by Eric Martin
Over at QandO, Bruce McQuain treats a Wall St Journal Editorial as a go-to source in terms of assessing the implications of the recently signed truce between the Sadrist trend and the Iraqi government (a truce, it should be pointed out, that has yet to fully take hold). McQuain reacts to the editorial’s claim that, despite early press reports that called the truce a draw, Maliki was the big winner:
A draw? A draw, at least where I come from, doesn’t have one side imposing restrictions on the other side. This is dictating terms with the caveat that if they’re violated, the destruction of the other side will continue as it was before.
IOW, this "truce" says to the Mahdi Army, accept these conditions and stick with them or well [sic] give you no choice at all.
That interpretation is a bit one-sided (a shock, I know, considering how fair and balanced the WSJ editorial page usually is). First of all, the Sadrists won concessions as well: as the editorial mentioned, there is to be less targeting of Sadrist members, requirements for police warrants prior to arrest, and provisions for limiting the use of US military personnel in Sadr City (more below). Further, both sides, not just Maliki’s, are issuing warnings and caveats. According to the only statement issued to date by Moqtada al-Sadr himself, the Mahdi Army’s compliance with the truce is contingent on a few factors:
In the event of commitment by this government to the clauses that have been signed by the brothers assigned by us under the seal of this office, then the faithful should commit to what is contained therein and comply with it. However [or "provided that"] there is formed a supervisory council for the implementation of the agreement, so as to protect the power [or honor] of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi resistance.
So if the government lives up to its end of the bargain, and a supervisory council is formed, the Sadrists will comply. Sadr also contends that the truce limits use of the US military:
Where the above points [legitimate law-enforcement, searches and so on] require it, the government is the relevant party for determining what Iraqi force is required for the extension of security in the city, avoiding recourse to foreign forces.
The Sadrist current is also allowed to keep its small arms (and, in effect, its heavy arms too unless the Iraqi government forces can find and seize the heavier stuff – easier said than done). All in all a mixed bag, with uncertainty surrounding the implementation, acceptance and durability of the cease-fire. Not exactly the total victory advertised.
McQ also gets tied into knots by the editoria’l’s claim that the truce signifies a defeat for Iran, as Iran was forced to accept Maliki as a "serious opponent" after it, allegedly, "invested heavily" in Sadr in order to take down Maliki:
As the WSJ points out, Iran had invested its interests in Sadr and the Mahdi Army. Iran, as it has discovered, backed the wrong horse. We’re now supposed to believe that Maliki will…suddenly cozy up to the country which had, directly, been threatening his leadership.
Hmmm. You know, Iran has "invested heavily" in Maliki’s Dawa Party as well. So much so, that it’s extremely unlikely that they’d be trying to take him down. Some history: