Month: August 2007

by hilzoy

(Note: this is a response to a post on Andrew Sullivan’s blog. Most of the posts I’ve written while guest-blogging there have fit both places; this one, however, is more a Sullivan post. But I put it here anyways. If you want the background, here’s the post I’m responding to, and here’s Steve Clemons’ response, which he posted before I posted this.)

I agree with Steve Clemons’ response to Jamie’s post ‘Whither the Antitotalitarian Left?‘. But I am also puzzled by one other point that Jamie makes:

“With the impending realist takeover of the Democratic Party, anti-totalitarianism will recede, and this is unfortunate. Whereas once the AFL-CIO had a large and effective international office, you’d be hard-pressed to hear, for instance, what they’re doing for Iraqi trade-unionists. (…)

Liberal interventionism, as a doctrine, has worked and ought to stay alive in the hearts of those claiming to be liberals–in spite of the failures of Iraq. Beyond the particularities of specific military interventions, what is most worrying is that the left has become so embittered by the response to 9/11 that it has withdrawn into a feral crouch from which it is more suspicious of what the Western democracies do to protect themselves than it is with the plight of oppressed people abroad. (…)

We may very well have a Democratic president. But what will inform their foreign policy values now that the Democratic Party is not animated by the anti-totalitarianism of old, but rather a mere hatred for the president and a serious lack of faith in even the potential role America can play in the world?”

I do not question the claim that “anti-totalitarianism” has receded in the Democratic Party. This is surely true. And there’s a good reason for it: totalitarianism is no longer the major danger that we face abroad. Despite George W. Bush’s attempts to paint al Qaeda as a totalitarian group bent on imposing a Caliphate on the world, al Qaeda is not a totalitarian organization, and its natural allies are not totalitarian regimes but failed states. In fact, there are not that many totalitarian states presently in existence; of those, some (e.g., Myanmar) pose no threat to us, while others threaten us not because they are totalitarian, but for some other reason. (E.g., North Korea threatens us because of the possibility that it might export its weapons, not its ideology.)

Our central foreign policy problems — for instance, failed states and the violence they foster, the rise of China, Iraq and the risk of further destabilization in the Middle East and Pakistan, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the collapse of our moral standing in the world in general and the Middle East in particular — have very little to do with totalitarianism. For this reason, it would be odd if anti-totalitarianism were still the driving force behind liberal foreign policy — not quite as odd as if we were all animated by fear of German militarism or the Bonapartist menace, but odd nonetheless.

I am, however, puzzled by the claim that the Democratic Party is about to undergo a “realist takeover”, and that it is animated by “a mere hatred for the president and a serious lack of faith in even the potential role America can play in the world.” What is the evidence for this claim? As best I can tell, the only evidence Jamie provides for his assertions about what motivates Democrats is his link to this article about a new foreign policy think-tank. It describes the people in that think-tank as believing that Democrats ought to be less interventionist and more realistic. But it presents very little evidence that Democrats are in fact following that prescription; in fact, when the article Jamie cites characterizes Democratic foreign policy as a whole, it is carefully noncommittal (e.g., “Just how much influence their argument is having on the front-runners in the Democratic presidential race is not immediately apparent.”)

The article does argue that some Democratic candidates have moved in realist directions, but its evidence is fairly weak. For instance, to support the claim that this is true of Hillary Clinton, it notes that in a recent speech on her foreign policy priorities, she “listed national interest first and values last, a slight shift, but a significant one to the finely-attuned ears of the foreign policy establishment.” As causes for concern go, the order in which Hillary Clinton lists her points doesn’t rank very high on my list. Moreover, as the article notes, and as I argued earlier, Barack Obama is not a foreign-policy realist at all. In general, the article describes the Democratic Party as one in which there is a “a genuine clash of worldviews”, not one that’s about to be taken over by anyone. So I’m not sure how linking to this article supports Jamie’s position.

There are Democrats who think that the idea of promoting democracy abroad has been so tarnished by George W. Bush that we should leave it aside for now and concentrate on rebuilding our own moral credibility. This is not exactly foreign policy realism: many people who hold this view think that rebuilding our moral credibility involves doing straightforwardly good things in other countries, and generally reclaiming the right to stand for our values. Others, myself included, think that we should make the case that George W. Bush has never been serious about promoting democracy to begin with, rather than ceding the term ‘promoting democracy’ to him. Some Democrats (and Republicans) are tempted to conclude that the United States has neither the patience nor the wisdom to try to promote our values abroad at all. But I don’t think many of us are animated solely by “mere hatred for the president and a serious lack of faith in even the potential role America can play in the world”, especially not if we’re talking about policy makers and advisors, as any discussion of a “takeover” of the Democratic Party must. I’d be interested in any evidence to the contrary that Jamie might present.

That brings me to my next point, which I’ll discuss below the fold.

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by publius

Over at Volokh, Dale Carpenter has an interesting, and touching, post on the GOP’s dysfunctional relationship with homosexuality. It’s more than hypocrisy, Carpenter says, something more complicated. I think he understates the base’s visceral dislike for homosexuality (which is what’s driving all this in the first place), but it’s still an interesting post:

The big, open secret in Republican politics is that everyone knows someone gay these days and very few people – excepting some committed anti-gay activists – really care. . . . So to keep religious conservatives happy the party has done two things. First, it has steadfastly resisted efforts to ease anti-gay discrimination in public policy, even when Republican politicians know better. . . . Second, to keep the talent it needs and simply to be as humane and decent as politically possible toward particular individuals, the party has come up with its own unwritten common-law code: you can be gay and work here, we don’t care, but don’t talk about it[.]

This uneasy mix of the public and the private is not exactly what I’d call hypocrisy. It’s perhaps better described as a form of ideological schizophrenia: private acceptance welded to public rejection. It’s a very unstable alloy.

For the closeted gay Republican, this alloy means a life of desperation and fear and loneliness, of expressing one’s true feelings only in the anonymity of the Internet, of furtive bathroom encounters, of late nights darting in and out of dark bars, hoping not to be seen. It means life without a long-term partner, without real love.

In reading this, I thought of Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! There are some fascinating parallels between Mr. Craig and Mr. Sutpen’s tragic falls. Major spoilers below, so I’ve put it below the fold.

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