False Confessions

by Katherine

"And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures.

These procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods used — I think you understand why — if I did, it would help the terrorists learn how to resist questioning, and to keep information from us that we need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I can say the procedures were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary."

—President Bush, 9/6/06

As Human Rights Watch noted at the time, the President’s speech defending the CIA’s black sites, renditions, etc. "pointedly omitted mentioning the information obtained from Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, one of the first top suspects placed in CIA detention." This is probably because al-Libi is reported to have made false confessions under "tough interrogation" about ties between Iraq and al Qaeda that Colin Powell cited in his speech to the UN.

The Senate Intelligence Committee report on ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda contains some details about Shaykh al-Libi’s confessions and recantations that I don’t believe have been reported before today. Certainly I hadn’t read them.

This is from pp. 79-82 of the report; 82-85 of the PDF. Cites omitted, and I apologize in advance for transcription errors:

"In January 2004, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, the source of reports on al Qa’ida’s efforts to obtain CBW training in Iraq, recanted the information provided. Al-Libi said he had a "strong desire to tell his entire story and identify why and how he fabricated information since his capture." Al-Libi claimed that he fabricated "all information regarding al-Qa’ida’s sending representatives to Iraq to try to obtain WMD assistance." Al-Libi claimed that to the best of his knowledge al-Qa’ida never sent any individuals into Iraq for any kind of support in chemical or biological weapons, as he had claimed previously [REDACTED].

([REDACTED]) Al-Libi told CIA debriefers in January 2004 that when he was detained by the United States in early 2002 one of his American debriefers had told him that he had to tell "where bin Laden was and about future operations or the U.S. would give al-Libi to [another foreign service.]" [REDACTED] Al-Libi claimed that the debriefers told al-Libi that he would have to sleep on the floor of his cell if he did not talk. Later, according to al-Libi, debriefers repeated the threat to send al-Libi to a foreign country [REDACTED], instructed him to remove his heavy socks and gloves, and placed him on the floor of his cell. Although al-Libi was only on the cold floor for fifteen minutes, he claimed he "decided he would fabricate any information the interrogators wanted in order to gain better treatment and avoid being handed over to [a foreign government.] [REDACTED].

(U) According to al-Libi, after his decision to fabricate information for debriefers, he "lied about being a member of al-Qa’ida. Although he considered himself close to, but not a member of, al-Qa’ida, he knew enough about the senior members, organization, and operations to claim to be a member." "Once al-Libi started fabricating information," he claimed, "his treatment improved and he experienced no further physical pressures from the Americans."

([REDACTED]) After his transfer to a foreign government [REDACTED], al-Libi claimed that during his initial debriefings "he lied to the [foreign government service] [REDACTED] about future operations to avoid torture." Al-Libi told the CIA that the foreign government service [REDACTED] explained to him that a "long list of methods could be used against him which were extreme" and that "he would confess because three thousand individuals had been in the chair before him and that each had confessed."

([REDACTED]) According to al-Libi, the foreign government service [REDACTED] "stated that the next topic was al-Qa’ida’s connections with Iraq…This was a subject about which he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story." Al-Libi indicated that his interrogators did not like his responses and then "placed him in a small box approximately 50 cm x 50 cm." He claimed he was held in the box for approximately 17 hours. When he was let out of the box, al-Libi claims that he was given a last opportunity to "tell the truth." When al-Libi did not satisfy the interrogator, al-Libi claimed that "he was knocked over with an arm thrust across his chest and he fell on his back." Al-Libi told CIA debriefers that he then "was punched for 15 minutes."

(U) Al-Libi told debriefers that "after the beating," he was again asked about the connection with Iraq and this time he came up with a story that three al-Qa’ida members went to Iraq to learn about nuclear weapons. Al-Libi said that he used the names of real individuals associated with al-Qa’ida so that he could remember the details of his fabricated story and make it more believable to the foreign intelligence service. Al-Libi noted that "this pleased his [foreign] interrogators, who directed that al-Libi be taken back to a big room, vice [sic] the 50 square centimeter box and given food."

([REDACTED]) According to al-Libi, several days after the Iraq nuclear discussion, the foreign intelligence service debriefers [REDACTED] brought up the topic of anthrax and biological weapons. Al-Libi stated that he "knew nothing about a biological program and did not even understand the term biological." Al-Libi stated that "he could not come up with a story and was then beaten in a way that left no marks." According to al-Libi, he continued "to be unable to come up with a lie about biological weapons" because he did not understand the term "biological weapons."

(U) In February 2004, the CIA reissued the intelligence reporting from al-Libi to reflect the recantations."

The sources cited for this are "CIA operational cables" from 2/4/04, 2/5/04 and 2/19/04.

The report notes on page 108 (p. 111 of the PDF) that "The foreign government service denies using any pressure during al-Libi’s interrogation."

Based on previous news reports on al-Libi, the foreign government is probably Egypt. It sounds as if he was in CIA custody when he recanted his testimony in 2004, but it’s possible that he was speaking to CIA interrogators in a foreign prison.

Newsweek reported this June that al-Libi had most likely been transferred to Libya:

According to Numan bin-Uthman, a former fellow jihadi of al-Libi’s who has left the movement and is based in London, al-Libi was never a member of Al Qaeda at all. Moreover, Uthman says, he’s "90 percent sure" that al-Libi, who he says is dying of tuberculosis, has been released by the United States to Libya. (A CIA spokesman said he could not comment.) According to Uthman, al-Libi was a small-time member of a broader movement of jihadists who—inspired by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian killed during the CIA-backed mujahedin fight against the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—came to fight the Soviets in the 1980s and later, trained, to redirect jihad back to their home regimes. The so-called Khaldin camp that al-Libi helped run dated from this movement. "I know him personally. He’s not a member of Al Qaeda," Uthman, an anti-Kaddafi political activist who is considered credible by other Libyan exiles, told NEWSWEEK by phone from London.