Sometimes you read something so shocking that you can’t believe the author meant what he wrote. At Crooked Timber, John Quiggin exhibits many of the most worrying aspects of leftist criticism of foreign policy here:
The only remotely feasible option is to make a place for Sadr and his supporters in the political process, and to hope that he is moderated by the attractions of office, as has happened in many cases before. There were some tentative steps in this direction in the period between the April insurrection and the current fighting. But, as with everything else they have done, the Administration was too clever by half, offering the facade of democratic processes, while trying to rig them in favor of their preferred clients. Sadr rejected the crumbs he was offered then. If he survives, his price will undoubtedly be higher now.
There is almost certainly a place in the political process for many of his followers if ‘followers’ is used in a loose sense of the word. There almost certainly is not a place for Sadr himself, now that he has tried to start a civil war on two separate occasions. You can’t keep accomadating someone who thinks that armed insurrection is the solution to each political disagreement.
I would find “rig them in favor of their preferred clients” a funny description of trying to maintain some sense of secular government, except it is just so sad.
The whole thing smacks of wishful thinking about Sadr and Islamism.
But far worse is Prof. Quiggin’s extension of these thoughts in the comments.
When challenged on “The only remotely feasible option is to make a place for Sadr and his supporters in the political process, and to hope that he is moderated by the attractions of office, as has happened in many cases before….” he suggests:
Steve, the most obvious example is the Lebanese Hizbollah which was one of the leading participants in the civil war there, and committed numerous terrorist acts, but is now a more-or-less normal political party in the Lebanese context.
Hizbollah is still violently anti-Israel, but that is true of any party with significant popular support anywhere in the Islamic world.
Prof. Quiggin wants to use Hizbollah as a model for Sadr? He apparently doesn’t see any difficulty caused by the calling it more-or-less normal in the Lebanese context. That is exactly like dismissing the gulag as more-or-less normal in the Soviet context. It isn’t wrong in a descriptive sense, but as a model for how anything ought to work it is morally shocking. Or ought to be.
The hope that Islamist groups will be moderated by the attractions of office is certainly possible if Hizbollah is his idea of moderate. But that doesn’t make it a good idea for Iraq. Hizbollah might be a good model for Sadr, but it would be a model to confuse Westerners into supporting terrorist organizations.
What’s the alternative? Kill him? that might work, and the next guy in line to speak for Sadr City might be more moderate. Or he could be seen as a martyr, and his death could be used to create a huge extremist political movement. that would be an oops, i think.
Quiggin suggests a reasonable alternative: turn Sadr into a politician. Since leaving him out in the cold doesn’t seem to be working, I think the burden is on you, Sebastian, to articulate a better path to peace.
francis
Najaf: turning point for whom?
It is not yet clear who will “win” this showdown. Militarily, of course a large, very well-armed US force, backed up by extremely lethal airpower and augmented by some local Iraqi forces would seem to have a large advantage over a few hundred– perhaps 1,500 at most–lightly armed Mahdi fighters. (Urban fighting, however, can be really brutal. Do the US Marines there really have the guts for it?)
But as every first lieutenant should understand, the “Battle” of Najaf will not be won on the military battlefield. It will be won in the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, and in that arena the US/Allawi forces are almost bound to lose any all-out showdown.
SHI-ITE ORGANIZING
More recently, I’ve been going back to look at some of the more recent scholarship being done on the Shi-ites of Lebanon, and in particular on the notable successes won over the years by Hizbullah.
What is clear to me, from my own earlier work, from my close knowledge of developments in Lebanon throughout the past 30 years, and from this more recent work that’s now starting to come out, is that Hizbullah is an incredibly sophisticated, disciplined, and focused organization.
Some Westerners may look askance, or with a strong but unexamined sense of cultural/intellectual superiority, at a political movement run by men in turbans. They do so, I suggest, at the risk of considerably underestimating a religio-political culture that– in the case of Hizbullah, above all– has shown itself to be extremely adept at the core political chore of winning and keeping a strong and multifaceted political base.
And no-one looking at the political dynamics of the Middle East today can fail to see that Hizbullah is renowned throughout the entire region for being the only grouping anywhere that was able to liberate large chunks of Arab land from Israel’s military occupation. Considering that Hizbullah is a non-state actor and has none of the immense advantages that the stature of statehood confers, that’s no mean feat.
