by Doctor Science
Andrew Sullivan linked to Jeff Kingston’s review of Tokyo Vernacular by Jordan Sand, and its discussion of the firebombing of Tokyo in WWII. Kingston says
outside of Japan this is one of the forgotten horrors of WWII. … Oddly enough, there is no state memorial to this tragedy, and, in 1964, Emperor Showa actually bestowed an award on General Curtis LeMay, the man who was in charge of firebombing 66 of Japan’s cities, including Tokyo.
Sand suggests that the event is without official commemoration because
The families of many victims held a grievance against the imperial government for having brought the calamity upon them, or at least for having left them exposed to it. Investigative work by journalist Matsuura Sōzō and others revealed that authorities had put the safety and comfort of the emperor over the safety of the mass of Tokyo’s citizens, and that air raid warnings had even been delayed as a consequence.
The award LeMay received was the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class, and it was given to him on December 7, 1964. Australian blogger Jonathan Delacour has discussed why and how LeMay might have been given this award, but it’s all speculation as far as I can tell. Giving such a high award to LeMay, and doing it on Pearl Harbor Day, is so bizarre I honestly have no idea what they were thinking.
However, there are people here who might have a better idea! So tell me, liberal japonicus, why the firebombings of Tokyo (and other cities too, I assume) have no official commemoration.
The reality is that in both Germany and Japan the civil population was a prime strategic target, and they were killed deliberately. If we had lost the war, Roosevelt, Truman, Lemay, Eisenhower and Nimitz would have been war criminals.
Of course, the two biggest killings were Nanking and Manila, which the Japanese committed. And then there was Leningrad. The atomic bombs were small cheese compared to the other bombings.
The reality is that in both Germany and Japan the civil population was a prime strategic target, and they were killed deliberately. If we had lost the war, Roosevelt, Truman, Lemay, Eisenhower and Nimitz would have been war criminals.
Of course, the two biggest killings were Nanking and Manila, which the Japanese committed. And then there was Leningrad. The atomic bombs were small cheese compared to the other bombings.
So tell me, liberal japonicus, why the firebombings of Tokyo (and other cities too, I assume) have no official commemoration.
Well, these are my first thoughts. The memorials are primarily for Hiroshima and a lesser extent for Nagasaki. In fact, Nagasaki always seems a bit embarrassed (is so much as a city can be embarrassed) by the attention and tends to deflect the date quite a bit. It’s really only Hiroshima that memorializes its event, and in a lot of the discussion, that notion of that this can be seen as a single moment (obviously aided by the whole idea of nuclear fission) where everything changed is prominent. On the other hand, the firebombing was a campaign, so there is no ‘date’ to affix (interesting fact, the town where I live was firebombed twice, once on 1 July and a second time on 10 Aug, a day after Nagasaki was bombed (Kurume, a town about 40 minutes down the road, was bomb on 11 Aug)
I’m not convinced by Sand’s assertion of the families of the Tokyo firebombing victims and their anger at the Emperor are somehow linked to the lack of memorialization. I’ll have to look at Matsuura’s work, but I think it was published in the 70’s and 80’s to _reveal_ the delay in air raid warnings, whereas the commemoration of Hiroshima was going on during the late 50’s and early 60’s (it was 1964 that Malcolm X met with the 3 hibakusha journalists).
Furthermore, the focus on Hiroshima provided a useful defocussing, in that 1964 was the year of the Tokyo Olympics when Tokyo was reinventing itself. Tokyo has never prided itself on its depth of history (almost all of Japan is like that, though they give the impression that they do, but it is a selective focus on particular aspects of history) The Japanese were certainly helped along with the historical amnesia by the US, who promulgated the Reverse Course, which had the effect of bringing out all of the folks left of center immediately after the war, but then replacing them with conservatives (and identifying them so the left could be isolated and demonized) This is a neat article from the Journal of Historical Geography that talks about ‘A Cartographic fade to black’, which mirrors the way firebombing disappeared down the memory hole.
Those are just some first thoughts, and I’ll try to give you more later
So tell me, liberal japonicus, why the firebombings of Tokyo (and other cities too, I assume) have no official commemoration.
Well, these are my first thoughts. The memorials are primarily for Hiroshima and a lesser extent for Nagasaki. In fact, Nagasaki always seems a bit embarrassed (is so much as a city can be embarrassed) by the attention and tends to deflect the date quite a bit. It’s really only Hiroshima that memorializes its event, and in a lot of the discussion, that notion of that this can be seen as a single moment (obviously aided by the whole idea of nuclear fission) where everything changed is prominent. On the other hand, the firebombing was a campaign, so there is no ‘date’ to affix (interesting fact, the town where I live was firebombed twice, once on 1 July and a second time on 10 Aug, a day after Nagasaki was bombed (Kurume, a town about 40 minutes down the road, was bomb on 11 Aug)
I’m not convinced by Sand’s assertion of the families of the Tokyo firebombing victims and their anger at the Emperor are somehow linked to the lack of memorialization. I’ll have to look at Matsuura’s work, but I think it was published in the 70’s and 80’s to _reveal_ the delay in air raid warnings, whereas the commemoration of Hiroshima was going on during the late 50’s and early 60’s (it was 1964 that Malcolm X met with the 3 hibakusha journalists).
Furthermore, the focus on Hiroshima provided a useful defocussing, in that 1964 was the year of the Tokyo Olympics when Tokyo was reinventing itself. Tokyo has never prided itself on its depth of history (almost all of Japan is like that, though they give the impression that they do, but it is a selective focus on particular aspects of history) The Japanese were certainly helped along with the historical amnesia by the US, who promulgated the Reverse Course, which had the effect of bringing out all of the folks left of center immediately after the war, but then replacing them with conservatives (and identifying them so the left could be isolated and demonized) This is a neat article from the Journal of Historical Geography that talks about ‘A Cartographic fade to black’, which mirrors the way firebombing disappeared down the memory hole.
Those are just some first thoughts, and I’ll try to give you more later
There also doesn’t seem to be much in the way of a memorial regarding the Dresden fire bombings. (At least, a cursory Google search didn’t turn up anything beyond the fact that Dresden has, since Germany was reunited, been rebuilding some of the buildings that were destroyed.) And those were as damaging as the fire bombings of Tokyo.
There also doesn’t seem to be much in the way of a memorial regarding the Dresden fire bombings. (At least, a cursory Google search didn’t turn up anything beyond the fact that Dresden has, since Germany was reunited, been rebuilding some of the buildings that were destroyed.) And those were as damaging as the fire bombings of Tokyo.
There is a different sort of memorial for Dresden: Daniel Bukvich’s Symphony No. 1 (In Memoriam, Dresden, 1945) . Played it all the way back in high school (1983?). It is an important part of symphonic band reptoire. Worth a listen not only as a good example of non-traditional uses of instruments, but for the issue discussed here.
Program notes:
Symphony No. 1 (“In Memoriam Dresden, 1945”) was written as Dan Bukvich’s master’s thesis. The piece was originally conceived by Dan to fulfill the requirements of a composition assignment he had dealing with contemporary notation and “using sounds beyond normal instrument sounds. It had to deal with the realization of an entire piece of music from one germ of an idea,” says Bukvich. This work succeeded in launching the career of Dan Bukvich into national prominence.
The idea for the symphony derived from a conversation he once had with the legendary jazz artist Louie Bellson. They were talking about the music of Duke Ellington, and a favorite chord he often used, based on the pitches C, Db, E, G. The harmonic and melodic elements of the piece are based primarily on this chord.
There is a program underlying Symphony No.1. It is meant to depict the fierce Allied bombing attacks on Dresden, Germany, on February 13–14, 1945, which, according to most recent estimates, killed between 25,000 and 30,000 people. The four movements, “Prologue”, “Seeds in the Wind”, “Ave Maria”, and “Firestorm”, are derived from “The Destruction of Dresden”, an historic account of the bombings written by David Irving. Through modern notation, the human voice, and unusual adaptations of traditional wind instruments, Bukvich creates powerful, haunting timbres which evoke many of the emotions surrounding this tragedy. By both accident and design, Bukvich created a contemporary work for winds and percussion which, to this day, is considered amoung his most important contributions to the band repertoire. Bukvich downplays the significance of the piece saying, “I didn’t have any message in the Dresden symphony; I had to complete an assignment on graphic notation.” Although extramusical symbolism and unconventional techniques are used by the composer throughout this programmatic work, Bukvich was not trying to make any revolutionary musical statements. Nevertheless, “Symphony No.1” was a trend-setting piece that would mark the style of music wind conductors would come to expect from Bukvich, and demand from him in numerous, subsequent commissions.
There is a different sort of memorial for Dresden: Daniel Bukvich’s Symphony No. 1 (In Memoriam, Dresden, 1945) . Played it all the way back in high school (1983?). It is an important part of symphonic band reptoire. Worth a listen not only as a good example of non-traditional uses of instruments, but for the issue discussed here.
Program notes:
Symphony No. 1 (“In Memoriam Dresden, 1945”) was written as Dan Bukvich’s master’s thesis. The piece was originally conceived by Dan to fulfill the requirements of a composition assignment he had dealing with contemporary notation and “using sounds beyond normal instrument sounds. It had to deal with the realization of an entire piece of music from one germ of an idea,” says Bukvich. This work succeeded in launching the career of Dan Bukvich into national prominence.
The idea for the symphony derived from a conversation he once had with the legendary jazz artist Louie Bellson. They were talking about the music of Duke Ellington, and a favorite chord he often used, based on the pitches C, Db, E, G. The harmonic and melodic elements of the piece are based primarily on this chord.
There is a program underlying Symphony No.1. It is meant to depict the fierce Allied bombing attacks on Dresden, Germany, on February 13–14, 1945, which, according to most recent estimates, killed between 25,000 and 30,000 people. The four movements, “Prologue”, “Seeds in the Wind”, “Ave Maria”, and “Firestorm”, are derived from “The Destruction of Dresden”, an historic account of the bombings written by David Irving. Through modern notation, the human voice, and unusual adaptations of traditional wind instruments, Bukvich creates powerful, haunting timbres which evoke many of the emotions surrounding this tragedy. By both accident and design, Bukvich created a contemporary work for winds and percussion which, to this day, is considered amoung his most important contributions to the band repertoire. Bukvich downplays the significance of the piece saying, “I didn’t have any message in the Dresden symphony; I had to complete an assignment on graphic notation.” Although extramusical symbolism and unconventional techniques are used by the composer throughout this programmatic work, Bukvich was not trying to make any revolutionary musical statements. Nevertheless, “Symphony No.1” was a trend-setting piece that would mark the style of music wind conductors would come to expect from Bukvich, and demand from him in numerous, subsequent commissions.
I find it very odd that this firebombing is now regarded as “forgotten” when I knew about it by the time I was about 14 years old.
LeMay specifically said that if we lost the war, he’d be regarded as a war criminal. I suppose he’d have argued that this was about crippling the Japanese economy and therefore their ability to wage war. At the time, strategic bombing wasn’t working very well, and I suppose they were still trying to find a way to make it work. However, the firebombing didn’t work to cripple the Japanese ability to make war, and was certainly an atrocity. Hiroshima and Nagasaki appear to be the only instances of terror bombing working, and even that is controversial.
I cannot understand why the Japanese would give any award to LeMay and not commemorate the firebombing of Tokyo.
I find it very odd that this firebombing is now regarded as “forgotten” when I knew about it by the time I was about 14 years old.
LeMay specifically said that if we lost the war, he’d be regarded as a war criminal. I suppose he’d have argued that this was about crippling the Japanese economy and therefore their ability to wage war. At the time, strategic bombing wasn’t working very well, and I suppose they were still trying to find a way to make it work. However, the firebombing didn’t work to cripple the Japanese ability to make war, and was certainly an atrocity. Hiroshima and Nagasaki appear to be the only instances of terror bombing working, and even that is controversial.
I cannot understand why the Japanese would give any award to LeMay and not commemorate the firebombing of Tokyo.
So it goes.
So it goes.
I agree with johnw that the B-29 city firebombing raids in WWII are far from “forgotten.” Anyone familiar with the history of WWII, and of American “strategic bombing” in Europe and Japan, knows of the decision LeMay made to drop all pretense of “daylight precision bombing” in the Pacific, and basically to adopt the RAF’s area bombing strategy against Japan. American moral reservations were eroded as the war continued past the point where the Axis powers knew they had lost but continued fighting anyway. PBS’s “American Experience” episode, The Bombing of Germany (available on Netflix) documents this evolution pretty well.
As a career Army Air Forces general committed to the creation of a separate Air Force after the war, there was no way LeMay was going to let the AAF’s enormous investment in the B-29 program fail because of humanitarian considerations. Showing the the bombers were “successful” in defeating Japan without an invasion was critical, even if it meant abandoning high altitude daylight bombing and going down to 5000′ at night to drop hundreds of thousands of incendiaries and burn tens of thousands of civilians.
As for “state memorials,” I think this campaign IS downplayed in the US relative to the European campaign, where the 8th AF suffered huge casualties. That makes 8th AF history and memory more appealing.
As for the Japanese, frankly I think they were embarrassed and still playing “mollify the occupying power” as late as 1964. After all, they started the war, and were guilty of horrific atrocities when they were winning in places like China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific archipelagos in 1941-42. They continued to commit major atrocities right up to the end of the war.
