by Eric Martin
Stephen Walt makes at least a few good points on the costs of the Afghanistan escalation/occupation. First, it will end up costing more than advertised in real dollars when all is said and done. Wars always do. Second, there are serious opportunity costs that rarely enter the equation. Health care reform and other domestic initiatives are jeopardized by Obama's gambit. Walt offers a few on the foreign policy front:
1. The new Japanese government is actively rethinking its security partnership with the United States, and while I don't think we should rush to accommodate all of their concerns, we certainly ought to be paying very close attention. But having just returned from a quick Asian trip, Obama is likely to put relations with Japan (and other key Asian allies) on the back burner. That would be a mistake, because a significant erosion in the U.S. position there would have far more significant effects than the outcome of the Afghan campaign. Mapping out a long-term security strategy for Asia will take time and attention, and that's precisely what Obama doesn't have right now.
2. The democratic government of Turkey has been carving out a more independent and influential position at the crossroad of Europe and Asia. Its recent decision to reject Israeli participation in a scheduled NATO military exercise (which led to the exercise being canceled) is one sign of this new independence, as is its more active engagement with Syria and Iran. This development is not necessarily a bad thing, if Turkey uses its growing influence constructively. But it is a new feature of the global scene that calls for sustained attention and a nuanced U.S. response, and I'll bet it doesn't get either.
3. Brazil is becoming a more independent and less deferential power here in the Western hemisphere. President Lula de Silva has opened more than 30 embassies around the world since 2003, remains on good terms with Venezualan strongman Hugo Chavez, has defended Iran's nuclear research program, and recently hosted Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Brasilia. Obama and Lula have exchanged letters on some of these issues, and Brasilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim has said there is "no crisis" between the two countries. But he has also said that the two countries "are in different latitudes" and "must get used to disagreeing." A stronger and more assertive Brazil will also create new diplomatic opportunities for other Latin American countries (who have long resented U.S. dominance in the Western hemisphere), as well as opportunities for other great powers. And might this herald a gradual erosion of the Monroe Doctrine?
I'd add the stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process to that list. Obama's inability to get real concessions from Netanyahu on a settlement freeze is costing Obama big time in terms of Arab public opinion - but then, so is his underlying decision to escalate in Afghanistan.
This opportunity cost argument is one that I made frequently with respect to the Iraq war during the Bush years. Alas, even under Obama, wars still suck up massive amounts of brain power, resources and energy all in pursuit of vague objectives with low probabilities for success, however defined. The United States could be getting more bang for the buck in terms of advancing its interests, bettering the lives of its citizens and bettering the lives of foreigners through policies other than more and longer wars. And yet…
We’re running “a race that’s long gone by…” us; next superpower, please.
Walt should read the articles he cites. From the NYTimes article
More important, the analysts say, these stirrings may also be the first signs of something that both Tokyo and Washington should have had years ago: a more open dialogue on a security relationship that has failed to keep up with the changing realities in Japan and, more broadly, in Asia.
Walt seems to think any change in relations is a bad thing and it would be better to pull out of Afghanistan so we can maintain the status quo elsewhere. Yet the article argues that this is something we should have had a long time ago. Walt also seems to think that it is a bad thing that the Monroe Doctrine is going to fade away. I’m not saying that we should have go stuck in Afghanistan in order to allow Japan more space to create Hatoyama’s East Asian Community, but constantly trying to take everything as an indictment of that war seems to be short sighted.
Quick reply: I think preventing another massive (9/11 level or higher) terrorist attack on American soil is easily more important than any of those listed*.
*I know we’ve all talked before about whether denying AQ a safe haven in Afghanistan helps this, and FTR, I am well aware that many reading this disagree
The demise of the Monroe Doctrine??? That comment indicates hyperbole, if not hysterics. The Monroe Doctrine was against European powers colonizing the Americas. In this case, there is an existing, legitimate government in Brazil that is spreading its wings. Two very different things which have absolutely no relationship with one another.
Is there any evidence that these issues would be better addressed if the United States were to completely withdraw from Afghanistan right now? Is there actual evidence that the Administration is stepping back from diplomatic and political engagement in Asia, or South America?