TWO MORE THINGS ABOUT SHI-ITE ORGANIZING
I want to add two quick points. One, inevitably, has to do with the whole issue of “terrorism”, and the extent to which the discourse of “terrorism” is used and abused in order to vilify and exclude political opponents.
I have, of course, just been in South Africa, where Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, even Desmond Tutu, were for many decades routinely described by the apartheid rulers as “terrorists”. And in Mozambique, where the Frelimo government for many long years refused to talk to their Renamo opponents on the grounds that the latter were merely “bandidos” (bandits). Now, they are valued members of the national parliament…
So people do generally know how these discursive strategies of exclusion work. And that they are, at the end of the day, strategies that are always manipulated for political purposes.
FDL, we tried the Quiggin suggestion already. This is the second time that Sadr has tried to start a civil war. Why would it be a good idea to let him try insurrection every time he doesn’t get what he wants?
We’ve Heard This Story Before
Sebastian Holsclaw does not like the case that John Quiggin is trying to make for giving Muqtada al-Sadr yet another chance after he’s already attempted to raise a general insurrection not once, but twice. Needless to say, I don’t like it either.
This is the second time that Sadr has tried to start a civil war. Why would it be a good idea to let him try insurrection every time he doesn’t get what he wants?
What do you suggest we do with him as an alternative?
Sebastian
I believe it may never work to include Sadr in the government in some way but we’ve given the Iraqi’s soveriegnty already so what exactly are you suggesting?
Martyrs have followers.
Endless war that includes large numbers of American troops is unsupported by the American people.
What are YOU suggesting as an alternative?
“What do you suggest we do with him as an alternative?”
Next time he tries it, force him to surrender to be tried as an insurrectionist or kill him. You can’t treat someone who tries to start a violent revolution every time he doesn’t get his way as a merely political actor. Notice I say ‘tries to start’, I do not say ‘threatens to start’. He is way past the threat stage. Twice he has responded to politcal disagreements by attempting to start a bloody revolutionary movement. Pretending he is just a politician with a difference of opinion isn’t going to help anything.
The second sentence of Quiggin’s post reads: “Sadr is an irresponsible demagogue, his political agenda is reactionary and authoritarian and his militia has been guilty of many acts of thuggery and violence.” So it doesn’t seem to me that he’s looking at Sadr through rose-colored glasses. As you note, he then goes on to say that finding a political role for Sadr is “the only remotely feasible option”. He isn’t saying that this is likely or easy; only that it’s possible, and that it’s the best alternative available to us — clearly better than our storming the Imam Ali mosque, or his being turned into a martyr, or his retaining control of Najaf and Sadr City. I don’t see why you find this objectionable, let alone “shocking”.
And as Haven notes, there are precedents. Mozambique is in many ways the best, I think. Renamo had been guilty of really unimaginable atrocities: boiling children alive in front of their parents, disemboweling people and nailing them to trees, etc. William Finnegan, from whose ‘A Complicated War’ I’m taking these examples, quotes an American psychologist who had interviewed a ten year old boy who had watched Renamo decapitate his best friend, and who had then been forced to carry his friend’s head back to the Renamo camp on his head. Etc., etc. etc. And it’s not just grisly anecdotes: they kept the Mozambican civil war going for about 15 years, and the State Dept. estimated that they murdered 100,000 people. They are now a perfectly normal political party. I was in Mozambique about 7 years after the civil war, and asked a lot of people about this, partly because I found the idea that they had become a normal political party, and that their victims were prepared to treat them as one, impossible to imagine.) I am absolutely no fan of Sadr, but what he has done pales by comparison. Had the Mozambicans taken the attitude towards Renamo that you recommend towards Sadr (“There almost certainly is not a place for Sadr himself, now that he has tried to start a civil war on two separate occasions. You can’t keep accomadating someone who thinks that armed insurrection is the solution to each political disagreement.”), their civil war might still be going on today.
Actually martyrs usually don’t have followings. Jesus is one of the very rare counter-examples. Imam Ali is another.
Pretending he is just a politician with a difference of opinion isn’t going to help anything.
I don’t believe anyone is. I think the point of Quiggin’s article — as hilzoy remarks above — is that, given the opportunity to participate within a legitimate, empowering political process, he might choose to set aside violence as being an impractical means of achieving his methods.