We allowed them to go the denial-of-war-crimes route (compared to the Germans) and I think there was a “less said about it the better” attitude in the 60s that still exists today to a great extent. Hiroshima was an exception, where they could feel especially sorry for themselves, and current, more nationalistic attitudes (relative to China) are the product of a different time.
I agree with johnw that the B-29 city firebombing raids in WWII are far from “forgotten.” Anyone familiar with the history of WWII, and of American “strategic bombing” in Europe and Japan, knows of the decision LeMay made to drop all pretense of “daylight precision bombing” in the Pacific, and basically to adopt the RAF’s area bombing strategy against Japan. American moral reservations were eroded as the war continued past the point where the Axis powers knew they had lost but continued fighting anyway. PBS’s “American Experience” episode, The Bombing of Germany (available on Netflix) documents this evolution pretty well.
As a career Army Air Forces general committed to the creation of a separate Air Force after the war, there was no way LeMay was going to let the AAF’s enormous investment in the B-29 program fail because of humanitarian considerations. Showing the the bombers were “successful” in defeating Japan without an invasion was critical, even if it meant abandoning high altitude daylight bombing and going down to 5000′ at night to drop hundreds of thousands of incendiaries and burn tens of thousands of civilians.
As for “state memorials,” I think this campaign IS downplayed in the US relative to the European campaign, where the 8th AF suffered huge casualties. That makes 8th AF history and memory more appealing.
As for the Japanese, frankly I think they were embarrassed and still playing “mollify the occupying power” as late as 1964. After all, they started the war, and were guilty of horrific atrocities when they were winning in places like China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific archipelagos in 1941-42. They continued to commit major atrocities right up to the end of the war.
We allowed them to go the denial-of-war-crimes route (compared to the Germans) and I think there was a “less said about it the better” attitude in the 60s that still exists today to a great extent. Hiroshima was an exception, where they could feel especially sorry for themselves, and current, more nationalistic attitudes (relative to China) are the product of a different time.
Well, I believe that Japanese industrial production was not on a Western model, so rather than central factories, there were distributed workshops for most war material, often within urban districts and when the war was going badly, rather than try and build new factories, work was often distributed to these workshops. The exceptions were airplane factories which required a large assembly areas and these were attacked relatively early. Thus, a policy of urbicide seems like the “logical” approach that one would take.
Also, there seems to have been no moral restriction on causing fires, at least in Japan, the ‘bat-bomb‘ was suggested in early 42 and taken up in 43.
Well, I believe that Japanese industrial production was not on a Western model, so rather than central factories, there were distributed workshops for most war material, often within urban districts and when the war was going badly, rather than try and build new factories, work was often distributed to these workshops. The exceptions were airplane factories which required a large assembly areas and these were attacked relatively early. Thus, a policy of urbicide seems like the “logical” approach that one would take.
Also, there seems to have been no moral restriction on causing fires, at least in Japan, the ‘bat-bomb‘ was suggested in early 42 and taken up in 43.
Whatever the merits of Bukvich’s symphony, it is unfortunate that he associated it with the bombing of Dresden as described by David Irving. Irving’s account inflated the death toll by a factor of 10 and was the first milestone in this strange historian’s progression toward holocaust denial and overt antisemitism. (The casualty figure cited by bc is the one now accepted.)
The events of that night were horrific, but note also that Dresden’s Jews in “mixed” marriages and their children were *not* deported the next day as scheduled–or for the rest of the war. See Henny Brenner, _Das Lied ist Aus_.
Whatever the merits of Bukvich’s symphony, it is unfortunate that he associated it with the bombing of Dresden as described by David Irving. Irving’s account inflated the death toll by a factor of 10 and was the first milestone in this strange historian’s progression toward holocaust denial and overt antisemitism. (The casualty figure cited by bc is the one now accepted.)
The events of that night were horrific, but note also that Dresden’s Jews in “mixed” marriages and their children were *not* deported the next day as scheduled–or for the rest of the war. See Henny Brenner, _Das Lied ist Aus_.
Roger: I just cut and pasted the notes from Bukvich’s website and did not catch the Irving connection. “Unfortunate” is generous. I am troubled by even my inadvertent republishing of that association.
The narrow escape of Dresden’s Jews is fascinating and not something I knew. I read a bit more about it, and came across this interesting commentary from a Jewish artist living in Dresden about how there is not only a lack of a memorial for the bombing, but for the deportation as well:
“Two days before the bombing, the last Jews in Dresden were to be deported, but because of the bombing the deportation was postponed. To this day, the public feels traumatized by the destruction of the city — even though little of that destruction remains. The deportation of the Jews from the city has been lost. I feel that the city has not memorialized both narratives — the destruction of the city and the deportation of its Jews.”
Artists work (I think this is it)representing the two narratives is here
Roger: I just cut and pasted the notes from Bukvich’s website and did not catch the Irving connection. “Unfortunate” is generous. I am troubled by even my inadvertent republishing of that association.
The narrow escape of Dresden’s Jews is fascinating and not something I knew. I read a bit more about it, and came across this interesting commentary from a Jewish artist living in Dresden about how there is not only a lack of a memorial for the bombing, but for the deportation as well:
“Two days before the bombing, the last Jews in Dresden were to be deported, but because of the bombing the deportation was postponed. To this day, the public feels traumatized by the destruction of the city — even though little of that destruction remains. The deportation of the Jews from the city has been lost. I feel that the city has not memorialized both narratives — the destruction of the city and the deportation of its Jews.”
Artists work (I think this is it)representing the two narratives is here
The German relation to the WW2 bombings is complex too and was different in both parts, although the result was the same. In the GDR there could be no official mourning esp. about Dresden because it did not fit the political doctrine about WW2. Additionally it was a minefield because it touched on the question of the war coalition between the evil imperialist West and the glorious Soviet Union. Mixed signals. Should one mourn because Dresden got destroyed by the evil Anglo-Saxons, cheer because it was just punishment for fascism or be silent because there was the assumption that it happened to support the Red Army?
In the West there were mainly two reasons not to talk too much about the bombing campaigns:
1) the bombers were now allies
2) It was seen as ‘reaping the whirlwind for sowing the wind’, in other words ‘we ‘Coventried’* them and they Dresdened/Hamburged us in (more or less just) retaliation.
Those sentiments are still strong today.
A new factor after the reuni(ficati)on is that ‘Dresden’ became a war cry of the neonazi movement (Irving played a role there of course) and part of its campaign to push German victimhood. So, to mourn Dresden was seen as potentially playing into the hand of neonazis and was/is thus a risky business. Don’t forget: we love to wallow in our guilt and get angry when anybody tries to take even some part of it away**.
*the term got coined by Göring, the head of the German airforce. He threatened to ‘coventry’ all British cities until Britain would sue for peace.
**just recently the historian Christopher Clark noted that Germany is the only country where he really gets attacked for being too German-friendly, esp. now for ‘The Sleepwalkers’ (his books on Prussia and Wilhelm II, otherwise praised, drew some criticism on that front too).
The German relation to the WW2 bombings is complex too and was different in both parts, although the result was the same. In the GDR there could be no official mourning esp. about Dresden because it did not fit the political doctrine about WW2. Additionally it was a minefield because it touched on the question of the war coalition between the evil imperialist West and the glorious Soviet Union. Mixed signals. Should one mourn because Dresden got destroyed by the evil Anglo-Saxons, cheer because it was just punishment for fascism or be silent because there was the assumption that it happened to support the Red Army?
In the West there were mainly two reasons not to talk too much about the bombing campaigns:
1) the bombers were now allies
2) It was seen as ‘reaping the whirlwind for sowing the wind’, in other words ‘we ‘Coventried’* them and they Dresdened/Hamburged us in (more or less just) retaliation.
Those sentiments are still strong today.
A new factor after the reuni(ficati)on is that ‘Dresden’ became a war cry of the neonazi movement (Irving played a role there of course) and part of its campaign to push German victimhood. So, to mourn Dresden was seen as potentially playing into the hand of neonazis and was/is thus a risky business. Don’t forget: we love to wallow in our guilt and get angry when anybody tries to take even some part of it away**.
*the term got coined by Göring, the head of the German airforce. He threatened to ‘coventry’ all British cities until Britain would sue for peace.
**just recently the historian Christopher Clark noted that Germany is the only country where he really gets attacked for being too German-friendly, esp. now for ‘The Sleepwalkers’ (his books on Prussia and Wilhelm II, otherwise praised, drew some criticism on that front too).
Well, I believe that Japanese industrial production was not on a Western model, so rather than central factories, there were distributed workshops for most war material, often within urban districts and when the war was going badly, rather than try and build new factories, work was often distributed to these workshops.
Yes, that’s the conventional wisdom. As a kid in the 1950s watching CBS’s vintage “Air Power” series, I can still hear Walter Cronkite at his authoritative best airing this justification while the teevee showed small workshops in bamboo buildings. Actually, it’s not too different from Bomber Harris’s justification of city area bombing that “de-housing” the urban industrial work force would disrupt German war production.
As a child I was a lot more credulous about it, and besides I grew up in an Air Force family! As an old man today who’s studied the bombing campaigns most of my life as an historical hobby (and even written a couple of books about the 8th AF) I’m a lot more circumspect about the subject. I do like aviation historian Donald Miller’s explanation that “Wars fly out of control. We think we can control them at the outset, but * * * ”
I’m not criticizing anybody who’s posted on this subject but to me there is precious little to be gained from ex post facto discussion about the “morality” of what the Allies did in WWII in the bombing campaigns. My one exception is to say that Harris should have been sacked when Bomber Command developed far better methods of precision bombing at night, and he persisted in wanton area bombing at the expense of more effective means of attack that would kill fewer civilians.
Well, I believe that Japanese industrial production was not on a Western model, so rather than central factories, there were distributed workshops for most war material, often within urban districts and when the war was going badly, rather than try and build new factories, work was often distributed to these workshops.
Yes, that’s the conventional wisdom. As a kid in the 1950s watching CBS’s vintage “Air Power” series, I can still hear Walter Cronkite at his authoritative best airing this justification while the teevee showed small workshops in bamboo buildings. Actually, it’s not too different from Bomber Harris’s justification of city area bombing that “de-housing” the urban industrial work force would disrupt German war production.
As a child I was a lot more credulous about it, and besides I grew up in an Air Force family! As an old man today who’s studied the bombing campaigns most of my life as an historical hobby (and even written a couple of books about the 8th AF) I’m a lot more circumspect about the subject. I do like aviation historian Donald Miller’s explanation that “Wars fly out of control. We think we can control them at the outset, but * * * ”
I’m not criticizing anybody who’s posted on this subject but to me there is precious little to be gained from ex post facto discussion about the “morality” of what the Allies did in WWII in the bombing campaigns. My one exception is to say that Harris should have been sacked when Bomber Command developed far better methods of precision bombing at night, and he persisted in wanton area bombing at the expense of more effective means of attack that would kill fewer civilians.
The theoreticians of air war before WW2 were even more inhumane than what actually happened. The likes of Douhet were in favor of air war against civilians and culture only with poison gas the preferred agent for the former. And I believe the main reason not to use bio and chemical weapons was the fear that the other side would retaliate with stuff worse than what the own side had in stock. As a result (at least in Europe) it was ‘just’ traditional explosives and incendiaries. Morality played little role there. But all sides were prepared to escalate, if the other side had started using the nasty stuff.
The theoreticians of air war before WW2 were even more inhumane than what actually happened. The likes of Douhet were in favor of air war against civilians and culture only with poison gas the preferred agent for the former. And I believe the main reason not to use bio and chemical weapons was the fear that the other side would retaliate with stuff worse than what the own side had in stock. As a result (at least in Europe) it was ‘just’ traditional explosives and incendiaries. Morality played little role there. But all sides were prepared to escalate, if the other side had started using the nasty stuff.
I think the destruction of Korean cities by the US has a much better claim to be the forgotten air war than anything done by the Allies in WWII. Many years ago, after reading Bruce Cumings, I went to local libraries and went through the indices of books on the Korean War–the ones written by Americans typically (though not always) stressed the purely military conflict, and as far as atrocities were concerned they’d mention the massacres committed by the communists and the brainwashing of American POW’s. The British authors would speak in a straightforward way of the aerial campaign that utterly demolished Korean cities and killed anywhere from hundreds of thousands to perhaps millions of civilians. Bruce Cumings, of course, being a lefty, is the exception (though he’s apt to be a bit too understanding of the communist side for my taste).
There was documentary by Thames Television on the Korean War made back in the late 80’s. Cumings wrote a book on this-_I read it a long time ago. There was a section on the bombing–according to youtube, this part was not shown on American TV.
link
There’s footage from North Korean propaganda sources here, but the pictures of demolished towns speak for themselves.
But I think things are changing–in the past ten years or so it’s not unusual to see mainstream sources speaking about the atrocities committed by our South Korean allies (which were on a horrendous scale) and our bombing campaign. But I don’t know if the average person thinks of Korea when speaking of bombing campaigns that destroyed entire cities and slaughtered at least hundreds of thousands.
