Via Drezner, a necessary read on the mistakes made in the planning for the aftermath of the Iraq war. The Administration’s mistakes in Iraq have been long-discussed and are well known — indeed, per General Shinseki’s pre-war testimony, many of the mistakes were known as they were being made. Larry Diamond, former Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, now lays out the long-term consequences of these initial errors:
Many of the original miscalculations made by the Bush administration are well known. But the early blunders have had diffuse, profound, and lasting consequences-some of which are only now becoming clear. The first and foremost of these errors concerned security: the Bush administration was never willing to commit anything like the forces necessary to ensure order in postwar Iraq. From the beginning, military experts warned Washington that the task would require, as Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki told Congress in February 2003, “hundreds of thousands” of troops. For the United States to deploy forces in Iraq at the same ratio to population as NATO had in Bosnia would have required half a million troops. Yet the coalition force level never reached even a third of that figure. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his senior civilian deputies rejected every call for a much larger commitment and made it very clear, despite their disingenuous promises to give the military “everything” it asked for, that such requests would not be welcome. No officer missed the lesson of General Shinseki, whom the Pentagon rewarded for his public candor by announcing his replacement a year early, making him a lame-duck leader long before his term expired. Officers and soldiers in Iraq were forced to keep their complaints about insufficient manpower and equipment private, even as top political officials in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) insisted publicly that greater military action was necessary to secure the country.
There are three points:
1. Mass still matters. Technology may carry the day against conventional forces, but it will not carry the day against irregulars. Indeed, technology can become something of a mirage, giving the decisionmaker the feeling of power without actually confering power. (Note to Bush and Kerry: our enemies in the War on Terror are virtually all irregulars. Draw your own conclusions regarding the necessary size of the military.)
2. These errors could have been, and should have been, avoided. Shinseki’s pre-war testimony was clear on the point, but Tommy Franks’ “American Soldier” (a good read) also alludes to the paucity of the post-war plan (Phase IV). Moreover, though General Franks remains a true believer in Phases I-III of his Iraq War plan — and with some justificiation, at least to this layperson — the book allows that the orthodox view would have provided more troops even then. Sometimes, it bears remembering, an orthodoxy exists for a reason. (And sometimes it doesn’t — see Franks’ battles with meddling Joint Chiefs.)
3. The war is far from won. To focus on only one particular: If we fail to destroy Sadr utterly — kill or jail Sadr, and disperse his forces — our best-case scenario is that Sadr becomes the Iraqi version Arafat: A disingenuous “spokesperson” for an unpredictable and restless group, enforcing what security he can with thugs and condoning (if not actively participating in) terrorism against the central government. Needless to say, that’s not a good thing.
Update: Gary Farber notes in comments that he blogged on this article a few days ago. My apologies, Gary: I do read you; I must have missed it.
“Via Drezner,….”
Sniffles. No one reads me. I only posted this four days ago. Woe. Woe. Why dost I bother? Alas. Alack. My tree falls in the forest, but no one hears. (Why, yes, it’s all about me.)
Your points are all good ones. But, it seems to me there also needs to be a plan to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people (if that’s possible), beyond the military plan. If such a “Marshall Plan” exists, it escapes my view.
Not sure this isn’t the same point Roxanne is making (and Lord knows I have no desire to offer Rumsfeld an out on this), but had we imported 500,000 troops for improved security, wouldn’t that have looked and felt so much more like a full out occupation?
had we imported 500,000 troops for improved security, wouldn’t that have looked and felt so much more like a full out occupation?
Probably. But given that 1) it would’ve been called an occupation if our forces consisted of two Navy cooks assigned to the presidential palace, 2) it is an occupation until such time as full sovereignty is transferred to an Iraqi government which no longer requires us to provide it with a military, and 3) we want to actually succeed instead of looking less imperialistic in the process of losing, I’d say that’s the least of our concerns insofar as how large a force we should’ve used.
good points Catsy…just playing devil’s advocate.
Sorry, Gary. Missed it. (I do read you fairly regularly.) I’ll revise the post to note your catch.
To Roxanne & Ed: I’m not certain if there’s anything we could have done in Iraq to make it a success. However, a large number of additional troop at the beginning of the occupation may have made a crucial difference in restoring order, restoring basic services (electricity, garbage pickup, water, etc.), and “sealing” (to the extent such a thing is possible) Iraq’s borders. After the first few months, it may have been possible to reduce the number of troops — or disperse them — to lessen the feeling of an “occupation.”*
*That said, I come from the “feelings matter less than most think” camp: My sense is that Iraqis might have accepted more troops if they saw real improvements (which would have resulted, in part, from having more troops).
Jeebus, Gary, there is plenty of evidence that Fafnir reads you! Why should you care about lowly us? (as I quickly make sure Gary’s link is in my “Best Blogs” folder so he doesn’t go off on me).
One of the early consequences of the low troop count was the early decision (ny early June or so) not to disarm private militias, and actually use them to some extent to keep order. This included Sadr’s militia at the time.
These forces do not include the irregular guerilla fighters, but the openly armed such as the Peshmerga or the Badr corps.
Sadr is not the only one with an open and private army, nor is his the largest or best equiped — he just happens to be the only one who is fighting now.
The only thing preventing Iraq from devolving into warlordism is the presence of American troops, and we are essentially one faction headed by Alawi. At least, that’s probably how Iraqis see it.
Most of the others have the sense not to confront us, while Sadr is trying to score political points by confronting us. I suspect everyone is waiting for the chance to use their power to carve out a piece of the actio for themselves. I also suspect that everyone is holding onto their militias for just this reason.
Hmpf. I’ve seen no evidence whatever that there was *any* planning for the occupation. Unless you count accepting the grateful thanks of the cheering multitudes, as they all swear fealty to Chalabi.
You cannot fight with what you do not have. I hear constant complaints about how American soldiers are overstretched. Where do you think those extra 200,000 or so troops were to have come from?
America’s military strength lies in well-trained and motivated troops with high-end equipment. You cannot simply find one or two hundred thousand extra, high-quality troops.
Additionally, if Bush had committed a massive build-up similar to the first war, people would now be complaining about how he gave too much time for Saddam to prepare asymetrical defences. The IEDs and car bombs would still be happening. There would still be seemingly random mortar attacks and whatnot. This is a necessary consequence of such a war and occupation.
Your last point is out to lunch. Arafat had the support of the majority of Palestinians, some likely thinking that he was not hardcore enough. Sadr has a small “army” of local goons, Iranians, and other foreign fighters. He is not supported by the major Shia clerics. Sadr is small potatoes.
Examination after the fact is a necessary tool for future success. It is good that people are looking at places where better decisions could have been made, with more information of course. It should not be used, however, to unduly criticize those who actually had to make the tough decisions.
just playing devil’s advocate.
Points for the effort, Edward.