Maybe he won’t. Godwin’s a powerful force. But maybe he will. It worked in Mozambique, apparently — thanks for that info, hilzoy — it nominally worked in South Africa, and, fwiw, that attitude underlay the first Bush’s Administration policy towards China in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square (as explained to me by recently-retired ambassador Stapleton Roy at a dinner once).
That’s be an interesting question, though: do people have a list of countries, times and leaders where an insurrectionist was incorporated into the mainstream political process without undue upheaval (and, ideally, with success)? We’ve heard about plenty of failures; let’s try and get the full picture here.
Martin Luther King Jr.? Che Guevara? Joseph Smith?
Re: the questions of martyrs having followings. Sorry for lack of context.
Actually martyrs usually don’t have followings. Jesus is one of the very rare counter-examples. Imam Ali is another.
Gandhi? Viewed in a certain light, Hitler?
[I’m fairly sure there’s a long tradition of insurrections following the martyrdom of a religious figure in the ME and the subcontinent, but I don’t know the details offhand. Jesus (and the whole motley crew of Christian martyrs)and Imam Ali are exceptions for their longevity not, I’d argue, for the existence of a following.]
Correcting myself:
…he might choose to set aside violence as being an impractical means of achieving his methods.
Should read:
…he might choose to set aside violence as being an impractical means of achieving his GOALS.
Sorry about that.
Or they could be like Lebanon or Iran or the Sudan or the Taliban in Afghanistan. I’m completely unimpressed by any of those outcomes, and furthermore I suggest that they are more likely outcomes.
Quiggin specifically points to Hizbollah as a laudable possible outcome. What the hell is that? I’ll tell you what that is. That is a willingness to accept a very deep evil for the sake of stability–something which the left actively complained about during the much more dangerous Cold War. If you weren’t willing to live with it then why now?
The main difference between Sadr and Pinochet is his rate of success thusfar, yet most liberals on this very site were absolutely incensed by American support of Pinochet. That was during the Cold War when the danger was much greater.
” I think the point of Quiggin’s article — as hilzoy remarks above — is that, given the opportunity to participate within a legitimate, empowering political process, he might choose to set aside violence as being an impractical means of achieving his methods.”
We aren’t dealing with hypotheticals. He has already been given that chance and has rejected it twice.
“I’m fairly sure there’s a long tradition of insurrections following the martyrdom of a religious figure in the ME and the subcontinent, but I don’t know the details offhand. Jesus (and the whole motley crew of Christian martyrs)and Imam Ali are exceptions for their longevity not, I’d argue, for the existence of a following.”
I didn’t say they extinguish immediately upon the deaths of their leaders, but the longevity is the key.
And most of the Christian martyrs did not have strong followings (that were dangerous to their killers) after their deaths. Revering a martyr and becoming a danger are two different things. For the most part, those Christian martyrs who were threats to those who killed them had movements which did not long survive their deaths.
More likely outcomes than Mozambique that is.
Two points and a general comment, Sebastian. (1) The relevant question is not whether martyrs in general have strong followings, but whether this one would. It is therefore relevant that we’re talking about Shi’a Islam, which was founded as the following of the martyred ‘Ali, and which retains a huge emphasis on martyrdom to this day.
(2) There are, I think, major difference between hoping that Sadr can be drawn into the political process and supporting the US government’s position towards Pinochet in the ’80s. No one is talking about actually backing Sadr, let alone materially aiding him, let alone deposing a democratically elected government in order to put him in power. When John Quiggin starts talking about voiding Iraqi elections in order to give Sadr control of Iraq, I will be outraged, and at that point Chile will be a relevant parallel. at the moment, however, I don’t think it is.
The general point: I really don’t see why you find what Quiggin wrote “shocking”. You might get into an argument with him about whether the political wing of Hezbollah ((its Sinn Fein analog) is really as powerful a part of Hezbollah as he thinks, or how likely it is that Sadr can actually be drawn into the political process; but why is he (in your view) not just mistaken about some points about which reasonable people might differ, but shocking?
Just for the record, those notes, in my post, come from ‘Just World News’ by Helena Cobban Blog.
That is a willingness to accept a very deep evil for the sake of stability–something which the left actively complained about during the much more dangerous Cold War. If you weren’t willing to live with it then why now?
