Threat Theory

It has sometimes been remarked that the dual attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq are intended, at least implicitly, to be a pincer-like movement to put pressure on Iran. Before Sandy’s Bergery became topic number one, Glenn Reynolds and some others were keen on the idea. An InstaReader summed up the purported strategy as follows:

An attack against Iran will be much easier now since we can force them into a two front war, attacking from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Maybe this has been the strategy all along.

Another suggested:

I have always considered the Iraq war, coupled with Afghanistan, as a strategy against IRAN, and that the benefits which came along with it (seed of democracy, Saddam on trial, etc.), secondary. I think to any halfway informed individual, Iran is the ultimate reforming goal. I do believe, the strategy has been “misunderstimated”.

The folks who champion the Iran-pincer view of the Iraq war are well meaning and hopeful. They are also hopelessly and dangerously naive. There are two problems with the pincer strategy, and they are fundamental:

1. The threat is hollow. We lack the manpower (and, likely, the willpower) to confront Iran militarily. We lack the UN support or goodwill to impose an effective economic blockade. Iran knows this: It takes no genius to see that our military is already stretched thin; it takes no clairvoyance to sense that most of Europe has no stomach for a fight and our relations with our main European allies are poor; and it takes no special smarts to realize that neither President Bush nor Congress have proposed the type of military spending increases that would increase our military to a suitable size. Regardless of the angry noises from the campaign trail and Congress, Iran can likely count on at least a year — and likely several years — of relative freedom to do what it wants.

2. Iran will act in its self interest. It constantly amazes me that smart folks frequently propose strategies without considering that “the other side’s” reaction to the strategy inevitably alters the outcomes. It as if, turning into a headwind, they refuse to revise the mental rigging. Iran can see that it is now threatened on two sides by U.S. forces. It can comprehend the words “Axis of Evil,” and what they imply. It will act to defend itself. How? It will try tie us down in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will redouble its efforts to achieve the greatest deterrent, a nuclear bomb. (It can learn the lesson of North Korea as well as anyone.)

So, what does the pincer strategy get us? It increases the chance that Iran will seek the bomb. It reduces the chance that we’ll be able to stop Iran from getting the bomb. It is perhaps the worst possible justification for the Iraq war.

As I’ve repeatedly remarked before, the sole rational basis for invading Iraq was because Iraq posed a threat to the U.S. and its interest. Only this justified the costs in lives and lucre. Only this justified the opportunities forgone (the threats unlevied against North Korea and Iran; the pressures not brought to bear on Saudi Arabia; the state not-yet-established in Afghanistan). Only this made us safer.

WMDs were why I ultimately supported the Iraq war. And, while they may yet turn up in significant numbers, in their relative absence I can conclude only one thing: I was wrong to provide that support. (Was I misled? Absolutely not. Virtually everyone thought Iraq had WMDs; I played the odds. As did Bush.)

(Might we be saved, despite all odds, by a sudden popular uprising in Iran? Sure. But hope is not a plan, and getting lucky is not wisdom.)

Update: This is far too strong: “the sole rational basis for invading Iraq was because Iraq posed a threat to the U.S. and its interest.” I’m being unfair — that’s not the sole rational basis for invading Iraq; it’s the only basis, however, that I found convincing. And, no, I don’t want to reargue the point.

36 thoughts on “Threat Theory”

  1. “It increases the chance that Iran will seek the bomb.”
    By how much? From a 100% chance to 102%? 110%?
    No offense, but if you’re going to say others are dangerously naive it would be helpful if you weren’t joining them.

  2. By how much? From a 100% chance to 102%? 110%?
    Macallan, you’ll increase the effectiveness of your critique from 0 to a positive integer if you also confront the second half of my equation:

    It increases the chance that Iran will seek the bomb. It reduces the chance that we’ll be able to stop Iran from getting the bomb.

  3. “Only this justified the opportunities forgone (the threats unlevied against North Korea and Iraq)”
    I think we levied threats against Iraq, steno von.
    “Virtually everyone thought Iraq had WMDs”
    Obligatory rejoinder – depends on when we’re talking about – this was not the case after the last inspections. And “WMD” is such a broad category as to make your statement unuseful.

  4. von,
    I think that you are missing that what is in plain sight. The U.S. is not going to invade Iran because no one wants to drive the peaceful Iranian movement for democracy into the arms of the mullahs.
    Face it, if it came to Iran versus the U.S., who do you think these people would side with? Much better to have the regime overthrown from within. I believe that Bush has spoken to this in the past, although it would be nice if he was more vocal about it.
    Your analysis comes perilously close to saying that confrontation with Iran would lead them to start messing around and build the bomb, so let us not confront them. Obviously absurd, that. Pointing out that someone would resist is not an argument against confronting them.
    Finally, I will just say that I wish people would stop complaining about the woeful lack of manpower. Yes, more soldiers would be nice. This ignores the fact that this is true for every conflict in the history of mankind. You use what you have. As for willpower, you are correct. That could change, of course.

