Post Successful Surge Victorious Iraq

by Eric Martin

There are a few stories emerging from "Post-Successful Surge Victorious Iraq" worth mentioning.

First, some ominous signs surrounding one of the biggest (if not the biggest) impediments to the establishment of a peaceful, stable Iraq going forward: the resolution of the internal/external refugee crisis.  The population of displaced Iraqis numbers between four and five million (roughly 15-20% of the pre-war population).  Many of those who have fled were either forced out (by threats and/or the killing of family members) or chose to leave due to the instability and dangers present in their neighborhoods.

The problem is that, regardless of the motive for leaving, the residences of these refugees have been, in almost every case, taken over by either the evictors or Iraqis who were themselves evicted from other parts of the country.  As one could imagine, this creates an extremely fraught situation.  There are competing claims to home ownership, historical community ties being ruptured and potential for a new round of "corrective" displacements – all infused with sectarian tensions and a recent history of bloodshed.  Actually, the bloodshed is ongoing despite the success of The Surge: last month alone, there were 366 Iraqi civilian and security forces deaths from political violence that were reported in the press – actual numbers were likely higher as the media doesn’t catch them all.  That’s quite a complex knot to disentangle.

The Iraqi government is making some noises about addressing the problem, but thus far, there has been more talk than action. For example, the Maliki government recently declared that all those that took over homes illegally must vacate the premises, but enforcement of that decree has been non-existent.  Further, Maliki has been offering cash and other inducements to Iraqis abroad, and moving to shut down refugee camps in neighboring countries, but the follow-through on the assistance, again, has been underwhelming.  Marc Lynch offers his take on an article appearing in the Arab media:

Iraqi refugees from abroad: government not keeping its promises just giving us $120 and a pat on the back, instead of $700 and material support, they complain in story from Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat. What, a gap between Iraqi government’s rhetoric and implementation? I’d be shocked, shocked to learn that.

According to McClatchy, the lack of more comprehensive financial assistance is not the worst of it:

Only a small fraction of the roughly 5 million Iraqis who’ve fled their neighborhoods in fear since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion have gone back, although returns have picked up since the Iraqi government last month began urging people home. […]

Many Iraqi families have returned to their old homes in peace, but a disturbing trend already is emerging: They’re being targeted and attacked, and in some cases killed, for trying to go home. Some have been threatened. Others have found explosives tied to their front doors. Some have had their homes blown up.

The trend, along with an uptick in sectarian and ethnic violence in northern Iraq and growing tensions among rival Shiite factions in the south, is a worrisome development for American political and military leaders who’re increasingly eager to declare victory in Iraq so more U.S. troops can be sent to Afghanistan.

This will, unfortunately, only get worse – and the alternative is equally unsavory.  If the Iraqi refugee populations residing in squalor in foreign countries remains exceedingly high, there is the potential for broader unrest.  Such refugee populations are historically fertile grounds for radicalization and, in turn, such beleagured refugee clusters tend to destabilize host and neighboring states. 

Speaking of sectarian violence, the plight of Iraq’s Christians shows no sign of abatement:

Christians in Mosul are fleeing their homes after a spate of killings this week that left 12 Christians dead in one of the largest Christian communities in Iraq.

The killings follow large protests by the community last month against the passage of the provincial elections law. An article that would give representation to Christians and other minorities was removed from the law before its passage.

Now the last safe haven for Christians is gone, said Canon Andrew White the vicar of St. George’s church in Baghdad.

After a spree of killings and forced evictions of Iraqi Christians in Baghdad last year, many fled to Mosul. But even there they could not escape the danger. In February of this year the Archbishop Paulos Faraj Raho of Mosul was kidnapped and killed. […]

Christians once were estimated to be about 3 percent of the Iraqi population or about 800,000 people.

But as Iraq grew bloody and violent the Christian community dwindled. Now some estimate that more than half of Iraq’s Christians have fled. White believes that the Christian community is about a quarter of the estimated 800,000.

Some have accused the Kurdish peshmerga militia of being behind the anti-Christian activities due to the Christians’ opposition to Kurdish obectives with respect to regional laws, but it is unclear exactly who the perpetrators are.

As for the democratic process, there are serious problems on that front as well:

U.S. and Iraqi officials are seeing a shift in violence in Iraq from mass car bombings to assassinations using magnetic bombs, weapons with silencers and bicycle bombs. As provincial elections approach, some officials worry that assassinations will increase as political parties try to eradicate their competitors.