Because it always boils down to the same question: what are the alternatives?
In the case of Pinochet, we had alternatives. The Cold War threat posed by Allende was minimal; even if we didn’t like him, there were far better ways of dealing with Chile than by murdering him, overthrowing his government and installing a bloody despot in his place.
[I’d like to hear from Randy Paul on this one, as this is his beat.]
In the case of Sadr, what are the potential alternatives? We could absolutely kill him if he were to talk civil war again. We might even be morally justified in so doing, for all the warmth that will give us in the afterlife. The question, though, is: what good would it do? Would it make Iraq a safer or better place? How would Iraqis — both Sadr’s followers, and those ambivalent about America — react to it? Would the inevitable anger coalesce about a person or persons? How many people would we also need to kill in order to crush the Sadrite rebellion? Would this advance our ability to stop terrorists and, perhaps more importantly, terrorism?
[Added in proof: And of course, hilzoy is right in that we’re not talking about subverting an election, nor yet assassinating Allawi to put Sadr in his place. Both of which are key points in the consideration of Sadr-as-Pinochet.]
My gut reaction says, no, freezing Sadr out would cause more troubles than it would solve. [As we’re seeing right now.] You’re free to disagree, of course, but I get the feeling we’re not having an “agree to disagree” moment here; you really do feel this stance is illegitimate, as opposed to merely being wrong, and I haven’t the foggiest idea why.
The main difference between Sadr and Pinochet is his rate of success thusfar…
Oh? You say this on what basis?
BTW, for all your Pinochet references: what did you think about Pinochet and Chile? Did you support the assassination of Allende and the installation of Pinochet? Did you support his monstrous ways: the death squads, the rape camps, the executions? I feel like I’m in the dark here, never quite sure what it is I’m arguing against.
We aren’t dealing with hypotheticals. He has already been given that chance and has rejected it twice.
The key word there was “empowering”. The question about Sadr-as-politician becomes, can we integrate him into the political process enough so that he gets enough of what he wants to stop talk of civil war, while keeping him out of power enough so as not to turn Iraq into his personal fiefdom? Clearly, he felt he was insufficiently “empowered” (or “in control” if you prefer). Can we fudge the balance more his direction and still keep Iraq on track for the country we hope it will become?
Maybe not. In fact, I doubt it; but then, I’ve felt Iraq was pretty thoroughly fucked since about May 2003, so I’m not exactly the happy-fun-optimist guy we need. I do think, however, that incorporating Sadr into the political process for one (perhaps last) time will allow us to stave off the inevitable… and, when the inevitable comes, I think it will soften the blow.
And most of the Christian martyrs did not have strong followings (that were dangerous to their killers) after their deaths. Revering a martyr and becoming a danger are two different things. For the most part, those Christian martyrs who were threats to those who killed them had movements which did not long survive their deaths.
Sure. Now give them nukes.
More realistically, give them semi-automatics, high explosives, anonymous global linkages via secure encrypted lines, and the ability to quickly disseminate (and spuriously justify) graphic depictions of individual scenes of violence; and put them in a world of hundreds of times the population, in a time when human life is nominally considered sacred. Then reenact the various schisms and martyrdoms of the early church years — have you ever seen The Book of Martyrs, I think it is? Utterly gruesome, and it worked — or bathe in the darker side of the tradition of Imam Ali. Hashishim, anyone?
In short: I think you radically underestimate the potency of martyrdom nowadays, Sebastian.
“You might get into an argument with him about whether the political wing of Hezbollah ((its Sinn Fein analog) is really as powerful a part of Hezbollah as he thinks, or how likely it is that Sadr can actually be drawn into the political process”
This argument might have worked after the first insurrection. We are now on overt revolution attempt number two.
He clings to hypotheticals when the facts are already in.
As to twice rejecting peaceful alternatives, you’re going to have to come up with cites. As best I can tell, the US and its puppets (Riverbend’s term) have repeatedly tried to isolate Sadr and diminish his power. Remember the arrest warrant, or the shutting down of his newspaper? you think maybe he holds a grudge from the last time we slaughtered his army?
you say he has rejected peace. but if he knows that he is one of the most popular men in Iraq, that he has the potential to turn the occupants of Sadr City into a huge army, but is offered only scraps at the table of power, he is likely to disagree with your characterization, and say that the US and its puppet government rejected peace first.