  5. The U.S. is not going to invade Iran because no one wants to drive the peaceful Iranian movement for democracy into the arms of the mullahs.
    I agree that this is a good reason not to invade Iran. My point is that folks who have been attempting to justify the Iraq war on the ground that it threatens Iran are foolish. (It looks like you’d agree with the point.)
    Your analysis comes perilously close to saying that confrontation with Iran would lead them to start messing around and build the bomb, so let us not confront them. Obviously absurd, that. Pointing out that someone would resist is not an argument against confronting them.
    What I actually say is that it is counterproductive to threaten a country when you have no means to carry out the threat and no intention of carrying out the threat — and the other country knows both full well. Again, I’m squashing the “Iraq war pincer” theory that’s cropped up before it propogates further.
    This ignores the fact that this is true for every conflict in the history of mankind. You use what you have.
    Of course. And, when faced with an evident manpower shortage, you fund the necessary increases. Which I advocate, and would gladly help pay for.

  6. Von, the real threat to Iran is a democratic Iraq, which is why Iran is doing everything in its power to undermine Iraq today.

  7. “Finally, I will just say that I wish people would stop complaining about the woeful lack of manpower.”
    Wish away. Wish people would stop complainging there’s not enough food and security in Darfur, while you’re at it. You use what you have. So it works out.
    If only the Poles in WWII hadn’t complained about lack of manpower in their Army. That would have cured their problem.

  8. Von, the real threat to Iran is a democratic Iraq, which is why Iran is doing everything in its power to undermine Iraq today.
    Why? A democratic Iraq would most likely be dominated by the Shia, who have traditionally looked to Iran for guidance and support. Yes, relative secular freedoms would be something that the Iranian reformers would want to emulate, but supposing a pro-Iranian government headed by a popular figure like, oh, for example, al-Sadr were elected? I think that Iranian government would be fine with that.

  9. TtWD:
    the real threat to Iran is a democratic Iraq
    Passing for the moment the fact that it’s far from certain that a democratic Iraq will actually result from the Iraq War; passing also Double-Plus-Ungood‘s warning about the kind of democratic Iraq that is most likely to emerge; passing as well the likelihood that Iran may not at all be influenced by a democratic Iraq (it wasn’t influenced by a democratic Pakistan, for example):
    How long will it take for a democratic Iraq to emerge? Five years? Ten? In that amount of time Iran will be a nuclear power and we’ll all be praying for the stability of the Iranian mul-public, not hoping for street riots that may possibly some day lead to a republic.
    Again, the pincer theory is a bad theory — any way you slice it.

  10. It constantly amazes me that smart folks frequently propose strategies without considering that “the other side’s” reaction to the strategy inevitably alters the outcomes.
    You obviously haven’t been spending enough time on baseball teams’ message boards discussing trade possibilities. “Randy Johnson for Felix Rodriguez, the rights to Marvin Bernard and AZ eats half his 2005 salary!” 😉

  11. A democratic Iraq would most likely be dominated by the Shia, who have traditionally looked to Iran for guidance and support
    You actually have it the other way around, the Shia Holy Cities are both situated in Iraq.
    How long will it take for a democratic Iraq to emerge?
    Next January Von, haven’t you been paying attention.
    On a nuclear Iran emerging, I wouldn’t count on it. Von you have to stop projecting and start doing a bit of analysis. The first hurdle, how will Europe respond to the IAEA report this Sept and then we move on from there. The issues facing Europe will be more than just the second nuclear stain being analyzed by the IAEA.

  12. I agree with the thrust of this post – one comment – when von says “virtually everyone thought Iraq had WMD’s” is a small bit of revisionist history. You had people like Scott Ritter (who ended up being completely right), and also had the IAEA, there, on the ground, saying, “nothing is here guys”. So when looking at the evidence, there was quite a lot of flags raised at the time.
    On a lighter note, I think the “typo” theory might be correct:
    Imminent danger for WMD’s? Iran.
    Connections to 9/11? Iran.
    Some drunk typist at the NSC, had a typo, and when typing “ira..” then typed a”q” instead of “n”.
    It happens. What to do? I sure hope that typist is thrown off the typing pool.

  13. the Shia Holy Cities are both situated in Iraq.

    Qum is fairly holy, as well, and hasn’t had Ayatollahs and lesser authorities shot and suppressed over the last twenty-four years.

    How long will it take for a democratic Iraq to emerge?
    Next January Von, haven’t you been paying attention.

