Basra

by hilzoy

One way to get a sense of what might happen when we leave Iraq is to watch what happens in Basra now that the British are leaving. There are some things Basra cannot tell us: what will happen to Kirkuk, whether Turkey will invade Iraqi Kurdistan, what the war between Sunni and Shi’a will look like. But it can give us a sense of how the struggle for power among different groups in predominantly Shi’a areas might look. And so it is worth watching.

The Christian Science Monitor has published an article that gives us a good sense of the state of play now, as the British are pulling back:

“With the British exit earlier this month, which some analysts say is a prelude to the 5,500-strong contingent’s complete withdrawal from Iraq, comes great uncertainty for this city: Will Iran bolster its strategic foothold? Will the Shiite militias control the streets? Is the Iraqi Army strong enough to mediate the fight between rival parties?

What happens here may provide a window on the future for the rest of Iraq.

This is a city that operates according to a fragile balance of military force, fear, cronyism, and business interests. All of Iraq is perilous. But the violence and fear in Basra takes place mostly outside the sphere of Sunni-Shiite killings. Al Qaeda is not a factor.

Basra is a predominately Shiite city, yet it is still imbued with fear of kidnappings, assassinations, and being caught in the wrong place at the wrong time.

This instability reveals that the violence in Iraq is not only sectarian or the result of insurgent activity, but is also caused by deep-seated political and tribal rivalries and an intense scramble for power. (…)

In the fight between Shiite factions, Mr. Sadr’s army has emerged as the most formidable force.

The militia is said to number 17,000 in Basra alone and is divided into 40 company-size military units, according to a senior Iraqi security official. Little is known about their local leader, Muntasir al-Maliki, who had replaced a commander killed by British forces in late May, except what’s said about him having killed his own father a few years ago because he was an unrepentant supporter of the former regime.

They control multiple units in the 14,500-strong police force, and hold sway in hospitals, the education board, the university, ports and oil terminals, and the oil products and electricity distribution companies, says a Basra-based, Iraqi researcher. (…)

“The [Sadrist] movement is basically a state within a state in Basra that is able to confront the occupation,” [the researcher] says. “No one dares say a word and no one really knows who’s in control of the movement.”

With the British largely now out of the picture, many expect the Mahdi Army to turn on its main rival – the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, known by Iraqis simply as “the Majlis,” or council. It’s the dominant Shiite party in the ruling coalition of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.”

The article continues to explain who the other major players are, and what kind of position they are in. It’s long, but worth reading in its entirety. It also has a useful guide to the various groups operating in the city.

The government is trying to regain control of the city, its police force, and its government from various militia groups, chiefly the Mahdi Army. It does not seem to have been particularly successful as yet. This bears watching.