I think the destruction of Korean cities by the US has a much better claim to be the forgotten air war than anything done by the Allies in WWII. Many years ago, after reading Bruce Cumings, I went to local libraries and went through the indices of books on the Korean War–the ones written by Americans typically (though not always) stressed the purely military conflict, and as far as atrocities were concerned they’d mention the massacres committed by the communists and the brainwashing of American POW’s. The British authors would speak in a straightforward way of the aerial campaign that utterly demolished Korean cities and killed anywhere from hundreds of thousands to perhaps millions of civilians. Bruce Cumings, of course, being a lefty, is the exception (though he’s apt to be a bit too understanding of the communist side for my taste).
There was documentary by Thames Television on the Korean War made back in the late 80’s. Cumings wrote a book on this-_I read it a long time ago. There was a section on the bombing–according to youtube, this part was not shown on American TV.
link
There’s footage from North Korean propaganda sources here, but the pictures of demolished towns speak for themselves.
But I think things are changing–in the past ten years or so it’s not unusual to see mainstream sources speaking about the atrocities committed by our South Korean allies (which were on a horrendous scale) and our bombing campaign. But I don’t know if the average person thinks of Korea when speaking of bombing campaigns that destroyed entire cities and slaughtered at least hundreds of thousands.
Yes, that’s the conventional wisdom.
I’m hoping you can expand on this a bit. Do you mean you don’t think it was true that Japanese industry was distributed rather than concentrated? Or that even though this was true, the real reason for the campaign was because of the fact that it was carried out against the Japanese?
My own personal view is that it is really impossible to disentangle the threads of logical thinking and racism, so I don’t think a discussion of racism as a motivator of strategy helps us understand much. One of the interesting things in the link I gave up above to the article in the Journal of Historical Geography is seeing the basic planning that went into the incendiary attacks. It also notes that Billy Mitchell observed in 1928 that Japan was especially vulnerable to air power because of the Japanese construction. I don’t think this absolves anyone, but it makes it a lot more complicated.
Also, the scribd account that the journal is from has 464 documents related to the Air War on Japan, so you may want to check all that out if that is a topic of interest.
There was also this, that I first saw via LGM, which is gun camera footage from WWII. It seems to be arranged chronologically, so the first scenes are air to air combat and then, as the Japanese no longer defended against air sorties, you see all kinds of ground targets. When I watched that film, I thought it was likely that some of the places being strafed were places that I later visited.
Yes, that’s the conventional wisdom.
I’m hoping you can expand on this a bit. Do you mean you don’t think it was true that Japanese industry was distributed rather than concentrated? Or that even though this was true, the real reason for the campaign was because of the fact that it was carried out against the Japanese?
My own personal view is that it is really impossible to disentangle the threads of logical thinking and racism, so I don’t think a discussion of racism as a motivator of strategy helps us understand much. One of the interesting things in the link I gave up above to the article in the Journal of Historical Geography is seeing the basic planning that went into the incendiary attacks. It also notes that Billy Mitchell observed in 1928 that Japan was especially vulnerable to air power because of the Japanese construction. I don’t think this absolves anyone, but it makes it a lot more complicated.
Also, the scribd account that the journal is from has 464 documents related to the Air War on Japan, so you may want to check all that out if that is a topic of interest.
There was also this, that I first saw via LGM, which is gun camera footage from WWII. It seems to be arranged chronologically, so the first scenes are air to air combat and then, as the Japanese no longer defended against air sorties, you see all kinds of ground targets. When I watched that film, I thought it was likely that some of the places being strafed were places that I later visited.
Hartmut, since I’ve been annoying people no end lately, let me just tell you how much I appreciate your perspective from Germany. To be my age(ish) and to be German: your experience is a huge fascination for me.
to me there is precious little to be gained from ex post facto discussion about the “morality” of what the Allies did in WWII in the bombing campaigns.
I agree. It’s no trivial matter that the allies thought they might lose WWII. They felt that they needed to win until they actually did. These days, whatever war we happen to be in, we do a cost/benefit analysis and “pull out” if the costs are too high. I can’t really imagine that as an option in WWII.
Hartmut, since I’ve been annoying people no end lately, let me just tell you how much I appreciate your perspective from Germany. To be my age(ish) and to be German: your experience is a huge fascination for me.
to me there is precious little to be gained from ex post facto discussion about the “morality” of what the Allies did in WWII in the bombing campaigns.
I agree. It’s no trivial matter that the allies thought they might lose WWII. They felt that they needed to win until they actually did. These days, whatever war we happen to be in, we do a cost/benefit analysis and “pull out” if the costs are too high. I can’t really imagine that as an option in WWII.
A cost/benefit analysis makes sense if you feel like you have an option. If you are in an existential war, a war for survival, the option to stop doesn’t exist.
That is, the benefit of survival is worth whatever price it takes. And that was the way World War II was seen: as a war for survival.
But we (the United States) haven’t really had a hot war like that since. The Cold War was arguably such a war, so while we didn’t fight pitch battles (directly), we were willing to pay whatever it took for that as well.
A cost/benefit analysis makes sense if you feel like you have an option. If you are in an existential war, a war for survival, the option to stop doesn’t exist.
That is, the benefit of survival is worth whatever price it takes. And that was the way World War II was seen: as a war for survival.
But we (the United States) haven’t really had a hot war like that since. The Cold War was arguably such a war, so while we didn’t fight pitch battles (directly), we were willing to pay whatever it took for that as well.
Not to excuse LeMay for his area bombing strategy against Japan, but there was still hope that “bringing the war home” to Japan might eliminate the need for an invasion of the home islands. This was a pointed argument, particularly so since the horrors of an invasion of Kyushu and Honshu would have eclipsed Iwo Jima, which was going on at the same time as the Tokyo firebombing.
Not to excuse LeMay for his area bombing strategy against Japan, but there was still hope that “bringing the war home” to Japan might eliminate the need for an invasion of the home islands. This was a pointed argument, particularly so since the horrors of an invasion of Kyushu and Honshu would have eclipsed Iwo Jima, which was going on at the same time as the Tokyo firebombing.
These events should be memorialized to remind us that war is not an easy solution to our problems but a Moloch ready to destroy everything. We human beings are too ready to believe our leaders when they say that this war will be quick and easy…we’ll be in Moscow in six months, or we’ll be in Baghdad in six weeks, or we’ll hit the Americans so hard that they just collapse and withdraw. In fact, when weapons are used, the other guys’ response is resistance and revenge. We, ordinary citizens, need to absorb the suffering of people who were parboiled in the Sumida river when trying to escape the Tokyo firestorm in order to disarm the Sen. McCains on our side that seem to think that bombing somebody is the solution for all international disputes.
These events should be memorialized to remind us that war is not an easy solution to our problems but a Moloch ready to destroy everything. We human beings are too ready to believe our leaders when they say that this war will be quick and easy…we’ll be in Moscow in six months, or we’ll be in Baghdad in six weeks, or we’ll hit the Americans so hard that they just collapse and withdraw. In fact, when weapons are used, the other guys’ response is resistance and revenge. We, ordinary citizens, need to absorb the suffering of people who were parboiled in the Sumida river when trying to escape the Tokyo firestorm in order to disarm the Sen. McCains on our side that seem to think that bombing somebody is the solution for all international disputes.
Nanking didn’t justify firebombing Tokyo, and the two are different in kind. A strategic bombing–if you can call WWII levels of bombing sophistication “strategic”–campaign has a different intent and application than person-to-person violence at the point of a bayonet. On the limited moral scale applicable to such things, strategic bombing is less awful than personally focused violence on civilians.
Whether you agree with that or not, there was not a handy oracle laying around in the 1943-45 time frame to guide Allied strategy on the mores of progressive thought 70 years and in a very much safer world away. The poor, ignorant yokels of yesteryear had to get by on their own limited perspectives.
My dad died 6 years ago. But before he taught high school and before he went to law school (he was two years behind me at U of Houston), he was a career naval officer, Annapolis, Class of ’44. His class got out a year early to fight. He went to sea on a destroyer. After Normandy (being on a destroyer at Utah Beach meant pretty much being in the giving and not receiving end of things), his ship went to the Pacific. In early 1945, his destroyer was hit by a kamikaze while patrolling in some obscure part of the Philippine Islands. He was wounded–at age 21–and many others including his ship’s captain were killed. A very short time later, his ship was at Okinawa, and thereafter they were training for the invasion of the Japanese mainland. Destroyers *screen* fleets, meaning they are the outermost layer of ships surrounding the capital ships–battleships and aircraft carriers. Destroyers absorbed a disproportionate amount of Japanese air borne attention, perhaps because that late in the war, the quality of the Japanese pilot corp was severely depleted and the much less experience pilot corp couldn’t distinguish between destroyers (small, low value targets) and capital ships. Okinawa was particularly hard on destroyers, given the heavy use of kamikaze attacks, although Dad’s ship only had near misses.
Anyway, he told me that the intelligence forecasts for the invasion were 4,000,000 Japanese casualties and 1,000,000 Allied casualties. Keeping in mind that computers had not yet been invented and that no one really had a clue what invading the mainland would entail, it is enough for me that the subjective belief at the time was that 5,000,000 lives would be lost achieving the war goal of *unconditional surrender.* This ratio, as it was explained to naval officers at the time, was based on past experience in which the ratio of dead Japanese to Allies was roughly 4:1. Again, we can only imagine the crudeness of the body counting, but that’s the way things were back then.
Strategic bombing along with sinking every Japanese ship that might be bringing food to the mainland, or fuel, or what have you, and essentially starving the civilian population were a part of war, back then–not dissimilar to laying siege to a city even farther back in time.
Regarding the end of WWII, the historical record is clear. No one knew either atomic bomb was going to work and very few even knew about them. The US and its allies were gearing up for an invasion and follow on campaign that was going to dwarf Normandy. Unlike the Germans, the Japanese did not have 12,000,000 Soviet troops bearing in from the east.
But for the game-changer of two atomic explosions, the conventional end to WWII was going to be awful No one can say how awful, only that *awful* is what was in the cards. Dad and millions of others on the US side never regretted the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Very few who had actual skin in the game did.
Seventy years later and in a world in which the US faces no external, existential threat, we have the luxury of second-guessing. We do that a lot.
Nanking didn’t justify firebombing Tokyo, and the two are different in kind. A strategic bombing–if you can call WWII levels of bombing sophistication “strategic”–campaign has a different intent and application than person-to-person violence at the point of a bayonet. On the limited moral scale applicable to such things, strategic bombing is less awful than personally focused violence on civilians.
Whether you agree with that or not, there was not a handy oracle laying around in the 1943-45 time frame to guide Allied strategy on the mores of progressive thought 70 years and in a very much safer world away. The poor, ignorant yokels of yesteryear had to get by on their own limited perspectives.
My dad died 6 years ago. But before he taught high school and before he went to law school (he was two years behind me at U of Houston), he was a career naval officer, Annapolis, Class of ’44. His class got out a year early to fight. He went to sea on a destroyer. After Normandy (being on a destroyer at Utah Beach meant pretty much being in the giving and not receiving end of things), his ship went to the Pacific. In early 1945, his destroyer was hit by a kamikaze while patrolling in some obscure part of the Philippine Islands. He was wounded–at age 21–and many others including his ship’s captain were killed. A very short time later, his ship was at Okinawa, and thereafter they were training for the invasion of the Japanese mainland. Destroyers *screen* fleets, meaning they are the outermost layer of ships surrounding the capital ships–battleships and aircraft carriers. Destroyers absorbed a disproportionate amount of Japanese air borne attention, perhaps because that late in the war, the quality of the Japanese pilot corp was severely depleted and the much less experience pilot corp couldn’t distinguish between destroyers (small, low value targets) and capital ships. Okinawa was particularly hard on destroyers, given the heavy use of kamikaze attacks, although Dad’s ship only had near misses.
Anyway, he told me that the intelligence forecasts for the invasion were 4,000,000 Japanese casualties and 1,000,000 Allied casualties. Keeping in mind that computers had not yet been invented and that no one really had a clue what invading the mainland would entail, it is enough for me that the subjective belief at the time was that 5,000,000 lives would be lost achieving the war goal of *unconditional surrender.* This ratio, as it was explained to naval officers at the time, was based on past experience in which the ratio of dead Japanese to Allies was roughly 4:1. Again, we can only imagine the crudeness of the body counting, but that’s the way things were back then.
Strategic bombing along with sinking every Japanese ship that might be bringing food to the mainland, or fuel, or what have you, and essentially starving the civilian population were a part of war, back then–not dissimilar to laying siege to a city even farther back in time.
Regarding the end of WWII, the historical record is clear. No one knew either atomic bomb was going to work and very few even knew about them. The US and its allies were gearing up for an invasion and follow on campaign that was going to dwarf Normandy. Unlike the Germans, the Japanese did not have 12,000,000 Soviet troops bearing in from the east.
But for the game-changer of two atomic explosions, the conventional end to WWII was going to be awful No one can say how awful, only that *awful* is what was in the cards. Dad and millions of others on the US side never regretted the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Very few who had actual skin in the game did.
Seventy years later and in a world in which the US faces no external, existential threat, we have the luxury of second-guessing. We do that a lot.
