Last year, David Kay (search) had confidently predicted weapons would be found. But after nine months of searching, he said Sunday: “I don’t think they exist.” . . .
. . . Asked whether President Bush (search) owed the nation an explanation for the discrepancies between his warnings and Kay’s findings, Kay said: “I actually think the intelligence community owes the president, rather than the president owing the American people.”
Forget politics. Forget the fact that the search for WMDs isn’t yet over. Forget, “Bush lied, people died.” Forget the other good reasons for getting rid of Saddam. Forget to draw the devil horns on Cheney. Forget the torture chambers and rape-rooms. Forget to chant “it’s all about oiiiiilllll.” (Please, forget to chant “it’s all about the oiiiiilllll.”) Forget it all. Remember only this:
Our national security and our national credibility depend upon accurate intelligence. Our intelligence failed in Iraq. There must be an investigation. The investigation must include the offices of those in the administration charged with overseeing the US’s intelligence services: George Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleeza Rice.
You say that’s tough to do during an election year? Well, I’ll tell you a secret: Sometimes, it’s tough to do the right thing. Doesn’t keep it from being right.
UPDATE: Bird Dog, at Tacitus, reaches the same conclusion, though he focuses his ire on Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld (essentially absolving Rice and Tenet). I deliberately omitted mention of Cheney because I fear that any investigation of the Vice President will politicize — and thereby paralyze — the investigative process, given the current electoral cycle. It may be that Cheney is Spiro Agnew, back from the dead. Before we start j’accusin‘, though, let’s determine what the people with actual oversight over the intelligence (Rice, Tenet, Rumsfeld) did, or did not, do.
(How Bird Dog absolves Rice and Tenet of responsibility is, frankly, beyond my ken.)
One more reason to vote for ABB is that there is zero chance of the investigation you propose occurring while W. is in power.
Obsidian, Hear! Hear! Amid the bandar-log chatter, a sensible voice!
Great post Von…a serious approach to the WoT demands a thorough investigation of where our intelligence broke down.
Hear, hear.
Congress needs to start using the investigation power reasonably again (and not solely to damage administrations of the other party & protect administrations of their own), in the worst way.
Of course there are other kinds of investigation, but you need some degree of independence.
How likely do you reckon it is this will happen? I think I can honestly say pressure could be built on our PM to get this done. But your press seems to be far more pro/worried of being against your President for any pressure to do this.
I think Kay’s report by itself may be sufficient to up the pressure, particularly since he himself is essentially calling for an investigation. Kay was Bush’s man in Iraq; one cannot lightly dismiss his conclusion that there has been a massive failure of intelligence. (Though some will surely try to dismiss it.)
Were I advising Bush, I would suggest he “grasp this nettle with both hands,”* and call for an investigation immediately. (Of course, if the worst conspiratorial suggestions regarding his administration are true, well . . . )
von
*I.e., embrace the bad fact. When done judiciously, the tactic accomplishes three tasks: (a) you deny your opponent ammunition to use against; (b) you shape how the bad fact is portrayed; and (c) you appear candid and trustworthy. The only cost to you is that you’ve admitted that you can’t defend the thing that everyone already knows you can’t defend.
Personal experience: a powerful litigation tactic, though one that few attorneys pull off, because it’s both difficult to do (you have to admit the bad fact in a way that doesn’t cripple you) and contrary to the “concede nothing, argue everything” (and rack up the bills) school of thought that seems pervasive at many firms.
“Our national security and our national credibility depend upon accurate intelligence.”
Half true, both our security and credibility depend on how we act on the intel that is possessed. First, WMD was not the only justification for invasion. Second, no international or national orginazition was able to disprove what was common belief as to the existance of WMD, and it is still fact that past stockpiles of WMD are not accounted-for. Third, both security and credibility hinge on how we act in regards to what is believed. The world beleived in Iraqii WMD, or else both containment and the inspections were of no use. In a Post-9/11 world we enhanced our security and credibility as regards state sponsors of terror by the removal of Saddam (a national priority since 1998).
“Our intelligence failed in Iraq.” Again, partial credit. The WMD believed to exist now appear to be mere chimera, but that was not the only “Intel job”. 100% “Accurate Intel” comes 20 years after the regime change, through historians.
Everything else is best guesses.
“There must be an investigation. The investigation must include the offices of those in the administration charged with overseeing the US’s intelligence services: George Tenet, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleeza Rice.”
