The Old Flim Flam Flummox

by Eric Martin

Last Monday, a move by the Iraqi government emphasized, yet again, that the SOFA broached by the Bush administration and the Maliki government does not represent a "stinging defeat" for Iran (Condi didn’t get the memo either).  On that day, the Iraqi government announced its intention to oust the MEK from its soil (the MEK are a Saddam-backed anti-Iranian terrorist group).  Prior to establishment of the terms of sovereignty enshrined in the SOFA, the Iraqi government lacked this authority, but now the SOFA has given Iraq the ability to act.  And, no, Iran is not rueing the day.  Hillary Mann Leverett on the significance of this move, and the leverage lost in the process:

Monday’s news that the Iraqi government is moving quickly to prepare the expulsion or deportation of the MEK – the Saddam-era Iraqi-based Iranian terrorist group — from Iraq is an important story that needs to be understood in the context of the post-9/11 U.S.-Iranian dialogue over Afghanistan and al Qaida, a dialogue in which I directly participated.

During US talks with Iran in 2002-2003 when it became clear the US was going to invade Iraq, the Iranians made clear that they would turn over suspected al Qaida figures in Iran to the U.S. in exchange for the U.S. allowing MEK leaders based in Iraq to be turned over to Tehran.

In 2003, the Bush Administration inexplicably rejected this offer and then had the gall, as the occupying military power in Iraq, to give the MEK "protected status" under the Geneva convention, which essentially prevented the Iraqi government from turning the MEK operatives over to Iran. The Bush Administration’s reasoning was that they wanted to have the MEK on hand to use as necessary to be a thorn in the side of the Iranian government – and, perhaps even a paramilitary force supporting a U.S. strategy to achieve regime change in the Islamic Republic.

Since the US and Iraqi governments have concluded the SOFA, the US government can no longer protect the MEK. And, it is clear that the Maliki government is moving to assert its own sovereignty by laying the ground work for the MEK’s deportation to Iran. Now, Iran may get hold of the MEK forces without having to give up a single thing.

On the talk shows this weekend, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that the conclusion of the SOFA shows that the US is winning over Iran in the battle for influence in Iraq.

The story I’ve just recounted strongly suggests that, as usual, Rice is out of touch with on the ground realities.

You know, you might get better results from your bargaining chips if you actually attempt to bargain when in possession of said chips.  Just a thought.  Meanwhile, Matt Duss hammers home the greater significance of our dalliance with, and protection of, the MEK:

While it’s now understood that, despite the Bush administration’s claims, Saddam Hussein’s regime did not have any significant relationship with Al Qaeda, Saddam did have relationships with other terrorist organizations, one of which was the MEK. In addition to receiving financial, logistical and material support from from Saddam to carry out attacks inside Iran, “MEK forces also assisted the Iraq regime in the repression of Kurds and other minorities in northern Iraq.”

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Sec. Donald Rumsfeld declared the MEK “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Conventions, which is to say that a designated terrorist group known to have carried out attacks that killed Americans enjoyed greater legal protections than your average Iraqi picked up after curfew. The decision to protect the MEK — possibly for the purpose of carrying out future attacks against Iran — also revealed one of the underlying premises of the U.S. war on terror — the idea that we would make “no distinction” between terrorists and those who harbor them — to be just empty rhetoric.

But then, this type of semantic and rhetorical fraud is neither accidental nor particularly rare for the Bush administration:

During the presidency of George W. Bush, everything possible has been done to obfuscate and conflate the true meanings of the terms terrorism and insurgency.  Preferring the former, largely because of its emotional post-9/11 impact on the American psyche, Bush spokespeople and the president himself consistently have used the terms insurrection and terrorism interchangeably, indiscriminately, and inaccurately.

This has not simply been a case of intellectual carelessness.  It has been a conscious effort to label any group that threatened any status quo of which they approved as a “terrorist organization,” without any thought to the origins of or reasons for the struggle being waged.  Thus, in a moment of warm and fuzzy presidential friendship with Vladimir Putin, with American concurrence, the Chechen rebels officially became terrorists rather than insurrectionists trying to break free from centuries of Russian oppression.  As terrorists, they were far less acceptable outside Russia.

Further, and in the Bush administration’s limited and qualified defense, this is an old racket that was used to great effect during the Cold War.  The Bush team, while not the inventors, are just the latest perpetrators: Now with "9/11 Changed Everything" Razzle-Dazzle! 

