Eric Martin

by Eric Martin

Like Dr. iRack, I found Dexter Filkins’ review of Patrick Cockburn’s new book on Moqtada al-Sadr to be well worth the read (don’t agree with everything Filkins or Cockburn write, but overall, insightful). This is a pretty good summary of the persistent condition of ignorance vis-a-vis Sadr that has been so prevalent amongst US policymakers:

Muqtada al-Sadr stands for everything in Iraq that we do not understand. The exiles we imported to run the country following Saddam’s fall are suave and well-dressed; Muqtada is glowering and elusive. The exiles parade before the cameras in the Green Zone; Muqtada stays in the streets, in the shadows, surfacing occasionally to give a wild sermon about the return of the hidden twelfth imam. The Americans proclaim Muqtada irrelevant; his face adorns the walls of every teashop in Shiite Iraq. The Americans attack; Muqtada disappears. The Americans offer a deal, and Muqtada responds: only after you leave.

Who is Muqtada al-Sadr? What does he want? And how many divisions does he have? That we know so little so late about someone so central to the fate of Iraq is an indictment of anyone associated with the American endeavor there. But it is also a measure of Iraq itself: of its complexity, its mutability, its true nature as an always-spinning kaleidoscope of alliances, deals, and double- crosses. Muqtada al-Sadr is not merely a mirror of our ignorance, he is also a window onto the unforgiving land where we have seen so many of our fortunes disappear.

Administration policymakers have ignored, underestimated and prematurely written off Sadr since before the invasion (when few, if any, even knew who he was), to immediately after the invasion (when he was dismissed as an insignificant rabble rouser not worthy of attention), through a series of clashes with US forces and subsequent poltical maneuvers (after and during which Bush administration officials and their supporters have proclaimed Sadr and his movement dead so many times that cat’s stare in awe at his innumerable lives).

Even now, there is much buzz about the impact of the recent anti-Sadr operations in Basra and Sadr City – with many pointing to the fact that Iraqi government forces are in both places as a sign of Sadr’s diminishing relevance. I would caution against putting too much stock into that reading.

Some basic facts to consider: the Sadrist trend is generally estimated as comprising between 3-5 million Iraqis. That would put his movement in the range of 15-20% of the entire Iraqi population (especially when you consider that, due to the relatively modest means of his constituents, few Sadrists were among the massive exodus of some 2 million wealthier Iraqis that fled the country as refugees).

Though not a cleric yet himself, Moqtada is the heir to a well respected and immensely popular clerical lineage that dates back many decades (his father and father’s cousin were extremely influential Grand Ayatollahs). Beyond the sheer numbers of his constituency, Sadr represents a social movement (and an effective network that distributes vital services to millions of poorer Iraqis) and brand of religious millenarianism (Mahdism) that has a rich and lengthy tradition throughout Iraq’s Shiite-dominated south (the latter, with literally centuries of history). The Fadhila Party that dominates Basra is itself an off-shoot of the Sadrist trend that emerged after the assassination of Moqtada’s father – just to give you a sense of its reach.

Thus, it is entirely unrealistic to believe, as the Bush administratoin apparently does, that the Sadrist trend can be neutralized militarily, or marginalized through intra-Shiite political maneuvering. Despite recent gains made against Sadr’s militia, Sadr’s endgame involves exerting his considerable influence via the ballot box and through popular appeals. The US would be far better served by coming to grips with his clout and attempting to normalize relations with his movement, rather than trying to ignore it or adopt policies that amount to wishful thinking. If the US continues to target Sadr and his followers, in the end, such hostility will only harden anti-American attitudes, radicalize the Mahdist movement (and cause dangerous splinter groups to break off) and help weaken one of the truly nationalistic, anti-Iranian forces in Iraqi Shiite politics.

That last point, I would say, represents the other great misunderstanding about the Sadrist movement – its reputed ties to Iran. Actually, I’m not sure it’s a misunderstanding as much as useful propaganda adopted by the Bush administration in order to further a political agenda (permanent bases, heavy foreign involvement in the oil industry) that Sadr opposes. In this, the Bush administration has made common cause with Iraqi political parties (ISCI/Dawa) that have much stronger ties to Iran than Sadr. But that is a rather inconvenient and awkward position, so instead of acknowledging the reality of the situation, we adopt a fictitious narrative. But there is a potential for self-fulfilling prophesy: in targeting and isolating Sadr, we are pushing him closer to Iran by denying him viable alternatives.

I haven’t had the time to read Cockburn’s book on Sadr yet, but I have read this extremely informative piece by Reidar Visser. Visser’s work is a valuable tool in overcoming the ignorance surrounding Sadr and his movement that Filkins describes. I’ll post an excerpt below the fold that touches on some of the issues mentioned above, but I highly recommend the entire piece.

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by Eric Martin

Wow.  This is pretty big news (via the indefatigable Cernig):

Iraq’s most influential Shiite cleric has been quietly issuing religious edicts declaring that armed resistance against U.S.-led foreign troops is permissible — a potentially significant shift by a key supporter of the Washington-backed government in Baghdad.

The edicts, or fatwas, by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani suggest he seeks to sharpen his long-held opposition to American troops and counter the populist appeal of his main rivals…Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia.

But — unlike al-Sadr’s anti-American broadsides — the Iranian-born al-Sistani has displayed extreme caution with anything that could imperil the Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. […]

In the past, al-Sistani has avoided answering even abstract questions on whether fighting the U.S. presence in Iraq is allowed by Islam. Such questions sent to his Web site — which he uses to respond to followers’ queries — have been ignored. All visitors to his office who had asked the question received a vague response.

The subtle shift could point to his growing impatience with the continued American presence more than five years after the U.S.-led invasion.

It also underlines possible opposition to any agreement by Baghdad to allow a long-term U.S. military foothold in Iraq — part a deal that is currently under negotiation and could be signed as early as July. […]

Al-Sistani’s distaste for the U.S. presence is no secret. In his public fatwas on his Web site, he blames Washington for many of Iraq’s woes.

But a more aggressive tone from the cleric could have worrisome ripples through Iraq’s Shiite majority — 65 percent of the country’s estimated 27 million population — in which many followers are swayed by his every word.

A longtime official at al-Sistani’s office in Najaf would not deny or confirm the edicts issued in private, but hinted that a publicized call for jihad may come later.

"(Al-Sistani) rejects the American presence," he told the AP, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment to media. "He believes they (the Americans) will at the end pay a heavy price for the damage they inflicted on Iraq."

Yeah, those permanent bases, that 100 year slumber party…we might want to consider a change of plans.  Opposition from both Sadr and Sistani is deal breaker territory – especially when you throw in a good portion of the Sunni population as well. 

Now Sistani is old, and reportedly infirmed, but I wouldn’t bank on his successor changing that tune.  Consider this: Sistani is moving in this direction, at least partially, because of public sentiment and Sadr’s ability to capitalize on his anti-American stance.  Opposing the American presence is popular.  That’s not going to change any time soon.

Sistani also expressed his gratitude for the toppling of Saddam:

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by Eric Martin

Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously quipped, "freedom is untidy" in response to questions about the looting and chaos that erupted in Iraq post invasion. In some sense, he was right, though not in the sense that he intended – that freedom leads to lawlessness.  Freedom and democracy, or at least elections, are messy in that they can yield unpredictable results in terms of ruling regime.* 

This is a lesson that the Bush administration has been slow to learn.  It has repeatedly failed to recognize, willfully or gullibly, that elections themselves are no guarantor that a given preferred candidate will prevail.  Shockingly, foreign constituents don’t always see eye to eye with the Bush team, and sometimes even elect parties/leaders that the Bush team is at odds with.  Frequently in fact.

This pattern of disappointment and surprise was duplicated in a series of elections in Iraq in which the Bush team expected, each time, a strong showing for Chalabi and Allawi (the former couldn’t muster enough votes for a single seat in parliament).  Then, against the advice of Israelis and its Palestinian allies alike, the Bush team insisted on holding the Gaza elections that were supposed to marginalize Hamas in favor of Fatah.  Hamas won big of course, an outcome that surprised few – except the Bush administration.  Later, the administration neglected building relationships with the eventual victorious candidates/parties in Pakistan under the assumption that Musharraff would perform well enough to hold on to power via the ballot box.  Wrong again.

In Iraq, one of those messy, unpredictable events is looming on the horizon yet again.  A prospect that must, by now, strike fear in the hearts of Bush administration policy makers.  The background goes something like this: The Sunni Awakenings/CLC groups, whose recent cooperation with US forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq has greatly reduced violence, have been demanding a voice in the political apparatus (they have none due to their prior boycott of elections).  In fact, they have threatened violence and a resumption of hostilities if they aren’t given a voice – via elections, or otherwise.

So the Bush administration has been pressuring the Iraqi government to hold regional elections out of fear that security gains will melt away if it loses its Sunni allies.  Problem is, our strongest Shiite allies in the Iraqi government, ISCI and Maliki’s Dawa party, have been steadily working to put off regional elections (including vetoing the most recent legislation before later withdrawing the veto) because those parties fear they will lose considerable ground to the popular Sadrist current (which also sat out the last round of regional elections in some areas).

The Bush team wishes to prevent a Sadrist ascendancy mostly due to that group’s opposition to the occupation and its position on foreign oil investment.  Quite a pickle.  So what to do?  To its credit, the administraiton is not repeating its past mistakes in terms of collecting/manipulating data that predicts victory for their candidates despite the preponderence of countervailing evidence.  Instead, the Bush administration has, at last, developed an appreciation of empirical evidence and adopted a proactive approach.

First, it supported a military campaign to expel the Sadrists from Basra, and weaken their position in Sadr city.  While successful in some limited sense, no military campaign can really defeat the Sadrists absent truly horrific levels of violence (it is a political/religious/social movement that numbers in the millions, and it is deeply ingrained in Iraqi society with a decades’ long history and a centuries’ long tradition).  Disruption is possible, however, in an effort to keep the Sadrist trend and its militia away from the vote casting/gathering/counting process. That might be enough to help ISCI/Maliki manipulate the results in their favor. 

Not wishing to take any chances, there has been recent talk of banning the Sadrist trend from participating in upcoming elections because, get this, that group has a militia.   Problem is, um, which political groups in Iraq don’t have militias.  Perhaps sensing the weakness of that justification, and fearing the widespread backlash that would result from de facto disenfranchisement, a third path has emerged, or re-emerged (which will likely rely on gains from the first prong above):

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