David Brooks says he has a scoop:
Last week, the Senate Democratic leader, Harry Reid, made an offer to head off a nuclear exchange over judicial nominations. Reid offered to allow votes on a few of the judges stuck in limbo if the Republicans would withdraw a few of the others.
But there was another part of the offer that hasn’t been publicized. I’ve been reliably informed that Reid also vowed to prevent a filibuster on the next Supreme Court nominee. Reid said that if liberals tried to filibuster President Bush’s pick, he’d come up with five or six Democratic votes to help Republicans close off debate. In other words, barring a scandal or some other exceptional circumstance, Reid would enable Bush’s nominee to get a vote and probably be confirmed.
We’ll assume that Brooks’ report is accurate (there’s no reason not to. Brooks (and Kevin Drum, who pointed me to this story) argue that Frist should’ve taken the deal:
… Frist should have grabbed Reid’s offer. He should have done it, first, because while the air is thick with confident predictions about what will happen if the nuclear trigger is pulled, nobody really knows. There is a very good chance that as the battle escalates, passions will surge, the tattered fabric of professionalism will dissolve, and public revulsion for both parties will explode.
….
Second, Frist should have grabbed this offer because it’s time for senators to re-establish the principle that they, not the outside interest groups, run the Senate. Right now, most senators want to avoid a meltdown. It’s the outside interest groups that are goading them into the fight.
Of course the groups want a fight. The activists get up every morning hoping to change the judiciary, dreaming of total victory. Of course they’re willing to sacrifice everything else for that cause. But senators are supposed to know that serving the interest groups is not the same as serving the people: it is serving a passionate but unrepresentative minority of the people. At some point, leaders are supposed to stand up to maximalists, even the ones they mostly agree with.
Finally, it’s time to rediscover the art of the backroom deal. … In this model, leaders of the two parties would get together – yes, often in secret – and make reasonable bargains. …
Drum, focusing on Brooks’ second point, adds:
I don’t often agree with Brooks these days, but I think he’s on target here. This is not a symmetrical situation β conservative activist groups are way farther off the deep end these days than liberal ones β but it’s still a good thought for both sides. Making every fight into a game of nuclear chicken isn’t the right way to run a country.
I agree with Brooks quite a bit more frequently than Drum, and I generally agree with Brooks here. But I think Drum is deluding himself if he thinks that "conservative activist groups are way farther off the deep end these days than liberal ones"; both are pretty damn off. What conservative activists have (and liberal activists lack) is a majority of sympathetic representatives in the current Congress.
A couple further thoughts, however:
First, the timing of this "leak" is suspicious — and undoubtably strategic. The Democrats must recognize that they lost the momentum on the issue with they rejected Frist’s deal, and they’re trying to get it back.
Second, it seems clear that Frist couldn’t take a "secret" deal on judges for the same reason that Reid wanted the deal to be "secret": If knowledge of the deal remained secret,* it’d look like Frist was outmaneuvered by the Democrats (again). Frist’s base would blow up. (Indeed, there have already been calls to dump Frist as majority leader.)
By making public Reid’s "secret" proposal, however, the groundwork might be laid for a real deal that ends this so-called "crisis." A public deal that guarantees an up-or-down vote on Bush’s next Supreme Court nominee is a deal worth taking. Frist should risk trusting Reid — not only because it could lead to progress on judges, but because that’s what statesmen do. If Reid reneges, there will be plenty of time for revenge.
UPDATE: Don Singleton, commenting on Reid’s offer, seems to relish the possibility of a showdown on Judges. I think he doesn’t realize how fundamentally risky such a showdown is for both sides. You just cannot predict the electorate’s behavior on an issue like this, and the views of each party’s "hard core" are likely to be out of step with the views of the center. Singleton shouldn’t be so sure that this debate will play out in (on this issue, "our"**) side’s favor. (See the Schiavo mess, for starters.)
Again, this battle is really for the Supreme Court — not for ten judges. A deal that gets an up or down vote on Bush’s Supreme Court nominee is a deal that’s worth taking. If Reid can bring his side to the table on this deal even after it’s public, Frist should take it. Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
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