by Eric Martin
In March of 2009, when the Obama administration was conducting a strategic review to determine the way forward in Afghanistan, the primary tension was between engaging in a long term, multi-decade COIN campaign, or beginning the disengagement and reconciliation process – which would, itself, take several years to play out.
Ultimately, Obama opted for an amalgamation of the two: increasing troop levels again (on top of an earlier increase), giving General Stanley McChrystal free reign to implement COIN tactics, but also setting an aspirational timeline for the commencement of withdrawal, and emphasizing the fact that the mission was not open-ended.
One read of the Obama administration's approach was that the surge of troops, and uptick in operations, was meant to shift momentum, and pressure the Taliban to seek reconciliation on terms more favorable to the coalition and Afghan government – to tilt the battlefield in our favor so that the Taliban were not negotiating from a position of strength (or refusing to negotiate altogether).
Although preferable to engaging in an extended COIN campaign, there have been numerous problems with this hybrid approach (more on those below), and the early results are not encouraging. Anand Gopal reports:
The US’ initial strategy was to talk and shoot—step up raids and targeted killings against insurgent commanders, while pressuring (or enticing) them to quit the fight. While officials spoke often about reconciliation, their terms—abandon the armed opposition and recognize the Afghan government and constitution—were those of surrender, the type a victor imposes on the vanquished. Talks with senior leaders (except when discussing a possible surrender) were strictly ruled out, and as recently as this summer the US was placing insurgent leaders known to have communicated with the Kabul government on terror black lists. Under the US plan, a more broad-based reconciliation process, involving the Taleban as a whole, as well as other sectors of society, would have to wait until the US military could recapture momentum on the battlefield.
But ten months into the new US approach to Afghanistan, shifting momentum has not come. Instead, 2010 is the bloodiest year on record for this war, with insurgent-initiated attacks through the first half of this year up by 60 per cent compared to last year, according to one tally; the Taleban have been able to replace commanders as quickly as they are killed; the reach of the insurgency and the area under their control is at its height; and showcase offensives meant to mark progress, like Marja, have failed.
One of the problems with this strategy is the fact that an increase in military activity (kinetic operations) can create more enemies in the long run through the inevitable killing of innocent civilians and non-combatants. As Matt Waldman explains in a thoughtful report based on interviews with Taliban/insurgent leaders:
Interviews suggest that the longer the conflict has gone on, the greater the significance and prevalence of this motivation [retaliation against coalition forces for military aggression]. One southern commander explained how an attack by foreign forces incited him to fight:
I am a landowner and was working on the land. I was not a Talib. But some years ago American special forces came and entered my home without my permission at night and killed my two sons, my father, and two uncles without any reason. Another time they did the same thing in another village in my district. When I saw their acts and knew they came only to kill us, not to help, I started fighting against them. They forced me to fight them and now I will continue to fight them so long as they are in Afghanistan.14
Another commander argued that “if international forces keep bombing and killing civilians not only the Taliban but also all the rest of the nation will fight them.”
In addition to swelling the ranks of insurgents through imprecise military action, intensifying the conflict serves to breed mistrust between the various factions that will, eventually, be expected to cease fighting, disarm and broach a peace agreement. Waldman again: