by Charles
There is no getting around the facts. In the month of May, civilian casualties went up, extra-judicial killings (EJKs) went up, and U.S. military casualties went up. The number of suicide bombings went down.
The troubling part is the EJKs, which could mean several things. It could indicate that Sunni and Shiite militias have ramped up, but the numbers may also include the results of skirmishes between Sunni tribes and al Qaeda. It’s hard to know without examining every single incident. But the statistics aren’t unexpected, as General Petraeus made clear in his DC news conference over a month ago.
The surge strategy is in process but won’t be at full manpower until later this month. At best, there will be three full months from the time of full troop mobilization to General Petraeus’ September briefing on the status of Iraq. It is no coincidence that the next round of funding requests will also occur at that time. For me, I’m giving the surge strategy ’til the end of the year, so I’m reserving judgment on how it is working. There are small signs of progress, such as the salvation councils popping up in the provinces surrounding Baghdad. But there are plenty of signs of little-to-no progress, the most prominent being the lack of political breakthroughs on the national stage.
Read on…
At this point, I’d like to take a few moments and address where I’ve been wrong on Iraq. For anyone who doesn’t think I’ve acknowledged–or even recognized–that I’ve made mistakes, then you would be laboring under a major misimpression. If I’ve missed something from my list below, I’m sure a commenter or two will step in and, if there’s merit, I will update accordingly.
WMDs. Yes, I thought Saddam had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and I thought that Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. I don’t feel too bad about being wrong on this because I’m in good company. Also, for me, WMDs weren’t casus belli. Removing Saddam would’ve been okay by me anytime after he violated the first of the dozen or so binding UNSC resolutions. In my view, he himself was a weapon of mass destruction, and he provably demonstrated that he was not a person who could be trusted.
In retrospect, when Bush 41 launched his coalition-building efforts in the run-up to the Gulf War, he should have pushed for Saddam’s removal as one of the primary objectives. But it was a tough call to weigh the risk of fewer coalition members and a removed Saddam, or more coalition members and Saddam still in power. Looking back on it, the former choice may have been better long-term.
The 2003 post-war plan. There were workable plans for rebuilding Iraq, but the administration (from Bush on down) didn’t put them into practice. I was wrong at that time to believe that the administration had actually adopted one of those workable plans.
Also at the time, I didn’t know if we had the right manpower levels in post-war Iraq, but as the situation progressed, it became ever more clear to me that General Shinseki was right. We needed several hundred thousand troops to stem the post-war chaos and anarchy. That lack of manpower opened the door to a Sunni-Baathist insurgency, a growing Sadrist movement and an influx of al Qaeda.
I was baffled by Bremer’s decision to fire the Iraqi army. He explained his reasons but they never really made sense to me. I never did see the wrongness of retaining troops below the level of general or colonel. Tens or hundreds of thousands of fighting-age males would have been employed and paid and in charge of keeping order, rather than unemployed, unpaid and idle.
I was wrong to think there was more substance behind the plans that the administration outlined. There were plenty of bullet points, but little beyond them that I could see.
Competent personnel. I was wrong to think that, at that time, Bremer and Rumsfeld and the generals had a good bead on the situation and knew how to handle the challenges. Over the ensuing months since May 2003, that presumption completely tilted over. I wrote in October or November 2004 that Rumsfeld should not have been Defense Secretary in Bush’s second term because of how poorly the Iraq situation was going. I also wrote prior to November 2004 that Dick Cheney should not have been vice president in Bush’s second term because of his role in the Office of Special Plans. Of course, the buck stops at the commander-in-chief. He made some right moves after 9/11, but his personnel choices, communications apparatus and other matters of judgment have been goddawful. At Redstate, I wrote this blog entry on the failure of the generals, which went over real well with a couple of RS directors.
That Iraq turned the corner. Not long before the four contractors were murdered in Fallujah in April 2004±, I wrote at Tacitus that Iraq had turned the corner. Boy, was I wrong. Chastened by that, in subsequent posts I have purposely refrained from phrases such as "we are winning" or "we’ve turned the corner", etc. I’ve tried to temper my posts by acknowledging that there are plenty of challenges out there.
The Iraqi elections. I wrote about the elections here. I still think they were important milestones because of the adverse consequences had those elections failed.
That Victor Davis Hanson reference. In this post, I quoted VDH approvingly in his criticism of Scowcroft-Albright-Brzezinski that "Bush doctrine will not work and that the Arab world is not ready for Western-style democracy, especially when fostered through Western blood and iron." As I see it, the Bush doctrine has failed because Bush is a failing president. I still believe that the Arab world can handle Western-style democracy but with plenty of Islamic flourishes painted in, such as in Afghanistan. Whether democracy can be fostered via Western military might, I’m not so sure. It’s sorta-kinda working in Afghanistan, and we’ll see by year-end how things are going in Iraq.
Bush’s statements (and others) on counterinsurgency. In 2005, Bush and others spoke about new strategies such as clearing, holding and building, but the actions fell way short. They were nice-sounding words but the real commitment to mount a proper counterinsurgency campaign wasn’t there. After getting trounced in last November’s election, Bush finally got serious about making changes and there is now a U.S. commander in Iraq who has written the book on counterinsurgency doctrine. In my opinion, if the current strategy fails, it’ll be because it was implemented too late, not because it lacked soundness. There was also talk of new plans for Iraq, which sounded favorable but my support was conditional on their being well executed.
Training Iraqi troops. I was too optimistic that enough Iraqi troops were being trained well enough to manage things independently or with American overwatch, but at the time I wrote this post (which was prior to the bombing of the Golden Mosque), training was proceeding apace. The bombing in Samarra triggered a new and unprecedented wave of sectarian violence, which in turned revealed that our training of Iraqi forces was not what it should have been and was not as advertised. As it turns out, this process is going to take a while, and military transition teams (MiTTs) are going to have their hands full.
This sentence. "Improvements to our strategy and tactics can surely be made, but success ultimately depends on our will to prevail, nothing more" (cite). I bring it up because I’m sure someone else would have done so if I didn’t. I still agree with the sentence. With sufficient commitment to victory, the leaders will find a way to prevail, and do what it takes to make it so. In World War II, we made plenty of mistakes, and thousands or even tens of thousands died as a result of them. But collectively, the American people were willing to accept those sacrifices. Not so the current conflict. What bothers me about the president’s words is that the words weren’t being backed up, so I’m beginning wonder whether he has the requisite will to prevail. He didn’t take the necessary steps until after getting embarrassed at the polls last November, and even now it doesn’t look like he’s doing enough. This is one of several reasons why I have little to no confidence in this president.
Treatment of prisoners and detainees. My position has been clear since the get-go, and it hasn’t changed nor will it.
Anyway, I thought I’d get this out in the open.
Anyway, I thought I’d get this out in the open.
I, for one, appreciated it.
[C]ollectively, the American people were willing to accept those sacrifices. Not so the current conflict.
Because the current conflict isn’t WWII, nor WWIII. Despite tireless efforts to paint the Iraq War/Occupation as a titanic clash with Western Civilization at stake, Americans recognize that it is no such thing, and therefore not worth the blood and gold it’s cost already, much less any more of either.
If the US leaves now, there will horrendous suffering as the civil war continues.
If the US leaves five years from now, there will be horrendous suffering as the civil war continues.
Meanwhile, the military is buckling, the National Guard is unable to do its necessary work here at home, and Generals past and present are saying we just can’t keep doing this.
It’s time to swallow pride, give up illusions, and start withdrawing our troops in an orderly fashion… before even that option is closed off.
Did you think Iraq/Saddam had “large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons” in early 2003 when the UN inspectors were running around the country, pretty much unobstructed, and not finding any of them?
I can see how someone might believe in the reported intelligence pre-2003, that there were WMDs. But not after Hans Blix took over.
What was your thinking on the WMD issue in, say, early March of 2003?
Good post, Charles, in a number of ways.
I have to ask about this, though: “Removing Saddam would’ve been okay by me anytime after he violated the first of the dozen or so binding UNSC resolutions.”
It’s not my impression that you believe that the U.S. government and/or a coalition, or a UN force, should invade and overthrow the government of every nation thaat violates a UN Security Council resolution, or even when a government has violated a number. (I’ll run through a list of governments I’ve not noticed you declaring should be overthrown, if you like, to see if this is correct.)
So if you could clarify a bit more specifically what your criteria are for invasion and overthrowing, that might give considerably more insight into your thinking.
“In retrospect, when Bush 41 launched his coalition-building efforts in the run-up to the Gulf War, he should have pushed for Saddam’s removal as one of the primary objectives. But it was a tough call to weigh the risk of fewer coalition members and a removed Saddam, or more coalition members and Saddam still in power. Looking back on it, the former choice may have been better long-term.”
As I understand it, it seems fairly close to a sure thing that this would have lost us the support of Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab states. Which would have made the invasion impossible, of course, unless we were going to fight Saudi Arabia, as well.
I might be over-estimating the degree of their opposition, perhaps.
“That Iraq turned the corner. Not long before the four contractors were murdered in Fallujah in April 2004±, I wrote at Tacitus that Iraq had turned the corner. Boy, was I wrong.”
It’s good that you can write this, and I’m glad you did, as well as many of your other admissions of error. The more easily any and all of us can relax ourselves about admitting error, the better off we all are.
We all make errors, being human, and we are all served by learning from our errors — which we can’t begin to do without the first step, which is recognizing the error.
So there’s never any shame in error, per se. The problem arises with the degree of how stupid we may appear, or fear we may appear, depending on the degree of the error, and then is compounded by the next stage: how invested we’ve become by the degree of vehemence we’ve put into defending our error.
This degree of vehemence tends to be as much affected by pride, and emotion, and who is challenging us, and how they are challenging us, and our emotional reaction if we feel offended or insulted or angry or prideful, and through all the other emotional parts of our response as it does our rational consideration of how sure and our point really is.
That’s also part of being human.
So most of us tend to feel some degree — often an extremely high, or sometimes even overwhelmingly high, degree of resistance to admitting error, or sometimes, perhaps, even to reconsidering our views.
And, of course, our views always seem eminently defensible and sensible to us — but less so to others, who don’t have the same knowledge sets, and information input points, and set of emotional filters, and background context, and so on and so forth. Not to mention that we understand what we meant by our words perfectly well, but may not put them down on the screen in a way that is perfectly clear to every reader.
So good for you for admitting a bunch of errors.
But now a few specific points. 😉
“Chastened by that, in subsequent posts I have purposely refrained from phrases such as ‘we are winning’ or ‘we’ve turned the corner’, etc. I’ve tried to temper my posts by acknowledging that there are plenty of challenges out there.”
A key point behind much of the remaining friction between you and some others here, on Iraq, however, has been that while on some matters, you’ve been uncontroversial, on others you’ve been careful to refrain from certain phrases, but have still held to the attitudes and beliefs behind the phrases, which is to say that you’ve still, at times — though less as time has worn on — written about Iraq as if turning points may have been reached, or are about to be reached, or are what your present position is, as I understand it — that it’s entirely plausible that the turning point at least might be reached in another few months, and so we must support the effort to test out whether we’ll get there in just another few months.
In the old days, we called this “seeing light at the end of the tunnel.” You still see light at the end of the tunnel. Or at least you think it’s plausible that real soon now, that light might come into view, so walking down that tunnel is still the right way to go.
Others have been trying to pull the train into reverse for some time now, some only recently, some less recently, and some back to before the war (of whom I was not one), with more credit to those than any.
Anyway, that’s been a continuing source of friction, though doubtless that’s already clear to you. My point was that just being careful about a few phrases — while a wise step — only gets you so far.
I’ll leave addressing other stuff for later, because now my toothache on the right really is acting up, and I can’t focus. Owwie.
Good stuff.
I also think the ’03 WMD question is very important.
A quibble:
“I was baffled by Bremer’s decision to fire the Iraqi army.”
I think this is on the WH.
“This sentence. “Improvements to our strategy and tactics can surely be made, but success ultimately depends on our will to prevail, nothing more” (cite). I bring it up because I’m sure someone else would have done so if I didn’t. I still agree with the sentence. With sufficient commitment to victory, the leaders will find a way to prevail, and do what it takes to make it so.”
This remains a huge problem. What makes you think that your last sentence is true?
Haven’t lots of utterly committed leaders of nations, innumerable ones throughout history, lost wars, or found themselves unable to impose their will over a conquered land? Is there something unique about American that prevents this from happening to America, and its leaders? Has it never happened to America before? Or was that just because we, and everyone else with great material power, didn’t have enough will and commitment to win?
Or what?
Did [GODWIN] not have enough “will to prevail”?
Thanks for explaining your perspective Charles.
Yes, I thought Saddam had large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons
There’s something I don’t get. Let’s say Iraq did have large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. Why would that bother you?
Chemical weapons are not especially effective. If the wind isn’t right, they are as likely to kill you as the enemy. Mostly though, they just disperse. In any event, they are very dangerous to synthesize and deploy. In terms of dollar cost, they’re less effective than conventional munitions. So why are they such a big deal to you? Why are they any worse than fuel air bombs or cluster bombs?
Have you noticed that the Aum Shinri Kyo subway attack in Japan killed shockingly few people given the time, money, and expertise that went into it?
Biological weapons are even worse. Smart armies and terrorists don’t field bio weapons. They’re expensive and unpredictable. What precisely is the bio weapon scenario that made you though Iraq was especially dangerous? Did you really think that Iraq could ever deploy a highly infectious organism without suffering from its effects?
Also, for me, WMDs weren’t casus belli.
Then why would you ever talk about them? His mustache probably wasn’t a casus belli either…
Removing Saddam would’ve been okay by me anytime after he violated the first of the dozen or so binding UNSC resolutions.
Interesting. I was unaware of your fondness for the UNSC. How many UNSC resolutions would Israel have to violate before we should have to overthrow the Israeli government? I ask in all seriousness.
In my view, he himself was a weapon of mass destruction, and he provably demonstrated that he was not a person who could be trusted.
This is rather strange view. I deal with people who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted all the time; that’s why I sign contracts with them when I do business. If I knew I could trust them, I wouldn’t need the force of law backing up my commercial dealings. Do you believe that the US can only work with “trustworthy” politicians abroad?
There were workable plans for rebuilding Iraq, but the administration (from Bush on down) didn’t put them into practice.