It is amazing the number of people who, with no experience (and apparently no historical knowledge) second guess the use of the atomic bombs. Certainly the belief among those alive at the time (my father included) was that their direct military effect was trivial compared to their effect in giving the Emperor leverage to force the Japanese General Staff to surrender.**
That was why the bomb on Nagasaki was important. One bomb is very impressive, but could be a one-off. But get hit with a second one, and you have to think there may be more in the pipeline.
** From what I’ve read, one of the things which haunted Hirohito after the war was the thought that perhaps he could have ordered the surrender earlier. And spared both sides a whole lot of deaths. But at the time, he apparently didn’t think he could do so and get obeyed.
It is amazing the number of people who, with no experience (and apparently no historical knowledge) second guess the use of the atomic bombs. Certainly the belief among those alive at the time (my father included) was that their direct military effect was trivial compared to their effect in giving the Emperor leverage to force the Japanese General Staff to surrender.**
That was why the bomb on Nagasaki was important. One bomb is very impressive, but could be a one-off. But get hit with a second one, and you have to think there may be more in the pipeline.
** From what I’ve read, one of the things which haunted Hirohito after the war was the thought that perhaps he could have ordered the surrender earlier. And spared both sides a whole lot of deaths. But at the time, he apparently didn’t think he could do so and get obeyed.
It might be cynical reasoning post festum but I think that the use of these two atomic bombs on a civilian population probably saved mankind from nuclear war. I have a very low opinion of some of those that made the decision* (independent of my views whether the decision was reasonable/justifiable/justified/just) but there can be no doubt that the results were so shocking and concrete (as opposed to the rather ‘abstract’ Trinity test, that later decision makers could not avoid to take it into consideration (and those that would not did not get control of the red button). That imo played a large role in the Muffleys holding their ground under the pressure from the Turgidsons.
*Oppenheimer himself later regretted what he said right after the news came in of the successful bombing, so he is partially excused, but there were some that actually feared that Japan could surrender before one could ‘test’ the bomb on them because otherwise there would be little chance to do it in the forseeable future. It was the once-in-a-lifetime chance for a test on human guinea pigs on that scale.
It might be cynical reasoning post festum but I think that the use of these two atomic bombs on a civilian population probably saved mankind from nuclear war. I have a very low opinion of some of those that made the decision* (independent of my views whether the decision was reasonable/justifiable/justified/just) but there can be no doubt that the results were so shocking and concrete (as opposed to the rather ‘abstract’ Trinity test, that later decision makers could not avoid to take it into consideration (and those that would not did not get control of the red button). That imo played a large role in the Muffleys holding their ground under the pressure from the Turgidsons.
*Oppenheimer himself later regretted what he said right after the news came in of the successful bombing, so he is partially excused, but there were some that actually feared that Japan could surrender before one could ‘test’ the bomb on them because otherwise there would be little chance to do it in the forseeable future. It was the once-in-a-lifetime chance for a test on human guinea pigs on that scale.
but there were some that actually feared that Japan could surrender before one could ‘test’ the bomb on them because otherwise there would be little chance to do it in the forseeable future. It was the once-in-a-lifetime chance for a test on human guinea pigs on that scale.
Somewhere along the line, I must have missed these particularly vile individuals. Who were they and what is the proof they made these statements?
but there were some that actually feared that Japan could surrender before one could ‘test’ the bomb on them because otherwise there would be little chance to do it in the forseeable future. It was the once-in-a-lifetime chance for a test on human guinea pigs on that scale.
Somewhere along the line, I must have missed these particularly vile individuals. Who were they and what is the proof they made these statements?
Usually, victories are much easier to remember than atrocities. For example, the Vietnamese are heavy on celebrating the memory of their successful anti-aircraft units. If you visit the museum of the American War in Hanoi, there’s much more about AA than on the consequences of bombing to the civilians.
Similarly, almost every Finnish city has a memorial for the anti-aircraft units that protected the city during the WWII. This is mostly due to a few facts:
* The air defence of Helsinki was surprisingly successful in countering the three strategic-scale bomber offensives that the Soviet Union sent there in 1944. The city was not destroyed, so it could be seen as an actual victory. Helsinki has 15 AA troop memorials.
* The AA guns used in air defence during WWII were retired from service in 1980’s, making such memorials cheap to build in 1990s, when the political climate became amenable.
* The gun emplacements were outside the cities, typically on hill tops, which later became suburban parks. As they often lack art, such could be cheaply provided by raising an AA gun on its WWII-era concrete pedestal.
Usually, victories are much easier to remember than atrocities. For example, the Vietnamese are heavy on celebrating the memory of their successful anti-aircraft units. If you visit the museum of the American War in Hanoi, there’s much more about AA than on the consequences of bombing to the civilians.
Similarly, almost every Finnish city has a memorial for the anti-aircraft units that protected the city during the WWII. This is mostly due to a few facts:
* The air defence of Helsinki was surprisingly successful in countering the three strategic-scale bomber offensives that the Soviet Union sent there in 1944. The city was not destroyed, so it could be seen as an actual victory. Helsinki has 15 AA troop memorials.
* The AA guns used in air defence during WWII were retired from service in 1980’s, making such memorials cheap to build in 1990s, when the political climate became amenable.
* The gun emplacements were outside the cities, typically on hill tops, which later became suburban parks. As they often lack art, such could be cheaply provided by raising an AA gun on its WWII-era concrete pedestal.
“Whether you agree with that or not, there was not a handy oracle laying around in the 1943-45 time frame to guide Allied strategy on the mores of progressive thought 70 years and in a very much safer world away. The poor, ignorant yokels of yesteryear had to get by on their own limited perspectives.”
That’s not really true. In the 30’s in the context of the Spanish Civil War it was agreed that bombing civilians was a terrible horrible thing to do. If you read Shaw’s play “Heartbreak House”, which takes place in WWI, people were discussing the morality of the tiny air raids on civilians that the Germans conducted then–there were also occasions when German warships bombarded English coastal towns and killed civilians. People have the morality they think they can afford, so when Westerners thought it would save Allied lives to do the same things to German and Japanese (and Korean) civilians, their views changed. Also, of course, any defense of the bombing of civilians when conducted by Westerners completely undercuts the moralizing that Westerners are fond of doing when discussing acts of terrorism. If your homeland is under occupation, you’ve already suffered military defeat and loss of freedom. Faced with a serious possibility of that happening, then I think Americans would do anything. We did everything short of using nuclear weapons in Korea, which, I have noticed, is not part of the US.
“Whether you agree with that or not, there was not a handy oracle laying around in the 1943-45 time frame to guide Allied strategy on the mores of progressive thought 70 years and in a very much safer world away. The poor, ignorant yokels of yesteryear had to get by on their own limited perspectives.”
That’s not really true. In the 30’s in the context of the Spanish Civil War it was agreed that bombing civilians was a terrible horrible thing to do. If you read Shaw’s play “Heartbreak House”, which takes place in WWI, people were discussing the morality of the tiny air raids on civilians that the Germans conducted then–there were also occasions when German warships bombarded English coastal towns and killed civilians. People have the morality they think they can afford, so when Westerners thought it would save Allied lives to do the same things to German and Japanese (and Korean) civilians, their views changed. Also, of course, any defense of the bombing of civilians when conducted by Westerners completely undercuts the moralizing that Westerners are fond of doing when discussing acts of terrorism. If your homeland is under occupation, you’ve already suffered military defeat and loss of freedom. Faced with a serious possibility of that happening, then I think Americans would do anything. We did everything short of using nuclear weapons in Korea, which, I have noticed, is not part of the US.
That said, I don’t particularly feel the urge to moralize about the civilian bombing of WWII–in Korea it seems indefensible. And I always think of the denunciations of Palestinian terrorism whenever someone defends Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Tokyo.
One other point–there were people during WWII who criticized the bombing of civilians, but they were (obviously) ignored. And some military men were critical of the atom bombings, though it’s been awhile since I read Guy Alperowitz and the other historians and don’t recall who. Admiral Leahy, perhaps, might have been one, but I’m not sure.
That said, I don’t particularly feel the urge to moralize about the civilian bombing of WWII–in Korea it seems indefensible. And I always think of the denunciations of Palestinian terrorism whenever someone defends Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Tokyo.
One other point–there were people during WWII who criticized the bombing of civilians, but they were (obviously) ignored. And some military men were critical of the atom bombings, though it’s been awhile since I read Guy Alperowitz and the other historians and don’t recall who. Admiral Leahy, perhaps, might have been one, but I’m not sure.
A link to Elisabeth Anscombe, a rather prominent mid-20th century philosopher with access to time travel, which enabled her to adopt the views of early 21st century progressives on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anscombe was a devout Catholic, I gather (famous to C.S. Lewis fans because she wiped the floor with him in a philosophical debate once).
link
A link to Elisabeth Anscombe, a rather prominent mid-20th century philosopher with access to time travel, which enabled her to adopt the views of early 21st century progressives on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anscombe was a devout Catholic, I gather (famous to C.S. Lewis fans because she wiped the floor with him in a philosophical debate once).
link
Oh, the link to Flood (where I found the Anscombe paper) is there because it popped up near the top of a google search–I’m not familiar with this anarcho-capitalist.
Oh, the link to Flood (where I found the Anscombe paper) is there because it popped up near the top of a google search–I’m not familiar with this anarcho-capitalist.
People have the morality they think they can afford, so when Westerners thought it would save Allied lives to do the same things to German and Japanese (and Korean) civilians, their views changed.
True, there were people who said, rightly, that bombing civilians was wrong. The part they left off, was advising “how do you win a world wide existential war?” without killing civilians.
As for Germans, Japanese and Koreans, weren’t these civilians believed to be living in close proximity to legitimate military targets, or are you contending that it was US/Allied strategy to simply bomb civilians wherever they might be? And, if I’m not mistaken, in all three instances, their governments started the fight. One might assume that, but for picking and losing a war, the number of civilian casualties suffered by all three countries would be zero.
Also, of course, any defense of the bombing of civilians when conducted by Westerners completely undercuts the moralizing that Westerners are fond of doing when discussing acts of terrorism.
To a point, yes. There is a distinction between, e.g. bombing Hanoi Harbor where war materials are present with foreseeable attendant civilian casualties and bombing Hanoi suburbs because that is where people are most vulnerable. Similarly, there is a distinction between bombing Hanoi Harbor during a time of open hostilities and flying commercial airliners into office buildings for no apparent reason.
Conflating unintended collateral damage with intentional targeting of civilian targets such as office buildings and shopping malls is a common error in some quarters. Which is a different topic from whether our gov’t makes sufficient efforts to mitigate collateral damage.
People have the morality they think they can afford, so when Westerners thought it would save Allied lives to do the same things to German and Japanese (and Korean) civilians, their views changed.
True, there were people who said, rightly, that bombing civilians was wrong. The part they left off, was advising “how do you win a world wide existential war?” without killing civilians.
As for Germans, Japanese and Koreans, weren’t these civilians believed to be living in close proximity to legitimate military targets, or are you contending that it was US/Allied strategy to simply bomb civilians wherever they might be? And, if I’m not mistaken, in all three instances, their governments started the fight. One might assume that, but for picking and losing a war, the number of civilian casualties suffered by all three countries would be zero.
Also, of course, any defense of the bombing of civilians when conducted by Westerners completely undercuts the moralizing that Westerners are fond of doing when discussing acts of terrorism.
To a point, yes. There is a distinction between, e.g. bombing Hanoi Harbor where war materials are present with foreseeable attendant civilian casualties and bombing Hanoi suburbs because that is where people are most vulnerable. Similarly, there is a distinction between bombing Hanoi Harbor during a time of open hostilities and flying commercial airliners into office buildings for no apparent reason.
Conflating unintended collateral damage with intentional targeting of civilian targets such as office buildings and shopping malls is a common error in some quarters. Which is a different topic from whether our gov’t makes sufficient efforts to mitigate collateral damage.
McKinneyTexas, Secretary of State Stettinius has, according to a protege of his said: “If Japan bows out, we will not have a live population on which to test the bomb.”
Afaict, this is a single-sourced quote though.
I had not heard of either of these guys but this is the first hit google gave me.
It has been many years since I read Alperovitz’ study on the topic and I could likely find which of the military guys* voiced similar sentiments in there**. His work is also hotly debated*** but to my knowledge no one has reasonably accused him of lying.
Oppenheimer said (on the day the first bomb dropped) that he would have preferred to use the bomb on Germany which had regrettably become impossible due to German surrender (he later apologized for that iirc), which is a related but different cynicism. There seem to be several independent witnesses for that statement.
*and I am pretty sure that what I had in mind came from one of them
**if you give me a month or so. That book is rather thick.
***for his conclusion that the decision was heavily influenced by geopoplitical considerations, i.e. to preempt and impress Stalin
McKinneyTexas, Secretary of State Stettinius has, according to a protege of his said: “If Japan bows out, we will not have a live population on which to test the bomb.”
Afaict, this is a single-sourced quote though.
I had not heard of either of these guys but this is the first hit google gave me.
It has been many years since I read Alperovitz’ study on the topic and I could likely find which of the military guys* voiced similar sentiments in there**. His work is also hotly debated*** but to my knowledge no one has reasonably accused him of lying.