Francis
I love it when Sebastian says stuff like this:
“Actually martyrs usually don’t have followings.”
Considering that Sadr has the following of the poor and is a religious leader AND works out of SADR city. No, odds are against that a martyr here would have a following therefore…
Not that there is any family legacy of martyrdom there at all either. You know, other than having the poor part of town being named after your dad who was murdered by Saddam.
“Once known as Saddam City, then as Al Thawra, Sadr City is named for the Imam Mohammed Sadr, an Iraqi religious leader killed by Saddam Hussein.”
“Sadr City is subdivided into six sections. The district is one of the poorest in Baghdad. Unemployment is rampant. Homes are in disrepair. The population consists mostly of Shiite Moslems. It is also a haven for criminals released from Iraqi prisons by Saddam shortly before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
And you anarch,dramatically underestimate the danger of staving off the inevitable. I have no doubt whatsoever that if we allow Sadr to play the revolution game 5 or 6 times before someone kills or captures him, that he will have had time and emotional energy enough to build up a dangerous following that might outlast his death. Every time we let him get away with it, the chances of that happening get worse because every time we let him get away with it the more powerful he appears to potential followers.
When does it end? Revolution attempt 7? 8? Let him do it for 50 years?
We are no longer in the realm of hypotheticals. Sadr rejected political attempts and tried revolution earlier this year by using his paper to call for violent revolt. He was fought to a standstill and Iraq tired to incorporate him into politics again. He has rejected it again and has attempted violent revolution again. If Iraq tries to incorporate him again it will be the third attempt.
How many attempts must there be?
FDL, look it up yourself. I look forward to a presentation of revisionist history on your part.
May I suggest researching the following areas. Sadrist violence before the shutting down of the newspaper. (Yes it existed. Shocking, no?) You might want to studiously avoid citing the newspaper directly advocating violent revolution. Then you should avoid the topic of Sadr trying to take over cities, it makes it look like he was advocating violent revolution. Next, be sure to omit the location he is currently holed up in. Using shrines to hide while you shoot at your enemies doesn’t look good for your narrative.
Right now our army is fighting against Sadr and his fighters (call them what you will but they weren’t terrorists when we invaded and occupied their country). If they kill him or arrest him in the process of combat then we’ll deal with that reality. Did Crooked Timber recommend we sit back now and allow Sadr to take over? NO. In other words they’re saying lets be realistic and deal with the reality.
To give Sebastian a break… perhaps you meant suicide bombers and the like who consider themselves martyrs (and officially fit the definition) don’t have followings and you would be right.
Yes the vast majority of martyrs don’t have followers but then the vast majority of martyrs also weren’t leaders. Like Sadr.
So are you taking that quote out of context so you can make a point unrelated to the discussion or are you … sand dancing?
Regarding the “revolution attempt” … could someone give a summary of what the Sadrist forces did to spark the current violence? I read yesterday that US officials in Baghdad publicly stated the he personally wasn’t responsible for the violence, but I can’t find any backup material for that strange assertion.
Anyone know?
Ah yes, America’s finest defense of the 1st amendment. In a world with computers and cell phones and radio and mosques where people pray up to five times a day, let’s try to squelch angry rhetoric by closing down the newspaper! Sadr certainly won’t have any other means of getting his message out!
Idiotic. our heavy handed and ineffective response did nothing except PROVE HIM RIGHT!
what about that arrest warrant? best i remember, the violence escalated after an old warrant was made public, not before.
the basic point still remains — what are the alternatives? to the substantive question, i’ll add a procedural one — who decides? I thought that Iraqi interim government was “sovereign”; my president told me so. So isn’t the decision whether to kill, capture, accomodate or ignore Sadr the responsibility of the Iraqis?
Francis
“…times and leaders where an insurrectionist was incorporated into the mainstream political process without undue upheaval (and, ideally, with success)?”
Coupla guys named Begin and Shamir were in armed insurrection against the ongoing British government, and refused to cease armed action, or set down arms after independence was declared, when the dominant Haganah, as led by David Ben Gurion so ordered them to. After independence was declared, Ben Gurion had to order a military assault upon the freighter ship Altalena, bringing in arms for Irgun Zvai Leumi, sinking it,killing some members of the Irgun, before Begin was pushed to found the Herut party. Shamir, you may recall, was a leader of the Stern Gang, which was responsible for Britain’s minister of state for the Middle East, Lord Moyne, and the assassination of Count Bernadotte, the UN Represenative. If these guys weren’t terrorists, no one is.