Is there any evidence that these issues would be better addressed if the United States were to completely withdraw from Afghanistan right now?
Yes, the evidence is the disparate amount of resources consumed by one, and denied the other.
Is there actual evidence that the Administration is stepping back from diplomatic and political engagement in Asia, or South America?
See above.
Walt seems to think any change in relations is a bad thing and it would be better to pull out of Afghanistan so we can maintain the status quo elsewhere.
Not necessarily. He just thinks we should have ample resources dedicated to managing the shifting realities.
Yet the article argues that this is something we should have had a long time ago.
Right, and Walt argues that it would be better if we had ample resources dedicated to managing the shifting realities given how vital the relationships are
I’m not saying that we should have go stuck in Afghanistan in order to allow Japan more space to create Hatoyama’s East Asian Community, but constantly trying to take everything as an indictment of that war seems to be short sighted.
Everything? Not really.
But to argue that policies that suck up massive amounts of resources and attention don’t actually suck up massive amounts of resources and attention is willful blindness.
There are finite amounts of US resources and attention.
“The Monroe Doctrine was against European powers colonizing the Americas. In this case, there is an existing, legitimate government in Brazil that is spreading its wings. Two very different things which have absolutely no relationship with one another.”
It’s possible that people in Latin America might disagree with you on that–iirc, some claim the Monroe Doctrine has been used by the US as a justification for our own interference in the affairs of other countries.
“Yes, the evidence is the disparate amount of resources consumed by one, and denied the other.”
What resources, precisely?
“Yes, the evidence is the disparate amount of resources consumed by one, and denied the other.”
What resources, precisely? Specifically, what war resources are being consumed and how would they be applied elsewhere?
What resources, precisely?
Manpower, money and focus at State, the DoD, USAID, CIA, DIA, InR, the White House, Congress, Senate, etc.
There is only so much manpower, money and focus to go around within those groups/agencies/government bodies. Their budgets are only so big. Their staffs only so large.
When one policy consumes the lion’s share of those resources, other imperatives are starved.
See, for example, how the Afghan mission was starved after we invaded Iraq (actually, the starvation began before we invaded as assets were moved away from Afghanistan in preparation for the invasion). But it wasn’t just the Afghan mission. Other, non-military developments were given short shrift because so much of the foreign policy apparatus was sucked in by the vortex of Iraq.
Specifically, what war resources are being consumed and how would they be applied elsewhere
Not just war resources. Wars suck in so much of our foreign policy apparatus that it goes beyond “war resources.”
“There is only so much manpower, money and focus to go around within those groups/agencies/government bodies. Their budgets are only so big. Their staffs only so large.”
So have there been massive re-assignments of key staff to specifically address the Afghanistan war? Are Turkish, or Japanese, or Israeli policy experts being asked to address issues regarding Afghanistan? How much will the current budget for foreign policy concerns shift to specifically deal with Afghanistan?
“Not just war resources. Wars suck in so much of our foreign policy apparatus that it goes beyond “war resources.”
So you view the foreign policy apparatus as being unable to substantively engage in other policy areas during the course of a war?
So have there been massive re-assignments of key staff to specifically address the Afghanistan war?
Why “massive” and “key” and “specifically?”
So you view the foreign policy apparatus as being unable to substantively engage in other policy areas during the course of a war?
Why not simply “less able” as opposed to “unable?”
So have there been massive re-assignments of key staff to specifically address the Afghanistan war? Are Turkish, or Japanese, or Israeli policy experts being asked to address issues regarding Afghanistan? How much will the current budget for foreign policy concerns shift to specifically deal with Afghanistan?
Look at hiring priorities and funding for new hires. Look at the assignment of analysts. New hires are not being made in those areas, new studies are not being funded, prioritization is not accruing to them. Many analysts are being reassigned. USAID is tilting heavily toward the region.
This happened during Iraq too. I’m kind of surprised that this sounds so unusual to you. When the US government undertakes a massive new policy imperative, resources are dedicated to that policy imperative. Away from other areas.
