Don’t Stand So Close to Me

by Eric Martin

While it is understandable that Western audiences would react positively to news that reform-minded Mohammad Khatami has thrown his hat in the ring as a challenger to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it is crucial that US policymakers (and us commentators) take care to measure our reactions and avoid being seen as publicly championing Khatami.  Our overt support could end up being a kiss of death for Khatami.  A reminder, today, of the zeal of certain anti-American elements:

Iran’s former president was set upon by an angry stick-wielding mob today amid celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on the streets of Tehran.

The attack on Mohammed Khatami came just two days after the reformist cleric announced he would be running against the hardline incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June's presidential elections. […] 

During the revolutionary celebrations, attackers waving sticks approached the cleric, shouting “Death to Khatami. We do not want American government.” [emphasis added]

Ilan Goldenberg captures the sentiment here:

Engagement with the U.S. is generally popular in Iran and…this was one of the reasons Ahmadinejad was making positive noises about engagement today.  But, there is nothing that makes Iranians more suspicious than the idea that the U.S. has a vested interest in the outcome of their elections.  This view has been universally held in Iranian society since the U.S. and the British installed the Shah in a 1951 coup and overthrew a democratically elected government.  Any sign that we are supporting a candidate (Say Khatami), even an unintentional one, would be incredibly damaging to that candidate.  Conversely, if it became obvious that the U.S. was actively opposed to a candidate (Say Ahmadinejad) that could act as an electoral boon for him.  Given America's checkered past in Iranian politics and the Iranian sensitivities around this issue, it's best to not hinge any of our decisions on what happens in their elections.

Joe Kleinlooks at the situation and argues that we should wait until after the election to pursue negotiations with Iran – until after Ahmadinejad's "fate is sealed."  I tend to side with Ilan on this matter who, contra Joe Klein, argues that we should seize the momentum from Obama's election and pursue an opening of dialog with all due haste.  As Ray Takeyh and Susan Maloney point out, first impressions can have serious implications for establishing the parameters of the relationship going forward.

Trita Parsi expressed other concerns:

[Khatami's] decision to run will intensify temptations in Washington to hold back any effort to initiate diplomacy with Iran until after the election. These temptations should be resisted. The last thing Khatami needs is to be considered America's candidate in the race. In fact, opponents to Ahmadinejad argue that they will have an easier time pursuing diplomacy with the US if negotiations are initiated already under Ahmadinejad and the conservatives. It will simply be more difficult for the conservatives to oppose and undermine US-Iran talks if those talks began when a conservative held the presidency.

Even if Ahmadinejad is extending an olive branch in order to further his own prospects, better to lock in that position and attempt to give normalization its own momentum.  If Khatami wins, all the better.  If not, well then, at least we've begun the dance and it will be harder to stop the music.