“…do people have a list of countries, times and leaders where an insurrectionist….”
“Martin Luther King Jr.?”
I think I missed the part of King’s career where he was advocating use of arms, or overthrowing the government.
“…there were far better ways of dealing with Chile than by murdering him, overthrowing his government and installing a bloody despot in his place.”
Just for the record, technically speaking, “we” didn’t do that. “We” (meaning agencies of our government, most specifically CIA, at the direction of the highest authorities, specifically Nixon and Kissinger) did indeed try to organize/coordinate a coup, but the prospective coup was so unlikely to succeed (with blowback to the US) that Kissinger “turned it off.” The subsequent actual coup was absolutely influenced by the knowledge that the Americans had been looking to organize a coup and had approved of a previous plot, but was not actually planned in coordination with, or the knowledge of, the CIA; it was native (though Kissinger/Nixon was not unhappy with the eventual results).
It’s a small distinction, but there nonetheless, just for the record.
I think I missed the part of King’s career where he was advocating use of arms, or overthrowing the government.
Gary, please read my followup comment. Anarch’s comment got posted seconds before my response to Sebastian.
“Did Crooked Timber recommend we sit back now and allow Sadr to take over? NO. In other words they’re saying lets be realistic and deal with the reality.”
Actually Quiggin is quite close to saying yes. He does not seem to allow for fighting Sadr EVEN WHEN SADR STARTS KILLING PEOPLE, which is to say the very situation we are in right now.
Sebastian, what Quiggin actually said was that picking a fight with Sadr is indefensible because “Almost certainly, the current fighting will end in the same sort of messy compromise that prevailed before the first campaign started. Nothing will have been gained by either side. But 2000 or so people will still be dead.” A lot seems to turn on his factual assumptions — especially, that nothing will, ultimately be gained by fighting Sadr. I would add to this that by entering into this fight we also risk losing a lot, if (for instance) the mosque ends up being stormed and/or damaged. Also, we have put him in a situation in which he stands a good chance of gaining no matter what the outcome, unless he dies in which case it’s just his movement which wins, while we still lose.
All of this is not to say, one way or the other, what I would do now. I do think, however, that shutting down his newspaper was an act of idiocy, and that we should have done whatever we could to avert the present confrontation. This is not because I am against confrontation all the time; it’s because having a confrontation with someone who is holed up inside one of the holiest sites in Islam is, as far as I’m concerned, not a good thing.
You say that Quiggin’s view that we should hope that Sadr can be drawn away from violence and into politics is shocking. As I read him, Quiggin takes this view because he sees no better alternative. Do you see one? If not, why is it so shocking to hope for the least bad outcome? And if yes, and if your better alternative involves taking Sadr on (as, from your comments, it seems to), what do you make of the risk that this will make matters much, much worse?
“it’s because having a confrontation with someone who is holed up inside one of the holiest sites in Islam is, as far as I’m concerned, not a good thing.”
Your phrasing ‘having a confrontation’ hides quite a bit. We aren’t having a confrontation. Sadr is shooting at people from within the holy mosque while trying to overthrow the Iraqi government and set up an Islamist state. It is like saying that a woman being raped was ‘having a sexual encounter’.
“And if yes, and if your better alternative involves taking Sadr on (as, from your comments, it seems to), what do you make of the risk that this will make matters much, much worse?”
My position is that once he started a violent revolution against Iraq for the second time in six months that you have to permanently stop him. If that involves arresting and trying him, great. But most likely that will involve fighting him until he is dead. But it most certainly should not involve trying to rengage him in the political system because that has already been tried twice and in both cases he has tried to start a violent revolution.
You just can’t overlook the ‘trying to start a violent revolution’ part. It is somewhat important to the reality. Eliding that into “picking a fight with Sadr is indefensible” isn’t dealing with what Sadr is actually doing. He wants an Islamist state, and if Iraq is going to have secular underpinnings which don’t let him oppress the other two groups he wants a revolution. You can either let him have his Islamist state now, let him have a revolution kill thousands and then he gets his Islamist state when you give up fighting him, or you can confront him while he tries to start a revolution to get his Islamist state. Co-opting him into a secular government was a great goal. It has been tried twice. Sadr instead decided on a revolution to get an Islamist state.
