Eric Martin

by Eric Martin

Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously quipped, "freedom is untidy" in response to questions about the looting and chaos that erupted in Iraq post invasion. In some sense, he was right, though not in the sense that he intended – that freedom leads to lawlessness.  Freedom and democracy, or at least elections, are messy in that they can yield unpredictable results in terms of ruling regime.* 

This is a lesson that the Bush administration has been slow to learn.  It has repeatedly failed to recognize, willfully or gullibly, that elections themselves are no guarantor that a given preferred candidate will prevail.  Shockingly, foreign constituents don’t always see eye to eye with the Bush team, and sometimes even elect parties/leaders that the Bush team is at odds with.  Frequently in fact.

This pattern of disappointment and surprise was duplicated in a series of elections in Iraq in which the Bush team expected, each time, a strong showing for Chalabi and Allawi (the former couldn’t muster enough votes for a single seat in parliament).  Then, against the advice of Israelis and its Palestinian allies alike, the Bush team insisted on holding the Gaza elections that were supposed to marginalize Hamas in favor of Fatah.  Hamas won big of course, an outcome that surprised few – except the Bush administration.  Later, the administration neglected building relationships with the eventual victorious candidates/parties in Pakistan under the assumption that Musharraff would perform well enough to hold on to power via the ballot box.  Wrong again.

In Iraq, one of those messy, unpredictable events is looming on the horizon yet again.  A prospect that must, by now, strike fear in the hearts of Bush administration policy makers.  The background goes something like this: The Sunni Awakenings/CLC groups, whose recent cooperation with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq has greatly reduced violence, have been demanding a voice in the political apparatus (they have none due to their prior boycott of elections).  In fact, they have threatened violence and a resumption of hostilities if they aren’t given a voice – via elections, or otherwise.

So the Bush administration has been pressuring the Iraqi government to hold regional elections out of fear that security gains will melt away if it loses its Sunni allies.  Problem is, our strongest Shiite allies in the Iraqi government, ISCI and Maliki’s Dawa party, have been steadily working to put off regional elections (including vetoing the most recent legislation before later withdrawing the veto) because those parties fear they will lose considerable ground to the popular Sadrist current (which also sat out the last round of regional elections in some areas).

The Bush team wishes to prevent a Sadrist ascendancy mostly due to that group’s opposition to the occupation and its position on foreign oil investment.  Quite a pickle.  So what to do?  To its credit, the administraiton is not repeating its past mistakes in terms of collecting/manipulating data that predicts victory for their candidates despite the preponderence of countervailing evidence.  Instead, the Bush administration has, at last, developed an appreciation of empirical evidence and adopted a proactive approach.

First, it supported a military campaign to expel the Sadrists from Basra, and weaken their position in Sadr city.  While successful in some limited sense, no military campaign can really defeat the Sadrists absent truly horrific levels of violence (it is a political/religious/social movement that numbers in the millions, and it is deeply ingrained in Iraqi society with a decades’ long history and a centuries’ long tradition).  Disruption is possible, however, in an effort to keep the Sadrist trend and its militia away from the vote casting/gathering/counting process. That might be enough to help ISCI/Maliki manipulate the results in their favor. 

Not wishing to take any chances, there has been recent talk of banning the Sadrist trend from participating in upcoming elections because, get this, that group has a militia.   Problem is, um, which political groups in Iraq don’t have militias.  Perhaps sensing the weakness of that justification, and fearing the widespread backlash that would result from de facto disenfranchisement, a third path has emerged, or re-emerged (which will likely rely on gains from the first prong above):

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by Eric Martin

Over at QandO, Bruce McQuain treats a Wall St Journal Editorial as a go-to source in terms of assessing the implications of the recently signed truce between the Sadrist trend and the Iraqi government (a truce, it should be pointed out, that has yet to fully take hold).  McQuain reacts to the editorial’s claim that, despite early press reports that called the truce a draw, Maliki was the big winner:

A draw? A draw, at least where I come from, doesn’t have one side imposing restrictions on the other side. This is dictating terms with the caveat that if they’re violated, the destruction of the other side will continue as it was before.

IOW, this "truce" says to the Mahdi Army, accept these conditions and stick with them or well [sic] give you no choice at all.

That interpretation is a bit one-sided (a shock, I know, considering how fair and balanced the WSJ editorial page usually is).  First of all, the Sadrists won concessions as well: as the editorial mentioned, there is to be less targeting of Sadrist members, requirements for police warrants prior to arrest, and provisions for limiting the use of US military personnel in Sadr City (more below).  Further, both sides, not just Maliki’s, are issuing warnings and caveats.  According to the only statement issued to date by Moqtada al-Sadr himself, the Mahdi Army’s compliance with the truce is contingent on a few factors:

In the event of commitment by this government to the clauses that have been signed by the brothers assigned by us under the seal of this office, then the faithful should commit to what is contained therein and comply with it. However [or "provided that"] there is formed a supervisory council for the implementation of the agreement, so as to protect the power [or honor] of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi resistance.

So if the government lives up to its end of the bargain, and a supervisory council is formed, the Sadrists will comply.  Sadr also contends that the truce limits use of the US military:

Where the above points [legitimate law-enforcement, searches and so on] require it, the government is the relevant party for determining what Iraqi force is required for the extension of security in the city, avoiding recourse to foreign forces.

The Sadrist current is also allowed to keep its small arms (and, in effect, its heavy arms too unless the Iraqi government forces can find and seize the heavier stuff – easier said than done).  All in all a mixed bag, with uncertainty surrounding the implementation, acceptance and durability of the cease-fire.  Not exactly the total victory advertised. 

McQ also gets tied into knots by the editoria’l’s claim that the truce signifies a defeat for Iran, as Iran was forced to accept Maliki as a "serious opponent" after it, allegedly, "invested heavily" in Sadr in order to take down Maliki:

As the WSJ points out, Iran had invested its interests in Sadr and the Mahdi Army. Iran, as it has discovered, backed the wrong horse. We’re now supposed to believe that Maliki will…suddenly cozy up to the country which had, directly, been threatening his leadership.

Hmmm.  You know, Iran has "invested heavily" in Maliki’s Dawa Party as well.  So much so, that it’s extremely unlikely that they’d be trying to take him down.  Some history:

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