From the Washington Post, troubling news about our attempts to rebuild Iraq’s police force.
As the U.S.-led governing authority in Iraq attempts to build a security force of 220,000 in the next few months, the competing priorities of speed and thoroughness have prompted shortcuts in the recruiting and training process. The consequences are starting to become apparent. . . . more than 200 Iraqi policemen in Baghdad have been dismissed and dozens of others have had their pay slashed for crimes ranging from pawning government equipment to extortion and kidnapping. . . . . In addition, roughly 2,500 people on the payroll of the Facilities Protection Service, which guards government buildings, either do not exist or have not been showing up to work . . . . [A] number of Border Patrol officers have been disciplined for accepting bribes in exchange for allowing people without proper identification to enter Iraq.
The importance of building a capable Iraqi police force cannot be overstated. Iraq needs substantial foreign investment to rebuild its infrastructure, institutions, and public services. The principle barrier to that investment is security.*
Many (including I) have chanted the mantra of “more troops, more money, more international involvement” as a solution to Iraq’s security issues. Our chanting has gone unheeded. The US lacks the will to commit the troops necessary to do the job, and the period during which a massive show of US force might have been effective has slipped us by. The time for chanting is past. The Iraqis must pick up the slack.
Indeed, the US military could have provided, at most, only tempory relief. And resort to the rebuilt Iraqi army — tempting though it may be — is also no substitute. It is the role of the Iraqi police to protect Iraqis. Having the police actually police is what is meant by “the rule of law.”
“[W]hen have you ever seen the police lead a coup?” Casteel explained. “If you build a strong police force, you have a republic. If you build a strong military, you have a banana republic.”
What are we building in Iraq? What shape do we wish Iraqification to take? And, if anything is an improvement over Saddam, does that make everything acceptable?
It’s time to stop celebrating the capture of Saddam. There’s work to do.
von
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