Oppenheimer said (on the day the first bomb dropped) that he would have preferred to use the bomb on Germany which had regrettably become impossible due to German surrender (he later apologized for that iirc), which is a related but different cynicism. There seem to be several independent witnesses for that statement.
*and I am pretty sure that what I had in mind came from one of them
**if you give me a month or so. That book is rather thick.
***for his conclusion that the decision was heavily influenced by geopoplitical considerations, i.e. to preempt and impress Stalin
The British did a lot of reverse reasoning on the topic of bombing civilians. I think it is not too far from the truth to say that they found it impossible to hit only ‘legitimate’ targets* while not reviving the Royal Suicide Corps and then went looking for a justification why they hit mostly civilians. More than a bit of “We have either to admit that we fail miserably or we claim that we planned it that way in the first place. Now we just need a legal reason for it. Any ideas?”. Then they stuck with it.
On the German side it was mainly lack of patience and some British provocations that caused the switch from attacks on airplane factories and airfields to cities. I have read British estimates that the RAF would have lost the Battle of Britain if Göring had not made that switch and proceeded with the previous strategy for just a few more weeks. In a sense the Blitz saved Britain.
*early in the war only 50% of bombs fell within 5 miles(!) of the intended targets
The British did a lot of reverse reasoning on the topic of bombing civilians. I think it is not too far from the truth to say that they found it impossible to hit only ‘legitimate’ targets* while not reviving the Royal Suicide Corps and then went looking for a justification why they hit mostly civilians. More than a bit of “We have either to admit that we fail miserably or we claim that we planned it that way in the first place. Now we just need a legal reason for it. Any ideas?”. Then they stuck with it.
On the German side it was mainly lack of patience and some British provocations that caused the switch from attacks on airplane factories and airfields to cities. I have read British estimates that the RAF would have lost the Battle of Britain if Göring had not made that switch and proceeded with the previous strategy for just a few more weeks. In a sense the Blitz saved Britain.
*early in the war only 50% of bombs fell within 5 miles(!) of the intended targets
“As for Germans, Japanese and Koreans, weren’t these civilians believed to be living in close proximity to legitimate military targets, or are you contending that it was US/Allied strategy to simply bomb civilians wherever they might be? ”
I’ve never heard anyone claim that the Tokyo firebomb raid was meant to destroy legitimate military targets, except in the sense that if you kill enough factory workers, destroy enough homes and demoralize the enemy, it might shorten the war. Freeman Dyson worked for Bomber Command in WWII and in “Disturbing the Universe” he says that after Hamburg, the Brits tried to do it again–that is, start a massive firestorm, but it turns out to be difficult. They didn’t succeed again until Dresden. You start firestorms in cities or try to do it if you want to kill people on a massive scale. At Tokyo the US used an early form of napalm–do you really think that they dropped napalm in massive quantities on a huge flammable city and didn’t intend it to kill civilians in gigantic numbers? The same is true in Korea–virtually every town in North Korea was leveled.
In North Vietnam, there was more care taken in Hanoi not to destroy the city,which is where the diplomats lived, but Western reporters who managed to travel in the southern part of North Vietnam said it was a moonscape–every town leveled. People lived underground. My source is Michael MacClear’s “The Ten Thousand Day War”, which is a mostly non-judgmental account of the war, not a leftwing Chomsky-style condemnation.
As for deliberate killing vs. collateral damage, the distinction is real, but in WWII, Korea, and to a lesser degree in Vietnam, civilians were targeted Since then I think the West has gotten a bit sneakier–targeting civilian infrastructure and then imposing sanctions so it can’t be repaired, as was done in Gulf War I. Death toll goes up, the government is pressured (not that it had any effect on Saddam) and there is plausible deniability. It’s gone out of fashion to admit one is deliberately trying to kill civilians, so I think the collateral damage excuse is deployed. This is moral progress, but it can be exaggerated. Not that the term “collateral damage” is always an excuse, but when, for instance, Israel uses white phosphorus in urban areas or dumps cluster munitions all over southern Lebanon in the closing days of the 2006 war, that’s state terror.
Examples where it isn’t an excuse–I think it’s clear that in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan the US didn’t use the level of indiscriminate firepower that it used in Korea and Vietnam. If the US had, then the death toll in Afghanistan under the US would have been what it was under the Russians (or what it was in Vietnam). Clearly we didn’t carpetbomb towns in Afghanistan. (Fallujah in Iraq was partly leveled, but Fallujah probably got hit the hardest. I never have figured out what to believe about the death toll in Iraq.)
On the terrorism front, the tactic is always wrong, but I wouldn’t lump the Palestinians in with Al Qaeda. The Palestinians kill civilians for much the same reason Westerners do–they perceive it as a legitimate tactic to win their freedom–if you think Americans wouldn’t target enemy civilians if there was a chance it would keep us from being conquered then we have rather different views of what Americans are like.
“As for Germans, Japanese and Koreans, weren’t these civilians believed to be living in close proximity to legitimate military targets, or are you contending that it was US/Allied strategy to simply bomb civilians wherever they might be? ”
I’ve never heard anyone claim that the Tokyo firebomb raid was meant to destroy legitimate military targets, except in the sense that if you kill enough factory workers, destroy enough homes and demoralize the enemy, it might shorten the war. Freeman Dyson worked for Bomber Command in WWII and in “Disturbing the Universe” he says that after Hamburg, the Brits tried to do it again–that is, start a massive firestorm, but it turns out to be difficult. They didn’t succeed again until Dresden. You start firestorms in cities or try to do it if you want to kill people on a massive scale. At Tokyo the US used an early form of napalm–do you really think that they dropped napalm in massive quantities on a huge flammable city and didn’t intend it to kill civilians in gigantic numbers? The same is true in Korea–virtually every town in North Korea was leveled.
In North Vietnam, there was more care taken in Hanoi not to destroy the city,which is where the diplomats lived, but Western reporters who managed to travel in the southern part of North Vietnam said it was a moonscape–every town leveled. People lived underground. My source is Michael MacClear’s “The Ten Thousand Day War”, which is a mostly non-judgmental account of the war, not a leftwing Chomsky-style condemnation.
As for deliberate killing vs. collateral damage, the distinction is real, but in WWII, Korea, and to a lesser degree in Vietnam, civilians were targeted Since then I think the West has gotten a bit sneakier–targeting civilian infrastructure and then imposing sanctions so it can’t be repaired, as was done in Gulf War I. Death toll goes up, the government is pressured (not that it had any effect on Saddam) and there is plausible deniability. It’s gone out of fashion to admit one is deliberately trying to kill civilians, so I think the collateral damage excuse is deployed. This is moral progress, but it can be exaggerated. Not that the term “collateral damage” is always an excuse, but when, for instance, Israel uses white phosphorus in urban areas or dumps cluster munitions all over southern Lebanon in the closing days of the 2006 war, that’s state terror.
Examples where it isn’t an excuse–I think it’s clear that in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan the US didn’t use the level of indiscriminate firepower that it used in Korea and Vietnam. If the US had, then the death toll in Afghanistan under the US would have been what it was under the Russians (or what it was in Vietnam). Clearly we didn’t carpetbomb towns in Afghanistan. (Fallujah in Iraq was partly leveled, but Fallujah probably got hit the hardest. I never have figured out what to believe about the death toll in Iraq.)
On the terrorism front, the tactic is always wrong, but I wouldn’t lump the Palestinians in with Al Qaeda. The Palestinians kill civilians for much the same reason Westerners do–they perceive it as a legitimate tactic to win their freedom–if you think Americans wouldn’t target enemy civilians if there was a chance it would keep us from being conquered then we have rather different views of what Americans are like.
A link to Elisabeth Anscombe, a rather prominent mid-20th century philosopher with access to time travel, which enabled her to adopt the views of early 21st century progressives on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Kind of misses the point: Ms. Anscombe wrote in 1956, 11 years after WWII was safely over. Even then, in the fairly immediate aftermath of WWII, Ms. Anscombe’s views were well and truly on the fringe. Today, progressives seem to instinctively *know* that using the atomic bomb was both unnecessary and wrong at the time and seem have no problem imposing that view retroactively on those who would have had to pay the price for such discernment.
In fact, Ms. Anscombe may be one of the original perpetrator’s of the myth that the Japanese were on the verge of surrendering. Per Ms. Anscombe, the source of this news was Stalin, who reported that the Japanese wanted him to mediate a surrender, so perhaps we have a gullibility issue as well. She barely blinks at the internal inconsistency of claiming, as stated, that surrender was imminent, with the then Japanese gov’t rejecting the Potsdam Declaration, which preceded Hiroshima.
Ms. Anscombe notes in passing that the invasion of Japan would be hugely expensive in cost of lives, but fails to square that sad fact with the much smaller number of lives that were lost and which led directly to the end of the war.
She is not a pacifist. She is worse, actually: she is the kind of busy body who, after the shooting is over and it is safe, comes out with rules of warfare that would making winning more costly and take longer, if, under her rules, the war could be won at all.
She posits, if I am reading her correctly (I did not scrutinize every thought), that any civilian death, regardless of how unintended, is murder and that the number of deaths is simply a matter of degree and that, implicitly, only war that kills enemy combatants is morally permissible.
This useful piece of nonsense ranks right there with unilateral disarmament, and pacifism, as the least likely ideas ever to deter war.
The problem with her thinking, if it takes hold, is that it would only take hold in a country completely disinclined to go to war in the first place. So, you have a passive, peace-loving country who, in advance, limits its willingness to defend itself. Imagine that as a strategy against Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany.
A link to Elisabeth Anscombe, a rather prominent mid-20th century philosopher with access to time travel, which enabled her to adopt the views of early 21st century progressives on the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Kind of misses the point: Ms. Anscombe wrote in 1956, 11 years after WWII was safely over. Even then, in the fairly immediate aftermath of WWII, Ms. Anscombe’s views were well and truly on the fringe. Today, progressives seem to instinctively *know* that using the atomic bomb was both unnecessary and wrong at the time and seem have no problem imposing that view retroactively on those who would have had to pay the price for such discernment.
In fact, Ms. Anscombe may be one of the original perpetrator’s of the myth that the Japanese were on the verge of surrendering. Per Ms. Anscombe, the source of this news was Stalin, who reported that the Japanese wanted him to mediate a surrender, so perhaps we have a gullibility issue as well. She barely blinks at the internal inconsistency of claiming, as stated, that surrender was imminent, with the then Japanese gov’t rejecting the Potsdam Declaration, which preceded Hiroshima.
Ms. Anscombe notes in passing that the invasion of Japan would be hugely expensive in cost of lives, but fails to square that sad fact with the much smaller number of lives that were lost and which led directly to the end of the war.
She is not a pacifist. She is worse, actually: she is the kind of busy body who, after the shooting is over and it is safe, comes out with rules of warfare that would making winning more costly and take longer, if, under her rules, the war could be won at all.
She posits, if I am reading her correctly (I did not scrutinize every thought), that any civilian death, regardless of how unintended, is murder and that the number of deaths is simply a matter of degree and that, implicitly, only war that kills enemy combatants is morally permissible.
This useful piece of nonsense ranks right there with unilateral disarmament, and pacifism, as the least likely ideas ever to deter war.
The problem with her thinking, if it takes hold, is that it would only take hold in a country completely disinclined to go to war in the first place. So, you have a passive, peace-loving country who, in advance, limits its willingness to defend itself. Imagine that as a strategy against Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany.
And, if I’m not mistaken, in all three instances, their governments started the fight. One might assume that, but for picking and losing a war, the number of civilian casualties suffered by all three countries would be zero.
And if I’m not mistaken*, quod jus ad bellum, jus in bello non est.
*Given my grasp of Latin, I’m pretty sure this rhetorical flourish unfortunately isn’t all that rhetorical on a grammatical level.
And, if I’m not mistaken, in all three instances, their governments started the fight. One might assume that, but for picking and losing a war, the number of civilian casualties suffered by all three countries would be zero.
And if I’m not mistaken*, quod jus ad bellum, jus in bello non est.
*Given my grasp of Latin, I’m pretty sure this rhetorical flourish unfortunately isn’t all that rhetorical on a grammatical level.
early in the war only 50% of bombs fell within 5 miles(!) of the intended targets.
Hartmut, the Norden bombsight was something that the Americans had, but the British (and Germans) lacked. With it, targetted bombing was at least roughly possible — the probably error was just over 1,000 feet (in combat conditions). Without it, accuracy was so low, as you note, that only saturation bombing had any reliable effect.
early in the war only 50% of bombs fell within 5 miles(!) of the intended targets.
Hartmut, the Norden bombsight was something that the Americans had, but the British (and Germans) lacked. With it, targetted bombing was at least roughly possible — the probably error was just over 1,000 feet (in combat conditions). Without it, accuracy was so low, as you note, that only saturation bombing had any reliable effect.
So McK, you’re suggesting that it’s foolish and amoral to regard warfare tactics which result in civilian casualties, intended or otherwise, as immoral when avoiding them would make victory difficult or impossible?
So McK, you’re suggesting that it’s foolish and amoral to regard warfare tactics which result in civilian casualties, intended or otherwise, as immoral when avoiding them would make victory difficult or impossible?