What plans were they? Can you point to any of them? Did you know the contents of the plans when the war started? Or did you only decide much later that the plans were “workable”?
CB, before I go into my questions or disagreements, let me first state that I really appreciate this post. It is not easy to admit errors in judgement.
My major disagreement is that you abviously still believe that the actual going into Iraq was okay, well I have always been against it. And so that you don;t think I am just some pacifist nutcake or AQ sympathizer, I was fully behind the Afgah mission. In fact, that is one (though to some degrees the least) of the reasons I was against going into Iraq.
It was obvious to me that we had not finished the job and were (to some degree illegally) pullng support out of Afghanistan to go after Saddam.
I felt at the time that Saddam was a toothless tiger and even if he did have WMDs (and I thought he might have a limited supply) he was no threat to anyone outside the borders of Iraq. I also believed, as I have found out others have come to the conclusion, that he was actually a stabilizing influence in the ME and by goin in we were stirring up a hornet’s nest we weren’t equipped to handle.
Although there has been plenty of incompetence, this cannot all be placed on that fact. The mission was virtually impossible from the start, if part of the goal was a western-style democracy. Especially if trying to institute it at the point of a gun. That doesn’t work.
And Afghanistan is not an appropriate example, since 1) we have never held a gun at the head of Karzai and 2) the prognosis at this moment is very guarded.
Also, and CaseyL pointed this out already, WWII is not an appropriate comparison either. In that situation we were actually fighting people that attacked us and that not had global domination in their minds, but also a actual possibility of achieving it. Saddam had neither and AQ lacks the latter.
But these are criticisms of concepts and approaches, not of you. I appreciate that you have avoided all the trigger phrases that have upset people in the past. Although I do believe Bush has turned into the best firend AQ ever had, I would not accuse you of being the same just because you did support him and/or his objectives for a long time. I have never doubted your sincerity.
I thought I’d get this out in the open.
These misjudgements have been out in the open.
What I and others here appreciate is your stepping up to take responsibility for them; it can’t be easy. Thanks.
What was your thinking on the WMD issue in, say, early March of 2003?
I thought Saddam had them somewhere, Quiddity, mostly because there was so much unaccounted for. After the war, when the group that was searching for WMDs came up empty, the evidence looked pretty clear that large stockpiles did not exist, and then David Kay put the whole matter to rest.
It’s not my impression that you believe that the U.S. government and/or a coalition, or a UN force, should invade and overthrow the government of every nation thaat violates a UN Security Council resolution…
True, Gary, but in the case of Iraq, the Gulf War never really ended, at least that’s how I see it.* After the war, you had the same untrustworthy character in Saddam who invaded two neighboring countries and had a history of developing and using weapons of mass destruction. An Iraq without Saddam (and therefore without sanctions) could very well have been a better place for Iraqis, the Middle East and the rest of the world, but of course we’ll never know for sure. And of course, any toppling of the dictator would mean that the topplers competently usher in a new government that is favorable to Iraqi, American and world interests.
You still see light at the end of the tunnel.
I don’t know if I’ve said it here, but I range from mildly optimistic to mildly pessimistic that the current plan will help turn things around. I fear that it’s been implemented too late.
This remains a huge problem. What makes you think that your last sentence is true?
We have the firepower for one thing which, except for Vietnam, helped us to prevail in every one of our past conflicts. With that advantage and assuming our leaders have that indomitable will, then they will find ways to turn the situation around. The sports analogy is probably an imperfect one, but I spent a dozen years watching Michael Jordan will his way to victory, time and time again. Quite frankly, I don’t see that mindset in the Bush administration. If it existed, said administration would have found ways to be ahead of the curve in the Information War and would have been more willing to test and try new strategies instead of “stay the course”. A president who really had the will to prevail would have made victory a higher priority than personal or political loyalty, and hence would have fired people such as Rumsfeld et al. for not getting the job done. A president who really thirsted for success would have been more involved, getting in faces, demanding results. I saw little evidence of that actually happening.
* Korea may be the next closest simile, but the situation has been stable for decades, and there is always Red China to think about if we were to get militant with NK.
BTW, get well on that toothache thingy. A healthy Gary is a good thing.
How many UNSC resolutions would Israel have to violate before we should have to overthrow the Israeli government? I ask in all seriousness.
Please point out the binding UNSC resolutions that Israel has violated, Turb. From what I see, the UNSC resolutions taking Israel to task are not under Section 7 of the UN Charter (cite).
I deal with people who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted all the time; that’s why I sign contracts with them when I do business.
Saddam breached his contract early on when he violated the terms of the ceasefire.
“We have the firepower for one thing which, except for Vietnam, helped us to prevail in every one of our past conflicts. With that advantage and assuming our leaders have that indomitable will, then they will find ways to turn the situation around.”
I’m not up to more than the shortest of responses at the moment, but how do you see firepower as being the controlling factor in a counter-insurgency war or in a civil war? How do you see American firepower changing the political conditions of Iraq for the better?
“BTW, get well on that toothache thingy.”
Thanks. Bad now, even after three hydrocodones, but this sort of thing does tend to pass after some hours. Or days. Anyway, the dental clinic that-doesn’t-use-nitrous is open again on Monday, but not before. Meanwhile: distractions!
I don’t know if Slarti is reading this, but if/when he does: bases plans. (You can read it, too, Jes, even though it’s me pointing it out. I promise I’ve left no cooties!)
I don’t think thhat it is moral to stay in a fighht in order to prevail. That’s putting vanity ahead of hhuman life.
I realize that Charles didnn’t say thhat we had to prevail for no other reason than simply to prevail, but but he didnn’t give nnay purpose to remain inn Iraq othher than winning for winning’s sake. Maybe I missed it?
I don’t wannt to start a fighht with Charles because I , too, appreciate the couurage iit takes to write a post like this one.
I cann think of reasons to stay inn Iraq but the desire to prevail isnn’t one of them. I’d like to cleann up our mmess. I’d like to save Iraqi lives. I’d like the refugees to be able to come home. I’d like Iraq to have a good government.
I’m just not sure it is withhin our power to achieve that.
Miitary power isnn’t the power that mmatters inn this situation. There’s a quote form thhe mayor of Baghdad on Joe Kienn’s section of Swamplannd that is something to thhe efffect thhat the iraqis will work things out faster if we get out, our presence being a source of aggravvation.
So I’m concerned thhat Bushh actually has the will to prevail because his personnal vanityis at stake. He can’t allow a defeat. His problem is that will without wisdom doesnn’t accomplishh the inntended goal.
So I don’t think we need will. I think we need wisdom.,
Charles,
Do you have any response to my chem/bio weapon questions?
You mentioned before that SH had used chemical weapons and I still don’t see why that matters. Could you explain? I know that SH killed lots of Kurds using chemical weapons, however, armies generally have no trouble annihilating civilian populations whether they’ve got chemical weapons or not. Civilian populations fare poorly against aerial bombardment in general.
Also, I’m still curious about these “workable plans” you spoke of earlier.
Also, I second Gary’s questions about the utility of our firepower in this conflict.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems most of our arsenal is worthless. We cannot use nuclear weapons, and we cannot use large scale aerial bombardment. We cannot use naval bombardment or in general bring our warships too close for fear of missile attacks. We cannot use artillery to provide counterbattery fire because insurgents often place their artillery in the midst of civilians. Our use of attack helicopters has been greatly limited because of innovative Iraqi air defense tactics developed before the war. Our tanks are of limited use inside Iraqi cities with their narrow streets; in any event, there is no armor for them to engage. So what firepower advantage is left? Is there anything besides greatly improved machine guns, sniper rifles, and RPGs?
The firepower comment is so jarring coming from you, or, anyone who has read the counterinsurgency manual. Counterinsurgencies are not won with firepower. You don’t need to be Gen. Petraus to realize that.
I don’t get it. We have high casualties in the same month that dems vote against the war? DOesn’t make sense!
Heh.
Charles,
I think you’re overstating the role of leadership and will, and I say that as someone who roughly agrees with you as to the rationales behind the war.
If we pretend that we had it to do all over again, and we assume that the Bush administration will completely neglect post-invasion planning, it’s my suspicion that had they exhibited complete agnosticism as to what was the proper course of action in the occupation, and merely listened to the troops on the ground as to what was working and what was not, and then supported the winning strategies with funding and material support, I believe that we would be looking at a far better situation in Iraq than we do now.*
I don’t think this is a matter of leadership and will, I think this is a simple matter of managerial competence, of being able to discsern what works and what doesn’t by trial and error and adapt. The troops are trying their damndest to do just that; meanwhile, the civilian and military leadership seem to be content to push their theories, formed in a vacuum, all the way down.**
* Although I doubt any of us in my parallel universe would be anywhere near satisfied with it, quite frankly.
** And yeah, I guess this is the Hayekian critique of the war effort.
Charles, may I suggest this? Please do some reading on the WW1-era French belief in the doctrine of elan, and how it related to their strategies, and their losses, in World War 1.
My thanks if you’ll make this effort.
Since I see a pile-on brewing in the future, all I’ll say for the moment is that I appreciate this post.
Jonas, it’s my sense that there was no planning for the post-war and no reaction when things started going bad in large part because the Bush admin didn’t have the will to commit the political capital and make the ideological sacrifices (in taxes, smaller govt., cooperation with Europe, …) that would have been necessary to try [hopelessly, in my view] to reach an acceptable outcome. It’s not one thing or the other, it’s just one thing.
To be fair, Gary, I just looked it up, and it seems that rather analogous the concept of morale, as we understand it. And while it’s more than reasonable to critique relying on morale or “elan” as your stategy, it would be completely foolish to dismiss it as a significant factor of military success.
At risk of putting you off doing more reading on your own — which I really do hope you’ll do — the nutshell version is that the French spent most of the Great War working with precisely the belief you hold: that the key to winning wars and battles is “indomitable will,” and that military units, soldiers, and armies, can, like “Michael Jordan will [their] way to victory.”
What this resulted in was year after year of this:
And so on. Rinse, cycle, repeat. It turned out that elan was no use against machine guns massed with barb wire, no matter how much artillery you used, or infantry you used, or how much elan everyone had.
This doctrine not incidentally included the subdoctrinal necessity of occasionally executing soldiers who showed insuffient elan, or worse, undermining the elan of others, by, you know, loser-defeatist type talk that maybe elan wasn’t going to do the trick by itself, and that maybe these massed infantry charges into machine gun fire, month after month, year after year, wasn’t actually going to win the war.
But as I said, please look into this on your own. I have to assure you that it really isn’t true that willpower alone can win wars, and that the single topmost key factor in winning wars is having enough of the stuff.
I don’t think you’ll find many military officers who would argue this point.
I think my 11:53 comment answers the élan issue.
It turned out that elan was no use against machine guns massed with barb wire, no matter how much artillery you used, or infantry you used, or how much elan everyone had.
Sort of like the Children’s Crusade, really.
“And while it’s more than reasonable to critique relying on morale or ‘elan’ as your stategy, it would be completely foolish to dismiss it as a significant factor of military success.”
Certainly morale matters, Jonas: of course.
But it’s not the controlling factor in a war, which is what Charles is saying it is, unless one side, including the civilian population, simply lacks general popular support, which is a different order of magnitude of a situation.
Factors that can and do outweigh morale much of the time include numbers, logistical ability, amount of logistical support, firepower, position, situation, strategic approach, tactics across-the-board, speed of maneuver, faster decision loops, better communications, better intelligence, technology, political situation, weather, season, alliances made or broken, type of battle/war, and on and on, though of course, which might be the dominant factor depends.
But most of the time willpower alone isn’t going to overcome one or more of these things, whether it’s in a battle, or in a war overall.
rilkefan,
I agree with you in part, at least. I don’t think it takes the back-breaking, WWII-style effort that some seem oddly nostalgic for, but it definitely takes more money, more diplomacy, and more managerial skill than the Bush Administration has demonstrated so far.
Part of my previous point was, and feel free to disabuse me of it, was that I think with identical levels of money and diplomacy, and merely smart management, something like the turning point of the bombing of the shrine in Feb ’06 could have been avoided.
That’s not to say that is adequate or acceptable at all, merely it would be a quite better world than the one we both share today.
I’ll take this opportunity to share my apparently unique critique of the Neocons. I think that the formative event of their mindsets, after twenty some-odd years of in the Cold War, was its collapse, and how easy and cheap that was, as far as the US was concerned. It was some loans, some diplomacy, support the new leader, and that was the end of that. Looking at Russia and former Soviet Republics today you can clearly see the myopia of this strategy, but it was the one they brought with them to Iraq. I don’t think it was a matter of not wanting to risk making the commitment; I think they honestly believe the commitment is wholly unnecessary.
“Sort of like the Children’s Crusade, really.”
I didn’t think that involved any actual fighting.
Gary,
I think we’re in agreement. I’m going to ask out of curiousity and not conviction – do you think that willpower is foundational to military efforts? That the “logistical support, firepower, position, situation, strategic approach, tactics across-the-board, speed of maneuver, faster decision loops, better communications, better intelligence, technology, political situation, weather, season, alliances made or broken, type of battle/war” success depends mostly on this factor? I suspect it does, hence the abandoned but still relevant Powell doctrine, but I am most certainly open to the possibility of my error.
“feel free to disabuse me of it”
Well, I’m not informed or smart enough to do so. It does seem pretty clear to me that the degree of effort available from the country was not sufficient to the task of achieving a positive result – reason #7 why I opposed the war.
In the end, I’ve noticed that most of those still supporting the war tend to come from one of two closely related places. Deep down, there’s a fundamental belief in one of two things:
US exceptionalism or US infallibility.
At this point, it seems to be either a belief that we’re a magic and blessed nation and that if we just wish hard enough we’ll get what we want, or a belief that we can’t possibly be wrong — we’ve sunk too much time, effort, blood, money, and thought into this and being wrong is not an option.
There’s probably a third category out there, the “Oh god, oh god, it’s a mess — we have to fix it, we have to fix it!” — but I’m not sure that’s so much ‘war support’ as ‘guilt’.
rilkefan,
I’m not informed or smart enough to truly believe it. So it remains a hunch.
I think that whatever might have been adequate, at that period of time (2002-2003) would have been available. Again, another loosey-goosey suspicion on my part. I don’t perceive it to be very deabilitating as far as war efforts go. And ironically, far more brief that than what we’re enduring now – how does the saying go, buy it today or pay tomorrow?
