One of The Onion’s funnier pieces was written fifteen days after September 11th, titled US Vows to Defeat Whoever We’re at War With:
"America’s enemy, be it Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the Taliban, a multinational coalition of terrorist organizations, any of a rogue’s gallery of violent Islamic fringe groups, or an entirely different, non-Islamic aggressor we’ve never even heard of… be warned," Bush said during an 11-minute speech from the Oval Office. "The United States is preparing to strike, directly and decisively, against you, whoever you are, just as soon as we have a rough idea of your identity and a reasonably decent estimate as to where your base is located."
Added Bush: "That is, assuming you have a base.
We’ve come a long way since those early weeks, and we have a ways to go. A piece in the US Army War College magazine Parameters, titled The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy, adds some clarity to al Qaeda and the dogma that fuels their movement (hat tip to Redstate colleague jadedmara):
In contemporary Western discussions of the Muslim world, it is common to hear calls for a "reformation in Islam" as an antidote to al Qaeda. These calls often betray a misunderstanding of both Sunni Islam and of the early modern debate between Catholics and Protestants. In fact, a Sunni “reformation” has been under way for more than a century, and it works against Western security interests. The Catholic-Protestant struggle in Europe weakened traditional religious authorities’ control over the definition of doctrine, emphasized scripture over tradition, idealized an allegedly uncorrupted primitive religious community, and simplified theology and rites. The Salafist movement in the Sunni Muslim world has been pursuing these same reforms for a century.
More important, the contemporary pundits’ calls for "a reformation in Islam" carry with them an implication that the traditional Sunni clerical elite is the ideological basis for al Qaeda, and that weakening the traditional clerical establishment’s hold on the minds of pious Sunnis would promote stability. In fact, the opposite is clearly the case in most of the Sunni world. The mutual condemnations that the establishment and Salafist camps have exchanged over the past century, not to mention the blood shed by both sides, make this clear.
Even in Saudi Arabia, which is exceptional because the religious establishment there is itself Salafist, there is a split between a pro-establishment Salafist camp and the revolutionary Salafists. The Saudi regime and its establishment Salafist allies have asserted themselves against revolutionary Salafist tendencies repeatedly since the 1920s, and are belatedly doing so again now.
The revolutionary Salafists are outsiders. Their movement, from its origins a century ago until today, has been at odds with the Sunni establishment. By tracing the movement’s ideological development over the past century, it becomes clear why al Qaeda’s leaders have chosen their present strategy: the experience of their movement drives them to view their opponents within Sunni Islam—“the near enemy”—as a more important target than non-Muslims—“the far enemy.”
There are Sunnis (the traditionalists), and then are Sunnis (the neo-Salafis). Author Christopher Henzel traces the history of the "revolutionary Salafists" from medieval Sunni scholar Taqi ad-Din Ahmed ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) to Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and beyond:
The guerilla war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 was the incubator for the contemporary stage in the development of revolutionary Salafist doctrine and strategy. Many Arab volunteers in Afghanistan coalesced around revolutionary Salafists who remained outsiders to the Sunni clerical establishment, even as some of the Arab regimes, and the United States, funded them. Many Arabs in Afghanistan came under the influence of the Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, a prolific writer whom many found persuasive, but who, like all the revolutionary Salafists, was condemned by the Al-Azhar clerical establishment.
Henzel believes that al-Zawahiri’s writings provide the best insights into the al Qaeda movement and its strategy:
In his 2001 book Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Zawahiri identifies and prioritizes the goals of what he calls the “the revolutionary fundamentalist movement”: first, achievement of ideological coherence and organization, then struggle against the existing regimes of the Muslim world, followed by the establishment of a “genuinely” Muslim state “at the heart of Arab world.” Zawahiri views the current stage of the jihad as one of worldwide, revolutionary struggle, to be waged by means of violence, political action, and propaganda against the secular Muslim regimes and secularized Muslim elites. Zawahiri argues that because the terrain in the key Arab countries is not suitable for guerilla war, Islamists need to conduct political action among the masses, combined with an urban terrorist campaign against the secular regimes, supplemented with attacks on “the external enemy”—i.e., the United States and Israel—as a means of propaganda that will strengthen the jihad’s popular support.
