Eric Martin

by Eric Martin

You might expect that after brash declarations like "Mission Accomplished" (2003), "last throes" Part I (2005), "last throes" Part II (2006), and Rich Lowry’s infamous "We’re Winning" cover photo and story (2005), Iraq war supporters would have developed a little healthy circumspection.  You could have assumed that after declaring every new development over the past 5+ years the turning point and pivot to victory (the killing of Uday and Qusay, capture of Saddam, handover from CPA to interim government, elections, constitution, etc), that a more mature and cautious "wait and see" approach would be the norm.  You would, of course, be wrong (you always are). 

John McCain on the campaign trail lets the American people in on the best kept secret: we’ve actually already won the Iraq war.  Who knew?

I repeat my statement that we have succeeded in Iraq, not we are succeeding we have succeeded in Iraq. The strategy has worked and we now have the Iraqi government and military in charge in the major cities in Iraq. Al Qaeda is on their heels and on the run… [emph. added]

Of course, it’s the kind of success that requires Americans to continue to fight and die in the war.  That’s already won.  And over. 

…but the success that we have achieved is still fragile and could be reversed, and it’s still – if we do what Sen. Obama wants to do, then all of that could be reversed and we could face again the chaos, increased Iranian influence and American loss and defeat.

Ah, sweet victory.  Still no definition of success or victory – but who cares, whatever it is, it’s ours!  And again, we see the absurd suggestion that Iranian influence has been lessened by our efforts to facilitate the consolidation of power by Iran’s main proxies, ISCI and Dawa.  Right.  But I’ll put that aside because now would be a good time to check in with the Kagans who, just last month, were telling us that we were "very close to succeeding."  One can only imagine the progress of their pollyanna:

All of the most important objectives of the surge have been accomplished in Iraq. The sectarian civil war is ended; al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been dealt a devastating blow; and the Sadrist militia and other Iranian-backed militant groups have been disrupted.

The sectarian war has ended?  Or is it just in its last throes (more on this below)?  What of the Iranian-backed political parties (ISCI, Dawa) that are getting stronger?  More important, what about that political reconciliation stuff that Bush and Petraeus said was the most important objective of The Surge, and without which, the various conflicts would eventually re-ignite?

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has accomplished almost all of the legislative benchmarks set by the U.S. Congress and the Bush administration. More important, it is gaining wider legitimacy among the population. The attention of Iraqis across the country is focused on the upcoming provincial elections, which will be a pivotal moment in Iraq’s development.

Wow.  That sets a new benchmark for mendacity.  Regarding provincial elections, the results are being cooked and, as such, will represent a "pivotal moment" the same way the last two rounds have – not so much.  As to the benchmarks being "accomplished," the Kagans (with Jack Keane, "KKK" for short – I kid) are, quite frankly, lying. 

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by Eric Martin

While I’m usually the one complaining about the neverending string of stories telling of Moqtada al-Sadr’s demise, which began in 2003 and continue to this day (with each new contribution showing little concern for the unbroken streak of error that preceded it), this piece by Andrew Lebovich goes too far in the other direction. Lebovich’s conclusion:

Thus the surge cannot necessarily be said to have weakened militia groups in Iraq. Rather, we have succeeded in reworking the militia structure, inadvertently aiding the Sadrists both in the streets and in parliament by eliminating their rivals, while not posing a serious threat to the organization. They are still armed, and as-Sadr is still just as opposed to America’s occupation of Iraq, and Iraq’s current government. Ultimately, it is Iraq’s political process that has shifted towards as-Sadr, not the other way around.

While I agree with Lebovich that the recent anti-Sadrist operations in Basra, Sadr City and Amarah don’t pose a "serious threat to the organization" itself (the org. is too big with too, long a tradtion), the military campaign has proven to be a setback for the Sadrists both politically and with respect to their militia.  And that is exactly what these campaigns werwe intended to achieve.  They were undertaken with an eye on the upcoming election schedule (with local elections slated, tentatively, for this fall, and nationwide elections to be held in 2009). 

First, the intention has been to weaken the Sadrists so that ISCI/Dawa can maintain its control of the local government machinery in the Shiite-dominated South, then ISCI/Dawa could use that position to ensure a strong showing (by hook or crook) in the national elections in 2009.  Thus far, the anti-Sadrist operations have succeeded in supplanting the Sadrist presence in Basra and other parts in the south, while deposing the Sadr-friendly (or led) government n Amara. 