Why give the Clinton Admin a free ride, intel does not turnover like groceries in the store. Pollack wrote about the Iraqii threat, and he was suprised too. The real point is we need to shake up the existing burocracy not just skewer those now in the executive (our humint capability has withered for 30 years, it will take decades to reinstitute what once existed, and than there will still be no certainty).
“Intel” is a comparative and subjective resource. As much “Art” as “Science” because it is the realm of people and their thoughts as it is about material (and the tangible material sought is precisely that which is being hid). Unfortunately for the past 30 years the intel community has looked to “science” – technological observation, and since the Church Commission, intentionally eshewed “art” – the dirty job of subverting foreign nationals to betray their countries. We have conducted foreign policy as naifs for 30 years, this problem is bi-partisan, and includes my favorite administration as well (Reagan, not Bush 43).
Von, check out Tacitus on June 9, 2003. A good and long discusion about whether the “Sales Job” was defecient.
How about this: try investigating the intelligence failure, rather than the people. If you do that, it’ll seem less like a witch-hunt, and more like a reasonable demand for the facts. If it falls out in that investigation that there seriously boneheaded decisions made, those ought to be brought into the light for all to see, and punished suitably. If you begin by investigating only the people you don’t like, you may wind up missing something very important, and not fixing the problem in the process.
Why give the Clinton Admin a free ride, intel does not turnover like groceries in the store. Pollack wrote about the Iraqii threat, and he was suprised too.
I don’t mean to, Steve Malynn; it’s just that it’s awful tough to re-fire Clinton-era appointees whom have already been fired.
As for intel being part art and science, I agree of course. The problem here is that the science appears to be for crap, and the art is ugly as sin. Calling something “art” doesn’t cause responsibility to go “poof!”
As for the other bases for the war, sure, they were there (and are still valid). But they don’t explain the intelligence failure. And, yeah, like it or not, saying “but we had other reasons to invade Iraq that didn’t turn out to be completely wrong” doesn’t make our WMD intelligence look better.
If you begin by investigating only the people you don’t like, you may wind up missing something very important, and not fixing the problem in the process.
I agree, Slartibartfast. But I wanted to be clear that we should not put a Chinese wall between “intelligence” and “administration” in the investigation. The processes employed by both career analysis and political appointees should be investigated.
Concur, von.
A housecleaning in the CIA and in the State Dept. are in order, but how likely?
“A housecleaning in the CIA and in the State Dept. are in order, but how likely?”
As is a housecleaning in the upper reaches of the DOD. None strike me as particularly likely.
Tenent is a holdover (wink); I’m not sanguine that this congress can get beyond partisanship, the current committees and the indepentent 9/11 investigations have been all about politics. That being said, I’m not excited about the window dressing that has been applied to date to address the problem: Homeland Security will only work as a department if it is streamlined and actually starts to replace some entrenched burocrats and departments.
Tenent is a holdover (wink);
I stand corrected, then. (Frankly, I’m amazed that Tenet kept his job after 9-11.)
Of Course, we’re probably looking at different parts of the DOD to clean-out, JKC.
The interesting thing about the Military is that it’s “up or out” policy and the transfers out of the Pentagon back to operating units together limit the problem of entrenched and over-powerful burocrats to the civilian structure (and that structure gets a shake-up with each change of administration), in vast contrast to any other federal dept.
Most interestingly, Rumsfeld is doing more shaking up than most of his predecessors.
So why do you posit that Rumsfeld needs to go (reading between your lines)?
Isn’t this call to get our intelligence agencies’ act together something that has gotten sounded every few years for the past few decades?
“(How Bird Dog absolves Rice and Tenet of responsibility is, frankly, beyond by ken.)”
That’s simple. In this Administration’s power relationships, Tenet and Rice are flunkies and Cheney and Rumsfeld are powers.
In any fight between either of the first two and either of the second two, who is sure to win? The answer is obvious. And thus the responsibility is obvious. Tenet was powerless, and Rice has shown no sign to this date of having the faintest control over Cheney; the best we can say is that there was an appearance of her being given some oversight over Rumsfeld when Iraqi policy was moved to some degree to the White House the other month.
But all Tenet could do was: a) what he was told; b) quit; c) be fired.
And in a fight between Cheney and Rice, who do you think would win? Who do you has won?