Zawahiri wants his Salafist readers to keep in mind that the Arab establishments are the real targets, even if “confining the battle to the domestic enemy . . . will not be feasible in this stage of the battle.” Highly visible attacks against external enemies, and the inevitable retaliation, Zawahiri explains, will rally ordinary Muslims to the radicals’ cause, strengthening the main struggle, the one against the current regimes of the Muslim world. As Zawahiri writes in Knights:
The jihad movement must . . . make room for the Muslim nation to participate with it in the jihad for the sake of empowerment. The Muslim nation will not participate with [the jihad movement] unless the slogans of the mujahidin are understood by the masses. . . . The one slogan that has been well understood by the nation and to which it has been responding for the past 50 years is the call for jihad against Israel. In addition to this slogan, the [Muslim] nation in [the 1990s] is geared against the US presence. [The Muslim nation] has responded favorably to the call for the jihad against the Americans. . . . [T]he jihad movement moved to the center of the leadership of the [Muslim] nation when it adopted the slogan of liberating the nation from its external enemies. . . . [Striking at the United States would force the Americans to] personally wage the battle against the Muslims, which means that the battle will turn into a clear-cut jihad against infidels.
This passage shows that the revolutionary Salafists do not expect to actually defeat America or its allies (whatever al Qaeda propaganda may claim). Instead, spectacular terrorist attacks are a means toward the end of changing the character of the conflict, changing it from a campaign waged by a small faction of extremists against the regimes of Muslim world, into “a clear-cut jihad against infidels,” which would, the Salafists hope, attract wide support among the Muslim masses.
Zawahiri views the current phase of the jihad as a revolutionary war, and the ideological component of the struggle is thus very important. Like Mao and the North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, Zawahiri considers political and propaganda action to be just as important at some stages as military efforts are. “The jihad must dedicate one of its wings to work with the masses, preach, provide services. . . . [T]he people will not love us unless they feel that we love them, care about them, and are ready to defend them.” This last point—convincing the people that the revolutionary Salafists are “ready to defend them”—again illustrates how Zawahiri sees high-profile terrorist strikes against the external enemy as a means of making propaganda for the Muslim masses. He calls on his followers, at this stage of the struggle, to “launch a battle for orienting the [Muslim] nation” by striking at the United States and Israel. Thus, al Qaeda’s immediate goal is not to destroy Israel or even drive the United States out of the Middle East; rather, it is to “orient the nation.”
Obviously, the movement has failed to take root in the Muslim world. The point Henzel makes is that the neo-Salafis, or "Salafist revolutionaries", are the true outsiders in the Sunni world. In light of this, what is a United States to do?
The American invasion of Afghanistan failed to bring about this mobilization. However, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, combined with US support of Israel’s policies in the occupied territories, may at last be triggering the radicalization of the masses and middle classes of the Arab world that al Qaeda has hoped for.
Sunni Islam’s most active reformers over the past century have been its outsiders, the Salafists. It is the insiders of Sunni Islam who are America’s natural allies. Western advocates of “reformation” understandably want to see the existing secular, Westernized classes in Muslim countries gain the upper hand. But these politically weak classes are small elites viewed with suspicion by both the masses and the regimes. Any American effort to strengthen these elites must be a project for several decades, to be carried out quietly and with the greatest caution. The United States would gain little if more among the Muslim masses came to regard Muslim liberals as agents of the global hegemon, bent on depriving Islam of its capacity to resist a Western culture that most view as morally depraved.
The United States should instead exploit its ties to the existing regimes of the Sunni world in order to combat jointly the revolutionary Salafists. The US struggle against al Qaeda and similar groups will be chiefly a matter of intelligence and police work, with perhaps a role for special forces working with local partners in ungoverned areas. Only the existing Muslim regimes, in coordination with American investigators and spies, can defeat the cells of al Qaeda and similar groups moving among the Sunni world’s masses. The United States needs to support and to engage with these undemocratic regimes even more closely if US security services are to be granted the liaison relationships with local authorities that are essential to the real war against terrorism. Washington should set aside, for now, its ambitions for democratic revolution in the region, at least until the Salafist revolution is contained.