Not meaning to dump another fox in the henhouse, but I’m wondering if there’s any reconsidering of the Lancet study among folks around here and why/why not.
Morat20,
No, I’m not sure it’s guilt, so much as wanting another option between Bush’s more-of-the-same and the oppositions let’s just go home. Both of which seem to have a reasonably equivelent level of humanitarian horror.
I’m going to ask out of curiousity and not conviction – do you think that willpower is foundational to military efforts?
I’m not Gary, but I’ll say for myself that I think the relevant phrase here is “necessary but not sufficient”. But what most discussions of willpower in this context, particularly with regard to the situation in Iraq, is the extent to which willpower and morale are part of a circle with all the other things you mentioned. Whether it’s a vicious or a virtuous circle often depends on things beyond the military’s direct control.
I have to assure you that what I’m saying about the French doctrine of elan is ultra conventional analyses:
That’s your theory.
The French theory that willpower is the key factor in war wasn’t origional to WWI, or the pre-war era. It’s a long French military tradition:
The base doctrine being the doctrine that having more elan, willpower, than the enemy, was the key to victory.
Again:
This theory of yours, that “success ultimately depends on our will to prevail, nothing more” — a doctrine you apparently was unaware was French (;-)) — has been decisively proven wrong, I’m afraid.
And it’s a terribly important point. Absolutely crucial, to understand that the idea is a terrible fallacy.
Oh, and I really was serious when I pointed out that it was also Hitler’s theory. German willpower would overcome the subhuman east and the decadent west.
Again: not a theory that worked out in practice.
Oh, and I really was serious when I pointed out that it was also Hitler’s theory. German willpower would overcome the subhuman east and the decadent west.
Again: not a theory that worked out in practice. But not for lack of German willpower, not by the German soldier, or civilian, or leadership.
“I think that the formative event of their mindsets, after twenty some-odd years of in the Cold War, was its collapse, and how easy and cheap that was, as far as the US was concerned.”
There’s probably something to that, as a factor, though, of course, it’s pretty stupid reasoning, since the collapse of Soviet communism was a process that took a little over 80 years, and didn’t just happen in the last few years, or because of things done only in the last few years — it was the long series of events over the decades playing out that took the toll.
Give us a magical ability to wait 80 years for results in Iraq, and I’ll be vastly less pessimistic.
Josh,
I agree with you on this, 100%.
“I’m going to ask out of curiousity and not conviction – do you think that willpower is foundational to military efforts?”
Well, generally speaking, you have to have your troops and NCOs and officers more than not have enough morale to be willing to attack, and not run when on the defense, and hold to the usual ratios of shots actually fired to kill, and generally do one’s duty, and maintain enough discipline for functionality, of course.
How much morale is necessary beyond that kinda depends on what the specific strengths of the enemy are, and what your weaknesses are, and vice versa, and how important morale is to the specific element necessary for your victory, or at least to staving off your defeat.
For instance, it probably takes higher morale to run with a sword into an enemy spear line, but less — while still a lot — to man a machine gun nest against the same spearmen who are now attacking.
Then there’s the necessity in a democracy in modern war for a sustained war to be supported by the populace over however long the war is putting a noticeable stress on the nation, particularly in terms of casualties, but that’s something of a different order of business, as I said, although also entirely crucial as time passes.
It’s important, although over a yet longer period of time, for non-democracies, as well. The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, after a decade of increasingly painful and increasingly unsuccessful effort, because the populace, for all that the USSR was still a reasonably totalitarian state, had become sufficiently intolerant of the war, and the casualties, when weighed against the invisible benefit, and clear necessity.
It became not worth the cost to the Kremlin in terms of the unrest it was generating across the Soviet Union, as well as not worth the cost of the military and economic drain it placed on the USSR, as well as the damage to the image of Soviet power.
Which was also the calculation that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made about another war.
Incidentally, Rome: Total War is a lot of fun, if you happen to like turn-based strategy, real time tactical battle, computer games.
For an entirely different sort of computer game fun, I’ve wasted a lot of time lately on The Movies.
If I’m not making any sense at any point, I blame the hydrocodone, which has finally helped.
Gary,
To be clear, I’m not speaking of the effort to depose a regime, which did take 80 years in the case of the Soviets but a matter of months in the case of Iraq. I’m talking about the aftermath and how “painless” it was for us at the time. The Soviet Union was a hundred times bigger than Iraq yet would seem to have cheap in comparison to Iraq. Hell, we even made money, right?
Oh, Gary, you’re such a pessimist. No more than 50 years, tops.
“I’m not Gary, but I’ll say for myself that I think the relevant phrase here is
‘necessary but not sufficient’.”
That, too.
Oh, and I really was serious when I pointed out that it was also Hitler’s theory. German willpower would overcome the subhuman east and the decadent west.
The Triumph of the what again?
Gary,
Not probably, even in my modest state, I’ll say it takes far less morale with the machine gun.
Actually that’s what I find odd about this conflict – I think that our forces could have had that kind of confidence had their been some cogniscence of the reality of the disorderly, chaotic guerrila warfare they were facing. But it seems we’re at least partially stuck in the “traditional” war mindset, which I imagine is disconcerting.
Keep in mind, I think this is what is at the core of the conservative argument about what they might call “loser-defeatists.” So part of the problem here is that they’re not seeing how opposition to the war helps when it’s not a strategy for winning. That’s not my position, but I suspect it’s theirs, and one of many ways everyone is talking past each other in this situation.
Which puts the lie to the whole notion of media/academic/political undermining of the war. I don’t think it helped the war any for certain; but good lord, even under the Soviet situation of totalitarian control, it didn’t make a damn bit of difference.
Is there a wierd, contemporary redeeming of Nixon/Kissenger that I wasn’t invited to? I kid, because I love.
I’m not sure about turn-based, but it does sound interesting. As a Macintosh user, I generally have to ignore such interesting advice.
And if I am not making any sense, I blame the wine, which means I lose the argument. You, at least, have a good excuse. Me? Not so much…
Anarch,
This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!
“Actually that’s what I find odd about this conflict – I think that our forces could have had that kind of confidence had their been some cogniscence of the reality of the disorderly, chaotic guerrila warfare they were facing.”
Remember that for an amazingly long time, Don Rumsfeld — with Bush backing him — denied that there was any such thing going on: there was no insurgency he insisted, month after month after month. Hard for an army to do much about an insurgency that the boss insists isn’t there.
“The Triumph of the what again?”
It really was exactly what Charles is saying, I’m afraid: German willpower makes Russian numbers, and geography, irrelevant! Germany has the willpower to win! Germany will declare war on America, because America is decadent, and it doesn’t matter how large their industrial might is, compared to German willpower!
It didn’t matter. And really, few peoples and leaders anywhere had more willpower, really, although the Japanese beat them out, I would say. But I can’t think of many other contenders in the last couple of centuries, although I should emphasize that I still really can’t focus for now…. 🙂
“Keep in mind, I think this is what is at the core of the conservative argument about what they might call ‘loser-defeatists.’ So part of the problem here is that they’re not seeing how opposition to the war helps when it’s not a strategy for winning.”
I need to address this when I’m not in pain and on painkillers, but they’re failing to take into account that the need for public support has long been a part of military theory. It’s, as you noted, inherent to the Powell/Weinberger Doctrines.
It’s inherent to democracy, of course, is what it is. Failing to note that, in a democracy, public support isn’t automatically granted to the government — and this is as it should be, though in a war, the populace is apt to rally around when the government says there’s a threat, and it’s necessary to defend you, if the government hasn’t already lost credibility in the eyes of the majority of the public.
Point being that ignoring this need, and simply declaring that The People Must Always Support Their Leaders Because That’s The Only Way To Support The Troops is a declaration that you’re willing to support any fool leadership, no matter what war they want, no matter who the leadership is. This isn’t a position that, in fact, almost any conservative has ever actually taken.
And insofar as it comes close to any known political philosophy at all, unalterable and automatic support for the Leader and leadership, particular in military attacks, is, yes, most associated with fascism. Or, less specifically, at least militaristic authoritarianism.
“I don’t think it helped the war any for certain; but good lord, even under the Soviet situation of totalitarian control, it didn’t make a damn bit of difference.”
You take my point.
“Is there a wierd, contemporary redeeming of Nixon/Kissenger that I wasn’t invited to?”
No, but there’s an endless redeeming of the idea that we really coulda and shoulda won Vietnam, if we’d just exercised that darn willpower like we should have. George W. Bush expressed this view of the Vietnam war when he visited Vietnam a year or so ago.
It’s completely wrong, of course, and utterly against what there are endless tapes and memos of what Nixon and Kissinger said many many times, that the war couldn’t be won militarily, and that all that could be done was get the U.S. out, with a decent interval before South Vietnam fell.
Jonas wrote: “I don’t think it takes the back-breaking, WWII-style effort that some seem oddly nostalgic for”
The only reason anybody calls for that is that it would at least match the rhetoric of the hawks.
And I suppose if we’d made an effort of getting on a war footing, with a well-publicized effort to increase the size of the military, train them in Arabic and local culture, equip them, and generally make them ready for a ground war and occupation in the Middle East, the locals might well have been less likely to oppose us. Especially if the added language skills prevented many of the early civilian deaths.
The mere knowledge of our massive military output in WW2 surely had a significant effect on the morale of enemy officers. Had we tried to ‘go to war with the army we had’, rather than having the will to limit operations somewhat at first until we were ready, it would have been a huge morale boost for the Axis.
Jonas Cord writes: ” I’m going to ask out of curiousity and not conviction – do you think that willpower is foundational to military efforts?”
Willpower isn’t unidirectional.
Are you including the willpower to delay or avoid a war you really would like to have, and the willpower to cut losses and leave despite how bad that makes you look and/or feel?
Willpower only helps when put in service of wisdom.
The time for willpower was in 2002 when people were saying we had to invade Iraq *right then*.
Charles, I admire your willingness to acknowledge these mistakes. That takes guts and humility.
…but but he didnn’t give nnay purpose to remain inn Iraq othher than winning for winning’s sake. Maybe I missed it?
I didn’t give a reason here, wonkie, but I have previously said that it’s important for us to leave Iraq a better place than it was when we entered, and that I consider victory to be a free, peaceful, non-theocratic representative republic. I don’t know why this information isn’t more widely published, but I would accept those conditions as a measure of success.
Do you have any response to my chem/bio weapon questions?
Not much of one, Turb (and BTW, I shorten everyone’s names here). Their existence would have further demonstrated Saddam’s non-compliance with UNSC resolutions, but like I said, it wasn’t casus belli for me.
Also, I’m still curious about these “workable plans” you spoke of earlier.
It’s too far back in time for me to recall specifics, but I remember writing a post on the subject at Tacitus. There was an agency at DoD (or State?) responsible for post-war plans, and I looked up the information because there were quite a few who stated flatly that no post-war planning undertaken. There was.
So what firepower advantage is left?
Superior firepower is still necessary to mount a successful COIN strategy. I didn’t say anything specific about counterinsurgency doctrine in my response, but that was what I was getting at. Bush & Co. were wedded to a plan that was increasingly wrong as the insurgency gained momentum, and the higher-ups took way too long in recognizing it and addressing it. Where were Bush and Rumsfeld in this process? Why didn’t they accurately assess the situation and call on their generals to make necessary adjustments? I think I know part of the answer, and it has do with Rumsfeld’s treatment of people who dissented from his party line, as noted here. The Marines are better versed in COIN strategy and they have a decades-old Small War Manual to draw from. The assets and the doctrine were there to be utilized, but they were for the most part ignored.
Gary, at this late hour I’d rather not get into a what-came-first discussion regarding will, competence, strategy, etc. Also, if I gave the impression that will = “unyielding resistance to change tactics or to try new and creative strategies”, then my apologies because that’s not what I meant. At all.
I know I’m in basketball mode, but I watched Lebron & Co. defeat the Pistons earlier tonight. In game 5 last Thursday, LeBron put the team on this shoulders and scored 30 of the team’s final 31 points, including the game-winner with two seconds left. In game 6, he was incessantly double-teamed so he quickly made adjustments, drawing fouls and dishing off to players who had the hot hand. In this series, he had the superior combination of will and firepower (in the form of outrageous talent) and enough smarts to devise a nimble and effective strategy for victory in the last two battles.
That’s what I was driving at when I was talking about will, not the plodding unimaginative French who refused to change despite staggering losses. That’s why I support the current COIN doctrine because it is smart and flexible, but underlying it must be the will to attrite the enemy, to kill or capture the unreconcilables and to help the others reenter society. Unfortunately, successful COINs take time and our representatives in DC are on a different timeline.
That said, I will read your links, but not tonight. I’m whipped.
Charles:
It’s too far back in time for me to recall specifics, but I remember writing a post on the subject at Tacitus. There was an agency at DoD (or State?) responsible for post-war plans, and I looked up the information because there were quite a few who stated flatly that no post-war planning undertaken. There was.
Wasn’t this the famous State Department document listing all the social conditions in Iraq, the different tribes, the religions, etc., that was over a thousand pages long?
And wasn’t that the very same document which Don Rumsfeld expressly forbade DoD personnel to read, because it had been drawn up by the limp-wristed Arab-lovers in the State Department?
IMHO probably the best example of the err limitations of relying on will power as the route to victory was the Japanese experience in WW2. IIRC it was a British general who said roughly “Many armies talk about fighting to the last cartridge and/or man. The Imperial Japanese Army was the only one in history to do it on a regular basis”. It still didn’t do them a lot of good in the end.
On a different note, I think one of the things that tripped us up was a different variation on the collapse of the Soviet Union. The neo-cons may have thought, “We beat the Soviets, how hard could Iraq be?” This was the same attituide that led us to discount the guys in black pajamas in Vietnam. It is also a recurring problem with people experienced in conventional war, who see a counter insurgency as a small war. It is, but they do not realize that counter-insurgency is graduate level warfare. It is sort of like newtonian physicists with a thorough understanding of their topic, running into quantum mechanics for the first time. Counter insurgency is harder, because it needs to be constrained.
Though one might add that the Japanese belief in willpower was in part a reflection of their early successes in the war, most notably against the British, who vastly underestimated the Japanese fighting capability, and ended up surrendering Singapore to a force 1/3 their size. A number of ironies present themselves at Singapore, and two of them would be the Patrick Heenan, a british officer who spied for the Japanese and the fact that the Indians who surrendered to the Japanese in Singapore and Malaysia made up the core of the Indian National Army, which fought on the side of Japanese. Imperialism has a way of boomeranging.
