Well, their tough-stance approach yielded squat, so the Bush WH is now going to try a slightly souped-up version of the old Clinton plan to get North Korea to stop making nukes.
Old Clinton Plan
Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to halt activities at its plutonium producing nuclear reactors in Pyongyang in exchange for a relaxation of economic sanctions, a gradual move toward normalization of diplomatic relations, fuel oil deliveries, and construction of a light-water reactor to replace the graphite-moderated reactor shut down at Pyongyang. Plutonium from light water reactors is harder to use for nuclear weapons than the plutonium procured by graphite-moderated reactors. IAEA inspectors monitored North Korea’s compliance. Upon completion of the light-water reactors, originally scheduled for 2003 but subsequently indefinitely delayed, North Korea was to dismantle its graphite reactors and ship its 8,000 remaining fuel rods out of the country.
New Bush Plan
Under the plan, outlined by American officials on Tuesday evening, in response to pressure from China and American allies in Asia, the aid would begin flowing immediately after a commitment by Kim Jong Il, the North Korean leader, to dismantle his plutonium and uranium weapons programs. In return, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea would immediately begin sending tens of thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil every month, and Washington would offer a “provisional” guarantee not to invade the country or seek to topple Mr. Kim’s government.
[…]
By setting a three-month grace period, Mr. Bush’s aides say they are trying to correct what they view as major flaws in the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement with North Korea that President Bill Clinton signed, but which has been abandoned. Under that agreement, North Korea never had to ship its plutonium fuel out of the country, and it continued to receive fuel oil and other aid while, intelligence officials assert, it started a second, secret program to build bombs out of uranium fuel, with help from a clandestine network built by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear chief.
It’s not clear to me what the difference is between “ship its 8,000 remaining fuel rods out of the country” and “ship its plutonium fuel out of the country” but that seems to be the only significant distinction between the two plans.
Reading between the lines however, it doesn’t look like the Administration has much hope the North Koreans will accept this offer. In fact, it looks like this plan is designed to quell criticism from China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea more than it is to make any real headway in the stalemate:
Asked Tuesday night why the North Koreans should respond before they see whether Mr. Bush has been re-elected, or whether they will be dealing with a Democrat who has promised one-on-one talks, one of Mr. Bush’s aides said, “Maybe they won’t.” But if they fail to agree, he said, “they will have to weigh the effect on the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Russians and the Chinese,” all of whom are potential sources of energy, food and investment.
In a nutshell, the US blinked:
Several outside experts said they believed that the North Koreans now think they have the upper hand in the negotiations, partly because South Korea has agreed to direct talks on military issues and because China, which is organizing the negotiations in Beijing, has provided the North with millions of dollars in fuel and other goods to keep talking.
“The North Koreans don’t feel under any pressure to make concessions right now because they feel the United States is not in a position to take military action, and not in a position to walk away,” said Gary Samore, who ran the nonproliferation office of the National Security Council under Mr. Clinton and is now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “They are in a strange position; they are being paid by the Chinese to talk.”
[…]
With the new offer, Mr. Bush has retreated on one major point: after insisting a year ago that the allies cut off oil to North Korea, he has now agreed to allow a resumption of oil shipments – though not American oil – before the country actually dismantles anything. But because the shipments would last only for three months if the North reneged on any part of its disarmament pledge, Mr. Bush’s aides argue that there would be little at risk.
Maybe Bush picked up a copy of My Life and read the bits about North Korea and thought, “Hmmm…why didn’t I think of that?”
[roll eyes]
hint
I’m sure there are technicalities I don’t appreciate here, Timmy, but how does “dismantle his plutonium and uranium weapons program” significantly differ from “dismantle its graphite reactors”?
The problem the U. S. seems to have in negotiations is a lack of willingness to give anything up. For example, to make real headway in negotations with North Korea we’d have to apply real pressure on the Chinese without whose support the regime would surely founder.
But to apply pressure on the Chinese we’d have to be willing to give up cheap T-shirt or sneakers. Or their purchasing our bonds.
I agree with Dave about China.
Edward, it requires M&E to process the plutonium as well as uranium. If you eliminate the machinery, equipment and raw materials, you materially curtail the program. The other change is no light-water reactor.
What Bush has given up is the requirement that NK first agree to the elimination of nukes before any other talks could begin.
First, the focus on the graphite reactors is what got us in trouble under the Agreed Framework. It technically banned all nuclear weapons research, but only cared about verifing the graphite reactor status. So an agreement which specifically outlines all of “his plutonium and uranium weapons program” is focusing in the right place. It isn’t good enough for NK to agree to stop work on a specific plan of acquiring nuclear weapons if it lets them off the hook into doing another plan.
Second, the timing seems significantly different unless I’m misreading it. The Agreed Framework let all of NK’s upside come for years before they had to substantially deal with the upside for the US. It seems the window in the proposed Bush deal is much smaller.
Third Clinton refused to cut off the fuel aid even after he found out about continuing nuclear programs. I think a 3 month period of resumed shipments with a cut-off is not necessarily a great idea, but it is certainly distinguishable from Clinton’s never-cut-them off actuality. The reason I am skeptical about even the 3 month period is that when NK refuses to honor its agreements, much of the world will still act as if cutting off the aid is a case of the US causing a diplomatic incident.
Dave, this comment doesn’t make sense to me: “The problem the U. S. seems to have in negotiations is a lack of willingness to give anything up.” It seems to me that the problem is the ONE thing the US won’t give up is that NK needs to totally abandon its nuclear programs and get rid of its nukes. Since the one thing NK won’t give up is its nukes and nuke programs, we have an impasse. NK claims to have problems with all sorts of other things, but it uses those to try to extract helpful concessions from the US without ever budging on the nuclear issue. If it can get everything it wants from the US without ever even getting to the nuclear issue, it will. That is why the US refuses to negotiate in pieces. We won’t agree to a peace treaty without an agreement on the nuclear issue because to do so would leave us with even less leverage than we already have on the only issue we care about.
I dunno. It looks better than the ol plan but I dunno if it’ll work cause man that Kim Jong Il likes eatin his plutonium.
Sebastian Holsclaw:
Since I believe that the key in resolving our problems with North Korea is China, my point was specifically related to negotiating with the Chinese. It’s long appeared to me that we tend to get rolled in negotiating with the Chinese and I believe it’s because we’re too greedy and they know it.
For an enormous number of reasons the Chinese leadership is extremely difficult to exert pressure on. To do so we’d have to be willing to threaten trade relations that are at least as important to us as to them.
For me the $64B question is why the Chinese continuing to prop up the North Korean regime. Based on my reading of the situation I’d say that they want to promote stability and they’re willing to let the U. S. be bad cop (even though the Chinese have more to lose with a nuclear-arms-producing North Korea than we have) as long as we’re willing to play the role.
Dave, the Chinese do not want millions of hungry refugees streaming into their country. Nor do they want US troops on their border.
My point exactly.
So….you think that since they don’t want refugees or US troops at their border they will be willing to push hard on the North Korean government? Or???
No, I think the Chinese would rather have neither NK refugees nor US troops on their border. I also think that they should be carrying more weight than they are right now in defusing the situation. Why aren’t they? My guess is that so long as we’ll do the heavy lifting, bear the costs, and be the bad guys, and they get neither NK refugees nor US troops on their border they’re quite happy to let us keep right on doing it.