Similarly, the United States must avoid positioning itself as the foe of the traditional Sunni clerical establishments, or provoking some of them into sympathy with their erstwhile foes, the revolutionary Salafists. If mainstream Sunnis come to view the United States as bent on a campaign to weaken or remake traditional Muslim culture, then more and more mainstream Sunni believers will conclude that the revolutionary Salafists they once reviled were right all along. At that point the world really would see the clash of civilizations sought by both al Qaeda and some US pundits.
Is there a contradiction between "the United States needs to support and to engage with these undemocratic regimes even more closely" and what I wrote yesterday? Yes and no. The fundamental point is that we must stay engaged with governments we don’t care much about (read Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, etc.). Does it mean that we must accept their behavior and put the push for freedom in the back of the line? No. We can and must do both, but it will take more Condoleeza Rice and less Donald Rumsfeld for us to succeed at it.
Changing subjects a bit (but still sticking to the "who our adversaries really are" theme), Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey wrote a helpful piece in the New York Times called the Madrassa Myth. Some key excerpts:
Of the 75 terrorists we investigated, only nine had attended madrassas, and all of those played a role in one attack – the Bali bombing. Even in this instance, however, five college-educated "masterminds" – including two university lecturers – helped to shape the Bali plot.
Like the view that poverty drives terrorism – a notion that countless studies have debunked – the idea that madrassas are incubating the next generation of terrorists offers the soothing illusion that desperate, ignorant automatons are attacking us rather than college graduates, as is often the case. In fact, two of the terrorists in our study had doctorates from Western universities, and two others were working toward their Ph.D.
A World Bank-financed study that was published in April raises further doubts about the influence of madrassas in Pakistan, the country where the schools were thought to be the most influential and the most virulently anti-American. Contrary to the numbers cited in the report of the 9/11 commission, and to a blizzard of newspaper reports that 10 percent of Pakistani students study in madrassas, the study’s authors found that fewer than 1 percent do so. If correct, this estimate would suggest that there are far more American children being home-schooled than Pakistani boys attending madrassas.
The authors contend that madrassas are "not a threat to the United States", and they have a point. My only question is how many of that 1% in Pakistani madrassas graduate to groups such as al Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir and so forth. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the larger threat are those secular Muslims who "get religion" at Saudi-funded mosques and schools in the United States and Europe, as noted here and here.
(also posted at Redstate.org)
In fact, a Sunni “reformation” has been under way for more than a century, and it works against Western security interests.
The Protestant Reformation wasn’t an especially peaceful or necessarily enlightened event, so I’ve always wondered why we hold it up as a model.
What we seem to really wish for is a Muslim “Enlightenment,” that is, for them to quit taking their religion quite so literally.
I often think that the Onion’s post-9/11 coverage was one of the few things that kept me sane because, while everything else was so lethally serious, they were the only thing that genuinely made me laugh.
This was absolutely my favorite response – not just in The Onion, but anywhere – in all of the 9/11 coverage:
If you missed it, read the whole thing here. The last 11 words were the best punchline ever.
Quality post, Charles. Thanks for the links. And I agree with Anderson. Though it’s often not comfortable to say out loud, an Age of Reason is essentially what we would like to see begin in the Islamic world.
ThirdGorchBro: an Age of Reason is essentially what we would like to see begin in the Islamic world.
Would be nice to see it in the US, too. 😉
Heh, no argument here.
What do you think of western civilization, Mr. Gandhi?
According to everything I’ve read about the period, though, the main players in the Age of Reason came out of splinter Protestant groups. The call to reason and even state secularization was in part enabled by official discrimination against minority religious groups. (See Voltaire’s fascination with the practically disenfranchised Quakers of England, Moses Mendelsohn’s tightrope-act of renvendicating Mosaic law within a plea for secular rule, Kant and Goethe’s early upbringing among Pietist groups, the Unitarian Jacobins–Godwin, Priestley, Hazlitt, young Coleridge–of the late eighteenth-c, and perhaps even the rumors of Burke’s being a cryto-Catholic, for the Burke-inclined of this board.) The bloodily divisive Protestant Revolution and the Age of Reason are intimately linked–as Neal Stephenson’s Baroque Cycle does a pretty decent job of pointing out.
On the more substantive points of CB’s post, I took it back to my site, where I can pontificate without fear that anyone will read me.
Rightwigers hate secularism at home, but hope to export it to the Middle East?
Jackmormon: I read it, even before I read your comment here. And I agreed with it too.
Rightwigers hate secularism at home
Uh, no.
It sounds like a great idea, Mr Farber.
On the more substantive points of CB’s post, I took it back to my site
Very nice stuff, Jackmormon
Chas
I do appreciate the post and such, but I fear that you should rethink your position since you cite your previous posts, which lead back to your Tacitus post which cited this essay, which you claimed demonstrated your understanding of the historical context of Wahhabism.
I realize that this is a winding road, but I think that Jackmormon’s blogpost identifies precisely the problem that arises when you take the position you do and I think that the problems of your position can be identified with Codevilla’s imprecise rendering of the history of the Protestant reformation. To (perhaps unfairly) summarize Codevilla, he views the Protestant reformation as the result of a collection of heresies which rose up and had to be stomped out by ‘sword and sermon’. (neglecting the small fact that if those heresies were completely stomped out, all of Europe would be Catholic, though we might, given Henry VIII’s views on divorce, still have the notion of WASPs) For those of you who don’t like to click through, a few quotes that I think show the tenor of Codevilla’s arguments.
and
I objected to this cartoonish view then, and I still do and if Chas is basing his position on this kind of history, it will be inevitably flawed (you realize that the Ranters and the Anabaptists can be described as the direct ancestors of such bloodthirsty cults as the modern day Methodists and Baptists. I was raised Methodist, so I never did like Baptists so much (those guys always won the softball tourneys) but I think Codevilla is a little OTT IMHO. And if Codevilla thinks we need to have a replay of the Albigensian Crusade, I’ll pass, thank you)
Because the problem is in the foundation, it is impossible for me to point to x or y being wrong, it is more like a science based on phlogiston, internally consistent but altogether wrong.
Looking at that list of heresies smashed, it’s not just the anabaptists that persisted under the radar of the mainstream. (And as a former member of another anabaptist offshoot cult turned sect turned religion, I can assure you that we don’t always win softball games.) The ranters and levellers, for instance, turned England upside-down, then, when the pendulum swung aainst them, puttered off to settle the US. Of course they didn’t use their enemies names for them when they arrived here, but…
Hilzoy, if you keep reading my site, I’ll be soon able to triangulate your IP number from my sitemeter!
Rightwigers hate secularism at home, but hope to export it to the Middle East?
This particular right-winger wouldn’t mind seeing a little bit more secularism here at home, too.
Jackmormon, I read your blogpost and I think you identify the inherent contradictions our current policies correctly. I guess where we differ is that I think we can continue a bit longer until we have ridden out the current wave of Islamism (or Salafism or Wahhabism or whatever you want to call it). I remain hopeful that progress we are making is outpacing the rising resentment toward us. Call me Dr. Pangloss if you must. 😉
(Though I don’t disagree with your suggestion at the end of your blogpost. There dern well should be Congressional investigations into what’s going on at Gitmo, Bagram, etc.)
Rightwigers hate secularism at home, but hope to export it to the Middle East?
I suddenly saw Charles with a wig on the right side of his head… 😉
The recent mainstreaming of Charismatic and Fundamentalist interpretations into the American mainline Protestant denominations is a very bloodless “reformation” but it includes the rejection of Enlightenment values.
Because the problem is in the foundation
Well, even with differences in views of the history of Christianity, LJ, the summary of the growth of Wahhabism tracks pretty well with other things I’ve come across. The Wahhabis’ religious intolerance and belief in sharia-based theocracy is a problem, especially since they preside over the birthplace of Islam. The oil-rich Saudis are beholden to the Wahhabis and they fund ludicrous amounts abroad to mosques and schools in order to advance this harsh interpretation of Islam.
On the more substantive points of CB’s post, I took it back to my site, where I can pontificate without fear that anyone will read me.