I’ve never heard anyone claim that the Tokyo firebomb raid was meant to destroy legitimate military targets, except in the sense that if you kill enough factory workers, destroy enough homes and demoralize the enemy, it might shorten the war
Which is entirely different from someone finding a historical document that authoritatively states, in effect, “the Allied policy of area bombing is to attrit the civilian population to the point where, as a country, it ceases to exist.” In other words, genocide. Because if the plan were really genocide, civilian attrition on a mass scale, I’m pretty sure of two things (just for starters). First, that would have been written down somewhere. Second, the bombing campaigns would have flown over much less defended targets routinely.
do you really think that they dropped napalm in massive quantities on a huge flammable city and didn’t intend it to kill civilians in gigantic numbers? The same is true in Korea–virtually every town in North Korea was leveled.
In addition to my points immediately above, the difference between ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ is germane. If rail yards, diffuse war-making light industry, harbor facilities and communications infrastructure are legitimate military targets residing in a civilian environment, there is indeed a moral dilemma: does one conclude a war by prolonging the enemy’s means to resist when the enemy encapsulates its industrial capacity with civilians or does one take the enemy as one finds it and act accordingly. A lot of the answer has to do with who pick the fight, how that belligerent signaled it intended to fight the war and why that belligerent started the fight.
So, I might expect civilian casualties even if I would prefer and intend otherwise.
Examples where it isn’t an excuse–I think it’s clear that in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan the US didn’t use the level of indiscriminate firepower that it used in Korea and Vietnam.
Or in Gulf War I, for that matter. Let me repeat my initial comment on this thread:
Nanking didn’t justify firebombing Tokyo, and the two are different in kind. A strategic bombing–if you can call WWII levels of bombing sophistication “strategic”–campaign has a different intent and application than person-to-person violence at the point of a bayonet.
Gulf War I was the first war fought with satellite surveillance, high definition targeting and a host of other advantages that were light years in the future even in Viet Nam. As a proximate result of needing massive force multipliers to overcome the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority across the board, we built smarter and ever smarter weapons with ever more increasing means of targeted delivery.
Those awesome advantages didn’t exist in WWII or Korea. I think the main flaw in revisionist thinking is inferring policy or intent from outcome. Dresden, Tokyo and any number of other events–after the fact, at a time when the measure of destruction can be seen, and when the shooting has long since stopped–are almost impossible to explain. Quasi-pacifists infer that these outcomes could only be the result of conscious intent (if that were true, then we could all agree that Obama and the Democrats intended the ACA roll-out to be a travesty because, you know, outcome = intent). As I intimated earlier, if that were the case, someone in a position to set policy would have likely written that down and then that written policy would have been disseminated far and wide to ensure that it was carried out. We would have a name, if not several names and those would be names that we know from history, probably the names of presidents, for starters. No such evidence that that happened exists.
The simplest explanation is usually the best: bad shit often happens when people are confronted with overwhelming and unprecedented horror. War in 1930’s was different from war in ’40’s and was different again in Korea. It was killing at great distances on a mass scale. No one knew, until they did it, what outcomes would be. Holding back was not on the agenda. Just the opposite. People were afraid and they wanted the war over. The tools of war were very crude by today’s standards and the ability to discriminate among targets was reflected in the reality of how wars were fought.
I’ve never heard anyone claim that the Tokyo firebomb raid was meant to destroy legitimate military targets, except in the sense that if you kill enough factory workers, destroy enough homes and demoralize the enemy, it might shorten the war
Which is entirely different from someone finding a historical document that authoritatively states, in effect, “the Allied policy of area bombing is to attrit the civilian population to the point where, as a country, it ceases to exist.” In other words, genocide. Because if the plan were really genocide, civilian attrition on a mass scale, I’m pretty sure of two things (just for starters). First, that would have been written down somewhere. Second, the bombing campaigns would have flown over much less defended targets routinely.
do you really think that they dropped napalm in massive quantities on a huge flammable city and didn’t intend it to kill civilians in gigantic numbers? The same is true in Korea–virtually every town in North Korea was leveled.
In addition to my points immediately above, the difference between ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ is germane. If rail yards, diffuse war-making light industry, harbor facilities and communications infrastructure are legitimate military targets residing in a civilian environment, there is indeed a moral dilemma: does one conclude a war by prolonging the enemy’s means to resist when the enemy encapsulates its industrial capacity with civilians or does one take the enemy as one finds it and act accordingly. A lot of the answer has to do with who pick the fight, how that belligerent signaled it intended to fight the war and why that belligerent started the fight.
So, I might expect civilian casualties even if I would prefer and intend otherwise.
Examples where it isn’t an excuse–I think it’s clear that in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan the US didn’t use the level of indiscriminate firepower that it used in Korea and Vietnam.
Or in Gulf War I, for that matter. Let me repeat my initial comment on this thread:
Nanking didn’t justify firebombing Tokyo, and the two are different in kind. A strategic bombing–if you can call WWII levels of bombing sophistication “strategic”–campaign has a different intent and application than person-to-person violence at the point of a bayonet.
Gulf War I was the first war fought with satellite surveillance, high definition targeting and a host of other advantages that were light years in the future even in Viet Nam. As a proximate result of needing massive force multipliers to overcome the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority across the board, we built smarter and ever smarter weapons with ever more increasing means of targeted delivery.
Those awesome advantages didn’t exist in WWII or Korea. I think the main flaw in revisionist thinking is inferring policy or intent from outcome. Dresden, Tokyo and any number of other events–after the fact, at a time when the measure of destruction can be seen, and when the shooting has long since stopped–are almost impossible to explain. Quasi-pacifists infer that these outcomes could only be the result of conscious intent (if that were true, then we could all agree that Obama and the Democrats intended the ACA roll-out to be a travesty because, you know, outcome = intent). As I intimated earlier, if that were the case, someone in a position to set policy would have likely written that down and then that written policy would have been disseminated far and wide to ensure that it was carried out. We would have a name, if not several names and those would be names that we know from history, probably the names of presidents, for starters. No such evidence that that happened exists.
The simplest explanation is usually the best: bad shit often happens when people are confronted with overwhelming and unprecedented horror. War in 1930’s was different from war in ’40’s and was different again in Korea. It was killing at great distances on a mass scale. No one knew, until they did it, what outcomes would be. Holding back was not on the agenda. Just the opposite. People were afraid and they wanted the war over. The tools of war were very crude by today’s standards and the ability to discriminate among targets was reflected in the reality of how wars were fought.
So McK, you’re suggesting that it’s foolish and amoral to regard warfare tactics which result in civilian casualties, intended or otherwise, as immoral when avoiding them would make victory difficult or impossible?
I follow your question right up to ‘as immoral when avoiding them would make victory difficult or impossible.’ I can’t connect the meaning of this part of the question with the predicate, sorry.
But, what I am saying are these: (1) civilian casualties, given our much more sophisticated modern capabilities, should be avoided as much as is reasonably possible; (2) hard and fast, black and white rules of virtual purity in war-fighting tactics are morally and practically wrong even today and much more so in the context of WWII and Korea and (3) the moral scales tilt less harshly on the party attacked than they do on the party starting the fight. I guess a 4th and a 5th statement would be that people who are never going to have to live with the consequences of rules they would impose on others have the least standing to speak with authority and, yes, sometimes, killing a disproportionate number of civilians to achieve a military end can be justified morally depending on the end and depending on the means.
So McK, you’re suggesting that it’s foolish and amoral to regard warfare tactics which result in civilian casualties, intended or otherwise, as immoral when avoiding them would make victory difficult or impossible?
I follow your question right up to ‘as immoral when avoiding them would make victory difficult or impossible.’ I can’t connect the meaning of this part of the question with the predicate, sorry.
But, what I am saying are these: (1) civilian casualties, given our much more sophisticated modern capabilities, should be avoided as much as is reasonably possible; (2) hard and fast, black and white rules of virtual purity in war-fighting tactics are morally and practically wrong even today and much more so in the context of WWII and Korea and (3) the moral scales tilt less harshly on the party attacked than they do on the party starting the fight. I guess a 4th and a 5th statement would be that people who are never going to have to live with the consequences of rules they would impose on others have the least standing to speak with authority and, yes, sometimes, killing a disproportionate number of civilians to achieve a military end can be justified morally depending on the end and depending on the means.
I believe there is something to be said that a big factor in the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima was a demonstration to Russia and we had to drop the second to show Russia we had more than one.
Russia was on the way in full force to give us a hand to pound on Japan.
Not sure how to measure the cost/benefit of scaring Russia with nuclear confrontation.
What seems amazing to me is that when Japan surrendered it was a complete surrender with no die-hard insurgence during the occupation.
I believe there is something to be said that a big factor in the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima was a demonstration to Russia and we had to drop the second to show Russia we had more than one.
Russia was on the way in full force to give us a hand to pound on Japan.
Not sure how to measure the cost/benefit of scaring Russia with nuclear confrontation.
What seems amazing to me is that when Japan surrendered it was a complete surrender with no die-hard insurgence during the occupation.
In addition to my points immediately above, the difference between ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ is germane.
[…]
So, I might expect civilian casualties even if I would prefer and intend otherwise.
The legitimacy of the doctrine of double effect is hardly a settled matter in ethics. And with good cause. Especially when you leave out two of the strongest supporting cavaets in its favor: requirements for military necessity and proportionality. If you’re relying on military expediency and jus ad bellum to take the place of those notions, double effect becomes a despicable fig leaf with nothing to recommend it.
Or in Gulf War I, for that matter.
And yet, despite this, you had Iraq’s civilian infrastructure bombed back from a respectable second-world-ish level to that of a broken third-world state. You have the DoD publically trotting out arguments of dual use to justify smashing water and electrical facilities (or worse), while anonymous DoD sources and civilian officials (well, not always anonymous, TYVM Ms. Albright) coyly crowing about how this will “accelerate the effects of the sanctions” on the civilian populace and suchlike.
All that precision doesn’t make things a bit better if you use it to inflict indirect, plausibly-deniable civilian casualties.
In addition to my points immediately above, the difference between ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ is germane.
[…]
So, I might expect civilian casualties even if I would prefer and intend otherwise.
The legitimacy of the doctrine of double effect is hardly a settled matter in ethics. And with good cause. Especially when you leave out two of the strongest supporting cavaets in its favor: requirements for military necessity and proportionality. If you’re relying on military expediency and jus ad bellum to take the place of those notions, double effect becomes a despicable fig leaf with nothing to recommend it.
Or in Gulf War I, for that matter.
And yet, despite this, you had Iraq’s civilian infrastructure bombed back from a respectable second-world-ish level to that of a broken third-world state. You have the DoD publically trotting out arguments of dual use to justify smashing water and electrical facilities (or worse), while anonymous DoD sources and civilian officials (well, not always anonymous, TYVM Ms. Albright) coyly crowing about how this will “accelerate the effects of the sanctions” on the civilian populace and suchlike.
All that precision doesn’t make things a bit better if you use it to inflict indirect, plausibly-deniable civilian casualties.
“Which is entirely different from someone finding a historical document that authoritatively states, in effect, “the Allied policy of area bombing is to attrit the civilian population to the point where, as a country, it ceases to exist.” In other words, genocide. Because if the plan were really genocide, civilian attrition on a mass scale,”
This is just confused. I never said that the object of the bombing campaigns was to wipe out the entire country–the object was to kill enough people and do enough damage to the civilian infrastructure that morale would collapse. This isn’t exactly news. LeMay used incendiaries on Tokyo because he wanted to burn as much of the city as possible. He wasn’t horrified by the results–he got the results he wanted.
“A lot of the answer has to do with who pick the fight, how that belligerent signaled it intended to fight the war and why that belligerent started the fight.
So, I might expect civilian casualties even if I would prefer and intend otherwise.”
You’re having it both ways is what you’re doing. It’s one thing to try precision bombing and avoid civilian casualties if possible. Paul Fussell talks somewhere about how when the Allies invaded France there were thousands of French civilians killed. Obviously that wasn’t intended. But LeMay loads hundreds of B-29’s with incendiaries and dropped them on a city with the intent of burning it to the ground. I don’t feel any particular need to moralize about it 70 years later, but the pretense that there was no intent to kill civilians here is just fatuous. If you can persuade yourself that there wasn’t I want you on my defense team next time I deliberately burn a city to the ground.
And who picked the fight is a separate question from who gets to target civilians. You can have the best cause in the world and you still don’t have the right to target civilians–a moral stand most people find crystal clear when it comes to terrorism aimed at people like us, but one which quickly becomes murky when we or someone like us wants to do it.
“It was killing at great distances on a mass scale. No one knew, until they did it, what outcomes would be”
This is simply false. People were speculating about the terrible consequences of the new means of warfare from fairly early on in the 20th century. And when the war came, they were trying to burn cities down. Freeman Dyson, who I cited upthread, mentions how when he joined Bomber Command they were elated at the firestorm in Hamburg–it was a tremendous success and they hoped to duplicate it again, but it turns out to be difficult to start firestorms. Here’s a link to where he talks about this-
link
And historical evidence aside , there’s a certain common sense element here. LeMay dropped thousands of tons of incendiaries on a highly flammable city — it doesn’t exactly require a genius to see that the intent was to kill on a massive scale. You’re the first person I’ve ever read who tried to deny this. I think there’s some need here to deny that Westerners could ever sink as low as to do something like that. To me it’s just business as usual–people do what they think they have to, and rationalize it as necessary.