“Isn’t this call to get our intelligence agencies’ act together something that has gotten sounded every few years for the past few decades?”
Not at all! Only since the Bay of Pigs!
(Or, arguably, Suez/56.)
No, wait, there was this “Pearl Harbor” thing. And in between something in Korea.
So, obviously: nah.
It could be argued that the last time the CIA was perfect was when it was the OSS (WWII). Of course that is nostalgia, a good old day that probably did not exist.
If I recall correctly, Donald Kagan (brilliant historian in the UK), had an article last year that pointed out that intel rarely wins wars, and has been vastly overrated by the press for years.
Donald Kagan’s at Yale. Do you mean John Keegan? (It’s the kind of thing I’d expect to hear from Keegan rather than Kagan, given that Keegan’s a military historian and Kagan isn’t.)
well, Kagan specializes in the Peloponnesian war. But in an old school war you need intelligence to figure out how many triremes or hoplites or what have you your enemy has. Now you also need it to figure out exactly who your enemy is. Surely that makes a difference.
I knew someone was going to point that out as soon as I posted it. I still wouldn’t call Kagan precisely a military historian; he seems more on the diplomatic end of things. But that’s just splitting hairs.
I thought Kagan’s On the Origins of War was great when I first read it, but I suspect that it wouldn’t stand up nearly so well now. And the things I’ve heard about his new book on the Peloponnesian war don’t exactly fill me with hope for it…
Josh, you are right, it was John Keegan.
von, I think you are underestimating the will to be stupid that comes from wishful thinking.
The basic reasoning is as follows:
Saddam is Evil.
Saddam is capable of anything.
Saddam wants WMD.
There is some noise about WMD in Iraq.
Therefore, all the other noise about no WMD in Iraq is nefarious scheming by Saddam.
When Ritter says: he ain’t got them, it’s because he’s a pedophile and he’s been blackmailed. When some defector says, they ain’t got none, he’s either a plant or he’s ignored.
When some defector favorite of Chalabi says, they’ve got da bomb, he’s given airtime on nightly news. After all, that’s sexy stuff.
It’s incestuous amplification, and it’s not an intelligence failure per se. It’s executive negligence.
Here’s Kay today in the L.A Times:
Liane Hansen: Knowing what you know now, though, did Iraq pose an imminent threat?
Kay: Liane, I think this is one of the questions the American public and politicians are going to have to grapple with. “Imminent” depends — it’s a risk assessment. How risky are you to run? And in the shadowing effect of 9/11, it seems to me that you recalculate what risk based on the intelligence that existed. I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground, as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion — although I must say I actually think Iraq, what we learned during the inspection, made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war.
Before the war, had any person, said, “I don’t think we should invade Iraq, because I don’t think Saddam had weapons of mass destruction to threaten us,” that person would have clear standing to hammer Bush today.
But, the after-the-fact political whining doesn’t impress me, Von. Yes, let’s beef up our intelligence, and fire those who botched it. But, most of the post-carping is by folks who just oppose Bush, anyway, anyhow, in any manner.
But, the after-the-fact political whining doesn’t impress me, Von. Yes, let’s beef up our intelligence, and fire those who botched it. But, most of the post-carping is by folks who just oppose Bush, anyway, anyhow, in any manner.
In fairness, Navy, I was whining pre-, during-, and post-. Always agreed with the ends. Always thought that the means to be, well, not all that special.
Still supporting Bush over Dean, if it comes to him. (And Bush over Clark, now I’ve had a chance to get to know Clark. Yup, that’s an honest-to-God reversal by me.)
Navy Davy – our foreign secretary, Jack Straw, disagrees with Kay (but then, Straw’s an idiot anyway):
“We were never saying that Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United Kingdom. The serious and current threat was to the world and that was absolutely true and I remain convinced it was.”
Before the war, had any person, said, “I don’t think we should invade Iraq, because I don’t think Saddam had weapons of mass destruction to threaten us,” that person would have clear standing to hammer Bush today.
Yay. Navy Davy has given me the thumbs up.
It takes registration, but here is the John Keegan article from the Daily Telegraph: Forget about James Bond – intelligence never wins wars
By John Keegan
(Filed: 22/10/2003)
While the two historians have different subject matter, I have conflated Keegan, Kagan and VD Hansen as I read their books around the same time between 1987-93. (trivia A: Faces of Battle, Origins of War, Western Way of War — among others).