I read your post twice through, Jack, and I don’t see where we’re in disagreement.
Well, even with differences in views of the history of Christianity, LJ, the summary of the growth of Wahhabism tracks pretty well with other things I’ve come across.
Thanks for the response. Unfortunately, it is not the growth of Wahhabism that is the question, it is what is the appropriate reaction. Codevilla’s piece (which you have not expressed any reservations about, despite multiple suggestions that you take some time to understand some of the dynamics inherent in the Protestant Reformation) suggests that the US take the role of the Catholic church and try and keep a lid on the heresies. Your post here does the same. You quote the following:
The United States should instead exploit its ties to the existing regimes of the Sunni world in order to combat jointly the revolutionary Salafists. The US struggle against al Qaeda and similar groups will be chiefly a matter of intelligence and police work, with perhaps a role for special forces working with local partners in ungoverned areas. Only the existing Muslim regimes, in coordination with American investigators and spies, can defeat the cells of al Qaeda and similar groups moving among the Sunni world’s masses.
I may be mistaken, but I believe that you have heaped abuse on those who would suggest that this conflict is a police conflict rather than a military one. But more importantly, this advocates that we try and keep a lid on things by supporting regimes. Already, we are discussing rendition to these regimes as a way of getting out of the Gitmo mess.
The Catholic-Protestant struggle in Europe weakened traditional religious authorities’ control over the definition of doctrine, emphasized scripture over tradition, idealized an allegedly uncorrupted primitive religious community, and simplified theology and rites. The Salafist movement in the Sunni Muslim world has been pursuing these same reforms for a century.
The US found its origin in weakening the control of traditional authorities, and part of the fervor behind the notion of the US is found in the uncorrupted nature of man. While the US supporting the opposite ideals is may not appear as bad as inviting Karimov over for lunch, not only is it a 180 degree reverse from the principles of our foundation, if you believe that the strength of the US is found in diversity and a rejection of tradition for tradition’s sake, you are therefore plotting a path that will ultimately result in failure.
You say that there is no disagreement between you and jackmormon, so does this mean that Jackmormon’s notion that
…the contradiction between dealing, as we seemingly must, with corrupt regimes while holding out a promise of republican values is a particularly dangerous line to walk. It’s dangerous to our troops who are conveniently located within a local radius of resentment, and it’s dangerous for our domestic politics, which have become increasingly schizophrenic–and on both sides of the aisle.
is one you agree with? I will skip over your positions on various domestic policies, but given that you have devoted your space to howls of disapproval about the behavior of the left, I don’t see how you can you agree with it, unless you think that contributing to the schizophrenia jackmormon notes is a good thing.
From a realpolitik stance, setting aside all questions of truth and correctness, wouldn’t it be more appropriate to acknowledge (even if you don’t believe it) that Gitmo is a gulag? How can you argue that we can safely target the SA regime for change without propping up another regime that is equally or more inimical to Wahhabist/Salafist values? I don’t think these do you or don’t you questions are very fair, but it this case, given you highly specific rants about SA, how can you agree with what Jackmormon wrote? Or is it dangerous, but unavoidable? Your previous posts have never really hinted at the danger, they seem to have been more attempts to immunize yourself so you don’t have to argue that Bush admin policy is correct.
It may seem that by asking these questions, I have some answers. But I don’t. I’m really not sure if an organization like the Muslim Brotherhood is a group willing to work within the confines of the electoral system, or is a 5th column waiting to take power (though you obviously already have them categorized, despite evidence such as this, which underlines that a group in one country is not the same as a group in the other country.) But I do know that when we had the chance to do our best to the most reactionary Islamic regimes (the Taliban in Afghanistan, which would fit the notion of a murderous sect far better than any thing else one could think of), we took the forces we had there and retasked them for taking on Iraq, one of the few regimes with a secular character in the region. And we are now making noises about another Baathist regime, Syria, as well as a Shia state, Iran (note there is not one word about the Shia Muslims in your piece. Hey, been there, done them) Sure, hindsight is 20/20, but if you honestly think that what you propose now is the correct strategy, you should be not only doing multiple mea culpas for your previous positions, but make some statements about the mistaken notion that nuclear strikes in Iran or attacking Syria in order to dry up support for insurgents definitely not being a good thing.