If you want specifics, ask the agency heads.
Also important: the amount of high level prioritzation. Our upper level people are going to be focused on Afghanistan, so even where good work/suggestions are emerging from the ranks on these issues, policy will languish for lack of high level attention/prioritization.
So you view the foreign policy apparatus as being unable to substantively engage in other policy areas during the course of a war?
Wars have, historically, tended to consume the lion’s share of attention and policy focus. This is not actually a controversial statement. We can sometimes manage to chew gum and walk at the same time (sometimes quite well), but some areas will inevitably be neglected.
Everything? Not really.
Well, you’ve mentioned or linked to mosquito nets, health care, US infrastructure, Asia-US relations, Israel-Palestinian problems, and the Monroe Doctrine. What’s next, Tiger Woods?
And I am unclear on how something like this would be better dealt with if we weren’t in Afghanistan. Do you really think that Netanyahu would ease up on Obama if Afghanistan wasn’t on his plate? Or that it would be better to have US forces remain at Futenma, despite the fact that the majority of Okinawans want the US out? (Sorry, the equivalent English link is behind the paywall, but the graph should be clear enough)
It is appealing to think that everything is fungible and 1$ unspent here immediately goes to the wonderful places where we can all agree that they need to be spent. But the world doesn’t often work that way. And when it does, it is often a sign that you are missing something.
Well, you’ve mentioned or linked to mosquito nets, health care, US infrastructure, Asia-US relations, Israel-Palestinian problems, and the Monroe Doctrine. What’s next, Tiger Woods?
Well, I guess that’s everything then.
Joking aside, that is very dishonest of you.
I didn’t actually make all of those items an “indictment of the war.” Mosquito nets, I mentioned, was one far cheapier, easier and more likely to succeed way to help people if that is our motive (it obviously isn’t). I never said we would be funding that effort but for the war. So, no.
It is appealing to think that everything is fungible and 1$ unspent here immediately goes to the wonderful places where we can all agree that they need to be spent. But the world doesn’t often work that way.
Right. But I never said it does. So, nice strawman.
But this much is true: if you spend 50% of your budget on something, you can’t then spend 75% of your budget on something else. So, health care and infrastructure (and everything else) only receive a certain percentage of the budget because the military takes up a certain percentage. Large increases in the military’s share will come at the expense of other possible spending programs. At a time when larger investments are needed in health care and infrastructure (and other non-military priorities), large increases in military spending are particularly painful.
That is not everything, but it’s not nothing either.
Do you really think that Netanyahu would ease up on Obama if Afghanistan wasn’t on his plate?
I think Obama could dedicate more resources, energy, political capital and high level personnel to try to move that situation. Do you think that his efforts with respect to this issue (that he made such a big rhetorical push for) haven’t suffered at all for lack of attention in the upper echelons/prioritization?
Or that it would be better to have US forces remain at Futenma, despite the fact that the majority of Okinawans want the US out?
No, it would be better if we weren’t so distracted with Iraq and Afghanistan that we can respond intelligently to Japanese concerns and work out a mutually agreeable shift in our policy.
“At a time when larger investments are needed in health care and infrastructure (and other non-military priorities), large increases in military spending are particularly painful.”
I’m pretty sure this statement is acknowledged by everyone. I guess the argument is not whether our commitment in Afghanistan is a miserable sacrifice; it’s whether it’s a worthwhile sacrifice. It’s really on that plane that the argument needs to be held (although the issue is somewhat moot since the sacrifice will be made – I guess the next potential pivot allowing for public opinion to influence policy is in 2011.)
If the country decides it doesn’t support the plan in Afghanistan, what’s the alternative plan? Whom do we support now? Should we support Congressional candidates who want to withdraw funding? I’m inclined to support Obama in the hope that he at least has a cohesive strategy. I don’t have a lot of faith in it, but as Hedrik Hertzberg’s New Yorker comment points out – there are no good options.
I’m pretty sure this statement is acknowledged by everyone. I guess the argument is not whether our commitment in Afghanistan is a miserable sacrifice; it’s whether it’s a worthwhile sacrifice.