12 thoughts on “The Old Flim Flam Flummox”

  1. There are no words. Is there anything else that can come out that will reveal them to be more despicable than we already think they are ?
    Of course they is. We can just hope it will come out during their WAR CRIMES TRIAL. Not to mention TREASON. (yah, not really… except by own their definition. Not pursuing Al Qaeda members so as to protect a terrorist organisation ? Seriously ? I’d love to see the neocons defend that one, and by “love” I mean “it’ll make me want to rip my eyes out, so better not contemplate it”)

  2. There are no words. Is there anything else that can come out that will reveal them to be more despicable than we already think they are ?
    Of course they is. We can just hope it will come out during their WAR CRIMES TRIAL. Not to mention TREASON. (yah, not really… except by own their definition. Not pursuing Al Qaeda members so as to protect a terrorist organisation ? Seriously ? I’d love to see the neocons defend that one, and by “love” I mean “it’ll make me want to rip my eyes out, so better not contemplate it”)

  3. […] Travel was arranged for him, first to Khoramshar, where he was attended and observed for several days by an IRGC minder, then to Tehran, where an officer of the IRGC offered him $10,000 to help him get set up as a politician in Iraq, which he said he politely refused. Many other made this trip, he said, and most did not refuse.
    “America has baked Iraq like a cake,” Haider said. “And given it to Iran to eat.”
    The support that Iran provides various militias and Shia insurgents like Jaysh al-Mahdi — which has been overstated — is ancillary. Iran’s most important and effective mode of influence in Iraq is political. They exercise this influence through their main proxies, ISCI and teh Badr Organization, through a close and longstanding relationship with the Da’wa Party, and through numerous personal contacts within Iraq that the IRGC has assiduously cultivated since the 2003 invasion.

    These are the key points. They are the reasons that talking points from conservatives about how we’re in a binary fight between the “good guys” in Iraq, and the “Iranian-backed Sadrites” always read so insanely detached from reality. Iraqi politics has never been binary win/lose, and neither has Iranian influence. That so many conservatives have been so completely clueless about this (“nuance is for liberals” — is why they’ve been so totally hopeless and useless at foreign policy and defending United States interests.)
    Understanding foreign policy requires understanding multiplex influences and interests. It’s not really all that hard, but it really does require seeing further than We’re For The Good Guys (Iraqi government) and Against The Bad Guys (Enemies-of-Iraq). (Which is why U.S governmental designations of groups into one or the other is insanely counter-productive.)
    (It’s why folks like DaveC would gibber incoherently that liberals were “for” Sadr, and he’d be ignorant of DAW or SCIRI or any actual Iraqi parties.)

  4. […] Travel was arranged for him, first to Khoramshar, where he was attended and observed for several days by an IRGC minder, then to Tehran, where an officer of the IRGC offered him $10,000 to help him get set up as a politician in Iraq, which he said he politely refused. Many other made this trip, he said, and most did not refuse.
    “America has baked Iraq like a cake,” Haider said. “And given it to Iran to eat.”
    The support that Iran provides various militias and Shia insurgents like Jaysh al-Mahdi — which has been overstated — is ancillary. Iran’s most important and effective mode of influence in Iraq is political. They exercise this influence through their main proxies, ISCI and teh Badr Organization, through a close and longstanding relationship with the Da’wa Party, and through numerous personal contacts within Iraq that the IRGC has assiduously cultivated since the 2003 invasion.

    These are the key points. They are the reasons that talking points from conservatives about how we’re in a binary fight between the “good guys” in Iraq, and the “Iranian-backed Sadrites” always read so insanely detached from reality. Iraqi politics has never been binary win/lose, and neither has Iranian influence. That so many conservatives have been so completely clueless about this (“nuance is for liberals” — is why they’ve been so totally hopeless and useless at foreign policy and defending United States interests.)
    Understanding foreign policy requires understanding multiplex influences and interests. It’s not really all that hard, but it really does require seeing further than We’re For The Good Guys (Iraqi government) and Against The Bad Guys (Enemies-of-Iraq). (Which is why U.S governmental designations of groups into one or the other is insanely counter-productive.)
    (It’s why folks like DaveC would gibber incoherently that liberals were “for” Sadr, and he’d be ignorant of DAW or SCIRI or any actual Iraqi parties.)

  5. “Is there anything else that can come out that will reveal them to be more despicable than we already think they are ?”
    The key thing here is who “them” are. Actual knowledgeable people might break it down by individuals, rather than ethnic prejudice!

  6. “Is there anything else that can come out that will reveal them to be more despicable than we already think they are ?”
    The key thing here is who “them” are. Actual knowledgeable people might break it down by individuals, rather than ethnic prejudice!

  7. Hum, I was thinking of the Bush administration. And “them” included the individuals who did this stuff, whoever they turn out to be (who’s the boss, Bush, Cheney ? What was everybody’s role ? Unless there’s some actual personal accountability I really don’t care, “Bush administration” covers it well enough for me).
    In this case, Rumsfeld seems to have played a role.

  8. Hum, I was thinking of the Bush administration. And “them” included the individuals who did this stuff, whoever they turn out to be (who’s the boss, Bush, Cheney ? What was everybody’s role ? Unless there’s some actual personal accountability I really don’t care, “Bush administration” covers it well enough for me).
    In this case, Rumsfeld seems to have played a role.

  9. Excellent and enlightening reporting, Eric, as always. I just have one question about wording: I found the difference between “semantic and rhetorical fraud” and “lie” a little obscure in this context. Can you explain what you mean by rhetorical fraud, and why you did not use the word lie?

  10. Excellent and enlightening reporting, Eric, as always. I just have one question about wording: I found the difference between “semantic and rhetorical fraud” and “lie” a little obscure in this context. Can you explain what you mean by rhetorical fraud, and why you did not use the word lie?

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