While the Sadrists remain popular, ISCI/Dawa have attained a position to control the election machinery which is, arguably, more important.  As Boss Tweed famously opined after an election in 1844, "The ballots [don’t] make the outcome.  The counters [do]."  So, for the time being, ISCI/Dawa have muscled the Sadrists out of a position to "count" or even effectively "observe."

Further, the Mahdi Army militia (JAM) itself has taken heavy losses, as it always does when it goes toe-to-toe with the US military (see, ie, 2004 uprising).  That doesn’t, as some overenthusiastic commenters argue, mean that the JAM is defeated.  But then, to state a truism, defeating an insurgency/guerilla movement is exceedingly difficult.  It’s too easy for guerilla movements to melt away, adjust, adapt and re-emerge to fight another day, another way.  Gary Brecher (he of War Nerd fame), sheds some light:

The most recent and ridiculous take is that "Moqtada al Sadr is renouncing violence." Talk about naive! What led these geniuses to that conclusion is that on June 13, Moqtada al Sadr, leader of the biggest and toughest Shia militia, the Mahdi Army, sent out a big announcement: "From now on, the resistance will be exclusively conducted by only one group. … The weapons will be held exclusively by this group." In other words, he’s switching from a big, sloppy, amateur force to a select group of professional guerrillas.

Brecher sees this as a natural evolution, akin to the transformation undertaken by the IRA (no, not a perfect analogy – but it’s not meant as that.  There are definitely strong parallels though):

The trouble is, when po’ folks organize, they have this fatal addiction to big, fancy titles and military fol-der-ol. It’s easy to understand: It helps stomped-on people feel braver, have a little pride. So these groups always go for show, a lot of pomp and uniforms, and a traditional military organizational chart. Pretty soon the guy next door is a colonel, the clerk in the corner store is a four-star general, and they’re strutting around in homemade uniforms feeling ready to take on Genghis Khan. Good for morale, but fatal to real urban guerrilla war. There are two reasons for that. First, these amateur armies get slaughtered when they go up against professional troops; and second, the traditional open organizational chart makes it very easy for the occupiers to identify everyone who’s anyone in the insurgency. When an organization starts out fighting mobs from the enemy tribe, that’s fine. So when the IRA tried to fight the British Army head to head in the 1970s, it got stomped; so did Sadr’s militia when it went up against U.S. troops in April 2004.

Due to the JAM’s popularity and community base, Brecher argues that the Maliki government and US forces have been able to take advantage of informants (sometimes tortured or coerced) to pick off JAM members, most of whom are well known to many if not most of the locals.  So now, a shift:

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by Eric Martin

This past April, when rumors of the return of the main Sunni political bloc (IAF) to the Maliki government were swirling, I preached caution – as similar stories had been reappearing regulary, to no avail, since August 2007 when the IAF withdrew.  Nevertheless, the prospect of the IAF re-upping with the Maliki government has never seemed like a bridge too far considering a few of the relevant factors.

For one, the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups have been forming political parties to challenge the IAF’s stranglehold on Sunni politics at the national and local levels.  In fact, the demand by the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq for a share of the political pie has been, ostensibly, one of the major impetuses behind the Bush administration’s call for regional elections in Iraq.  The IAF, however, lacks widespread support in the Sunni community due, in part, to being viewed as collaborators with the occupation/Maliki government, as well as the fact that many Sunnis (Sons of Iraq/Awakenings) boycotted the last rounds of elections so the IAF’s legitimacy as representatives of Sunni Iraqis has always been dubious.

So in many ways, the IAF is facing a similar intra-sect challenge that Maliki/ISCI are facing from the Sadrists: factions that had boycotted recent regional elections, benefiting from outsider status and anti-occupation credibility, mobilizing to challenge unpopular incumbents tied to the Americans.  Given this common predicament, it’s not entirely surprising to see reports (caution: still speculative) that the IAF might be looking to rejoin the Maliki government (again) if it can obtain an electoral advantage vis-a-vis its intra-sect rivals in the same ways that Maliki/ISCI have been attempting with respect to the Sadrists.  Marc Lynch:

The move to break up the Awakenings now is also, according to al-Khaleej, tied to a secret deal with the Islamic Party of Tareq al-Hashemi (which as part of the IAF has finally announced its return to the Maliki government ).  Maliki, reportedly, would move to weaken the Awakenings ahead of provincial and Parliamentary elections, breaking up their power and barring them from forming political parties (using the "no parties with militias" as the legal pretext, perhaps).   