Well, I’m currently arguing on this thread with two people that don’t seem to agree, though I hope I am wrong in my interpretation of their arguments as I thought it was a rather uncontroversial assertion to begin with.
“This happened during Iraq too. I’m kind of surprised that this sounds so unusual to you. When the US government undertakes a massive new policy imperative, resources are dedicated to that policy imperative. Away from other areas.”
I don’t recall saying that it sounded unusual. What I asked was if you could cite resources, including intellectual, that are being re-assigned to deal with the Afghanistan war that are capable of addressing the other policy issues raised by Walt.
“If you want specifics, ask the agency heads.”
Well if you don’t really know what or how resources are being re-allocated to address Afghanistan, on what basis are you determining that the escalation will negatively impact other areas of foreign policy?
I suppose I should also ask: do you advocate a complete military and diplomatic disengagement from Afghanistan? If not, then in your terms, how much ‘resources’ are you willing to devote to Afghanistan?
Joking aside, that is very dishonest of you.
Well, I think ‘willful blindness’ is just an ad hom, so I guess we are even. Though the ‘indictment of the war’ was more directed at Walt’s list, I’m not going to claim that it doesn’t seem like you view everything through the prism of Afghanistan. And it sure seems that the Walt article is seized on by you because he lists potential negative impacts that Walt has conjured up. Yet when it is pointed out that those negative points are incoherent, rather than address the criticism, you argue that we should have ‘ample resources’. Precisely what those resources are is never stated by Walt or by you.
While you claim that my point about imaginary fungibility is a strawman, everything you’ve posted is focussed on precisely that sort of notion, whether it is mosquito nets, or Steve Clemons estimating the cost of one soldier in the field. And then you make an argument based on fungibility. Amazingly resilient straw, it seems.
As for the Futenma issue, do you believe that Obama would make a big rhetorical push to vacate the base if he didn’t have Afghanistan to deal with? Given that Futenma is an artifact of a Cold War view of the world, with Okinawa as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, it is hard to imagine the field of play being remarkably better for not being in Afghanistan, but it may be like the unseen advantages of maintaining a Monroe Doctrine that I am missing. I’ve argued that we have to face Afghanistan because that is the way conflicts are going to play out in the future, so it is hard to imagine that withdrawing from that conflict is going to encourage the military to face up to that fact. That what is happening in Afghanistan is in some ways, a proxy war between the COIN advocates and the folks who think that the Raptor and the Crusader and the B2 were appropriate expenditures is something I have noted, but you seem to gloss over that. If the COIN advocates were to throw their hands up, who do think you think wins the procurement battles, the folks who wanted the Crusader or the Raptor or the folks who want to spend it on mosquito nets?
Finally, I’d just echo the sentiment that several have expressed about Obama taking the morally correct, something to the effect that he is trying something (that Sapient notes has the value of at least some coherency) that may be the last, best hope, but that all of the options suck. I think I have been pretty clear about this in what I have posted, but if you are going to attach oblique summaries that claim the opposite without trying to even confirm that is the case, then you should really avoid invoking dishonesty.
Yet when it is pointed out that those negative points are incoherent, rather than address the criticism, you argue that we should have ‘ample resources’. Precisely what those resources are is never stated by Walt or by you.
Not incoherent. I didn’t get that from you. Rather, you made mention of a timeline and other factors that seemed irrelevant to the fact that regardless of the preferred outcome, these evolving issues need more time and focus. I listed the resources upthread that were not going to address these issues (again, regardless of preferred outcome). I don’t agree with everything Walt says in terms of solutions, just that these issues require attention.
While you claim that my point about imaginary fungibility is a strawman, everything you’ve posted is focussed on precisely that sort of notion, whether it is mosquito nets, or Steve Clemons estimating the cost of one soldier in the field. And then you make an argument based on fungibility. Amazingly resilient straw, it seems.
No. Mosquito nets don’t fit here. I never said that “if we weren’t spending X dollars on Afghanistan, we would be spending them on mosquito nets for Africa.” I defy you to find that statement. You won’t of course. Hence, straw.