"Some of the organizations that are seeking political power are resorting to intimidation and violence," said Maj. Gen. Michael L. Oates, the commander of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, whose area of command includes most of southern Iraq. "So you’ll see individual bombs used against a prominent member of a party. I personally think we will see an uptick of that type of violence as we go into the election cycle because . . . the way some people deal with political tension here is to eliminate the other parties by using violence." […]

The Ministry of Interior has issued a warning asking people not to park in public places to avoid militants attaching magnetic bombs to vehicles. The weapon is then remotely detonated using a cell phone.

That’s quite a warning: Don’t park your car in public due to risk of bombings. 

Interestingly, the US military continues to blame these assassinations on its twin bete noirs: al-Qaeda in Iraq and the "Special Groups" that are supposedly comprised of Sadrists that receive training from Iran. 

"What we’re seeing is a change in tactics by both al Qaida and the (Shiite) special groups, or the special rogue elements that have been trained in Iran. What you’re seeing is they are conducting intimidation assassinations against (Iraqi) government officials," Odierno told USA Today.

Pinning all of Iraq’s political violence on these two factions is convenient.  This blame simultaneously helps the Iran hawks build the case for military confrontation with Iran, it muddies the waters with respect to the true front on the war against al-Qaeda (on the Afghan/Pakistan border, not Iraq), and it shields US policy makers from having to admit/confront uncomfortable facts: our putative allies in the Iraqi government have strong, historically-rooted connections to Iran (ISCI, Dawa) and/or have armed militias that pursue ulterior agendas (Badr, peshmerga).

The problem with this theory is that, well, it just doesn’t add up.  Consider the identities of the victims:

On Thursday, a prominent parliament member from the Shiite Muslim faction led by radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr was killed near his home when an explosive-laden motorcycle rammed his convoy. Saleh al Ugaili died in a Baghdad hospital of his wounds. […]

In the New Baghdad district of the capital, men with silencers have killed as many as seven people in the last two months, residents say. All were prominent Iraqi officers or members of Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr’s movement, they say. [emphasis added]

Either al-Qaeda in Iraq is able to pull off high-profile operations in Baghdad and parts of the Shiite south (Karbala for example) despite prior claims that they were on the run, and relegated to a small enclave in and around Mosul, or other parties are behind the assassinations of the Sadrists. 

Wonder who those could be?

Meanwhile, the McCain campaign is all worked up because Barack Obama won’t use the word victory to describe Iraq.  Blinded by partisanship I suppose.

9 thoughts on “Post Successful Surge Victorious Iraq”

  1. “The problem is that, regardless of the motive for leaving, the residences of these refugees have been, in almost every case, taken over by either the evictors or Iraqis who were themselves evicted from other parts of the country. As one could imagine, this creates an extremely fraught situation.”
    One, two, many Kirkuks!

  2. Eric, I said a long time ago your posts re too long but I’d like to add they are always worth the read. Good stuff here. I also think that the Bush-McPalin theme that the surge is working is at least partly a plan to be able to blame Obama as viloence rises in Iraq.

  3. Still awaiting the tape of Osama endorsing Obama in order to get the Son of Cain elected (worked perfectly against Kerry and I fear it would work again)

  4. U.S. and Iraqi officials are seeing a shift in violence in Iraq from mass car bombings to assassinations using magnetic bombs, weapons with silencers and bicycle bombs.
    This is good news as bicycle bombs are obviously more environmentally friendly. Now if we could just get the bicycle bombers to wear safety helmets…

  5. The assassination of the Sadrist politicians could have been by other Sadrists, which was suspected when Sadr’s Brother-in-Law got schwacked back in April. It’s pretty unlikely that Al-Qaeda could pull something off these days in the holy Shi’ite city of Karbala. They would last about two seconds, as the Iraqi Security Forces do not screw around down there. It’s most likely Shi’ite on Shi’ite fighting for power, which has been a big problem ever since I was over there.

  6. which has been a big problem ever since I was over there the occupation started the first weeks of the war

  7. Lt.Nixon, your link doesn’t support the suspicion, not really. Yes, there may have been some on the Sadrist movemnet that didn’t like him, but the list of possible suspects is much much more than other Sadrists.
    I agree, though, that Shi’te on Shi’ite violence is the most likely cause, much of it either condoned by or even encouraged by the Maliki government. And it is likely to get worse before it gets better.
    About the only measurement of the “success” of the surge has been the lowering (although hardly to an acceptable level) of the violence. By most other criteria, almost nothing has changed in Iraq in the area that really matters, which is getting a stable, fully representative government supported by the vast majority of the people. And when I say “supported” I mean recognized as legitimate.

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