Lynch, quite correctly, points out that the Maliki government has never been willing to integrate and embrace the Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups and, thus, that it shares the goal of weakening them generally speaking.  So the IAF would have a willing ally in Maliki.  He goes on to suggest, however, that such a move by Maliki would likely run afoul of the Bush administration’s designs.  But I’m not so sure. 

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by Eric Martin

David Brooks a week ago today:

But before long, the more honest among the surge opponents will concede that Bush, that supposed dolt, actually got one right. Some brave souls might even concede that if the U.S. had withdrawn in the depths of the chaos, the world would be in worse shape today.

That paragraph touches on, either expressly or implicitly, the various ways in which The Surge has been mythologized, exaggerated and shaped into a cudgel for political use, as discussed in Part I.  There is the unqualified assertion that The Surge succeeded, that as a result victory is within reach, and that those that supported The Surge showed superior judgment and thus should be rewarded at the ballot box.  That’s a lot of tendentiousness to unpack.

Initially, it is important to repeat, again, that the ostensible purpose of The Surge was to greatly reduce violence such that the various ethnic/religious/political factions could take advantage of the lull in fighting to nail down the many planks considered the foundation of long term, lasting political reconciliation (without which, presumably, the fighting will continue). As measured against its stated purpose, as enunciated by President Bush himself, The Surge has failed almost entirely. 

Far from fostering political reconciliation, the Maliki government is losing allies and falling back on ever slimmer parliamentary majorities (if that).  Most key components of the so-called benchmark legislation remain unpassed, and those measures that have passed (such as the relaxation of the De-Baathification law) have not been implemented in such a way as to achieve the desired result.  It’s not enough to simply pass legislation with benchmark titles after all.  The only worth such laws have is in how they effect the incentives of the warring parties, so implementation is everything.

The reasons that The Surge has failed should be familiar, and they reveal the serious conceptual flaws underlying this policy.  First, The Surge was, by design, a short-lived troop escalation.  As Daniel Larison points out, it was always unrealistic to expect that a temporary influx of soldiers would be able to hold the window open long enough to achieve the many difficult compromises associated with the reconciliation agenda.   

But even that begs the question.  The entire strategic foundation of The Surge rests on the assumption that the primary impediment to reconciliation is the violence itself – that if the groups could just stop fighting, they would agree to reconcile the issues that…led them to fight in the first place.  That only confuses the symptoms for the pathology.

It is not intra-Iraqi violence that is preventing the parties from agreeing on a vision of the future Iraq and from sharing power and wealth in order to achieve reconciliation.  Rather, the violence itself is a symptom of the unwillingness of groups with power to share, and the deep disagreement between many parties on a host of vital issues pertaining to the future character of Iraq as a nation (partition vs. unitary, sovereign vs. heavy-handed foreign presence, etc.). 

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by Eric Martin

Like Dr. iRack, I found Dexter Filkins’ review of Patrick Cockburn’s new book on Moqtada al-Sadr to be well worth the read (don’t agree with everything Filkins or Cockburn write, but overall, insightful). This is a pretty good summary of the persistent condition of ignorance vis-a-vis Sadr that has been so prevalent amongst US policymakers:

Muqtada al-Sadr stands for everything in Iraq that we do not understand. The exiles we imported to run the country following Saddam’s fall are suave and well-dressed; Muqtada is glowering and elusive. The exiles parade before the cameras in the Green Zone; Muqtada stays in the streets, in the shadows, surfacing occasionally to give a wild sermon about the return of the hidden twelfth imam. The Americans proclaim Muqtada irrelevant; his face adorns the walls of every teashop in Shiite Iraq. The Americans attack; Muqtada disappears. The Americans offer a deal, and Muqtada responds: only after you leave.

Who is Muqtada al-Sadr? What does he want? And how many divisions does he have? That we know so little so late about someone so central to the fate of Iraq is an indictment of anyone associated with the American endeavor there. But it is also a measure of Iraq itself: of its complexity, its mutability, its true nature as an always-spinning kaleidoscope of alliances, deals, and double- crosses. Muqtada al-Sadr is not merely a mirror of our ignorance, he is also a window onto the unforgiving land where we have seen so many of our fortunes disappear.

Administration policymakers have ignored, underestimated and prematurely written off Sadr since before the invasion (when few, if any, even knew who he was), to immediately after the invasion (when he was dismissed as an insignificant rabble rouser not worthy of attention), through a series of clashes with US forces and subsequent poltical maneuvers (after and during which Bush administration officials and their supporters have proclaimed Sadr and his movement dead so many times that cat’s stare in awe at his innumerable lives).