How silly, Quiggin doesn’t see what is gained because he is so focused on the US. Sadr gains quite a bit with every iteration of the foment-revolution/appeasement game. Each time he reinforces the idea that a secular government has no future and suggests that his Islamist government is a long-term inevitability. Each time he fights and survives he gets the propaganda value of fighting the allegedly strong US forces who are not ‘brave enough’ to fight him. (I have never understood how this story always works when he hides out in holy sites that we are too civilized to bomb.)
All these comments about Sadr and nothing about Iran, I think you are missing the real story.
I didn’t even want to get into the Iran thing because so many people like to act as if Iran has nothing to do with it. I alluded to it with the Pinochet comparison, but I’m not interested in fighting it out over things like that that we can’t prove. It is more than enough that Sadr has tried to start a revolution twice.
And you anarch,dramatically underestimate the danger of staving off the inevitable.
Somehow I doubt it. I’m the one predicting Iraq will turn into Tophet on the Tigris, remember?
I have no doubt whatsoever that if we allow Sadr to play the revolution game 5 or 6 times before someone kills or captures him, that he will have had time and emotional energy enough to build up a dangerous following that might outlast his death.
See carsick’s post. Sadr’s probably already at his peak martyrdom potential — right now he can siphon off the popularity of his dead (dare I say, martyred?) father but hasn’t put forward much in the way of his own. Frankly, I don’t see him as gaining all that much credibility by his various iterations except insofar as we look like schmucks for not being able to put the rest of the country under control. That is, Sadr’s gain in popularity is only by contradistinction to our (now, Allawi’s) failings elsewhere.
It could be that we’re simply unable to bring order to Iraq while Sadr’s still around — I honestly don’t know enough to say — but it has always struck me that the proper way to “win” in Iraq (for whichever version of “winning” we’re using today) is to get the Iraqis to resist him. If we go in there gangbusters, kick his ass, and then continue to fail to fulfill our promises to the country — which, regrettably, is what I see happening — we allow him not just martyrdom, but a veneer of utopianism that will prove an incredibly potent recruiting tool to his spiritual successors.
If, however, we bottle him the hell up, effectively laying more-or-less peaceful siege to him (as I understand we’re doing) we have the chance to inflict on him that which he truly fears: obsolescence. That’s the real stick in this, I think, not death. If anything can motivate a peaceful resolution from Sadr — if my read on him is correct and he’s unafraid of death but is interested in a piece of the pie — it will be watching the rest of Iraq calm down, straighten up, and liberalize… without him.
But maybe nothing can. Maybe we should go in there, crucify his ass, slaughter the whole damn city, raze it to the ground and salt the earth therein.* If Iraq’s going to descend into hell anyway, maybe we ought to be its guides; a final gesture of compassion in the face of darkness.
Anyway, it’s late and I’m a tad tipsy, so I should sign off now. If this poor spirit has offended… well, ignore me. It ain’t worth it.
* That story, btw, is a complete fiction, based on a rather poor translation in (I believe) the 19th century. Go figure.
It’s a small distinction, but there nonetheless, just for the record.
You are completely correct, Gary. In my defense, I’ve found that making the subtler, more correct argument inevitably ends in heartache; those who want to believe the worst do, those who want to ignore it use that slight distinction to absolve the US of all responsibility. I stopped the effort of total accuracy on this matter some ten years ago, and it’s made no qualitative difference that I can see. YMMV.
I alluded to it with the Pinochet comparison…
You did? How?
Anyway, you still haven’t given your opinion on Pinochet. Would you mind doing so?
Sure starving him out is a perfectly good option so long as the seige doesn’t end with the government letting him back into the political sphere–if you let him back in he has only gained. Of course we have to be ready for him to use women and children to smuggle food in. Probably best to use that as a propaganda victory to prove that he is not honorable enough to fight, and must hide behind women and children.
Wow, that is a mighty big ‘except’. Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing?
Wow, that is a mighty big ‘except’. Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing?
Dunno. I couldn’t figure out what you were saying 😉
No, wait. I couldn’t figure out what I was saying.
