by Eric Martin
During the debate last Friday, John McCain, as predicted, spent much time lauding The Surge as one of the greatest strategies in the history modern warfare. In so doing, he misattributed every positive development in Iraq to its influence, while exaggerating the parameters and permanence of those encouraging trends. On the flip side, McCain spoke, again in hyperbolic pathos, of the dire consequences that would have stemmed from a decision not to implement The Surge.
One such horrible in the parade marshalled by McCain is the supposed increase in Iranian influence that would have resulted had we commenced withdrawing from Iraq according to Obama’s preference, rather than increased our troop presence via The Surge. This is a line of attack that McCain has used quite frequently in the past and, despite the fact that it is divorced from the reality of the situation, I suspect that it is an argument that we will hear repeated often over the coming weeks. After all, McCain has proven to be stubbornly immune to the censure of the fact checkers.
Nevertheless, Reidar Visser is doing his part, while parsing the recent Pentagon report on Iraq, to point out that our Surge-related efforts to help Maliki and his allies in the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq consolidate control over Iraq isn’t what one could rightly describe as an exercise in containing or rolling back Iranian influence. Quite the opposite:
The second main problem in the report has to do with the Pentagon’s take on Iranian influences in Iraq. The Department of Defense simply refuses do deal open-mindedly with the possibility of pro-Iranian influences inside the current Iraqi government. Instead the report brusquely asserts, “despite long-standing ties between Iraq and some members of the GoI, Tehran’s influence campaign is beginning to strain that relationship due to the rising perception that Iran poses a significant threat to Iraqi sovereignty.” Maybe it is the overuse of acronyms that prevents Pentagon analysts from detecting the problem here? Surely, when ISOF are conducting COIN with IP support to defeat the JAM and SGs and other undesirables, it all sounds so well organised that it almost comes across as unthinkable that Iranian interests could conceivably be served by these actions. At any rate, not one word is said about the massive Iranian influence in Najaf where the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq dominates, or about the repeated complaints by Shiite tribal leaders in the south that the government of Iraq is too close to Iran, or the continued praise for Iran by members of the Badr brigade, one of Washington’s supposed key allies among the Shiites of Iraq.
It is assumptions like these that drive the report authors to exaggerate again and again the significance of Nuri al-Maliki and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim turning against some of their own Shiite enemies. Repeatedly, Maliki’s operations against Sadrists in Basra and elsewhere are described as the ultimate sign of a national attitude and something that should prompt Sunnis and the Arab world at large to instantly embrace the Maliki government (pp. vi, 8). Symptomatically, the decision by one relatively minor and office-seeking Sunni group to revert to their role in the government before the summer is spinned as “a welcome sign of re-engagement by Sunni Arabs at the national level” on p. 1. But it is the basic assumption that Iranian hands are only controlling and benefitting from the Sadrists and the “special groups” that is problematic. Instead Pentagon analysts should bear in mind what their “ally” Sadr al-Din al-Qabbanji of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq said about these matters in the Tehran-based ISCI newspaper Al-Muballigh al-Risali back in 1999 on 15 February, when he furiously criticised Muhammad al-Sadr for daring to start a revolt in Iraq without reference to Iran’s leadership: “We need to treat Khamenei’s leadership in the same fashion as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr treated Khomeini’s leadership”, i.e. the supremacy of the leader of the Iranian republic should never be challenged. In other words: Historically, the unpredictable Sadrists have always been a problem and not an asset to Iran and ISCI; in 2007 they appeared to finally get better control of the situation as Muqtada was left with no other option than to flee to Iran at the start of the surge. But instead, the Pentagon refers to “recognition of Coalition and ISF tactical superiority” as the main cause of the weakening of the Sadrists.
I recognize that this is, perhaps, a detail-heavy story for the media to fully digest and master. But getting a grasp of the minutiae isn’t necessary to form a simple corrective. In essence, McCain is trumpeting the anti-Iranian bona fides of various political parties (ISCI, Badr, Dawa) that were formed in Iran by the Iranian regime (one trained, militarily, by a branch of the Quds force that McCain considers a terrorist organization) and/or took shelter there for much of the 1980s and 1990s. They each, to some extent, actually aided Iran against Iraq in the war between those two nations. That’s kind of important.
So to all you talking heads who are no doubtedly reading this blog, go for the nickel version: The Shiite political parties in charge in Iraq strongly tilt toward Iran – their traditional patrons. So how does McCain’s plan to help those parties to extend their writ in Iraq lessen Iran’s influence?
I mean, how’s Iran gonna recover from that blow?
I suspect when more of the facts of the American story in Iraq filter out, we’ll find that State and the Pentagon have been at loggerheads, and that in fact a great deal of diplomatic activity preceded the Surge, including forging some kind of agreement with the Iranians that led to the Iranians brokering the Maliki-Sadr ceasefire. Whether the Iranians subsequently felt like they were burned on that deal or not, I don’t know. I’d say Tehran is waiting for 4 Nov like the rest of us in any case to plot their next move.
Mind you, I could be judging the Pentagon harshly. It might also just not be worth it for people like Petreus, whose political ambitions or lack thereof I’ve found hard to read, to correct the record of those politicians with a vested interest in the Surge storyline (primarily McCain). It’s not clear to me whether Petreus is just McCain’s boy at this point, or whether he’s actually not all that comfortable with being his informal running-mate.
Either way, if Obama wins, I expect Petreus to be ‘promoted’ out of anyplace where he can interfere in the briefest amount of time that might still be considered seemly.
I was actually a bit disappointed in Obama in the first debate when he didn’t hammer on this a bit more. The general point is pretty clear — invading Iraq has installed a pro-Iran government, which would seem to be a strategic error, not a tactical one ;-).
I wonder if that general point is somehow considered radioactive by the Obama camp, however.
Btw, Petreus may well be a fine commander. But his counter-insurgency manual was not in the slightest bit original, and I happen to doubt the Surge’s primacy in recent events, so without meaning to criticise the man, I do think his new reputation as counter-insurgent-mastermind is basically a classic example of politicians bolstering support for a crappy war by inventing a hero.
Then again, I’ve been drinking with Europeans.
Drinking with Europeans will do it every time. Petreus was a heck of a division commander. But his command in Iraq and the surge itself was more good timing than anything else. It may be the boy’s been promoted once too often.
“Symptomatically, the decision by one relatively minor and office-seeking Sunni group to revert to their role in the government before the summer is spinned as ‘a welcome sign of re-engagement by Sunni Arabs at the national level’ on p. 1.”
Argh! Spun. It’s is spun. Not “is spinned.”
On substance, I pointed out in another thread yesterday Alissa Rubin’s piece on the factional fighting in Iraq.
Over on Afghanistan: oops.