Even now, there is much buzz about the impact of the recent anti-Sadr operations in Basra and Sadr City – with many pointing to the fact that Iraqi government forces are in both places as a sign of Sadr’s diminishing relevance. I would caution against putting too much stock into that reading.

Some basic facts to consider: the Sadrist trend is generally estimated as comprising between 3-5 million Iraqis. That would put his movement in the range of 15-20% of the entire Iraqi population (especially when you consider that, due to the relatively modest means of his constituents, few Sadrists were among the massive exodus of some 2 million wealthier Iraqis that fled the country as refugees).

Though not a cleric yet himself, Moqtada is the heir to a well respected and immensely popular clerical lineage that dates back many decades (his father and father’s cousin were extremely influential Grand Ayatollahs). Beyond the sheer numbers of his constituency, Sadr represents a social movement (and an effective network that distributes vital services to millions of poorer Iraqis) and brand of religious millenarianism (Mahdism) that has a rich and lengthy tradition throughout Iraq’s Shiite-dominated south (the latter, with literally centuries of history). The Fadhila Party that dominates Basra is itself an off-shoot of the Sadrist trend that emerged after the assassination of Moqtada’s father – just to give you a sense of its reach.

Thus, it is entirely unrealistic to believe, as the Bush administratoin apparently does, that the Sadrist trend can be neutralized militarily, or marginalized through intra-Shiite political maneuvering. Despite recent gains made against Sadr’s militia, Sadr’s endgame involves exerting his considerable influence via the ballot box and through popular appeals. The US would be far better served by coming to grips with his clout and attempting to normalize relations with his movement, rather than trying to ignore it or adopt policies that amount to wishful thinking. If the US continues to target Sadr and his followers, in the end, such hostility will only harden anti-American attitudes, radicalize the Mahdist movement (and cause dangerous splinter groups to break off) and help weaken one of the truly nationalistic, anti-Iranian forces in Iraqi Shiite politics.

That last point, I would say, represents the other great misunderstanding about the Sadrist movement – its reputed ties to Iran. Actually, I’m not sure it’s a misunderstanding as much as useful propaganda adopted by the Bush administration in order to further a political agenda (permanent bases, heavy foreign involvement in the oil industry) that Sadr opposes. In this, the Bush administration has made common cause with Iraqi political parties (ISCI/Dawa) that have much stronger ties to Iran than Sadr. But that is a rather inconvenient and awkward position, so instead of acknowledging the reality of the situation, we adopt a fictitious narrative. But there is a potential for self-fulfilling prophesy: in targeting and isolating Sadr, we are pushing him closer to Iran by denying him viable alternatives.

I haven’t had the time to read Cockburn’s book on Sadr yet, but I have read this extremely informative piece by Reidar Visser. Visser’s work is a valuable tool in overcoming the ignorance surrounding Sadr and his movement that Filkins describes. I’ll post an excerpt below the fold that touches on some of the issues mentioned above, but I highly recommend the entire piece.

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by Eric Martin

Wow.  This is pretty big news (via the indefatigable Cernig):

Iraq’s most influential Shiite cleric has been quietly issuing religious edicts declaring that armed resistance against U.S.-led foreign troops is permissible — a potentially significant shift by a key supporter of the Washington-backed government in Baghdad.

The edicts, or fatwas, by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani suggest he seeks to sharpen his long-held opposition to American troops and counter the populist appeal of his main rivals…Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia.

But — unlike al-Sadr’s anti-American broadsides — the Iranian-born al-Sistani has displayed extreme caution with anything that could imperil the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. […]

In the past, al-Sistani has avoided answering even abstract questions on whether fighting the U.S. presence in Iraq is allowed by Islam. Such questions sent to his Web site — which he uses to respond to followers’ queries — have been ignored. All visitors to his office who had asked the question received a vague response.

The subtle shift could point to his growing impatience with the continued American presence more than five years after the U.S.-led invasion.

It also underlines possible opposition to any agreement by Baghdad to allow a long-term U.S. military foothold in Iraq — part a deal that is currently under negotiation and could be signed as early as July. […]

Al-Sistani’s distaste for the U.S. presence is no secret. In his public fatwas on his Web site, he blames Washington for many of Iraq’s woes.

But a more aggressive tone from the cleric could have worrisome ripples through Iraq’s Shiite majority — 65 percent of the country’s estimated 27 million population — in which many followers are swayed by his every word.