My take on this is that Charles would do it all over again, just with better execution.
Which means that he has learned nothing from his misjudgments, since the poor execution excuse assumes that the overall strategy for this war was a wise thing, but just poorly implemented.
As for the counter-insurgancy and the continued commitment to the surge, just more evidence of inability to exercise good judgment. It is nice to acknowledge past errors in judgment, but it means nothing if the next day you are willing to go out and repeat those errors.
The biggest difficulty with the surge and counter-insurgency effort is not poor tactics, etc. It is because most of the people in the country hate us and want us gone. Successful counter-insurgency in such a situation is impossible.
Indeed, it is questionable to refer to it as counter-insurgency, as opposed to intervention on behalf of the Shia against the Sunni in the civil war. There is a reason why the Sadr militia has largely made itself scarce during the surge — it is being fought for their tacit benefit, whether we like it or not.
It is maddening to see such stubborn adherance to bad ideas, while simultaneously acknowledging that past adherance to those ideas was a mistake.
That’s what I was driving at when I was talking about will, not the plodding unimaginative French who refused to change despite staggering losses.
Unfortunately, your version of “will” still has the ring of “La Marseillaise.”
Good post Charles.
IIRC the French got the elan infection from the Russians* as did almost everyone else. But the other nations were, unlike France (and maybe the US), in the end able to counter the infection.
Another anecdote: In the Russian-Japanese war of 1904/5 an officer was asked why he sent only troops without fighting experience against enemy machine guns. His answer was, that no soldier who ever faced MG fire would do so a second time.
Verdun might be the most perverse use of the doctrine. The German high command did not actually plan to take Verdun but to draw all French manpower into the bloodmill because Germany had a higher killing efficiency and more people to spend.
A British officer is quoted with something like: In the end one side will have one unit left and the other none. The first side wins. Rumsfeld was not that different (flypaper theory).
*The idea of the bayonet being wiser than the bullet became notorious through a Russian general.
Good post, Charles.
Saddam breached his contract early on when he violated the terms of the ceasefire.
The US violated its contract (via handshake and wink-and-a-nod) with Saddam when after April Gillespie, the then US ambassador to Iraq, told Saddam that what he did vis a vis Kuwait (and the UAE) was entirely a matter between them, including if Saddam were to attack Kuwait – yet after he did what we said was none of our concern, we attacked and invaded Iraq!
I served in Desert Storm and didn’t know of the objective facts BEFORE that war. If I had, I would not have felt at all just in my dropping of bombs on the poor bastards on the ground in Iraq. C’mon, Saddam was FAR from the worst shit in the ME. The House of Saud is JUST as bad as Saddam yet we can’t lick their anal sphincters enough.
Given that the above April interchange DID take place, that it WAS official US government communication to Saddam pre-Desert Storm, the subsequent attack on Saddam and ALL that follows from that is illegitimate and indefensible.
but I have previously said that it’s important for us to leave Iraq a better place than it was when we entered, and that I consider victory to be a free, peaceful, non-theocratic representative republic.
Ah! Then you admit, just not directly, that it is lost, as most of us have been saying for a long time, and that there can be no point to our staying. The fact is that we will NOT leave Iraq in a better place than when we entered. Impossible. …And a peaceful, non-theocratic republic? HAH! It IS already well along in that direction and the INSTANT the US inevitably pulls out (either with tail tucked tight against ass in full view or skulkily in the dark) the theocracy will begin in earnest in a precise model of the Iran government.
First: kudos to CB: this is an excellent post: hard as it must have been to compose.
Second: a minor quibble: the black bar on your first chart (“Civilians Killed”) for February ’06 – which was picked up from your source – represents the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra: it’s a benchmark they use, but, unexplained, looks anomalous.
Third (and most important): while it is good to see that you (unlike many other pro-war bloggers) have some sort of actually quantifiable notion of “victory” – as compared to the simpleminded “We Win, They Lose” sloganeering which is all too prevalent – I can’t help but wonder: just how close to (or far from) this goal are we? And isn’t there an unspoken subtext to all this which should append the point “No US Casualties” to this list of the preferred outcome?
(“Unrealistic utopian wishlist” of outcomes in my more-cynical estimations. It’s a good thing, perhaps, that RedState’s photo left off the “An ally in the War on Terror” bit at the bottom of the Admiral’s placard: the goals outlined therein are straightforward and sensible enough without being disfigured by cheapjack slogans)
No, no, you misunderstand me. I didn’t mean that willpower meant that. But believing that willpower is what determines success in war means that strategies and tactics aren’t what determines success in war, that numbers aren’t what determines success in war, that position doesn’t determines success in war, that economics doesn’t determine success in war, that technology doesn’t determine success in war, that firepower doesn’t determine success in war, that all those other factors mentioned don’t determine success war, and so on.
This is the doctrine you assert, Charles, which I’m trying to convince you is dead wrong.
“Improvements to our strategy and tactics can surely be made, but success ultimately depends on our will to prevail, nothing more.”
“Nothing more” means “nothing more. I’m hopeful that perhaps you’re starting to see that this is simply wrong. Our success depends on nothing other than our will to prevail. No other factor matters. We could have no weapons, ten soldiers, and be attacking Atlantis undersea by holding our breath, but if we have enough will to prevail, we shall succeed against ten billion water-breathing nuclear robot soldiers!
That’s the doctrine you are insisting is the correct one. French elan.
It’s not a doctrine that reflects reality.
In point of fact, “will to prevail” is a relatively minor factor in modern warfare, and gets trumped by innumerable other factors most of the time. Sorry, but that’s just the way it is.
“That’s why I support the current COIN doctrine because it is smart and flexible,”
Yeah, but “will to prevail” is what success ultimately depends, nothing more, so smart and flexible is irrelevant. Or are you starting to agree that maybe success, in fact, does depend on more factors than simple “will to prevail,” and that “nothing more” is, ah, wrong?
“…but underlying it must be the will to attrite the enemy, to kill or capture the unreconcilables and to help the others reenter society.”
A strategy of attriting the enemy is how we lost the Vietnam War. We did everything in this sentence, and it was completely irrelevant.
“That said, I will read your links, but not tonight. I’m whipped.”
Sure, I’m not insisting you do your homework over the weekend. 🙂
Though there will be a pop quiz on Tuesday. 😉
I do appreciate that when you write a post, and multiple people respond, it can become exhausting and confusing and somewhat bewildering trying to keep track of all the different points of view, and arguments, and points of fact, and cites, and so on. I appreciate your willingness to put some energy and time into responding, and into considering what people have to say. Thanks.
Donald Clarke:
Just so. It’s difficult to imagine a nation and a military — Army and Navy both, as well as their air wings — having more willpower than the Japanese Imperial Forces in WWII, as I said. Not only did relatively few soldiers surrender, often preferring to kill themselves, but, of course, they famously invented the kamikazi, to attempt to use willpower to overcome material lacks, and after the war, Japanese soldiers continued to be found in remote locales, hiding so as to continue the fight, for decades thereafter, continuing into the 1970s.
Willpower is not, in fact, what ultimately prevails in warfare, “nothing more.”
No, no, you misunderstand me. I didn’t mean that willpower meant that. But believing that willpower is what determines success in war means that strategies and tactics aren’t what determines success in war, that numbers aren’t what determines success in war, that position doesn’t determines success in war, that economics doesn’t determine success in war, that technology doesn’t determine success in war, that firepower doesn’t determine success in war, that all those other factors mentioned don’t determine success war, and so on.
This is the doctrine you assert, Charles, which I’m trying to convince you is dead wrong.
“Improvements to our strategy and tactics can surely be made, but success ultimately depends on our will to prevail, nothing more.”
“Nothing more” means “nothing more. I’m hopeful that perhaps you’re starting to see that this is simply wrong. Our success depends on nothing other than our will to prevail. No other factor matters. We could have no weapons, ten soldiers, and be attacking Atlantis undersea by holding our breath, but if we have enough will to prevail, we shall succeed against ten billion water-breathing nuclear robot soldiers!
That’s the doctrine you are insisting is the correct one. French elan.
It’s not a doctrine that reflects reality.
In point of fact, “will to prevail” is a relatively minor factor in modern warfare, and gets trumped by innumerable other factors most of the time. Sorry, but that’s just the way it is.
“That’s why I support the current COIN doctrine because it is smart and flexible,”
Yeah, but “will to prevail” is what success ultimately depends, nothing more, so smart and flexible is irrelevant. Or are you starting to agree that maybe success, in fact, does depend on more factors than simple “will to prevail,” and that “nothing more” is, ah, wrong?
“…but underlying it must be the will to attrite the enemy, to kill or capture the unreconcilables and to help the others reenter society.”
A strategy of attriting the enemy is how we lost the Vietnam War. We did everything in this sentence, and it was completely irrelevant.
“That said, I will read your links, but not tonight. I’m whipped.”
Sure, I’m not insisting you do your homework over the weekend. 🙂
Though there will be a pop quiz on Tuesday. 😉
I do appreciate that when you write a post, and multiple people respond, it can become exhausting and confusing and somewhat bewildering trying to keep track of all the different points of view, and arguments, and points of fact, and cites, and so on. I appreciate your willingness to put some energy and time into responding, and into considering what people have to say. Thanks.
Donald Clarke:
Just so. It’s difficult to imagine a nation and a military — Army and Navy both, as well as their air wings — having more willpower than the Japanese Imperial Forces in WWII, as I said. Not only did relatively few soldiers surrender, often preferring to kill themselves, but, of course, they famously invented the kamikazi, to attempt to use willpower to overcome material lacks, and after the war, Japanese soldiers continued to be found in remote locales, hiding so as to continue the fight, for decades thereafter, continuing into the 1970s.
Willpower is not, in fact, what ultimately prevails in warfare, “nothing more.”
It’s not basketball.
Gary: It really was exactly what Charles is saying, I’m afraid:
Yes, yes, I know. I’ve been saying it for years.
Charles: In this series, he had the superior combination of will and firepower (in the form of outrageous talent) and enough smarts to devise a nimble and effective strategy for victory in the last two battles.
This is why you fail.
I mean that in the nicest possible way in which one can quote Yoda. You’ve precisely summarized the strength of will meme from the right blogosphere and, in so doing, summarized precisely why it will almost necessarily fail.
Here, in no particular order, are some of the reasons why:
[In fact, the only performances I can think like that are Vince Young in the two Rose Bowls; most other standout QB performances involved, at the very least, great linemen and at least one great receiver.]
And, to me, the two most important points of all. Yes, LeBron had the game of a lifetime. There’s a reason why they’re called games of a lifetime. How many games has LeBron played where he hasn’t accomplished that? How many games has he played where he made some shots, blew some shots, and ended with (for a Great Player) an undistinguished record? Why should our record be any different?
And finally: What on earth makes you think we’re LeBron? What makes you think we have the right skillsets, the right combination of talent, training and ability, to say we’re one of the greatest players of our generation? Not just good — the greatest to ever play? That, in a nutshell, is American Exceptionalism at its worst.
It’s actually worse than that: it’s a sin. It’s hubris of the highest kind, to say that we can accomplish anything with sufficient will; it is saying that we are like unto the gods, with all the calamity that that entails. That, right there, is the reason that you, and we, fail: in failing to recognize our limits, we’ve taken on a task that we cannot accomplish. We’re not wise enough. We’re not good enough. We’re not strong enough. This isn’t a slight on our capabilities for good, nor a slight on our previous accomplishments, it’s an acknowledgement of the difficulty — if not impossibility — of the task that President Bush laid out before us. And like all self-fulfilling prophecies, our very lack of acknowledgement of our limitations has made them worse. Our very lack of wisdom — of knowing ourselves — has given us the clusterf*** we now see in Iraq, and has taken from us any hope of success.
I’ve taken long enough that this is probably a pile-on by now, but please: take what I wrote to heart. It’s pretty much our only chance at an optimal — which, by now, is nowhere close to good — solution.
In point of fact, “will to prevail” is a relatively minor factor in modern warfare, and gets trumped by innumerable other factors most of the time. Sorry, but that’s just the way it is.
Anyone remember the Alamo?
Jonas:
No, I’m not sure it’s guilt, so much as wanting another option between Bush’s more-of-the-same and the oppositions let’s just go home. Both of which seem to have a reasonably equivelent level of humanitarian horror.
Wanting another option doesn’t make it exist.
The “Oh God, Oh God, we broke it, we have to fix it!” crowd’s problem — and I’m speaking loosely here, not specifically at any one person — is that they too believe in exceptionalism.
Some problems can’t be fixed by anyone. Other problems might theoretically be fixable, but that fix not be within the means of anyone interested or in a position to fix it.
Such is it with Iraq. The “It’s time to leave crowd” contains a very large number of people who do, in fact, seriously and deeply wish that we could fix the mess we made in Iraq. Nonetheless, we recognize that the capacity to break something does not always grant one the capacity to repair it afterwords.
Deluding oneself into thinking America has the capacity to fix Iraq — especially under present leadership — isn’t any better than deluding oneself into thinking we can “win” in Iraq. Neither are within the realm of possibility.
I don’t see any substantive difference between Charles’ (loosely paraphrased) “If we’re dedicated enough and just keep trying sooner or later we’ll win” and “If we’re dedicated enough and just keep trying sooner or later we’ll unbreak the egg”.
The situation is — and has been for a very long time — outside of US control. Probably since the very beginning. 150,000 troops, 200,000 troops — we’d need to flood the country with three or four times that number just to make a dent and we don’t have that many soldiers.
We don’t have a leadership willing to acquire them — either through the draft of consensus building afar — and it becomes simply a matter of numbers.
We don’t have enough manpower. All the willpower, or guilt for that matter, in the world doesn’t turn 200k troops into 3 times that number.
This has been a good discussion. Thank you, Charles.
I think it is essential righht now for us Americanns to consider the possiblity tht we can’t influence events inn Iraq posiitively over time not because we lack sufficient will, but simply becausse we are outsiders.
. i know we can get some seductive winns here and there–Annbar, for isnnstance–but even in thhe places where we are in fact helpinng to restore community-supporteed government and realtively peaceful daily life, the Iraqis think we should get out and get out soon. If the locals see our presences as a problem, evenn inn thhe areas wherre some success has been achieved, thhen maybe our preswennce is inndeed a problem!