But is there fungibility in budgeted dollars? Yes, some. That was never disputed – I never said there was none. But I also never said that the spending would automatically go to the “wonderful places where we can all agree that they need to be spent” if we just shut off the spigot in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Rather, I noted that it would be impossible for the money to go elswehere if it was already allocated. That is, for it to even have a chance of ending up in a more productive use, it would have to not be allocated.
So, flimsy straw.
If the COIN advocates were to throw their hands up, who do think you think wins the procurement battles, the folks who wanted the Crusader or the Raptor or the folks who want to spend it on mosquito nets?
Neither. COIN advocates are not pushing for nets, and the procurement folks aren’t completely shut out by COIN’s ascendancy. COIN is still troop intensive, and troops still need material, vehicles and other costly items. The defense budget will increase massively under multi-decade COIN ops.
but if you are going to attach oblique summaries that claim the opposite without trying to even confirm that is the case, then you should really avoid invoking dishonesty.
If you don’t want me to suggest that you disregard the tradeoffs, stop arguing that there aren’t any, and that budget items aren’t fungible in the sense that they magically go to wonderful places if not spend on wars.
Well if you don’t really know what or how resources are being re-allocated to address Afghanistan, on what basis are you determining that the escalation will negatively impact other areas of foreign policy?
Zach, if I was getting paid by you or someone else, I would make it a research project. But if you need me to provide evidence that massively expensive and time consuming foreign policy endeavors such as our current project in Afghanistan use up massive amounts of money and other resources within our foreign policy apparatus, then I’m at a loss.
Certain presumptions taken at face value are necessary to advance the conversation. This is not a controversial notion. But if you don’t accept it, so be it. Wait for the evidence that will be more readily available years from now.
Futenma is an artifact of a Cold War view of the world, with Okinawa as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”
Wait, what has changed since the end of the Cold War that means that the US doesn’t need said “unsinkable aircraft carriers”? The ability for the US to use airbases close to the Asian mainland is an important deterrent to any ideas China might have about military interference (by proxy) in other Asian nations.
Perhaps this is on my mind since I just got back from Airstrip One, but US overseas air bases in strong allies are crucial to the air power projection at the heart of US military hegemony.
I don’t want to put words into your mouth or jump on irrelevant side points, but I’m curious how one would reconcile support for an interventionist foreign policy with indifference to the logistical support that it requires.
I view the maintenance of US military hegemony as essential to providing peace and stability in the world, and view the continuance of relatively unimportant conflicts like Iraq and to a much lesser extent Afghanistan as dangerous both because of the cost and distraction and because they undermine US moral standing which in turn undermines the logistical support from other countries that the US requires.
Having said that, I don’t think Afghanistan is a great threat to US moral standing. At least not yet.
“Do you really think that Netanyahu would ease up on Obama if Afghanistan wasn’t on his plate?
I think Obama could dedicate more resources, energy, political capital and high level personnel to try to move that situation. Do you think that his efforts with respect to this issue (that he made such a big rhetorical push for) haven’t suffered at all for lack of attention in the upper echelons/prioritization?”
Ack. I agree that Afghanistan is almost certainly sucking up important fiscal and political resources that could be better employed elsewhere.
On the other hand I’m pretty sure that the situations in Israel and Japan aren’t significantly among them.
With no Afghanistan I am relatively certain that Obama could waste lots of effort on Netanyahu, but I’m also pretty sure that it would be a waste (unless he could credibly signal something very dramatic like cutting off a majority of US aid to Israel, which would likely cause internal (to the US) political problems which would jeopardize lots of the domestic policies Obama would rather deal with. So that isn’t going to happen).
And the Japan thing I’m even less convinced is related.
If you wanted to argue that Afghanistan was making our Iran/Saudi Arabia policy complicated, you’d be on much stronger ground.
And the Japan thing I’m even less convinced is related.
I don’t know if “related” is what I or Walt meant. Just that these situations require time, energy and attention to manage. Things that will be in short supply with the jealous mistress of Afghanistan assuming so much.
As for Israel/Palestine, you have a point. Still, I think active engagement has a value, and is the only hope for a breakthrough.