“I guess a 4th and a 5th statement would be that people who are never going to have to live with the consequences of rules they would impose on others have the least standing to speak with authority and, yes, sometimes, killing a disproportionate number of civilians to achieve a military end can be justified morally depending on the end and depending on the means.”
If applied consistently, this has much wider applicability than I think you want it to. You probably mean the wriggle room there at the end to enable you to justify Western killing of civilians, but I think others can and will apply it in ways you don’t like.
“Which is entirely different from someone finding a historical document that authoritatively states, in effect, “the Allied policy of area bombing is to attrit the civilian population to the point where, as a country, it ceases to exist.” In other words, genocide. Because if the plan were really genocide, civilian attrition on a mass scale,”
This is just confused. I never said that the object of the bombing campaigns was to wipe out the entire country–the object was to kill enough people and do enough damage to the civilian infrastructure that morale would collapse. This isn’t exactly news. LeMay used incendiaries on Tokyo because he wanted to burn as much of the city as possible. He wasn’t horrified by the results–he got the results he wanted.
“A lot of the answer has to do with who pick the fight, how that belligerent signaled it intended to fight the war and why that belligerent started the fight.
So, I might expect civilian casualties even if I would prefer and intend otherwise.”
You’re having it both ways is what you’re doing. It’s one thing to try precision bombing and avoid civilian casualties if possible. Paul Fussell talks somewhere about how when the Allies invaded France there were thousands of French civilians killed. Obviously that wasn’t intended. But LeMay loads hundreds of B-29’s with incendiaries and dropped them on a city with the intent of burning it to the ground. I don’t feel any particular need to moralize about it 70 years later, but the pretense that there was no intent to kill civilians here is just fatuous. If you can persuade yourself that there wasn’t I want you on my defense team next time I deliberately burn a city to the ground.
And who picked the fight is a separate question from who gets to target civilians. You can have the best cause in the world and you still don’t have the right to target civilians–a moral stand most people find crystal clear when it comes to terrorism aimed at people like us, but one which quickly becomes murky when we or someone like us wants to do it.
“It was killing at great distances on a mass scale. No one knew, until they did it, what outcomes would be”
This is simply false. People were speculating about the terrible consequences of the new means of warfare from fairly early on in the 20th century. And when the war came, they were trying to burn cities down. Freeman Dyson, who I cited upthread, mentions how when he joined Bomber Command they were elated at the firestorm in Hamburg–it was a tremendous success and they hoped to duplicate it again, but it turns out to be difficult to start firestorms. Here’s a link to where he talks about this-
link
And historical evidence aside , there’s a certain common sense element here. LeMay dropped thousands of tons of incendiaries on a highly flammable city — it doesn’t exactly require a genius to see that the intent was to kill on a massive scale. You’re the first person I’ve ever read who tried to deny this. I think there’s some need here to deny that Westerners could ever sink as low as to do something like that. To me it’s just business as usual–people do what they think they have to, and rationalize it as necessary.
“I guess a 4th and a 5th statement would be that people who are never going to have to live with the consequences of rules they would impose on others have the least standing to speak with authority and, yes, sometimes, killing a disproportionate number of civilians to achieve a military end can be justified morally depending on the end and depending on the means.”
If applied consistently, this has much wider applicability than I think you want it to. You probably mean the wriggle room there at the end to enable you to justify Western killing of civilians, but I think others can and will apply it in ways you don’t like.
What’s ironic to me about this, btw, is that I just had my latest bout of impatience with people at another blog over the issue of bombing and shelling cities because there are terrorists there. I think it’s wrong, and some of them don’t. One or two thinks that to fight terrorists you have to do what is necessary. And no, I’m not talking about Israel and Gaza, but Assad and the Palestinian refugee camp at Yarmouk.
What’s ironic to me about this, btw, is that I just had my latest bout of impatience with people at another blog over the issue of bombing and shelling cities because there are terrorists there. I think it’s wrong, and some of them don’t. One or two thinks that to fight terrorists you have to do what is necessary. And no, I’m not talking about Israel and Gaza, but Assad and the Palestinian refugee camp at Yarmouk.
(1) civilian casualties, given our much more sophisticated modern capabilities, should be avoided as much as is reasonably possible;
Agreed.
(2) hard and fast, black and white rules of virtual purity in war-fighting tactics are morally and practically wrong even today and much more so in the context of WWII and Korea
I’m normally relatively circumspect with my tone, but… I’m sorry, McK. This is absolute bulls#|t. Hard and fast black and white laws of war and rules of engagement – particularly in terms of targeting civilians – are absolutely practical and moral today. And I’m not saying this as someone who never put skin in the game, or faced potential consequences for said rules. I’m saying this as someone who deployed to Afghanistan as Army JAG Corps personnel assigned to an Infantry unit. You are completely and utterly full of s#|t, and suffering from the precise sense of misleading abstraction you’re decrying in those who disagree with you.
You set hard and fast rules. You strive to see them followed. You know they won’t always be followed, and in situations of true military necessity they’ll go out the damned window. But you still impose them and enforce them with zeal no matter how much risk-adverse force-protection advocates want to throw them in the trash. You limit the frequency and impact of violations as much as you can, and you make sure violations don’t become systematic and doctrinal. And wonder of wonders, you still accomplish the mission.
You know why we haven’t seen the same levels of indiscriminate “collateral damage” in OIF and OEF as we did in earlier conflicts? Because of those damned hard-and-fast, black-and-white rules you’re decrying so loudly.
(3) the moral scales tilt less harshly on the party attacked than they do on the party starting the fight.
Again, your implication that jus ad bellum relieves a party of jus in bello obligations is, to attempt to come back to a more typical and cooler tone, troubling.
(1) civilian casualties, given our much more sophisticated modern capabilities, should be avoided as much as is reasonably possible;
Agreed.
(2) hard and fast, black and white rules of virtual purity in war-fighting tactics are morally and practically wrong even today and much more so in the context of WWII and Korea
I’m normally relatively circumspect with my tone, but… I’m sorry, McK. This is absolute bulls#|t. Hard and fast black and white laws of war and rules of engagement – particularly in terms of targeting civilians – are absolutely practical and moral today. And I’m not saying this as someone who never put skin in the game, or faced potential consequences for said rules. I’m saying this as someone who deployed to Afghanistan as Army JAG Corps personnel assigned to an Infantry unit. You are completely and utterly full of s#|t, and suffering from the precise sense of misleading abstraction you’re decrying in those who disagree with you.
You set hard and fast rules. You strive to see them followed. You know they won’t always be followed, and in situations of true military necessity they’ll go out the damned window. But you still impose them and enforce them with zeal no matter how much risk-adverse force-protection advocates want to throw them in the trash. You limit the frequency and impact of violations as much as you can, and you make sure violations don’t become systematic and doctrinal. And wonder of wonders, you still accomplish the mission.
You know why we haven’t seen the same levels of indiscriminate “collateral damage” in OIF and OEF as we did in earlier conflicts? Because of those damned hard-and-fast, black-and-white rules you’re decrying so loudly.
(3) the moral scales tilt less harshly on the party attacked than they do on the party starting the fight.
Again, your implication that jus ad bellum relieves a party of jus in bello obligations is, to attempt to come back to a more typical and cooler tone, troubling.
someone in a position to set policy would have likely written that down and then that written policy would have been disseminated far and wide to ensure that it was carried out.
McK, I think you are overlooking a phenomena, exemplified by conspiracy theorists (in my experience) but not limited to them. The view seems to be that, while the government is inept (not to mention evil, in most versions) at everything else, it is positively brilliant at keeping secret its various nasty conspiracies. Not that it can keep most other stuff secret successfully, mind. But secret conspiracies are its one true skill.
Once you buy into the view, it is entirely possible to believe that anything bad that happens was intended. Whether it is massive loss of life in Tokyo or the botched rollout of Obamacare — if you think it was bad, someone must have deliberately caused it to be bad. Because, you know, without evil intentions (and secret conspiracies to implement them), the world would be just about perfect all the time and everywhere.
Oh, yes. And anyone who doubts this is a fool, deluded successful by the various secret conspiracies.
someone in a position to set policy would have likely written that down and then that written policy would have been disseminated far and wide to ensure that it was carried out.
McK, I think you are overlooking a phenomena, exemplified by conspiracy theorists (in my experience) but not limited to them. The view seems to be that, while the government is inept (not to mention evil, in most versions) at everything else, it is positively brilliant at keeping secret its various nasty conspiracies. Not that it can keep most other stuff secret successfully, mind. But secret conspiracies are its one true skill.
Once you buy into the view, it is entirely possible to believe that anything bad that happens was intended. Whether it is massive loss of life in Tokyo or the botched rollout of Obamacare — if you think it was bad, someone must have deliberately caused it to be bad. Because, you know, without evil intentions (and secret conspiracies to implement them), the world would be just about perfect all the time and everywhere.
Oh, yes. And anyone who doubts this is a fool, deluded successful by the various secret conspiracies.
I believe there is something to be said that a big factor in the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima was a demonstration to Russia and we had to drop the second to show Russia we had more than one.
This is also historical revisionism and minimally supported, mostly through inference, in the historical record.
Especially when you leave out two of the strongest supporting cavaets in its favor: requirements for military necessity and proportionality. If you’re relying on military expediency and jus ad bellum to take the place of those notions, double effect becomes a despicable fig leaf with nothing to recommend it.
I’m not sure where it is taken as received wisdom that ‘military necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ are the strongest guiding decision drivers in the morality of war-fighting. They strike me as subjective pretexts to second guess the people whose asses were on the line, after the fact and for political reasons. But don’t let that keep you from taking the high moral ground from any who dare disagree with you. Or from imputing to others your own unkind take on their thought processes.
And yet, despite this, you had Iraq’s civilian infrastructure bombed back from a respectable second-world-ish level to that of a broken third-world state.
Sure, and the real reason was, you know, a lust for killing innocent civilians. Good sleuthing. Gulf War I began with bombing Baghdad and that certainly caused considerable civilian casualties. However, Baghdad was also a command and control center, a communications center and a logistics center. Shitty things happen to civilians when their leaders (1) start a fight and (2) locate legitimate military targets in civilian population centers. It’s a huge tragedy, but it is foolishly unwise to increase one’s own casualties and to prolong a conflict to allow Anscombe’s rule to drive tactics and strategy.
All that precision doesn’t make things a bit better if you use it to inflict indirect, plausibly-deniable civilian casualties.
Again, equating outcome with intent, and here, a specifically base intent when alternative theses are available and at least as likely.
I believe there is something to be said that a big factor in the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima was a demonstration to Russia and we had to drop the second to show Russia we had more than one.
This is also historical revisionism and minimally supported, mostly through inference, in the historical record.
Especially when you leave out two of the strongest supporting cavaets in its favor: requirements for military necessity and proportionality. If you’re relying on military expediency and jus ad bellum to take the place of those notions, double effect becomes a despicable fig leaf with nothing to recommend it.
I’m not sure where it is taken as received wisdom that ‘military necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ are the strongest guiding decision drivers in the morality of war-fighting. They strike me as subjective pretexts to second guess the people whose asses were on the line, after the fact and for political reasons. But don’t let that keep you from taking the high moral ground from any who dare disagree with you. Or from imputing to others your own unkind take on their thought processes.
And yet, despite this, you had Iraq’s civilian infrastructure bombed back from a respectable second-world-ish level to that of a broken third-world state.
Sure, and the real reason was, you know, a lust for killing innocent civilians. Good sleuthing. Gulf War I began with bombing Baghdad and that certainly caused considerable civilian casualties. However, Baghdad was also a command and control center, a communications center and a logistics center. Shitty things happen to civilians when their leaders (1) start a fight and (2) locate legitimate military targets in civilian population centers. It’s a huge tragedy, but it is foolishly unwise to increase one’s own casualties and to prolong a conflict to allow Anscombe’s rule to drive tactics and strategy.
All that precision doesn’t make things a bit better if you use it to inflict indirect, plausibly-deniable civilian casualties.
Again, equating outcome with intent, and here, a specifically base intent when alternative theses are available and at least as likely.
Also, what Donald Johnson said. Your points 4 & 5 point right back to the point of view that lead to my (confusing?) blanket attempt to sum up the consequences of what you’ve been saying:
[Explicit scope/anaphoric resolution added.]
I’d agree with DJ that your statements pretty much are going to take you to places you don’t wanna go unless we assume some fairly specific enthymemes.
Also, what Donald Johnson said. Your points 4 & 5 point right back to the point of view that lead to my (confusing?) blanket attempt to sum up the consequences of what you’ve been saying:
[Explicit scope/anaphoric resolution added.]
I’d agree with DJ that your statements pretty much are going to take you to places you don’t wanna go unless we assume some fairly specific enthymemes.
I’m not sure where it is taken as received wisdom that ‘military necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ are the strongest guiding decision drivers in the morality of war-fighting. They strike me as subjective pretexts to second guess the people whose asses were on the line, after the fact and for political reasons. But don’t let that keep you from taking the high moral ground from any who dare disagree with you. Or from imputing to others your own unkind take on their thought processes.