One of the fundamental errors in our approach to this war has been thhe unwillinness of American decisionnmakers to understand the Iraqi purspective. The need some Americans have to demonstrate that Americanns have the will to win inn order to create good government as Charles definnes it is an American goal, not an Iraqi one. As long as we are there to fight for our goal, we are at cross purposes withh the Iraqis.
LJ: “…most notably against the British, who vastly underestimated the Japanese fighting capability, and ended up surrendering Singapore to a force 1/3 their size.”
Largely due to the fact that Singapore’s large fixed guns all pointed to the sea, as did their entire defensive infrastructure. The British made the classic military blunder of never considering that the enemy might land further up the peninsula and take Singapore from the rear, by land, and thus, with amazing stupidity, left themselves helpless in that event.
Of course, the Turks did the same thing at Aqaba, leading Lawrence to do the same thing, but the Turks had more of an excuse in doubting anyone would cross the desert, then the British did at Singapore.
“April Gillespie, the then US ambassador to Iraq”
April Glaspie.
Also, “including if Saddam were to attack Kuwait” isn’t something that was said. It would be damning if she’d said that, but neither of the two transcripts include this piece of false information.
Reality:
There’s plenty to criticize about Glaspie’s instructions, but making up, or passing on, claims that she explicitly approved the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein is something which is unsupported by the record.
“The House of Saud is JUST as bad as Saddam yet we can’t lick their”
Might want to note the posting rules, and the unstated concern for office software filters.
In any case, in point of fact, Saudi Arabia hasn’t invaded anyone else, and hasn’t killed hundreds of thousands of people, which Saddam Hussein did. The Iran-Iraq War, the Anfal campaign, and other large-scale military actions, both externally, and internally, do, in fact, make SH’s regime worse than Saudi Arabia, until such time as Saudi Arabia begins an eight-year-long war that results in the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
“Given that the above April interchange DID take place, that it WAS official US government communication to Saddam pre-Desert Storm, the subsequent attack on Saddam and ALL that follows from that is illegitimate and indefensible.”
That doesn’t particularly logically follow. A person or a nation can make a mistake, and then not be forever locked into affirming the mistake.
That doesn’t mean that therefore the defense of Saudi Arabia, or expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait was inherently right, but it does mean that they weren’t inherently wrong.
I should, before I head out, that I’ve seen this “But we’re LeBron” attitude played out in a different venue. There have been a lot of popular science books written about Ramanujan, the famous Indian mathematician, focusing on how he was an outsider with no formal training who nevertheless produced mathematics of exquisite beauty and unbelievable profundity. I will never forget the conversation I had with a friend, where he mentioned he could produce similarly great math.
I stared at him blankly.
Why not? he asked. After all, Ramanujan didn’t have formal training, and look what he did! So it’s possible!
And all I could say was: yes, but you’re not Ramanujan.
I consider victory to be a free, peaceful, non-theocratic representative republic.
My interpretation of the information available is that a representative republic elected by the Iraqis of today will not install a non-theocratic government, at least not without US troops around to enforce it. It might not be Iran, but it wouldn’t be Turkey either. That makes this a long-term occupation, for as long as US troops are required to enforce the necessary behavior on the population and their government.
With sufficient commitment to victory, the leaders will find a way to prevail, and do what it takes to make it so.
If the previous paragraph is accurate, the cost of that commitment and victory, in both direct military expenses as well as indirect costs such as the long-term care for large numbers of veterans, will be huge — trillions of dollars. I myself am unwilling to accept the opportunity cost that goes with that expenditure. It often seems that the same people who would tell me that $3.5T for Iraq and its aftermath would be money well spent also tell me that $3.5T to make Social Security solvent forever (their figure, not mine) is so expensive as to be impossible. Respectfully, I must disagree with their priorities.
That’s apparently a myth about the Singapore guns only pointed towards the sea, Gary. I’ve heard that too, but also encountered the claim that it’s a myth and the link supports the myth claim.
I’d jump in with comments about the Lancet2 casualty estimate (the digression LJ tried to launch), but don’t have the time to do the long-winded post. Probably just as well. Short version–I don’t think we can say for sure if L2 is right or wrong, my position all along. A recent poll funded by ABC, USAToday and a couple of other news organizations early this year found that 1 household out of 6 had suffered at least one casualty (dead or wounded), which translates into something like 600,000 households with casualties. The number of deaths you’d get from that depends on the number of casualties per household, the fraction which are deaths (1 out of 4 is typical for explosions, I gather, but death squads would produce a higher fraction, probably) and whether the poll really elicited all casualties since the invasion began. But a minimum death toll of 150,000 seems plausible, based on that poll. Some would be insurgents.
Insert various cuss words. The link works. It wasn’t supposed to look like that, but it works.
It’s not a myth, so much as fussing over precise wording.
Yes, the guns could fire to the North, but they were naval guns, designed and placed to fire AP (armor-piercing) shells and HE (high explosive) shells at naval targets. AP is pretty useless against infantry. The British simply weren’t prepared for an attack down the penninsula, from the rear, by land, and that’s no myth.
The bit about the guns turning is trivial, though you’re entirely right to correct me that “fixed” was an erroneous choice of words by me, so thanks for that.
I think rilkefan, and Jon H (Willpower only helps when put in service of wisdom) cover my views of will pretty well.
And if we’re going to use sports analogies let’s talk about what the will to win really means there. It doesn’t just mean showing up for the game and gritting your teeth and trying really really hard.
It means a lot of time and work and sacrifice practicing and getting in shape instead of going for beer and pizza. It means devoting effort to figuring out good strategies and what the opponents are likely to try do, their weaknesses, etc. (Coaches don’t study all that film for nothing). It means having the self-discipline to assess the situation realistically when doing all this. Only then does in-game effort pay off.
“Will” is needed for the entire project, preparation and planning as well as execution.
“It means having the self-discipline to assess the situation realistically when doing all this. Only then does in-game effort pay off.”
The outcome of a game is typically not, however, life or death. The stakes differ utterly from an existential war, just as the stakes of an existential war differ from those of an optional war.
All along the administration and most war supporters have presented Iraq as a vital, existential, war: there was no choice involved in launching this invasion.
All along, the behavior of the administration and most supporters have been inconsistent with the notion that conquering and remaking Iraq was a matter of existential survival for the United States.
Sometimes the “in-game effort pay off” only comes from by choosing not to attack, and thus not having damaged one’s country and military. As Jon H. said last night: “The time for willpower was in 2002 when people were saying we had to invade Iraq *right then*.”
Would that I would have seen that myself, rather than fence-sitting, as I did with rapidly-increasing skepticism, until I bailed completely with Abu Ghraib.
Yes, Gary, it was trivial, but it was a golden opportunity to correct you on some trivial fact, so I could hardly be expected to pass it up. It probably won’t happen again for another six months, if that.
Anyway, it’s apparently the sort of trivia that exercises military history buffs, because I know I’ve seen partisans of Singapore’s coastal defenses leaping to defend the honor of their 15 inch guns.
I wonder what the armor-piercing ammo did when it hit ground? I assume it would still explode after penetrating much more deeply than the HE rounds would.
Gary beat me to what seems to me like a crucial factor: This war and occupation were never, at any time, treated seriously by the administration in practical terms. People who really thought that the fate of our civilization simply wouldn’t have tolerated the well-documented problems with troop readiness, under-supply of crucial materiel, and on and on. I fully believe that if Charles, von, jrudkis, or anyone else here who sees the war and occupation as serious matters were in charge, those defects wouldn’t have been tolerated…but they weren’t in charge, Bush and Cheney are and neither of them has ever cared to support their rhetoric with attention to actual preparation.
Those of us who oppose the basic project tend not to dwell on this much, and those who support the basic project tend to regard the failings as the result of underlings (“if only the czar knew, he would put a stop to it”), so the matter kind of falls through the cracks. But it was discussed in 2002-3, with war supporters mostly dismissing every objection raised about practical readiness as the work of anti-war wimps and dupes. We were right, though: the US government wasn’t prepared for the task it committed itself to and declared to be of supreme importance for us all.
“Yes, Gary, it was trivial, but it was a golden opportunity to correct you on some trivial fact, so I could hardly be expected to pass it up.”
Indeed. Would it help if I started deliberately sprinkling my comments with One Trivial (But Obscure!) Error Each, so as to make for a Delightful Possibility with every comment?
Or should I just use a caramel center in the heart of each comment? Decisions, decisions.
“I wonder what the armor-piercing ammo did when it hit ground? I assume it would still explode after penetrating much more deeply than the HE rounds would.”
I’d have to look up what sort of fuzes they used, but airburst HE slightly above ground/ship level is more deadly in many circumstances than a direct hit. I’m not under the impression that AP can be set to airburst, but this is where my not-being-an-expert runs into the need to do-some-more-reading in order to speak further to the topic.
Airburst charges tend to set off by either time-of-flight or radar proximity. I have no idea which was actually used, though.
A WWII era APHE round would likely burrow so deeply into the ground that the explosion would hardly cause a ripple on the surface.
Just out of curiosity, does anyone here subscribe to the theory that “success ultimately depends on our will to prevail, nothing more” besides Charles? I see a lot of detractors, but no supporters besides Charles on this site.
I wouldn’t go that far. I would say that will is a critical component. It won’t carry the day by itself but you certainly won’t win without it.
I don’t know whether I agree or disagree. Certainly the will to prevail might be useless in the face of, for example, the discovery that our entire planet will be annihilated in two hours’ time. The idea that one can prevail if one is sufficiently committed is an interesting one to consider, but there are ancillary requirements such as being as adaptive, resourceful, etc as is required. This happens a lot in books and movies; probably less often in real life.
Assuming the problem is a tractable one to begin with, I mean.
And certainly the reverse of the statement is true: one can lose if one has all the talent, resourcefulness, etc as is needed, only lacks the will. At some point, action is normally required. In real life, though, will is only part of the mix.
“Would it help if I started deliberately sprinkling my comments with One Trivial (But Obscure!) Error Each, so as to make for a Delightful Possibility with every comment?
Or should I just use a caramel center in the heart of each comment? Decisions, decisions.”
Sprinkling with obscure but trivial errors would be sufficient–adding calories to them would only get in the way of my attempt to shed 5-10 lbs this summer. Slows down my running time.
Off to read OCSteve’s link.
“It won’t carry the day by itself but you certainly won’t win without it.”
But as I emphasized, someone with a very small amount of will, in a machine gun nest, is apt to win against the mostly highly motivated warrior charging the nest with a spear, almost every time, save for an amazingly lucky exception now and again, if the exercise is tried enough times.
The other specifics determine who will win in most cases.
And endlessly exhorting soldiers, or armies, or a nation, to keep sending their soldiers and army into a meat-grinder, because goldarn it, if we just just apply enough will, we’ll finally win, is crazy. It’s Pickett’s charge. It’s World War I strategy all over over again. It’s “we can win Vietnam” by just trying hard enough.
Charles, have you ever seen Paths of Glory?
Alternatively, possibly I should have made an inquiry about another possibly relevant audio-visual entertainment involving WWI, in which the phrase “cunning scheme” comes up a lot.
Slarti and OCSteve,
Thanks for answering.
OCSteve, you mention that one can’t win without will. Do you think that ever happens in real life? It seems like there is always some will, if nothing else, survival and loyalty to comrades often bolsters will.
It seems that will might be significant in contests between otherwise evenly matched armies, but that since disparities in will will be small in most cases, and most contests are not evenly matched, will isn’t a very useful thing to talk about…
Gary: That would be to give artistic verissimilitude to an otherwise baldrick and unconvincing narrative?
I will only note the lack (AFAICT) of a corresponding entry at Bizarro World.
Digressing back to Iraq, I meant earlier today to note this piece, whose main point is properly in the lede:
Does this seem like their heart is in it?
(Even if they were 3-year rotations, it still wouldn’t matter, so long as there’s no coherent and at least slightly popular, or at least generally considered to be effective and legitimate, government, but setting that aside for a moment.)
“OCSteve, you mention that one can’t win without will. Do you think that ever happens in real life?”
Why do you think soldiers ever surrender? In a hopeless enough situation, most non-Japanese soldiers will, if they don’t expect to be killed regardless, surrender, because the circumstances have given them reason to think that will alone is insufficient to win. That’s a realistic appraisal in many circumstances.
“It seems that will might be significant in contests between otherwise evenly matched armies, but that since disparities in will will be small in most cases, and most contests are not evenly matched, will isn’t a very useful thing to talk about…”
Modern armies not all entering a battlefield at once — and there not being so many clear battlefields any more in modern warfare, much of the time — it’s still significant as regards individual units, and individuals, in action, up to a point. It’s just not the One Thing That Will Determine The Outcome Above All Others, though few individuals running away tend to win.
Charles, thanks for this.
I’d like to make a comment on the “Bush doctrine” by following up on wonkie’s comment:
As long as we are there to fight for our goal, we are at cross purposes withh the Iraqis.
Constitutional republican democracy as we practice it was hammered out, at great cost and effort, over the course of several hundred years. It emerged in the context of our particular political history, and of our particular social and economic institutions.
It works well for us, generally. But it’s not the only possible form of just, equitable government.
There are 6.6 billion people on the planet. 300 million of them — about 4.5% — live in the US. The other 95.5% participate in their own political, social, economic, religious, and cultural traditions and institutions. They have their own history, and their own hopes and agendas for the future.
Islam, to take one example, has a rich and deep understanding of human community, equality, and justice. It’s one that we here in the west could, in fact, learn from if we were so inclined.
Here is the long and short of it, IMO. Assuming that it is appropriate, that it is our mission, or even that it is possible to introduce western democracy to the rest of the world is folly. In the best case, it’s well-meaning but naive. In the worst case, it’s a thin veneer for pure self-interest. In the normal case, it’s a mix of the two.
This has nothing to do with other people being “incapable” of western style democracy. It has everything to do with people needing to work out their own institutions, in accord with their own understanding of community, justice, social and economic equity, etc. That’s what we did, and are still in the process of doing.
We cannot, and we have no place attempting to, impose our political, social, economic, or cultural institutions on others from without, whether it’s via “blood and steel” or any other form of interference. IMO, it is the height of folly, in the fullest tradition of all that that word means, to think otherwise.