The ability for the US to use airbases close to the Asian mainland is an important deterrent to any ideas China might have about military interference (by proxy) in other Asian nations.
The ability for the US to use airbases close the Asian mainland would last days if not hours in any throw-down with the PRC.
The 21st century is not 1950.
(If you read the sentence you quoted you would note it says “by proxy”. But this is really irrelevant to the main point here.)
That said I’m not really sold that Afghanistan itself is preventing us from doing any of the other things talked about here except in an extremely indirect financial sense. Iraq is and especially was much more of an impediment to military cooperation because it was viewed as wholly illegitimate by much of the world, including many crucial US allies. Like, say, Turkey. I don’t think that Afghanistan is viewed nearly the same way.
I think my views on this are probably bending to inevitability. I don’t like our continuing occupation but given that my preferred choice of a rapid withdrawal without further build-up (because I don’t think there’s anything very useful we can do there) is nowhere near being on the cards, and the choices seem to have been between a dragged-out under-resourced war, or allocating more resources now so we can declare victory a year from now and then get out, I guess I’ll take the latter. I guess Obama did too. $100 billion/50,000 troops every year for 10 years or $200 billion/100,000 troops for maybe 2 years… well I can do that math, even if I think neither option is really worth it.
Wait, what has changed since the end of the Cold War that means that the US doesn’t need said “unsinkable aircraft carriers”? The ability for the US to use airbases close to the Asian mainland is an important deterrent to any ideas China might have about military interference (by proxy) in other Asian nations…I’m curious how one would reconcile support for an interventionist foreign policy with indifference to the logistical support that it requires.
First, I don’t think that military deterrents against other states are really an option in a global economy, so the idea of an extraterritorial base doesn’t really sit well. It is eventually going to come out that nuclear weapons were/are stored, if not in Futenma, at the other US bases and it would be far sighted to leave the Futenma base, especially since it might be the most dangerous base in terms of civilian safety in the world. I’ve also advocated that intervention be done on a international basis, but in the case of Afghanistan we can’t unring the bell.
I view the maintenance of US military hegemony as essential to providing peace and stability in the world
I think that one of the current bottlenecks for world peace and stability is US military hegemony and what is essential is the development of a relatively robust group of international actors willing to take steps to intervene rather than a single hegemon deciding when or when not to. In fact, the militaries of nations that do not have as strong a culture as that of the US in terms of the application of strictly military force are probably necessary.
To address your second comment, I don’t think that a rapid withdrawal without further build up contributes to our moral standing, so we are left with the two options you name, though I think that the latter option, if it forces Karzai to deal problems of government corruption, will be a bit more than simply declaring victory.
No. Mosquito nets don’t fit here. I never said that “if we weren’t spending X dollars on Afghanistan, we would be spending them on mosquito nets for Africa.” I defy you to find that statement. You won’t of course. Hence, straw.
Eric in June
But do you get so worked up about a cheaper option: government funding to buy mosquito nets for pennies apiece? No. Charity is never as appealing as shock and awe.
link
So it only is mentioned as a cudgel to argue with and doesn’t reflect your take on reality? Good to know.
It would be a shame, indeed, if the weak-willed Obama Administration failed to respond to an European attempt to colonize the Americas . . . I can certainly see why Walt is concerned about erosion of the Monroe Doctrine.
So it only is mentioned as a cudgel to argue with and doesn’t reflect your take on reality? Good to know.
Huh? That is the most bizarre conclusion regarding one of my arguments that I think you’ve made, and from a recent history replete with bad faith readings of every argument I posit, that’s saying a lot.
I wrote: I never said that if the government wasn’t spending X on Afghanistan, it would be spending X on mosquito nets.
This was to counter your suggestion that I was arguing that the budgeted money was fungible, and that if not spent on Afghanistan, it would go to “wonderful places” that I prefer. You said I was naive to argue such.
I said, I wasn’t being naive about mosquito nets, because my point wasn’t that the government WOULD be funding them BUT FOR Afghanistan, just that it would be a cheaper, more effective way of helping to save lives. And if citizens were concerned with helping the lives of foreigners, war is a very bad way to go about it. So let’s push for change.
