Eric Martin

by Eric Martin

Matt Yglesias discusses the tendency to misconstrue morality in intention and consquence when analyzing foreign policy options – especially relevant after the latest round of preening surrounding the conflict between Russia and Georgia (though the stench of "Bomb Burma for the Sake of the Burmese" still lingers in the air).

…I think a lot of people have a tendency to wave the flag of “morality” or “idealism” in foreign policy as a way of evading responsibility for the consequences of their ideas…There would have been nothing “moral” about it if Dwight Eisenhower had taken an “idealistic” stand over Hungary in 1956 and wound up causing a nuclear war. Nor would the fact that the resulting war would, in an important sense, have been the result of immoral Soviet actions really done a great deal to exculpate Eisenhower. There’s nothing new about this idea, it’s all in Max Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation” where he says that in the political domain we need an ethic of responsibility, where you put forth initiatives that actually lead to good consequences.

True to form, the McCain camp described Obama’s level-headed reaction to the Georgia/Russia conflict (a reaction shared by our European allies and the Bush administration itself!) as a "naive" brand of "appeasement" – betraying a lack of concern for human suffering.  Along these lines, McCain’s allies shrouded their calls for a widespread confrontation between the US and Russia (and their exhortations to the Georgians to "let’s you and him fight") in the cloak of compassion – defending the people of Georgia from a rapacious Russia which had morphed into some freakish Stalin/Hitler hybrid (our enemies always manage this transformation somehow). 

In the rush to claim the moral high ground in the periodic game of king of the sanctimonious mountain, however, none of the would-be humanitarians were forced to account for the repercussions that would actually result from their preferred course of action.  The death toll from the conflict if joined by the United States (or from a prolonged insurgency by Georgians with our aid) would be astronomical – potentially cataclysmic considering the availability of nuclear weapons.  Yet war supporters were safe to bask in their smug judgmentalism in the knowledge that even the Bush administration would not be so reckless. 

However, Andrew Sullivan is right to be concerned that when it comes to a potential McCain presidency, the safe harbor for the judgmental-set might be lost.  Not that this would deter them. When their advocacy leads to disaster, the moral stalwarts will just hide behind the nobility of their intentions – Max Weber be damned!

There is another aspect of the tendency to equate bellicosity with righteousness that is worth analyzing: many of the deeply concerned idealists that reach the solemn conclusion that war is necessary (with a frequency that belies the supposed painstaking deliberations taken to reach the oft-visited option of last resort) tend to be unmoved when presented with non-violent means to better the lot of a beleagured population.  The impassioned calls to action vanish, the brows un-furrow and the pious cloak is put back in the closet for another day.  Humanitarian crises just seem to draw less consternation when one of the options to help the target population isn’t to target the population. This commenter sums it up succinctly:

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by Eric Martin

There have been some pretty serious developments with respect to the Maliki government’s position vis-a-vis the Sunni Awakenings/Sons of Iraq groups over the past couple of weeks.  The nickel version is that the Maliki government is shifting from a mere refusal to integrate the Awakenings/SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces (or grant them civil positions in the government), to an active military campaign to forcibly disarm and disband those same militias.   Arms have been seized, some leaders have been arrested and others killed.

Marc Lynch has been out of town – so he has a solid alibi to explain away his silence on this important topic.  I do not have such an excuse, but will take advantage of his return to make amends for my heretofore neglect.  The Extra P:

A couple of weeks ago, I laid out the case that the problem of the future of the Awakenings was coming to a head.  Well, while I was away, the issue seems to have exploded.   McClatchy, the New York Times, the LA Times, and others have run important stories on what seems to be a concerted campaign by the Maliki government to crack down on the Awakenings movement – with what appears to be grudging American acceptance.   

The Awakenings experience demonstrates the limits of American influence over the Iraqi government – months of sustained, intense pressure on Maliki to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the Security Forces has produced remarkably little results, and now Maliki is cracking down on a pillar of Gen. Petraeus’s strategy against al-Qaeda.  This should be another nail in the coffin of the popular idea that improving security will lead the Iraqi government to make political accommodations with its rivals.

As stated previously, the argument that all the Iraqi factions needed was a lull in the fighting to resolve the underlying political issues that led to the fighting in the first place was always tenuous.  Further, the Awakenings/SOI strategy that preceded, and then accompanied, the Surge was working at cross-cutting purposes with the above.  On the one hand, the deal with the Sunni insurgents reduced the levels of violence, but on the other hand, as Brian Katulis points out, it further fractured Iraqi society by creating – or strengthening – distinct power nodes outside the central government.

What has been extolled as a central “success” of the surge has also exacerbated existing political divisions and fomented new political cleavages in an already fractured and fragile Iraqi body politic. Newly empowered sahwa leaders are challenging each other, traditional Sunni Arab political parties, and the Iraqi government. […]

What’s worse, current U.S. policy in Iraq does not take into account how the sahwa movements have…[made] it more difficult to achieve progress in striking the power-sharing deals necessary to stabilize their country.