Thanks –
Am I the only one who finds a statement like “The troubling part is the EJKs” somewhat creepy? There is no earthly reason to make up an acronym for “extrajudicial killings”, especially when you’re only going to mention it twice.
That phrase itself doesn’t seem particularly necessary either – unless you think that something like “civilian deaths” or “murders” would cause confusion by including judicial murders or accidental deaths – but if you must use it, at least forgo the acronym, unless you are trying to sound like some awful Vietnam war bureaucrat.
Sometimes the “in-game effort pay off” only comes from by choosing not to attack,
I agree.
But making that decision correctly also requires the will to look at objectives and choices realistically, rather than wishfully. That was really my point.
“Am I the only one who finds a statement like ‘The troubling part is the EJKs’ somewhat creepy?”
I was struck by the acronym, since I was equally unfamiliar with it. Any acronym or euphemism or jargon about killings is understandably apt to seem creepy, sure.
“There is no earthly reason to make up an acronym for ‘extrajudicial killings’, especially when you’re only going to mention it twice.”
Charles didn’t make it up.
You can question his usage of it, rather than a blunter term, if you like, but he didn’t make it up. He was following Army terminology.
“EJK” for “extra-judicial killings” is rare enough that it didn’t show up in the first ten Google pages of results, out of the 273,000 uses of “EJK,” but when the query is “ejk killings,” one finds over 500 usages, all seeming to stem from the Army.
One might wonder if Charles was being a bit blithe in adopting this, but that’s a rather fine point of style, and at a level at which few, if any of us, are consistently unquestionable. I’m certainly not. It’s certainly an argument that can be made, but if it’s worth making, I’ll leave to someone else.
“Murder” tends to well describe many extra-judicial killings, but it’s understandable that militaries tend to prefer to emphasize other categories of killings, and to emphasize the distinctions. What the implications are, and what best practices might be, I leave to others to discuss for now.
Mr. Baugh (now blogging here, true believers!): “Gary: That would be to give artistic verissimilitude to an otherwise baldrick and unconvincing narrative?”
M’lud, you have found the mot juste.
I should have noted that I do share this opinion, which I wouldn’t, on the other hand, put forth as more than a suggestion (regarding using “EJKs”): “…but if you must use it, at least forgo the acronym, unless you are trying to sound like some awful Vietnam war bureaucrat.”
Turb writes: “Do you think that ever happens in real life? It seems like there is always some will, if nothing else, survival and loyalty to comrades often bolsters will.”
I’d guess that only comes up in expected combat engagements.
Lack of will would be particularly in evidence in slack discipline before combat is likely. If a lack of will manifests in guards sleeping on duty, then when the commandos land, a surge of will in combat in the interests of survival and loyalty is going to be too late.
Will is not the same as bravado in the fight.
Gary: But as I emphasized, someone with a very small amount of will, in a machine gun nest, is apt to win against the mostly highly motivated warrior charging the nest with a spear, almost every time, save for an amazingly lucky exception now and again, if the exercise is tried enough times.
You are right, of course. I was thinking more though in terms of when things really get rough, not mowing down spear throwing warriors with a machine gun. That really does not take much will IMO. I’m just saying that all other factors being equal, the side with the most will, will carry the day in most cases.
Turbulence: OCSteve, you mention that one can’t win without will. Do you think that ever happens in real life? It seems like there is always some will, if nothing else, survival and loyalty to comrades often bolsters will.
I can agree with that. You don’t fight as much for “king and country” as for the poor schmuck beside you in the foxhole. I think most acts of heroism are more to protect your squad than save your country. So this is a very valid point.
“I can agree with that. You don’t fight as much for “king and country” as for the poor schmuck beside you in the foxhole. I think most acts of heroism are more to protect your squad than save your country. So this is a very valid point.”
I would agree with that. Which is why I say that Bush and Cheney have wasted the lives of the troops, but the troops themselves did not. The troops were fighting for each other, Bush and Cheney are pursuing some crazy imperial scheme that was nuts in the 1990s, and nuts squared after 9/11.
“That really does not take much will IMO. I’m just saying that all other factors being equal, the side with the most will, will carry the day in most cases.”
Sure. But the number of times in warfare that, in fact, all other factors are equal isn’t quite zero, but it isn’t a very large single digit, either.
And it can take only one other key factor — supply, ease of supply, numbers, technology, position, strategy, type of weapon, type of defense, air power, sea power, type of war, organization, competence, whatever — to conclusively carry the day.
I have to stop hanging out here. You all have me thinking more and more like a lefty. I used to be worried Rove would cancel my VRWC membership. Now I’m thinking he is going to contract a hit…
OCSteve, to my way of thinking, you’re just thinking like a good conservative, and I mean that seriously. You’re being cautious about means, lofty in aim, good-hearted, interested in what’s actually done versus what’s promised, looking for ways to accomplish aims with a minimum of side effects, interested in making fiscal sense…that’s all perfectly fine conservative turf, and from my point of view the more people get back to homesteading it the better.
“You all have me thinking more and more like a lefty.”
Don’t worry: while our ultimate goal is to get you to swear allegiance to Kim Jong Il, and take up a placard and a place in the crowd for him, we’re still a long way off from there.
Why, we haven’t even gotten to dialectical materialism, yet.
Slightly more seriously, either ideas are reasonably sound, or they aren’t. There are plenty of “rightwing” ideas I approve of — curiously enough, I’m all for liberty, and freedom, and defending them, and there are plenty of more specific shibboleths I can affirm; it’s when we start getting down further into the nitty-gritty that my ideas and some conservative ideas start to part company, or one side or another starts to tend to feel that a necessary other point is being left out.
But that’s also part of why I’m such a big fan of trying to talk about concrete specifics, over airy generalities that people tend to project all sorts of differing unstated interpretations and assumptions into.
That would be to give artistic verissimilitude to an otherwise baldrick and unconvincing narrative?
Ow. Ow ow ow ow ow.
Bruce: Thanks. I do appreciate that.
the more people get back to homesteading it the better
Man, I feel lonely out here… {tumbleweed blows by…}
Gary:
Bruce: Actually on a second reading that deserves more than a simple “thanks”. You may have just summed me up better than I could. I may adopt that as my motto.
You’re being cautious about means, lofty in aim, good-hearted, interested in what’s actually done versus what’s promised, looking for ways to accomplish aims with a minimum of side effects, interested in making fiscal sense…
I can live with that, hell, I can embrace that…
Interesting post, but I don’t pretend to understand how anyone can look at All the Ways That Bush Screwed Up, and not dismiss *any* hope of improvement under this horrible, horrible president.
I mean — “got serious about counterinsurgency AFTER LOSING THE 2006 ELECTIONS.” What does that tell you?
By 2004 at latest, Bush had a *duty* to realize what fools Cheney and Rumsfeld were. He didn’t.
–As for “will,” I just think of J.D. at the end of Heathers, shrieking “WILL, dammit!”
Gary:
Dude, you are killing me…
“Farber” will be a verb one day, if it’s not already.
“‘Farber’ will be a verb one day, if it’s not already.”
It used to be — in a small way — in the rec.arts.sf.* hierarchy of Usenet, more or less as a synonym for “googled” (although it predates Google’s existence by a couple of years). Um, actually. (Not my coinage or usage.)
I’m not quite sure what your usage means, though. 🙂
OCSteve, my pleasure. I’ve written before that I think America needs and benefits from a serious conservative presence. Even though my own sentiments go from libertarian to liberal, I think it’s good for every idea to face constructive challenge. The death or at least disappearance of sane conservatism does ill to the body politic.
Digressing, although I disagree with some language, and some bits, Zakaria also has some good stuff to say here.
He details much more, all of which should be read, though it’s been said before.
It’s exactly right: the best aides Osama bin Laden could have are the people running around, frantically on the lookout for signs of Teh Islamic Threat, building it up, being scared out of their wits, and doing their best to scare everyone else out of their wits.
No one could accomplish this goal of al Qaeda’s better than Michelle Malkin and all her ilk: how better to frighten moderate Muslims, and convince them that maybe bin Laden isn’t nuts, after all? How better could one build up fear about Islamist groups, and an illusion of their vast worldwide power, than by the hysterical alarmism of Malkinism, and the like?
Zakaria applies this well to the current Republican candidates (aside from Ron Paul).
Bruce: The death or at least disappearance of sane conservatism does ill to the body politic.
And here we are. “Sane conservatism” sounds almost bizarre to me these days…
Wow. What a post and a discussion I missed by having my in-laws in for the weekend.
Charles, this post is a greater credit to you than anything I have seen you write. I have additional objections to your positions than what you acknowledged, and agree with Gary’s position in the discussion on the importance of will, but I will save that for another day. I respect you far more for having the grace to write this than before.
“I spent a dozen years watching Michael Jordan will his way to victory, time and time again.”
I appreciate your honesty, but I take exception to the above. This idea of will is more fantasy than reality. Michael Jordan didn’t win games by force of will, he won by working his ass off day after day for years. George Bush will go to his grave without ever working his ass off over anything more challenging than a Nintendo box. He is not merely incompetent, he is a fool, and the will of a fool is worth fuckall.
I’m only an occasional reader of this blog, but I really ought to drop in more often. It’s good to read some genuinely open-minded arguing. You all seem like a nice bunch.
Charles — good post.
On the general question of “will”, I think it goes a bit further than I suspect some people do, but only if it is understood to mean really, truly trying to do everything in your power to make sure you prevail, and if it’s not just something that the troops and the people have, but something the leadership has as well. That’s why I have said on various occasions that I think that one of the reasons why we have failed in Iraq — not the only one, but one — is a failure of will on the part of Bush and his administration.
If they had really bent their whole minds and all their power to ensuring that we would win, we might not have won, but there are a whole lot of mistakes we would not have made.
About basketball: besides the other disanalogies other people have noted, one crucial one is: armed with a basketball, a team, a court, and opponents, winning a basketball game is the sort of thing one can do by playing very well, with will and talent. I could not win a basketball game by sheer will, but a talented person could, because the goal is in principle achievable by the available means. It is not the least clear to me that the goal in Iraq was ever achievable by the available means. It might have been, but it might also not have been. And if it wasn’t, then expecting us to prevail by sheer will would be like expecting a great basketball player to play basketball so well, and with so much passion and elan, that he not only won the game, but also filed his tax returns, averted a hurricane, and proved that there are infinitely many Fibonacci primes. By playing basketball.
rayc: It’s good to read some genuinely open-minded arguing. You all seem like a nice bunch.
I’m guessing you have not read all the recent threads ;).
Kidding. Mostly.
About basketball: besides the other disanalogies other people have noted, one crucial one is: armed with a basketball, a team, a court, and opponents, winning a basketball game is the sort of thing one can do by playing very well, with will and talent. I could not win a basketball game by sheer will, but a talented person could, because the goal is in principle achievable by the available means. It is not the least clear to me that the goal in Iraq was ever achievable by the available means. It might have been, but it might also not have been. And if it wasn’t, then expecting us to prevail by sheer will would be like expecting a great basketball player to play basketball so well, and with so much passion and elan, that he not only won the game, but also filed his tax returns, averted a hurricane, and proved that there are infinitely many Fibonacci primes. By playing basketball.
And this is why hilzoy is teh awesomest.
Just a few points.
OCSteve, not only do I reinforce what Bruce said, but I have to go just a little further. You are an example of what is good about the conservative side of the body politic. You are open to different ideas and willing to look at all the vidence.
Well, maybe except for global warming. 🙂
And one of the things that you have discovered, and probably taught a few of us on the left, is just how much commonality there is between the two sides in terms of the real fundamentals. We may differ in how to reach certain goals, but the goals are frequently the same.
In reality, you and I will probably never agree on many things, but I think that we have a certain respect for each other, and therefore are willing to have a type of discussion which stays on the facts, not personalities.
Secondly, and in light of the overall discussion here, the issue of the war is too often put into light of conservative vs liberal, which I think is a mistake. On one level, the idea of our intervening in another country for humanitarian reasons is more of a liberal idea than a conservative one. Bush invasion was counter to almost every conservative principle out ther. So you are not becoming a lefty, but are returning more to your real conservative roots.
I mentioned way above where I and Charles went our separate ways right from the beginning of the invasion. But where I really get ticked off about the whole “will” thing is that there is the assumption that those of us who oppose the war, either from the right or the left, have a lack of “will.” In truth, it took a lot of will to speak our minds when constantly faceed with derision and being called traitors or loser-defeatists. Additionbally, although I was totally against our invasion of Iraq, I “willed” for it to be a success as much as anybody.
The difference is that I and others came to a realization that it didn’t really make any difference, and not because or solely due to incompetence. That State Department study referred to above, the one that Rumsfeld refused to allow in tyhe preparation, not only talked about all that would need to be done (almost none of which was) but also, how even if everything was done right, it would still face a high likelihood of failure.
One needs a “will” to win, perhaps, but even harder is to have the “will” to do what is right in the face of a lot of opposition. Fortunately, based upon what I now see as right, the opposition is diminishing.
Long enough, though I could go on and on and on.
I’m guessing you have not read all the recent threads ;).
I’ve read many of the recent threads and I think that people here are pretty nice. I’m pretty sure that everyone here loves their spouse and cares deeply for their children.
Unfortunately, nice people can still be woefully misguided, ignorant, and dangerous. Perhaps if more nice people had realized that being nice is not sufficient for morality, we might not have so much blood on our hands.
Kidding. Mostly 😉
Just to add to John’s post, which I agree with, sometimes one of the hardest things is having the will to refrain from acting when it’s tempting and popular but not actually well-justified.
“You are an example of what is good about the conservative side of the body politic.”
OCSteve is of the Body?
Or is the insidious left trying to Absorb OCSteve?
Beware, OCSteve! Beware!
I have to object to this, on the grounds that you’ve been grossly unfair to us unmarried childless folks; we can be misguided, ignorant, and dangerous, as well.
One of the quotes that’s been on the sidebar of my blog for years: “Idealism, alas, does not protect one from ignorance, dogmatism, and foolishness.”
— Sidney Hook
Ugh: And this is why hilzoy is teh awesomest.
Yup. That she is. And I only rarely agree with her. 😉
John: …but I think that we have a certain respect for each other, and therefore are willing to have a type of discussion which stays on the facts, not personalities.
You can take that to the bank. My chit, and it is good.