The quote you dug up…doesn’t change that at all. If anything, it backs up my read.
As for reality and cudgels:
The reality of the situation, which is my take, is that funding the purchase and distribution of mosquito nets would be a much cheaper, more effective way of helping to save lives. It also has the advantage of not involving bombing the people you’re trying to help.
It would be smarter if we did that instead.
However, and this is where I respond to your argument re: fungibility, I have never, ever, ever argued that such funds are fungible, and that if we weren’t engaged in war in Afghanistan, we would certainly be buying and distributing mosquito nets.
What part of that are you missing so completely?
“However, and this is where I respond to your argument re: fungibility, I have never, ever, ever argued that such funds are fungible, and that if we weren’t engaged in war in Afghanistan, we would certainly be buying and distributing mosquito nets.”
Then why even bring mosquito nets up if they are irrelevant to any substantive point you are trying to make in this posting.
If you are trying to make the arguement that the attention we are giving to Afghanistan is sucking up resources (of all kinds) that would be used elsewhere, then stick to those things the resources would be used for, not what, in a perfect world, you think they should be used for.
Then why even bring mosquito nets up if they are irrelevant to any substantive point you are trying to make in this posting.
Good point.
Problem: I didn’t bring up mosquito nets.
LJ did.
Funny thing is, as per your advice: I actually tried in repeated comments to carve out the issue of mosquito nets because…I wanted to keep the conversation limited to those things that the tied-up resources would be used for, not what, in a perfect world, I think they should be used for.
My attempts to do so were rebuffed repeatedly by LJ.
mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets mosquito nets
There. Are we done now? (sheesh)
please
I don’t see what’s wrong with the mosquito net analogy. Eric’s point, I think, is one I’m fond of making–going to war for humanitarian reasons is immoral, stupid and cost ineffective in most cases. (One possible exception would be to stop an ongoing genocide). Whether we would then spend massive sums of money on mosquito nets is sort of literal-minded. The point is that if we really were willing to spend massive amounts of money to help people, there are better ways to do it.
You could argue that we are spending massive amounts of money in Afghanistan because we have to bomb them for our own security, and since we’re doing it then it is our obligation to rebuild the country, especially since we’ve played a role in funding the death and destruction that’s been going on there since the Russians went in. But we’re more likely to spend 100 billion dollars on mosquito nets.
I tend to agree, Donald. But it seems like the mosquito nets have been siezed upon as some fatal flaw in Eric’s post, and won’t be let go of. That aside, yeah, there are myriad other ways to be spending all this money that would do more good (i.e. help people) and a lot less bad (i.e. kill people).
I raise some points about Walt’s concerns and Eric seizes on the word ‘everything’. I make a list of Eric’s previous concerns and note that he seems to think that this is a question of fungibility. He accuses me of being dishonest and posting straw and challenges me to prove otherwise. I link to a comment that shows otherwise. He claims that he tried to ‘carve out the issue’. Now, I have ‘repeatedly rebuffed’ him. Of course, if I didn’t ‘rebuff’, we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Funny, that.
As I’ve said before, if you are going to argue that we completely withdraw, argue that. Eric wants to have a Goldilocks intervention, not too big, not too small and most of all, not too expensive. Somehow, an over the horizon capability with a smaller footprint is not going to inflame the Afghanistan public as much. When it is pointed out that we have to stay engaged with Pakistan, he argues that there are two distinct flavors of Taliban. My argument is that the whole place is like a house of cards and you can’t just pull out the cards marked Afghanistan from the bottom of the house and expect everything else to stay the same. How do we withdraw from Afghanistan and not do the same for Jacobabad and Dalbandin? Yet somehow, the Monroe doctrine and relations with a country that has pledged 5 billion dollars to the civilian reconstruction of Afghanistan hang in the balance. Of course, maybe the Japanese could just dump it in a big pile in the middle of Afghanistan and it would automatically go to where is needed, thanks to the ‘incorruptible’ Afghanistan (as separate from the Pakistan) Taliban. It’s easy to see why Eric seized on mosquito nets.