    Sure, and it will be a perfect working democracy, and everything will then be hunky-dory. Just like it is in Russia today. And as it has been in Pakistan ever since 1949. And in the Phillipines ever since the Spanish-American War. Because declaring the place a “democracy” makes it so, and makes it all work fine.

  14. I agree with the thrust of this post – one comment – when von says “virtually everyone thought Iraq had WMD’s” is a small bit of revisionist history.
    Scott Ritter and the IAEA do not invalidate the idea of “virtually everyone,” as it’s only one guy and one very timid international organization. Read some of this pre-9/11 conference of former Inspectors and Experts and tell me that “history is being revised.”
    You had people like Scott Ritter (who ended up being completely right), and also had the IAEA, there, on the ground, saying, “nothing is here guys”. So when looking at the evidence, there was quite a lot of flags raised at the time.
    “Nothing is here guys” is the play-it-safe, innocent-until-proven-guilty standard that the IAEA rather foolishly holds to. Case in point: “No sign Libya had uranium – IAEA” – 12/27/03, Al-jazeera.
    Scott Ritter has also offered such gems of wisdom as “We do not have the military means to take over Baghdad and for this reason I believe the defeat of the United States in this war is inevitable,” 3/26/03, News24.
    No doubt it’s that sharp mind of his that goes a long way towards explaining his fondness for getting busy in a Burger King bathroom with underaged girls.

  15. Jonas,
    Red herrings don’t change the point – and arguing by raising red herrings don’t invalidate the point. Also arguing in this manner reeks of desperation. There WERE other sources of information – and these were ignored – and the supposition I have is that they were ignored because the decision to invade had been made.
    I believe I can find other sources, saying at the time, that Iraq had no WMD’s. Anyone else have any remembrances/links?

  16. Sure, and it will be a perfect working democracy, and everything will then be hunky-dory.
    Nah, it won’t be perfect and there will be some hiccups along the way (Gary, similar to the Republic you currently live in) but I suspect that as compared to the theocratic fascist state next door, it will look pretty good (will generate a good deal of leverage in the region).
    I’m sorry Gary what was your point?

  17. Scott Ritter and the IAEA do not invalidate the idea of “virtually everyone,” as it’s only one guy and one very timid international organization.
    One guy with the expertise who, unlike most of the people pushing the war, was in a position to know what he was talking about–and whose naysaying turned out to be 100% correct.
    An international organization whose mission and expertise is in knowing, far better than those who pushed their discredited theories, which aluminum tubes are used for what–for example.
    Both of whom were far, far from the /only/ naysayers against this war. Your comment seems to imply they existed in a vacuum, and that there was no corroboration or agreement with them from anyone else.
    This is risible at best.
    “Nothing is here guys” is the play-it-safe, innocent-until-proven-guilty standard that the IAEA rather foolishly holds to. Case in point: “No sign Libya had uranium – IAEA” – 12/27/03, Al-jazeera.
    Thank you, but I’ll stack the IAEA’s track record of being right about nuclear programs and Iraqi WMDs up against the INC’s and the CIA’s any day.
    No doubt it’s that sharp mind of his that goes a long way towards explaining his fondness for getting busy in a Burger King bathroom with underaged girls.
    You deserve nothing but contempt for this kind of libelous smear. Look up the facts associated with this non-case before you embarrass yourself by trying to use it as an argument against a person’s credibility in their area of expertise.

  18. Timmy,
    You make a good point that one should look at democracy in Iraq in terms of gradual improvement. But your original post omitted saying this, and seemed to represent things in Iraq as “done” in January.
    And we still don’t know, remember, we only have the hope, at this point. The invasion turned out better than almost anyone predicted, and the occupation so far has turned out worse than anyone had predicted. We’ll see how the “post-occupation”, or whatever this period should be called, does.

  19. Red herrings don’t change the point – and arguing by raising red herrings don’t invalidate the point.
    I’m certain it does. In the case of Scott Ritter, it’s a stopped clock is right twice a day situation. Meanwhile, the IAEA is going to hope for the best until cold, hard, evidence is in plain view.
    When you are asking us to assume that Ritter and the IAEA should have changed everyone’s mind about Iraq, such issues are 100% relevant.
    There WERE other sources of information – and these were ignored – and the supposition I have is that they were ignored because the decision to invade had been made.
    They were also “ignored” before any decision was made to invade, both under Bush II and Clinton. I know it’s fashionable to say that Bush pulled the “Iraq as national-security issue” out of his rear, but that’s simply not true.
    Read this abstract from 1991 about Iraq’s Nuclear program. After getting burned by the total intelligence failure of not knowing that this program existed, are you prone to underestimate or overestimate Iraq’s WMD programs from then on?

