…
Shiite friends that would become Shiite enemies if we attacked Iran.
Sigh.
Old school thread watch….
They could amend the UCMJ to provide that it’s illegal for any U.S. servicemember to be in Iraq after such and such a date, with 20 years in prison being the penalty for noncompliance.
Old School thread watch.
In this corner, weighing in at 110 pounds and pushing 89 years of age and the recent recipient of a brand new plastic hip, Joseph “Blue” Polaski.
Maybe the goal isn’t to put one side or another into a position to win. Maybe the goal is to leave them both strong enough to keep fighting.
And I’m sure Saudi Arabia appreciates that its homegrown malcontents are all running off to fight Shiite infidels across the border instead of staying home and blowing up parts of Saudi Arabia.
On second thought, I suppose a plan that involves training the security forces of a government that is de facto Shi’ite IS picking sides in the civil war.
Given that 60% of the population is Shia — 75% if they cut the Kurdish north loose — does it matter whether we pick sides in a civil war? We know which side is going to win, the only question is how ugly it’s going to be. Or, we could be playing to keep there from being any winner, but that’s just ugly in a different sort of way.
Seems like if this was the case invading was even a bigger mistake than I thought.
But to me, it’s not at all clear which side would win. The side with a numeric advantage? Or the side with a lot of highly trained and experienced military leaders, intelligence specialists, etc…
I agree with Davebo, and add that the second side also had considerable control over the Iraqi munition supplies prior to our invasion, and likely walked away with the lion’s share of them.
thank you cleek. unintended, but appreciated humor.
The side with a numeric advantage? Or the side with a lot of highly trained and experienced military leaders, intelligence specialists, etc…
The Confederacy had all of that, and were fighting merely for the limited goal of secession, not conquest, and they STILL lost b/c of the numerical/manufacturing power disadvantage. Nor, myths to the contrary, was that because Grant was a brilliant leader. It was because he could afford to soak up losses equivalent to the entire Army of Northern Virginia in a mistake like invading through the Wilderness, and come back to fight another day.
So, yeah, if it’s a war, the Sh’ia (do I have the ‘ in the right place?) will win. But “win” in this case probably means genocide. In fact, the only advantage I can see to the US picking the Sh’ia side forthrightly is that it’s the one thing that might scare the Sunni enough to make them give up instead of fighting on until the Sh’ia are so pissed off that genocide is inevitable. Assuming it’s not too late for that, that is.
Harry Reid and publius share metaphors:
(Reid, about the Salazar amendment)
Given that 60% of the population is Shia — 75% if they cut the Kurdish north loose — does it matter whether we pick sides in a civil war?
There’s some question about the census.
Saddam claimed there were more sunnis and fewer shia than that. I don’t remember his claim now, something like 35% sunni arab and 50% shia arab.
The CIA World Factbook published figures like yours, perhaps based on a rather hypothetical public study, or maybe they knew something. It makes sense Saddam would want to tilt the numbers his way.
Recent pollsters have tended to actually find more like 30% sunni arabs and 55% shia arabs, with around 12% kurds and 3% other. Their results for the whole country depend on their estimates of the populations of the different provinces, which might also be wrong.
Clearly it makes a difference whether the ratio of shia to sunni is 3:1 or less than 2:1.
I would guess that available military technology for iraqis would tend to favor the defense. The shia army officially has no artillery. They will have 100 tanks, a quarter of them obsolete T55s and the rest obsolete T77s, all susceptible to shaped charges. They will have 800 other armored vehicles of a variety of types, some of them presumably less susceptible to IEDs etc than the tanks. Then they have a lot of trucks and a lot of security-trained infantry, with inadequate logistics.
I expect with that they can destroy a lot of sunni towns, but it would be real expensive. Or maybe they could dig up a lot of artillery we don’t know about. But without artillery and airstrikes, and without the best armor in the world, I’d much rather be on the side that waits and shoots at the guys who’re crossing flat land closing in on your dug-in positions, than be on the offense. I think it makes sense for shia armies to stay away from sunni population centers except the few that have such value it’s worth it to drive the sunni population out for good.
On the other hand, most of iraq depends on imported food, and the last I heard most of that food came from the southern ports. If the shias wanted to starve out the sunnis, what then? The sunnis could try to bring in food overland from the west. And if the USAF was still bombing smugglers on those borders, maybe most of the food wouldn’t get through.
Now say the kurds split and it turns out the sunnis are more than a third of the population instead of a quarter. In an honest unity government they’d have enough influence they could join and it wouldn’t be a surrender. They wouldn’t be in charge but they’d have a lot of say in things. It might turn out better for everybody than a war, and there’s a chance everybody would see that.
Is the outcome clear just from the census numbers? Not unless the census numbers are correct. They might be correct.
Nor, myths to the contrary, was that because Grant was a brilliant leader. It was because he could afford to soak up losses equivalent to the entire Army of Northern Virginia in a mistake like invading through the Wilderness
Invading through the Wilderness wasn’t a mistake–should he have tried a frontal assault on Fredricksburg, instead? Or divided his forces to both cover Washington and invade through the Peninsula, hoping Lee couldn’t manage to repeat the Seven Days and Second Bull Run?
The Wilderness could have been better executed tactically by the Army of the Potomac, but ultimately, as Grant and Lincoln recognized, a series of bloody battles with Lee’s army were going to have to be fought somewhere.
Our present day belief in cheap victory is a function of our technological superiority to most of our opponents, and even so, as Iraq demonstrates, is something of a delusion.