Turbulance: Unfortunately, nice people can still be woefully misguided, ignorant, and dangerous. Perhaps if more nice people had realized that being nice is not sufficient for morality, we might not have so much blood on our hands.
I’m trying to get mad at you for this, but it hits a little too close to home.
Gary: I was thinking more along the lines of this. 😉
Er, this.
Once more, with feeling?
“You can take that to the bank. My chit, and it is good.”
What happened to the good old days of conservatism, when the only possibly acceptable form of specie or exchange was gold? Instead, you offer a chit to fiat currency?
You some kinda commie, buddy?
Keep an eye out for the holy trinity of von Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard smiting you in your tracks one day. (I believe they charge for that sort of thing, too: can’t expect them to do it for altruistic reasons, y’know.)
“Er, this.”
Same idea, just updated.
🙂
(Okay, not entirely, but to a large degree, actually.)
But, like I said, resistance is only futile insofar as any given idea makes sense. There is no shortage of ideas that have been part of left orthodoxy that I’ve never signed on for, or have always strongly or partially objected to.
This is why I’ve always taken my politics a la carte, although if we have to generalize, I’m more or less some variety of liberal, to varying degrees depending on the specific.
But my willingness to identify in that fashion is really as much or more based on the way that the right has been so successful in demonizing the word “liberal” and “liberalism” in recent decades (as they had to other degrees of success for some decades before taht), and my desire to stand up for certain key ideas at the core of “liberalism,” which include but are not limited to defending liberty, our civil rights, freedom, the Constitution of the United States of America, the rights of the poor and the weak and those with little voice and little power, the right of the people to control their government, rather than that only the wealthy should have a say, to stand for the defense of the ideals of justice, equal opportunity, fairness, equal application of the law, and that no one in this country go without such basic needs as food, shelter, and medical care being met.
I’ll stand up for the ideals of — though not every program ever created under the aegis of — liberalism, as it was best exemplified by the best ideas and approaches of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and — in domestic affairs only — Lyndon Johnson, while their goals and ideals are under vicious and scurrilous attack.
If and when we ever get back to something resembling “normal” politics, where the issues at stake aren’t matters of torture, and curtailing habeas corpus, and invading other countries, and breaking our military, and corrupting the government for purely partisan or even more corrupt reasons, I’m apt to identify a lot less with “liberalism” and more with just my own notions, again.
(I was a lot less partisan in the Nineties, in point of fact, and plenty of even liberal, let alone leftist, folks in the blogosphere thought me obtusely and deeply annoyingly insufficiently partisan in tone and language and views during even 2002-3.)
But that future still seems quite some time off, for now.
On one level, the idea of our intervening in another country for humanitarian reasons is more of a liberal idea than a conservative one.
Maybe. If America honors her treaties, if her word means anything, then she is obligated to intervene in cases of genocide. So says the genocide convention at least. The notion that this country fulfills its obligations and keeps its promises might be a liberal one, but I would think some conservatives would like to lay claim to it as well.
OCSteve,
Sorry. I didn’t mean you in particular, just…all of us. Myself included. I was against the war from day zero, and I’ll always wonder if things might have turned out differently if I had been more active, written more letters, talked to more people, if only I had quit my job and went door to door in florida hawking Kerry for the 04 elections, etc. Probably not.
Having spent the weekend in Boston, I can safely say that I am not teh awesomest. My family is. Especially my m=new niece — except also my Mom and Dan, and my siblings, and their spouses, and my little nephews. Which is to say, my family.
Myself included. I was against the war from day zero, and I’ll always wonder if things might have turned out differently if I had been more active…
As someone in a similar position, all I can do is look back and say: how prescient I was, and how useless. In all senses of the word.
new niece. Mom and Dad. I cn typ. And spel.
This doesn’t bode well:
But you can put some of that down to the full complement of US troops not yet being there, right?
Well, actually, the main problem is this:
So, for now, once again we have the clearing, and the holding, what holding?, leading to not so much with the building.
But I’m sure the situation will improve, any time now, and there are lots of signs to be hopeful about!
Briefly and belatedly (when this was first posted I was trying to finish up a referee’s report on a 400pp. 16-author manuscript; my report [sent off earlier today] ran 20pp., single-spaced):
Charles, good post. It’s never easy to admit when you are wrong, particularly in front of this kind of crowd. (I told my students this year about some of my more egregious past errors – then realized that none of them were alive when I had committed these mistakes!)
Gary (and others, but mostly Gary) – brilliant commenting, especially on the “will” question. I thought I could wander in late to add some historical wisdom, but y’all have already hit many of the most obvious/salient examples. I could still add a few details on the Japanese conquest of Singapore, but they are so irrelevant to the theme of this thread that even I blush to include them here.
Well done, All!
(And so to bed.)
At the risk of getting piled on, I think we might be understating the importance of national will. We have mentioned many of the counter examples, but how about the ones that do showcase its importance. For example, the US Civil War and the Vietnam War. In the first case, the South had most of the other factors against it (inferior population, industrial capacity, navy, etc). It lasted 5 years because the factors on its side, including national will. The North is an even better example. If did had not had a strong national will, it would have quit during the first two years of defeats.
Vietnam is another good example. The US vastly outnumbered the North Vietnamese in terms of population, industrial capacity, air power, etc. This is reflected in the relative loss ratios. The US lost 58,000 dead and the North Vietnamese between 10 and 20 times that. However, the Vietnamese believed strongly enough in their cause, and had other advantages, that they had superior national will and were willing to undergo those 10-20 times higher casualties for longer than the US was willing to accept its own. Granted, it helped that they could see the light at the end of their tunnel, while the US could not, but they still had to be willing to pay the price.
WW2 in the Pacific is yet another example. The Japanese started it under conditions (Pearl Harbor) that guaranteed the US would have the national will to crush them, regardless of the cost. I think it is questionable if the US would have been willing to pay the same price if the Japanese had carefully declared war before hand, or even just ignored US possessions and just attacked the British, Dutch, and French colonial possessions; especially if they took the effort to frame it as a war against European colonialism.
In short, I agree with those that say national will is necessary, but not sufficient for victory. At the risk of yet another sports analogy, consider mountain climbing. If a climber is poorly prepared or just insufficiently skilled, no amount of determination will get the climber to the top of the mountain. On the other hand, if a climber lacks determination, he probably isn’t going to succeed at climbing, period. Determination and skill can counterbalance other factors, such as lack of supplies. That is how people climb Everest without oxygen, for example.
Charles: It’s a great post, and I really don’t want this to come out wrong, but:
Look, this is an awful lot of things to be wrong about. When a person is wrong about this many things, is it time to consider a full-scale ideological shift?
Ya know, if you had to put it all into a sentence, you could say something like this: this neocons created a power vacuum and they expected a democracy to fill it.
Ouch, *the neocons. I don’t want anyone to think I meant ‘the neocon’, intending to picking anybody here.
Donald,
interesting point, but it seems to suggest view national will as a simple neutral value that is then used for whatever purpose, good or bad. The South, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan all being examples of the power of national will suggests to me that it is something that we should only summon up in really life or death situations, and invading Iraq was not one of those, imo. Much of America’s reputation was based on the ‘slowness to anger’, so trying to pump up the national will in order to accomplish mission x seems to be a rather dangerous thing.
National Will is also relevant to other missions, such as Darfur. I don’t see us as having the will necessary to do anything about humanitarian crisis like Darfur once American blood is shed.
Donald Clarke: I don’t think anyone here would dispute the necessity of will to winning a war. It’s how important will is to victory — and to the particular victory conditions one is trying to attain — that’s at issue. I don’t think anyone can dispute that we, as a country, had the will to invade Iraq in 2003; I also don’t think anyone can dispute that we, as a country, did not have the will to not invade Iraq in 2003. Whether we might have had such if our leaders and pundits had approached the war differently is a counterfactual I don’t feel qualified to answer, but my wild-assed guess is that we didn’t and never really would have had the will to occupy and reconstruct Iraq as was needed.
[IOW, I pretty much trust the implied Bush/Cheney calculations in early 2002.]
To pick two further examples from your post: I agree that in WWII the US had the will and the way to overcome the Japanese. I don’t believe that the US had either the will or the way to win in Vietnam given our stated victory conditions. Obviously, we could’ve just nuked the damn country (shades of MacArthur in Korea) to “win” — and we might’ve even had the will to do it — but that wouldn’t have constituted a “victory” under our own terms, and it’s this confusion which is IMO responsible for the ephemeral legitimacy of the “We lacked the will to win!” meme common to the Vietnam War. What’s more, I don’t see how on earth we could have achieved “victory” in Vietnam given the means at our disposal. We were in a war we couldn’t win, because the key issue of the war — winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people to prevent them from turning to Communism — simply wasn’t amenable to the kinds of force we could (were willing?) to bring to bear.
I used “the will and the way” partly as an homage to a D&D supplement I’m fond of (: but partly because the two, while inextricably linked, can also be independent. “Whatever happens we have got/the Maxim gun and they have not”, etc. As in Vietnam*, I didn’t see then and don’t see now any way the US could have accomplished its stated goals in Iraq irrespective of “the will to win”. Put bluntly, the task was too monumentally huge for us — too many assumptions about foreign culture that were just wrong, too little planning and sacrificing but mainly too many variables over which we simply couldn’t have contorl — all the more so because the arguments that we could frequently boil down to “we’re Americans, we can do anything once we put our minds to it!” This is, as I noted above, hubris; and pride goeth before the fall, as I think we’re seeing here… and certainly, it’s what damn near everyone else thinks.
* Ok, I hadn’t actually been born during the Vietnam War, but you get what I mean.
Turbulance: I didn’t mean you in particular, just…all of us
Oops – there was supposed to be a smiley at the end of that. I shouldn’t be posting past my bedtime…
Just to chime in late on the notion of will.
A surplus of will/desire/conviction will not cause you to win a war; but a dearth of it will cause you to lose a war. If you are not willing to struggle past the set-backs and defeats, then you’ll lose when they’ll happen.
The only way to win a war without conviction is to have so much overpowering force that you win without a set-back or signficant set-backs. However, unless you learn and change strategy to surpass the road block, you’ll just hit it again.
You have have the conviction to achieve an objective, not a conviction to a methodology to achieve an objective.
jrudkis,
the point about Darfur is excellent, and really hits me, having been one of those internationalist type liberals. Now, I’m not so sure, though where that leaves me on things like Darfur, I’m not really sure.
This country, in terms of national will, was never sufficiently behind our going into Iraq.
Fully 1/3 was totally against any intervention and another 1/3 was, up until the bombs started falling, against it under the terms we did it. Without a strong and widespread coalition, without UN sanction, etc.
Only 1/3 was really gung ho from the beginning. And that doesn’t equate to national will. And starting from that point, any problems or signs of incompetency will ultimately trun that middle thrid off. And keep in mind, as I stated above, many of the first 1/3, myself included, and I suspect people like hilzoy, were really hoping and willing for a quick and efficient follow up to the invasion.
lj, I am with you and that is why I addressed that same point to OCSteve above. The problem is that if we are going to intervene, we have to do it in a manner that does not run counter to our goals and expectations.
And this is why I talk about the primary issue of intervention or war not being a cut and dried left vs right thing, and the same goes for will.
The right didn’t have the “will” in regards to Somalia or Lebanon. The left didn’t have it for Vietnam or the current situation. (I speak here in terms of how I perceive Charles to view “will”, as persevering through all obstacles to a distinct victory.)
The question of will may also depend on whether one is on the attacking or the defending side. There are many historical examples of the defenders/occupied people prevailing because the attackers/occupiers ran out of steam/will. Rome could have given in to Hannibal (who simply wanted a return to the times of coexistence and had no intention to destroy Rome or conquer Italy for carthage) or Spain accepted Napoleon’s brother as king (actually an improvement over(for?) the rotten Spanish political system). In both cases the “rational” path was not taken and the invader/occupier had to retreat in the end (Scipio/Wellington only accelerated the process).
OT: Am I the only one reminded of a late medieval pikemen battle by this photo?
I’m not sure I agree regarding Darfur. We don’t have the will now, its true. But if we had a real president, and if our military was not completely bogged down in Iraq, I could imagine the President addressing the American people and convincing them.
The speech practically writes iteself: “My fellow Americans, We can no longer afford to sit idly by while another genocide happens. After the Holocaust, we swore…We as a nation have been blessed by God…for this specific purpose….not to solve all conflicts, but to make some effort to end the most horrific slaughters humanity has yet witnessed…it will be difficult, and American servicemen will die, just like many died while liberating the camps…” While the President speaks, intermix pictures from concentration camps and Darfur today. This approach isn’t very subtle, but Americans of late have not been masters of nuance.
If a mediocre President could get the country fired about restoring a dictatorship in the middle east (Bush I), then I really think a good President could get the country fired about stopping a genocide. Americans want desperately to believe that they are good and noble people; a smart politician could tap into that.
Of course, because of Iraq, this is all fantasy. Regardless of will, we lack the capability to intervene.
Once we are involved in a place like Darfur, we would immediately become the enemy and the “cause” of the problem. The minority being exterminated now would take the opportunity to get vengeance, and we will be tarred with their crimes. Inevitably, some soldier somewhere will commit a crime, and that will tar the presence. We would be seen as choosing sides. There would be no exit strategy, because once we were gone, the ethnic cleansing would return. We have no one trained in local languages or culture.
And most importantly, we do not have a vital US interest that would provide any staying power once soldiers start to die.
I don’t see it as a possibility (that we would intervene long enough to matter), no matter who is President.
Late to the party, of course. Couldn’t a very similar piece be written about the boshevik revolution — Collectivization of the farms could have been handled more smoothly, but I still think it was an important milestone, etc.
There is a terrible disaster (imposed on other people) brought about by the policies you supported (if forced into an up or down vote). It is simply not acceptable yo go back and cherry pick things you would have done differently and wash your hands of the deaths of hundreds of thousands.
jrudkis,
I admire your skepticism. Tell me, were you as skeptical about Iraq in 03? Or does your skepticism reflect lessons learned from the Iraq debacle?
Part of me really agrees with you when you say that the US should not intervene unless its vital interests are threatened. If we, as a nation, decide that that is what we value then we have three options:
1. We withdraw from the genocide convention. We tell the world that all the crap we spouted about “never again” after WWII was just that: crap. We explain politely that it doesn’t really matter how many Jews or Tutsis or Armenians you systemically exterminate as long as you don’t harm American national interests.