  20. One guy with the expertise who, unlike most of the people pushing the war, was in a position to know what he was talking about–and whose naysaying turned out to be 100% correct.
    This is implying that Scott Ritter has evidence of what ultimately happened to known, UNSCOM-verified WMD that are still unaccounted for. Acting like Ritter’s rhetoric was substantive enough to reevaluate a decade of policy is not credible.
    Meanwhile, others with comparable or superior expertise disagreed with him.
    An international organization whose mission and expertise is in knowing, far better than those who pushed their discredited theories, which aluminum tubes are used for what–for example.
    Yes, when the IAEA makes a positive declaration, you can be assured that is likely correct. Do you honestly believe that one, in determining counter-proliferation strategy, has the luxury to wait for the IAEA to lumber along to these pristine conclusions?
    Thank you, but I’ll stack the IAEA’s track record of being right about nuclear programs and Iraqi WMDs up against the INC’s and the CIA’s any day.
    Great. Now governments can only act against Nuclear proliferation with 100% verified and certified evidence against the proliferators. How well, in the long-term, do you think that strategy would perform?
    You deserve nothing but contempt for this kind of libelous smear. Look up the facts associated with this non-case before you embarrass yourself by trying to use it as an argument against a person’s credibility in their area of expertise.
    Oh please, it was a joke. Your humorlessness in regards to this character, whose behavior and rhetoric has for the most part been absurd and ridiculous, is most regrettable.

  21. But your original post omitted saying this, and seemed to represent things in Iraq as “done” in January.
    JC, fair enough, I’m thinking of a 19th century (with the caveat of no slavery and women get to vote) democracy come next January. Some graft, clan relationships being a critcial aspect of politics and some hanky panky but an improvement over the current government in Iran and under Saddam. It won’t be perfect, bta no democracy ever is.

  22. It won’t be perfect, bta no democracy ever is.
    The issue isn’t the inability to achieve perfection, it’s a) how close to a reasonable approximation of the ideal does it come, and b) does it even warrant the name “democracy” at all. The naming of the thing is not the thing itself, to butcher Wittgenstein; just ask the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

  23. I read everything I could lay eyes on at the time and I was convinced Iraq did not pose too much of a threat. I shall refrain from posting all the links I have, or google for the ones I did not keep (I remember early interviews with Powell en Cheney, about how Iraq was not a real threat and what a cakewalk the invasion would be).
    But this pdf file gave a pretty good summary of why the war was unustified, with links to the relevant documentation.
    Foreign Policy does a thorough fisking of Bush’ speech oct. 2002.
    Robin Cooks resignment speech made a good summary of my own conclusions at the time.

  24. When do you reckon [Pakistan] was in existence?
    Farber — Pakistan was a democracy for several periods (between military juntas) in the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s. As for TtWD‘s point about Iraq: I think we’ll be lucky to have even a rudimentary democracy in Iraq by January (although I do hope that it occurs). Assuming one occurs, I think that it is more likely to follow the Pakistan model than, say, the India model.*
    von
    *We should increase financial and other support for the nascent Iraqi government in hopes of preventing such a result.

  25. Pakistan model than, say, the India model
    Two points
    First, I’m wondering what you think the difference is between the two models.
    Second and related, does the Iraqi Army have the legacy to fill the role that it has in Pakistan and Turkey?

  26. how close to a reasonable approximation of the ideal does it come
    Anarch, I gave you my measure, since I don’t know yours, a rhetorical question.

  27. Anarch, I gave you my measure, since I don’t know yours, a rhetorical question.
    Since you don’t know mine, a rhetorical question what?

  28. “Pakistan was a democracy for several periods (between military juntas) in the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s.”
    Yes, it was, if you believe the label is the most important thing, not whether it was a kleptocracy incompetently run by a combination of oligarchy/dictatorship and susceptible to military over-throw.
    Russia, also, is a “democracy.” Ferdinand Marcos ran a “democracy” until he made himself President-for-life. There are endless examples of such “democracies.”
    I’m not clear on what the virtues of such “democracies” are, however.

  29. Pakistan model than, say, the India model
    Two points
    First, I’m wondering what you think the difference is between the two models.

    Timmy, Mr. Punctuation can be your friend.
    Laying that aside, the difference is that India, despite all the stresses it has lived through, has always been a true democracy, and has remained so, put to the greatest test when a would-be dictator, Indira Gandhi, gave up the government when she lost an election. Civilian leadership has always maintained control, unlike the pseudo-democracy of Pakistan, and the intermittent semi-democracy/semi-militarchy of Turkey (looking better as it does for, oh, a whole few years now).

  30. Point taken, Garu re: Pakistan’s kleptocracy. I was in a glass-half-full phase of my life when I wrote about Pakistani democracy.
    Point re: the differences between India & Pakistan is also true; India, in fact, has a functioning and fairly robust democracy.

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