I think you believe that by making the slices thinner and thinner (Shia versus Sunni, Sunni versus Wahhabi, Salafi versus neo-Salafi) you are eventually going to get to the nub of the problem that you can destroy and then, having done so, pack everything back into its skin and walk away. Unfortunately, it doesn’t work that way.
I may be mistaken, but I believe that you have heaped abuse on those who would suggest that this conflict is a police conflict rather than a military one.
Intelligence and police work to get terrorists is fine, LJ. Putting terrorists through civilian courts, particularly those terrorists who belong to a group that has declared war against us, is another matter. Second, you may have missed my statement that it’s better to engage with some repellent regimes, i.e., choosing the lesser evil, but it doesn’t mean we can’t exhort reform. The point is this. If there are better alternatives, like in Iran, you support the better alternative. If there aren’t, then you go with engagement and work with what you have.
Should we take sides on certain brands of Islam? Yes, I think we should, for those brands that support the spread of sharia and are inimical to democracy. In particular, spotlighting how it gets spread to mosques and schools with Saudi money.
From a realpolitik stance, setting aside all questions of truth and correctness, wouldn’t it be more appropriate to acknowledge (even if you don’t believe it) that Gitmo is a gulag?
Absolutely not, because it’s not a gulag.
but make some statements about the mistaken notion that nuclear strikes in Iran or attacking Syria in order to dry up support for insurgents definitely not being a good thing.
I’ve made statements about Iran, specifically that it’s a bad idea to strike their bomb-making facilities with nukes. I’ve made statements about Syria, specifically that an Iraqi-style invasion is a bad idea (but I wouldn’t rule out strikes on terrorist camps).
I think you believe that by making the slices thinner and thinner (Shia versus Sunni, Sunni versus Wahhabi, Salafi versus neo-Salafi) you are eventually going to get to the nub of the problem that you can destroy and then, having done so, pack everything back into its skin and walk away. Unfortunately, it doesn’t work that way.
You believe wrongly. This is about spotlighting ideologies that are root causes to the War on Terror. This is about an ideological conflict, in many ways similar to the war against the religion of communism. Communism isn’t destroyed today, but it is disabled to the point where it’s not a threat. I’ll be fine with disabling certain Islamic belief systems to the point where its adherents don’t threaten the United States.
you may have missed my statement that it’s better to engage with some repellent regimes, i.e., choosing the lesser evil, but it doesn’t mean we can’t exhort reform. The point is this. If there are better alternatives, like in Iran, you support the better alternative. If there aren’t, then you go with engagement and work with what you have.
Sadly, I haven’t missed any of your statements and I’ve come to the conclusion that you really don’t know much about Islam. The fact that you are now arguing that Sunni are the problematic group is indicative of your approach: grab a group that sounds like you know what you are talking about.
And I really have no idea what you mean by ‘spotlighting’ (unless you think that the world operates like the new Mac operating system) and I don’t think you do either.
You know, the article you post has this
The Salafists’ current strategy, as Zawahiri described, is to provoke, on an international scale, a cycle of violence and repression that will mobilize the Sunni masses. The American invasion of Afghanistan failed to bring about this mobilization. However, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, combined with US support of Israel’s policies in the occupied territories, may at last be triggering the radicalization of the masses and middle classes of the Arab world that al Qaeda has hoped for.
To any thoughtful observer, this might invoke the first rule of holes, but for you, this suggests that we need to get involved in questions of weighing in on Islamic belief systems.
This is about an ideological conflict, in many ways similar to the war against the religion of communism.
*sigh* What the ‘war against the religion of communism’ did was have us define a lot of fights as being communist vs. anti-communism when what was fueling them was far more complex. That 2 colored world map was on view when you were flogging the Beslan-Al Queda link, but
Thus the radicalism which now seems to be spreading among the former Soviet Union’s young Muslims is as much due to local conditions as to imported ideologies.
Its roots, in other words, lie as much in disillusionment with the authorities as in new ideas from abroad. But that is something the authorities in these regions seem reluctant to admit.
link
And Charles.