LJ,
Honestly, you don’t appear interested in having an actual conversation.
So enjoy whatever little story you’ve concocted because every time I try to defend what I’ve actually written and my actual opinions, you distort it anyway. And then claim that plain words mean something other than their plain meanings.
It’s a waste of time, and a tedious one at that.
Again, you call me dishonest. What BS. Walt’s examples are faulty and I pointed that out and suggested that perhaps his premise is faulty. You took my criticism of Walt as criticism of your position. If the hat doesn’t fit, don’t stick your head in it. Or are you going to try to suggest that having 90% of your post be the article in question doesn’t mean that you actually agree with it in toto, a la Col. Gentile?
You hoover up any criticism that you think supports your position without actually considering why it does. For heaven’s sake, the Monroe Doctrine? I see you are now arguing in the next post (as you did previously) that Obama’s plan is somehow appropriate. I can point out the disconnect, but I can’t make you understand it.
Again, you call me dishonest. What BS.
Really? The whole nets thing was ridiculous. I never said if the government wasn’t spending money on Af/Pak, it would be buying nets. Full stop. You said I did say that. The link you provided did not prove that, but rather backed me up.
People like Donald Johnson can see my point clearly. It’s not that hard. I think you can too, but are being tendentious.
Somehow, an over the horizon capability with a smaller footprint is not going to inflame the Afghanistan public as much.
I never said so, nor have I said that inflaming the Afghan public (or not) was the key objective. Either dishonest or very confused.
When it is pointed out that we have to stay engaged with Pakistan, he argues that there are two distinct flavors of Taliban.
While I have pointed out the reality that there are different strains of Taliban, it was never in response to the suggestion that we need to stay engaged with Pakistan. That would be a total non-sequitur.
I agree that we need to stay engaged, I just disagree that the best way to do so is to pursue a multi-decades war in Afghanistan, with repeated incursions on Pakistani soil in pursuit thereof. That’s what I say when people push the need for engagement.
So are you dishonest or just reflexively trying to cast my arguments in a distorted light? I can’t say.
It’s easy to see why Eric seized on mosquito nets.
But I didn’t, and you know it. My first reference to them was that they didn’t belong on your list, and they should be left out of the discussion. The opposite of seizing on them, I wanted to remove them. You kept re-inserting them. My response: same as my first. You pressed on. My response: same.
Walt’s examples are faulty and I pointed that out and suggested that perhaps his premise is faulty.
Walt’s premise is spot on: Afghanistna will absorb resources that are needed to address other issues. While I don’t agree with each of his desired outcomes, I do agree that the situations need careful attention, resources and guidance to reach positive solutions.
Not sure why you’re having such a hard time with that concept, but there it is.
I see you are now arguing in the next post (as you did previously) that Obama’s plan is somehow appropriate.
No, what I argued was that Obama’s plan (if, and only if, the timeline is real) is not the worst case scenario – and considering some of the plans being floated, I can live with it. In that post I argued that an earlier exit would still be better.
In the next post, I suggest that the argument against the timeline centered around the “laying low” of the Taliban is absurd.
How is that a “disconnect”? Honestly?
I was surprised you didn’t mention Iran in connection with this post. Iran would be within its rights to see this as another buildup of troops on its borders. Most countries and peoples don’t like that, I don’t think Iran will either — neither their leadership nor even many of the Iranians opposed to it. We need dialogue with Iran, not its encirclement.
Related: I’ve read an unsourced claim that the number of troops in Iraq *plus* Afghanistan are now the highest ever, due to the slow pace of the drawdown in Iraq. I don’t have a handy web link for troops in the two countries by month; can anyone help? I’d be happy to learn the claim is wrong. (PS: even if it’s true, I assume that state of affairs would be *planned* not to last long. But both Iraq and Iran have provided nasty surprises before.)
my late nite comment apparently is stuck in the spam folder. You can let it out or not.
lj: I don’t see it in the filter. But if it shows up in the next day or two, I’ll release right away.
Thanks, I’ve posted a version of it at TiO, which is probably the best place for it :^)