A longtime official at al-Sistani’s office in Najaf would not deny or confirm the edicts issued in private, but hinted that a publicized call for jihad may come later.

"(Al-Sistani) rejects the American presence," he told the AP, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment to media. "He believes they (the Americans) will at the end pay a heavy price for the damage they inflicted on Iraq."

Yeah, those permanent bases, that 100 year slumber party…we might want to consider a change of plans.  Opposition from both Sadr and Sistani is deal breaker territory – especially when you throw in a good portion of the Sunni population as well. 

Now Sistani is old, and reportedly infirmed, but I wouldn’t bank on his successor changing that tune.  Consider this: Sistani is moving in this direction, at least partially, because of public sentiment and Sadr’s ability to capitalize on his anti-American stance.  Opposing the American presence is popular.  That’s not going to change any time soon.

Sistani also expressed his gratitude for the toppling of Saddam:

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by Eric Martin

Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously quipped, "freedom is untidy" in response to questions about the looting and chaos that erupted in Iraq post invasion. In some sense, he was right, though not in the sense that he intended – that freedom leads to lawlessness.  Freedom and democracy, or at least elections, are messy in that they can yield unpredictable results in terms of ruling regime.* 

This is a lesson that the Bush administration has been slow to learn.  It has repeatedly failed to recognize, willfully or gullibly, that elections themselves are no guarantor that a given preferred candidate will prevail.  Shockingly, foreign constituents don’t always see eye to eye with the Bush team, and sometimes even elect parties/leaders that the Bush team is at odds with.  Frequently in fact.

This pattern of disappointment and surprise was duplicated in a series of elections in Iraq in which the Bush team expected, each time, a strong showing for Chalabi and Allawi (the former couldn’t muster enough votes for a single seat in parliament).  Then, against the advice of Israelis and its Palestinian allies alike, the Bush team insisted on holding the Gaza elections that were supposed to marginalize Hamas in favor of Fatah.  Hamas won big of course, an outcome that surprised few – except the Bush administration.  Later, the administration neglected building relationships with the eventual victorious candidates/parties in Pakistan under the assumption that Musharraff would perform well enough to hold on to power via the ballot box.  Wrong again.

In Iraq, one of those messy, unpredictable events is looming on the horizon yet again.  A prospect that must, by now, strike fear in the hearts of Bush administration policy makers.  The background goes something like this: The Sunni Awakenings/CLC groups, whose recent cooperation with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq has greatly reduced violence, have been demanding a voice in the political apparatus (they have none due to their prior boycott of elections).  In fact, they have threatened violence and a resumption of hostilities if they aren’t given a voice – via elections, or otherwise.

So the Bush administration has been pressuring the Iraqi government to hold regional elections out of fear that security gains will melt away if it loses its Sunni allies.  Problem is, our strongest Shiite allies in the Iraqi government, ISCI and Maliki’s Dawa party, have been steadily working to put off regional elections (including vetoing the most recent legislation before later withdrawing the veto) because those parties fear they will lose considerable ground to the popular Sadrist current (which also sat out the last round of regional elections in some areas).

The Bush team wishes to prevent a Sadrist ascendancy mostly due to that group’s opposition to the occupation and its position on foreign oil investment.  Quite a pickle.  So what to do?  To its credit, the administraiton is not repeating its past mistakes in terms of collecting/manipulating data that predicts victory for their candidates despite the preponderence of countervailing evidence.  Instead, the Bush administration has, at last, developed an appreciation of empirical evidence and adopted a proactive approach.

First, it supported a military campaign to expel the Sadrists from Basra, and weaken their position in Sadr city.  While successful in some limited sense, no military campaign can really defeat the Sadrists absent truly horrific levels of violence (it is a political/religious/social movement that numbers in the millions, and it is deeply ingrained in Iraqi society with a decades’ long history and a centuries’ long tradition).  Disruption is possible, however, in an effort to keep the Sadrist trend and its militia away from the vote casting/gathering/counting process. That might be enough to help ISCI/Maliki manipulate the results in their favor. 

Not wishing to take any chances, there has been recent talk of banning the Sadrist trend from participating in upcoming elections because, get this, that group has a militia.   Problem is, um, which political groups in Iraq don’t have militias.  Perhaps sensing the weakness of that justification, and fearing the widespread backlash that would result from de facto disenfranchisement, a third path has emerged, or re-emerged (which will likely rely on gains from the first prong above):

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