The hope, or roll of the dice, was that the Maliki government would eventually, if begrudgingly, incorporate the Awakenings/SOI groups into the government – leading to non-violent buy-in from a potentially destabilizing segment of Iraqi society.  Maliki, however, feels no pressure to act.  Why would he when he has the US military around to back his every move?  The US government can’t pressure Maliki when its leverage is undermined by the fact that leaders like Bush and McCain are promising to provide Maliki with military support for the next millenium – whether or not Maliki is willing to make political concessions.  The violence in Iraq will flare up, however.

Maliki’s actions should not be interpred solely through the sectarian (Shiite v. Sunni) lens, however.  Rather, the federalist/nationalist, or Powers that Be (PTB)/Powers that Aren’t (PTA), paradigm is relevant. In this respect, Maliki has targeted political factions that do not currently hold power in the regional, and in some cases federal, government (the Sadrists, Awakenings/SOI).  In doing so, he is pushing ahead with an anti-democratic consolidation of power – flirting with the formation of a military dictatorship gussied up with democratic trappings.  Sam Parker (via a footnote to a Reidar Visser piece) explains:

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by Eric Martin

In October 2005, I first plagiarized borrowed from publius the concept of "vectors" to describe the sought after cross-sectarian/ethnic political alliances that could be formed by the Iraqi electorate.  These vectors are desirable because they would indicate that the Iraqi electorate was eschewing communal-based, factional politics that almost inevitably leads to instability or democratically enabled tyranny – a heavy-handed rule of the majority.  Unfortunately, the Iraqi people have done just the opposite: they have tended to vote communally, with each sectarian/ethnic constituency voting for similar parties/blocs with little, if any, crossover.  This voting pattern has reinforced and exaggerated the sectarian/ethnic identification which has fueled certain of Iraq’s multiple insurgencies and civil wars.

There are several causes for the centrifugal forces pulling voters into electoral enclaves: First, it is a typical human reaction to fear, anxiety and lawlessness (each available in ample amounts during and after the US invasion).  This is especially true in, though not exclusive to, a society that still has a vital tribal component.  Second, political/social/religious developments in Iraq in the decades preceding the invasion had exacerbated sectarian/ethnic divisions while empowering resistance movements and groups that tended to organize around such totems, and so these groups were best positioned to fill the vacuum post-invasion.  Finally, decisions by the Bush administration to organize the Iraqi government around a confessional power sharing arrangement, aka the "Lebanon Model," further entrenched these modalities.

Nevertheless, there have been recurring predictions that a new political consensus would emerge, one organized around the principle of Iraqi nationalism rather than religion or ethnic identity.  Thus far, however, those predicting the imminent emergence of such a cohesive, non-sectarian, nationalist vector have been disappointed.  Nevertheless, there are signs that a recent coalescence of disparate groups could establish the framework for such a conglomeration going forward. 

As Reidar Visser argues, the recent scuttling of the provincial elections law represented a victory for a nationalistic, cross-sectarian bloc (with Sunni and Shiite groups – including the Sadrists and even some Badr!) prevailing over the entrenched powers most committed to the fragmentation of Iraq into semi-autonomous regions (ISCI, the Kurds and some of Dawa).  Recall, the law could not be passed largely because the Kurds (and their staunch allies, ISCI) would not agree to a Kirkuk power-sharing arrangement inserted into the elections law.  Visser:

Yesterday’s failure of the Iraqi parliament to pass the provincial elections law before the summer recess may well end up being blamed on Sadrists and other “recalcitrants” who refused to give up their principles and adopt a more “businesslike” attitude. Or, alternatively, as an AP headline puts it today, “Iraqi election bill falls to ethnic rivalry.” However, quite apart from issues related to Islamic radicalism or ethnic identities, first and foremost the parliamentary deliberations of the elections law exposed some of the fundamental weaknesses and contradictions of Pax Americana in Iraq. […]

…On the one hand, there was a broad alliance of parties that pushed the elections agenda forward, and insisted on the insertion of a timeline in the legislation that was adopted in February this year. This group featured cross-sectarian cooperation and participation by secularists as well as Islamists, with the key parties being the Sadrists (Shiite Islamist), Fadila (Shiite Islamist), Tawafuq (Sunni Islamist), al-Hiwar al-Watani (Iraqi nationalist, mostly Sunni) and Iraqiyya (nationalist, secular-leaning). Those who opposed the prospect of early elections [and the power sharing provision] were primarily the Kurdish parties and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, Shiite Islamist), with some support from the Daawa party of Iraqi premier Nuri al-Maliki.

So, with the fault lines established (more on those fault lines here), Visser examines the common platforms:

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by Eric Martin

An article appeared in the New York Times over the weekend which contained some interesting analysis of the Sadrist trend’s recent fortunes. The lede:

The militia that was once the biggest defender of poor Shiites in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, has been profoundly weakened in a number of neighborhoods across Baghdad, in an important, if tentative, milestone for stability in Iraq.

It is a remarkable change from years past, when the militia, led by the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr, controlled a broad swath of Baghdad, including local governments and police forces. But its use of extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the group.

To some extent, the author is correct to note that the Sadrist trend has been weakened.  Considering the size and scope of the anti-Sadrist operations that have been undertaken over the past several months, it would be remarkable if the trend hadn’t suffered serious setbacks.  As I argued recently, while disagreeing with Andrew Lebovich’s contention that the anti-Sadrist actions had actually made the movement stronger:

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