OK, I’ll stop posting now. 🙂
Sebastian, you don’t seem, as yet, to have responded to the announcement of a ceasefire and truce negotiations. Assuming that these negotiations end in a truce on much the same terms as the old one, do you still think that the hundreds of deaths in this campaign (including many uninvolved civilians) were justified?
If not, what are you saying?
John the uprising was a huge blow for Sadr’s masters, the Iranian Mullahs, as illustrated in the following tip of the iceberg with more to follow.
So the answer is yes, as we now know who the true enemy is and so do the Iraqis. Plays great in the upcoming UNSC as well.
Military Win, PR Win, a Win Win scenario, wouldn’t you say John.
The wondrous Timmy: “we now know who the true enemy is and so do the Iraqis. Plays great in the upcoming UNSC as well.”
This I must see. US Ambassador announces that a foreign power is interfering in the affairs of Iraq. Seasoned diplomats totter from the room, clutching their sides as they shake with helpless laughter.
Oh, that’s a win-win all right, Timmy. There won’t be a dry eye in the house.
I thought that as far as the Bush Pontificate was concerned, the UNSC had long ago demonstrated its irrelevance?
UNSC had long ago demonstrated its irrelevance.
But it makes great theater and I was thinking the Iraqi Ambassador would comment on Iran’s internal interferrence in his own country. The US Ambassador will be to busy talking about Iran’s nuke program. But you knew all of that right?
Didn’t Hussein blame the Iranians every time the Iraqi Shia questioned his authority?
I think the Iranians have paid off everybody. From the Neocons to Dawa to Sadr to, well…”brothers-in-the-faith” and all.
We are in the Iranian backyard, internationalizing the Monroe Doctrine might be harder than we think.
Well, now that peace talks have broken down, we’ll all get a chance to see how Sebastian’s preferred option plays out. I very much hope that I’m wrong about it — and I mean that seriously; no snarkiness or irony intended.
“Sebastian, you don’t seem, as yet, to have responded to the announcement of a ceasefire and truce negotiations. Assuming that these negotiations end in a truce on much the same terms as the old one, do you still think that the hundreds of deaths in this campaign (including many uninvolved civilians) were justified?”
As usual the ‘peace’ talks are in flux. But if I were to assume that they end in a truce on much the same terms as the old one, I would clearly think the terms were foolish. But to frame the question as ‘was this campaign justified’ is completely silly since when Sadr attempts to start a revolution you must either fight him, or let him install an Islamist government. A huge problem with your analysis is that you refuse to acknowledge the cost of letting Sadr win.
Hilzoy, don’t despair yet, we may still get to see your prefered options played out quite a few more times.
Now that I’m back and somewhat rested:
Wow, that is a mighty big ‘except’. Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing?
I’ve reread your posts a few times, mine as well, and it turns out that I honestly don’t know whether we’re agreeing here or not. Let me phrase my point somewhat more clearly so we can figure this out:
Sadr’s gain in popularity precisely correlates with the US’ inability to restore peace and order to the rest of Iraq. That is, in my estimation he only looks good as an untried, untested alternative to our failings — now technically Allawi’s, but that’s somewhat irrelevant — the default choice of those who don’t like the way the American occupation is going but who don’t have any firsthand knowledge of Sadr’s rule. He’s all hat no cattle, to use a very geographically inapt metaphor.
Is that what you were trying to say? Or are our disagreements further down the road?
But it makes great theater and I was thinking the Iraqi Ambassador would comment on Iran’s internal interferrence in his own country. The US Ambassador will be to busy talking about Iran’s nuke program. But you knew all of that right?
And wouldn’t it be nice if our credibility about foreign nuclear programs and ties to terroristic elements were more intact? Something might actually come of it…
Ah, history. Fascinating.
1991: US condems unelected Ba’athist autocrat for brutal suppression of Shi’ite uprising, highlighted by the damaging assault on the Imam Ali shrine …
2004: US in position of enforcing crackdown of unelcted Ba’athist autocrat against Shi’ite uprising, faced with an impossible moral dilemma …
Boy does this suck.
From the BBC
It seems that my views aren’t too as far out of line with Iraqi opinion. Recall that these delegates have been selected on the basis of a process designed and controlled by Allawi and hte Americans.