2. We decide that our national interests includes the prevention of genocide and find some means to stick with our treaty obligations.
3. We internally decide to go with option 1 while making the noises associated with option 2. In other words, we lie through our teeth so that people getting slaughtered will place false hope in us, believing that the richest most powerful nation on Earth will actually follow through on its promises.
So, which option do you choose? Not choosing an option seems the same as choosing option 3.
On second reading, that first question sounds more accusatory than I intended. It really is just curiosity. Insert smiley faces as appropriate.
Iraq, sitting centrally in a region with 70% of known oil reserves, does have a vital US interest. It is therefore different from Darfur. I was skeptical about our staying power in Iraq, assumed from the beginning that it would take ten years and we only had five because we could not muster the will to stay longer, and that the occupation would be worse than the war. But I saw in Iraq an educated and relatively industrious people for whom democracy seemed a reasonable goal, and one that would hasten change throughout the middle east.
I don’t think that is true of Darfur, and I don’t know what we would leave behind even if it was best case scenario.
I would probably choose option 4 in Darfur, where we aid neighboring regional governments in intervening, but do not intervene ourselves.
I will respond to comments, but not ’til tonight or tomorrow. My schedule is intruding.
Look, this is an awful lot of things to be wrong about. When a person is wrong about this many things, is it time to consider a full-scale ideological shift?
Put another way, why is it so much easier for Charles to see Hugo Chavez as the disaster he is, but not George W. Bush? Maybe that was the inchoate irk that I felt in Charles’s otherwise unobjectionable Chavez post the other day.
jrudkis,
Can you please explain the precise US interest that you believe justified the invasion at the time? Mumbling about how Iraq is in a region with a lot of oil doesn’t make much sense. Venezuela is too as is Saudi Arabia. Does that justify American invasions of those two nations? Furthermore, if the goal of the war was to secure access to oil, it was a huge failure: Iraq is producing less oil now than before and pipeline and production facility security within Iraq have greatly deteriorated.
Perhaps I’m misreading you. Are you trying to suggest that America should invade countries that have lots of oil provided that there is a convenient pretext?
I don’t believe that throwing some cash at neighboring countries is sufficient to discharge our treaty obligations, but I will have to check the precise wording later.
No, I am saying that having a vital interest makes intervening against one despot or genocide possible or in our interest, and not intervening against others who are as bad or worse. In Iraq, we had a regime that was bad, did kill many, and had invaded two neighbors. That is not enough to make intervention worthwhile. We beleived that they were trying to get WMD’s that could hold the gulf hostage, whether they could reach the US or not. Having the life blood of the world economy straddled by that regime did make it in our interest, or at least arguably so.
I’ll try not to mumble next time.
I will only note the lack (AFAICT) of a corresponding entry at Bizarro World.
Although I should answer this one, Ugh. There are plenty of posts at Redstate and theForvm without corresponding entries at ObWi, Ugh. I wrote this with ObWi readers specifically in mind. I don’t have hard and fast rules anymore for what I post or where. I should also mention that RS isn’t some comfy ideological cocoon for me, at least not in the last year or so. I’ve taken plenty of positions contrary to the directors’ editorial stands, including the immigration bill, and my relationships with some of the moderators range from frosty to hostile. Just ask Thomas.
Vietnam is another good example
At the risk of a threadjack, I’d like to make a couple of comments about Vietnam and “national will”.
The US was involved in Vietnam for about 25 years, roughly from 1950 to 1975. Serious US troop levels began around ’65, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
Our involvement there actually had pretty broad popular support up until the very late 60’s and early 70’s. There was an anti-war movement prior to that, but they were generally considered to be more or less nutty fringe types.
Popular support for Vietnam failed when it became clear (a) that the war could not be won, and (b) that the civilian leadership had been deliberately lying about how well things had been going up until then.
There are, perhaps, a number of reasons that the war was unwinnable. But one that is almost never mentioned is that the military strategy was inherently flawed. The US would not take and hold territory in the north.
We refused to do this, in turn, because the next stop after North Vietnam is China, and the memory of our experience in Korea was still fairly fresh in the minds of military planners.
Vietnam is not a case of a US war being unwinnable because of the failure of popular support. It is a case of US popular support failing because the war was unwinnable, at least on the terms we set ourselves for fighting it for strategic and other reasons.
The greatest damage done by Vietnam was the undermining of national confidence in US foreign policy per se. People lost confidence in the credibility and wisdom of their leaders.
This happened not because the US people lost their spine, but because their leaders made bad decisions, and then lied about them.
The issue then, and in fact now, has nothing to do with the lack of will. It has to do with a lack of confidence in the wisdom and good faith of the leadership. That lack of confidence, in both cases, is IMO more than justified.
There’s no value in willing yourself to do stupid, ill-advised, damaging things.
Thanks –
Charles, it just seemed to be your pattern that when you posted here of late (for at least the past year or so, IIRC) there was always a corresponding post at RS, and the lack of one for a “my bad” post seemed notable (plus I try to link to your RS posts for the fun contrasts in comments here and there).
You have been notably less insane (;-)) than your fellow editors over there.
“Charles, it just seemed to be your pattern that when you posted here of late (for at least the past year or so, IIRC) there was always a corresponding post at RS, and the lack of one for a ‘my bad”‘post seemed notable (plus I try to link to your RS posts for the fun contrasts in comments here and there).”
I’m not going to offer the following as any sort of attempt to read Charles’ mind, since I could only guess what his thinking was/is, and the probablility of my missing endless alternative possibilites is very high, but I will observe that it’s not unreasonable to suspect that the same post, made at RedState, would provoke some disagreement, perhaps some rather sharp, and disgruntlement, more or less in the opposite direction from which the post got here, and that there is absolutely no obligation that I’m aware of that requires Charles to put him through the strain of trying to defend his various points to two different sets of people at the same time.
There’s just no such obligation on Charles, that I can see. It might be more impressive if he managed the task, but that’s hardly an obligation. It seems to me that he’s free to choose whom he wishes to address, when he wishes to take on the time-consuming effort of addressing them, as he likes.
It seems to me that we all have that freedom, and that under few circumstances — and I don’t see that this is one of them — put us in a situation where we deserve criticism for exercising that freedom.
Other’s mileage may, of course, vary. In which case perhaps we can start posting lists of where we think they’re really obligated to post a given set of points they’ve made here, and defend them.
Re Vietnam,
IIRC the South fell to a massive conventional military attack from the North in 1975. I have seen various people put forward the notion that the South could have withstood this attack if it had received logistical support from the US. I have also seen commentaters claim that the South had plenty of supplies, but corruption in the South Vietnamese government prevented those supplies from getting where they were needed.
I don’t know the history well enough to judge between these two points of view, but would appreciate any suggestions of where to look. My best guess at this point is that the South might have withstood the 1975 attack with enough US logistical aid, but probably would have fallen in 1978 or 1981. I don’t think it would have survived long enough to become a country like South Korea.
Gary – I didn’t mean to imply that Charles had some soft of obligation to also post at Red State.
On the point of will,
isn’t it obvious that a government that has to obfuscate or even invent reasons to go to war,
has little confidence in the will of its people if it made an honest case?
I mean, Charles seems to think there was a good reason to invade Iraq, and it could be done competently.
I think, if that reason and those real plans, with their cost and sacrifices, would have been presented, the will to do it would not have been there.
Popular support for Vietnam failed when it became clear (a) that the war could not be won, and (b) that the civilian leadership had been deliberately lying about how well things had been going up until then.
Russell,
Don’t overlook the many and complex effects of the draft, which were increasingly being felt.
OT: Charges against Omar Khadr dropped.
robd: On the point of will, isn’t it obvious that a government that has to obfuscate or even invent reasons to go to war, has little confidence in the will of its people if it made an honest case?
BOO-yeah!!!
I try not to think about that, b/c it suffuses me with rage, but for the White House to lie us/itself into war, treat the voters with thinly-veiled contempt, AND THEN for the goons to rail against the public for insufficient support/will …
… man, there’s got to be some prescription medication to help me deal with that.
Anderson – try a pint of vodka and a few beers.
Donald Clarke: On the end of the war in Vietnam, the most readable account is Frank Snepp, Decent Interval; Snepp was a CIA agent in Saigon during the last couple of years. The major NVN account available in English is Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory, but it’s not terribly insightful. (At that it’s far better than the pamphlet he nominally co-wrote with Vo Nguyen Giap, How We Won The War, which is little more than an expansion upon the principle that the Party Is Glorious.)
Of secondary accounts, I might recommend Stanley Karnow, Vietnam and Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time For War. William Duiker knows far more about Vietnam itself (as opposed to US policies and politics) than any other author; I think his Sacred War is probably more germane to this topic than his other books, but any would be good. On US policies at the end, see, inter alia, Arnold Isaacs, Without Honor; Stanley Kutler, The Wars of Watergate; and James Cannon, Time and Chance. The first two of these cover the end of the Nixon years; the last is on Ford. Ignore the self-serving memoirs of liars like Kissinger, which have no evidentiary value, so far as I’m concerned.
I suspect you’ll find that the consensus is not far from what you’ve surmised yourself – more US aid to RVN in 1975 might have postponed defeat, but not for long enough to make any real difference. The final campaign was remarkably quick – Van Tien Dung himself admits it was not even supposed to be the final campaign, just the set-up for the big push a year later – due to the complete implosion of the RVN leadership and armed forces. Talk about a failure of will! There were certainly sufficient supplies for the ARVN to fight, if they had chosen to, but they faced a major drawdown – and, implicitly, a complete re-orientation of their military strategy – in the near future, and apparently decided it was hopeless. At least that’s how I read it.
Hope this helps.
While this is deep in the thread, I just wanted to write my appreciation for your efforts in writing this post Charles. Thank you.
Anderson – try a pint of vodka and a few beers.
Bush and vodka both make me want to vomit, tho only vodka has yet actually precipitated the real thing. I’ll self-medicate with Lagavulin tonight.
Southern Comfort?
I’m not going to offer the following as any sort of attempt to read Charles’ mind…
I appreciate that, Gary. If you want to see a glimpse of my current state of mind, try here. I seldom front-page at Redstate anymore, only for the ones that I feel are really important or need to be said there. Similarly with ObWi. Lately, I’ve been taking my business to theForvm and to the blog section at RS. Since last January or so, I’ve decided to post when and where I please. Forgive my going meta, but to me the ideal blog would be one that has the dynamism of the comments here, the tone and tenor and balance of theForvm, and the content of ObWi and the better ones at RS.
At this point, I don’t have to much else to add commentwise, only that I’ve read all the comments. I’m basically in read-and-ponder mode for the time being as it pertains to this thread.
Good post, Charles. I’ve often thought your writing was best when it was most personal, explaining how you came to a decision or changed your mind, or how you understood what evidence or argument you found.
Don’t overlook the many and complex effects of the draft, which were increasingly being felt.
I think the draft was a huge factor, because it made the consequences of the war palpable for a lot of people.
I also think, however, that the draft was more a multiplier of opposition to the war, rather than a source. That is, had popular support been present, the draft would have been less of an issue.
In other words, the fact that there was a draft, which meant that you or your kids might serve and die, meant that a lot of folks, for whom the issue of the war might otherwise have been sort of academic, got off their butts and did something. But the reasons for opposing the war were, I think, rooted more in the failure of confidence in the leadership.
Thanks –
Anderson,
I know many people share your frustration.
But I am trying to understand Charles his position as a former supporter of Bush.
He still seems to think the faillures of the administration are a bug;
I think they are a feature.
For example, the appointments of partisan hacks over competent people is central to this government.
Dr Ngo,
Thank you for the information. I will try to follow up on your reading suggestions when I get back from Iraq.
Charles,
It is a liitle late, but thank you for the post which started this. I hope I can face up to my errors as well as you have, when my time comes.
Southern Comfort?
Waste of bourbon — when I’m dictator-for-life, possession or distribution of Southern Comfort will be a Gitmo-level offense.
He still seems to think the faillures of the administration are a bug;
I think they are a feature.
Something like that. I was actually spending a few moments this morning trying to be sympathetic to Bush.
The guy doesn’t care about foreign policy, he’s happy to see that Cheney’s all into it and willing to trust him on it. After 9/11, Bush doesn’t know what the eff to do; Cheney and Rumsfeld are chock-full of ideas. Why not go with their take? They’re the experts, after all.
So I can see Bush being led by the nose, including his being deceived by Tenet w/out realizing the pressures placed by Cheney/Rummy on CIA to get the “slam dunk.”
But after the looting of Baghdad and the beginning of the insurgency — in short, no later than the end of 2003 — Bush should’ve known what was obvious, that Cheney and Rumsfeld were fools.
By then, an election was up. Rove doubtless persuaded Bush that it would be suicided to fire Rumsfeld or ditch Cheney.
But that’s no excuse for not doing so after the 2004 election, or for continuing to let them run amok.
So, even with my best effort, I can’t do other than despise George W. Bush. I don’t know if he’s a wicked man, but he’s not especially distinguishable from one — compare gross negligence with intentional acts.
Clarke,
Are you in Iraq right now? If so, what are you doing and are you able to give us some firsthand observations of what you’re seeing?
Charles Bird said
“Clarke,
Are you in Iraq right now? If so, what are you doing and are you able to give us some firsthand observations of what you’re seeing?”
Yes, I am in Iraq right now, and have been since last July. Hopefully we will be leaving soon. We were at one point going to be extended until September, but I think they decided it was too politically expensive to extend reserve units unless absolutely necessary.
I work at a large forward operating base (FOB) in southern Iraq. The main mission of the FOB is detainee operations. As for news, you probably get more than I do, because for the most part we are all fobbits (semi-derogatory term referring to those who never leave the FOB). A few personnel get off the FOB, but not often, and mostly for logistics reasons. The nearest town is about 3 miles away, but we only visit it on business and I have never been there. I have gotten up to Baghdad twice.
As for what I am seeing, if the rest of Iraq was a peaceful as Bucca, we would have won by now. In the 11 months or so I have been here, there have been 3 US deaths, one suicide, one negligent homicide, and one from enemy action (IED off the FOB), out of a population over 1,500. Things have been heating up lately, with more indirect fire attacks in the last three months than in the preceding two years, but so far they have not been very effective.
A late response, Donald, but thanks for the info. Stay safe out there.