Traditional just war theory is pretty damned clear those are overriding principles, but in particular when attempting to generate subjective post hoc justifications grounded in double effect, they’re pretty well regarded as being critical. They also come up an awful damned lot in modern law of war, if you’d trouble yourself to consider it. I dunno. It might be relevant here. What do you think?
What actually tends to be debated is what precisely comprises proportionality and necessity. But your implication that these are notions that I’ve arbitrarily decided are important is not exactly credible, and it would behoove you to provide some basis for your assertion that they’re irrelevant, given their widespread use as primary factors for considering the lawfulness/morality of acts of war in both LoW and ethics.
I’m not sure where it is taken as received wisdom that ‘military necessity’ and ‘proportionality’ are the strongest guiding decision drivers in the morality of war-fighting. They strike me as subjective pretexts to second guess the people whose asses were on the line, after the fact and for political reasons. But don’t let that keep you from taking the high moral ground from any who dare disagree with you. Or from imputing to others your own unkind take on their thought processes.
Traditional just war theory is pretty damned clear those are overriding principles, but in particular when attempting to generate subjective post hoc justifications grounded in double effect, they’re pretty well regarded as being critical. They also come up an awful damned lot in modern law of war, if you’d trouble yourself to consider it. I dunno. It might be relevant here. What do you think?
What actually tends to be debated is what precisely comprises proportionality and necessity. But your implication that these are notions that I’ve arbitrarily decided are important is not exactly credible, and it would behoove you to provide some basis for your assertion that they’re irrelevant, given their widespread use as primary factors for considering the lawfulness/morality of acts of war in both LoW and ethics.
I never said that the object of the bombing campaigns was to wipe out the entire country–the object was to kill enough people and do enough damage to the civilian infrastructure that morale would collapse. This isn’t exactly news.
And where is that a stated policy of the air war? I’ve done my share of reading on this topic, and I’ve never come across anything like that. Whether the city was Hamburg or Tokyo, there were militarily valuable targets, which is not the same as targeting civilians and their infrastructure. The issue with Dresden, IIRC, is that there were no militarily significant targets. I do not deny that civilians, hundreds of thousands, were killed incidental to saturation bombing attacks. Are you saying it was established Allied policy to bomb civilians without regard to militarily legitimate targets for the purpose of breaking civilian morale? I’ll need a cite to an original document, not an historians inferences.
You probably mean the wriggle room there at the end to enable you to justify Western killing of civilians, but I think others can and will apply it in ways you don’t like.
Actually, I intend it as a one-size-fits-all rule and I would expect to be held to it. There is a huge element of subjectivity in all of this, and I as much as most people am fully aware that pretty much any principle can be argued in pretty much anyway someone chooses.
I’m normally relatively circumspect with my tone, but… I’m sorry, McK. This is absolute bulls#|t. Hard and fast black and white laws of war and rules of engagement – particularly in terms of targeting civilians – are absolutely practical and moral today. And I’m not saying this as someone who never put skin in the game, or faced potential consequences for said rules. I’m saying this as someone who deployed to Afghanistan as Army JAG Corps personnel assigned to an Infantry unit. You are completely and utterly full of s#|t, and suffering from the precise sense of misleading abstraction you’re decrying in those who disagree with you.
Good for you for being in the JAG corp. You’re a lawyer, so am I. You aren’t the first to mount the moral high horse, nor the first to move the goal post or to change the context of the discussion. You are, I infer purposefully, but am willing to be corrected, misstating my position.
First, I think you are saying “we have hard and fast rules, but these can be overridden by military necessity”. Which is another way of saying “we have hard and fast rules, sort of.”
Second, I think you are referring to ground combat rules of engagement, not general war-fighting limitations of the specific kind I was criticizing. There is no military value in, for example, raping civilians. Or shooting them in back while they flee. Or burning their homes whether they are inside or not. Hard and fast rules, fine, I get that. That is how I would write the rules. But that isn’t even remotely what was under discussion.
The issue is civilian collateral damage when legitimate military targets are being bombed, specifically under the limitations extant in WWII and Korea.
In that context, there is no military value in a hard and fast rule that says “no military operation can be justified if innocent civilians will be killed”, which was Anscombe’s point that I was addressing, if you have followed this thread with any degree of detail. And, such a rule is actually immoral, depending on context.
Anscombe created her logic to argue that Hiroshima and Nagasaki could never be justified because of the attendant civilian deaths. I think she was conveniently late in her moral grousing, wrong and dangerous in her thinking.
I never said that the object of the bombing campaigns was to wipe out the entire country–the object was to kill enough people and do enough damage to the civilian infrastructure that morale would collapse. This isn’t exactly news.
And where is that a stated policy of the air war? I’ve done my share of reading on this topic, and I’ve never come across anything like that. Whether the city was Hamburg or Tokyo, there were militarily valuable targets, which is not the same as targeting civilians and their infrastructure. The issue with Dresden, IIRC, is that there were no militarily significant targets. I do not deny that civilians, hundreds of thousands, were killed incidental to saturation bombing attacks. Are you saying it was established Allied policy to bomb civilians without regard to militarily legitimate targets for the purpose of breaking civilian morale? I’ll need a cite to an original document, not an historians inferences.
You probably mean the wriggle room there at the end to enable you to justify Western killing of civilians, but I think others can and will apply it in ways you don’t like.
Actually, I intend it as a one-size-fits-all rule and I would expect to be held to it. There is a huge element of subjectivity in all of this, and I as much as most people am fully aware that pretty much any principle can be argued in pretty much anyway someone chooses.
I’m normally relatively circumspect with my tone, but… I’m sorry, McK. This is absolute bulls#|t. Hard and fast black and white laws of war and rules of engagement – particularly in terms of targeting civilians – are absolutely practical and moral today. And I’m not saying this as someone who never put skin in the game, or faced potential consequences for said rules. I’m saying this as someone who deployed to Afghanistan as Army JAG Corps personnel assigned to an Infantry unit. You are completely and utterly full of s#|t, and suffering from the precise sense of misleading abstraction you’re decrying in those who disagree with you.
Good for you for being in the JAG corp. You’re a lawyer, so am I. You aren’t the first to mount the moral high horse, nor the first to move the goal post or to change the context of the discussion. You are, I infer purposefully, but am willing to be corrected, misstating my position.
First, I think you are saying “we have hard and fast rules, but these can be overridden by military necessity”. Which is another way of saying “we have hard and fast rules, sort of.”
Second, I think you are referring to ground combat rules of engagement, not general war-fighting limitations of the specific kind I was criticizing. There is no military value in, for example, raping civilians. Or shooting them in back while they flee. Or burning their homes whether they are inside or not. Hard and fast rules, fine, I get that. That is how I would write the rules. But that isn’t even remotely what was under discussion.
The issue is civilian collateral damage when legitimate military targets are being bombed, specifically under the limitations extant in WWII and Korea.
In that context, there is no military value in a hard and fast rule that says “no military operation can be justified if innocent civilians will be killed”, which was Anscombe’s point that I was addressing, if you have followed this thread with any degree of detail. And, such a rule is actually immoral, depending on context.
Anscombe created her logic to argue that Hiroshima and Nagasaki could never be justified because of the attendant civilian deaths. I think she was conveniently late in her moral grousing, wrong and dangerous in her thinking.
you’re suggesting that [it’s foolish and amoral to [regard [warfare tactics which result in civilian casualties, intended or otherwise,](1) as immoral] when avoiding them(1) would make victory difficult or impossible]
Let me try this: It is foolish and amoral to disavow tactics and strategies that assume but do not intend civilian casualties particularly when those tactics or strategies have the intent of shortening the duration and intensity of the fighting (which should be the intent anyway).
Traditional just war theory is pretty damned clear those are overriding principles, but in particular when attempting to generate subjective post hoc justifications grounded in double effect, they’re pretty well regarded as being critical. They also come up an awful damned lot in modern law of war, if you’d trouble yourself to consider it. I dunno. It might be relevant here. What do you think?
Sure, in the context of after the fact judging whether somebody went to far in burning down a village.
If I was talking about rules of engagement at the company and platoon level, I’d agree with you. If we were talking about artillery taking out the wrong village, I agree someone needs to account for why the intelligence was so bad or why someone fired without adequate intelligence.
My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.
you’re suggesting that [it’s foolish and amoral to [regard [warfare tactics which result in civilian casualties, intended or otherwise,](1) as immoral] when avoiding them(1) would make victory difficult or impossible]
Let me try this: It is foolish and amoral to disavow tactics and strategies that assume but do not intend civilian casualties particularly when those tactics or strategies have the intent of shortening the duration and intensity of the fighting (which should be the intent anyway).
Traditional just war theory is pretty damned clear those are overriding principles, but in particular when attempting to generate subjective post hoc justifications grounded in double effect, they’re pretty well regarded as being critical. They also come up an awful damned lot in modern law of war, if you’d trouble yourself to consider it. I dunno. It might be relevant here. What do you think?
Sure, in the context of after the fact judging whether somebody went to far in burning down a village.
If I was talking about rules of engagement at the company and platoon level, I’d agree with you. If we were talking about artillery taking out the wrong village, I agree someone needs to account for why the intelligence was so bad or why someone fired without adequate intelligence.
My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.
You’re a lawyer, so am I.
In the interest of transparency, no. I served as a paralegal. So yes, I fall into the wretched and treacherous class of semi-SME. However, by all appearances, this does not in any way, shape, or form mean I have less familiarity with military law than you. It just means IANAL, whereas YAALWOYAOE (You Are A Lawyer Well Outside Your Area Of Expertise).
You are, I infer purposefully, but am willing to be corrected, misstating my position
Your position has been far less clearly and unambiguously stated than you appear to believe it has. You have tightened it up considerably since I wrote the above, though.
First, I think you are saying “we have hard and fast rules, but these can be overridden by military necessity”. Which is another way of saying “we have hard and fast rules, sort of.”
“We have hard-and-fast rules, but the people on the ground are not so disciplined that they’ll never break them. When they do, there will be consequences, with possible mitigation based on circumstances.”
I’d argue there’s far too much mitigation, and far too weak consequences, but that’s me.
Second, I think you are referring to ground combat rules of engagement, not general war-fighting limitations of the specific kind I was criticizing.
No. This applies to artillery/aerial bombardment and air strikes as well. I obviously have less familiarity with operational strictures/RoE in those areas, but they are broadly addressed in the laws of war, and in findings derived therefrom. Proportionality and military necessity are considerations.
In that context, there is no military value in a hard and fast rule that says “no military operation can be justified if innocent civilians will be killed”, which was Anscombe’s point that I was addressing, if you have followed this thread with any degree of detail.
Again, it’s far from clear this was what’s being discussed. This has looked an awful lot more like a discussion of whether targeting civilians is legitimate. Not whether civilian collateral damage illegitimatizes an attack, but whether attacks explicitly targeting civilians to advance strategic-level objectives is justifiable. We’ve not been discussing whether Pearl Harbor was bad because 50-80 civilians died; we’ve been discussing whether dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – or firebombing Tokyo – IOT pressure the signing of an unconditional surrender and forestall invasion were legitimate.
Sure, in the context of after the fact judging whether somebody went to far in burning down a village.
No. In well-before-the-fact crafting of laws of war addressing whether e.g. aerial/artillery bombardment is lawful. And in shortly-before-the-fact legal reviews determining if a particular operation is lawful. So yeah, no. Proportionality and military necessity are considered in such matters – before the fact – at a higher (strategic) level, before being considered again in greater detail at a lower (operational) level. I’d say that I’d be much happier were the meanings of those terms construed more tightly than they are, but they are used as deciding factors and not merely justifying ones.
Look. I get that you don’t have any experience with the details of how legal matters work in modern war, but there are lawyers embedded all through the chain of command doing legal reviews of operations. You want to sit back and bloviate from your moral high horse about how unrealistic it is to consider civilian casualties when making strategic or operational war plans, fine. That’s not how it actually works. These things are considered. Not necessarily as much as I’d like, but by the sounds of it discernibly more than you think is necessary, or possibly even appropriate.
My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.
It might be worth your while to look into international law of war – which you had best believe informs how the DoD operates, though again, I’d prefer they tightened their interpretations rather a lot – before making broad, blanket statements like this. Proportionality and necessity are cited in limiting how targets of bombardment can be selected. There are black-and-white rules about this. The devil is in how these concepts are interpreted, and how anyone can hold the winners of a war to account for those interpretations if they won’t do it themselves.
You’re a lawyer, so am I.
In the interest of transparency, no. I served as a paralegal. So yes, I fall into the wretched and treacherous class of semi-SME. However, by all appearances, this does not in any way, shape, or form mean I have less familiarity with military law than you. It just means IANAL, whereas YAALWOYAOE (You Are A Lawyer Well Outside Your Area Of Expertise).
You are, I infer purposefully, but am willing to be corrected, misstating my position
Your position has been far less clearly and unambiguously stated than you appear to believe it has. You have tightened it up considerably since I wrote the above, though.
First, I think you are saying “we have hard and fast rules, but these can be overridden by military necessity”. Which is another way of saying “we have hard and fast rules, sort of.”
“We have hard-and-fast rules, but the people on the ground are not so disciplined that they’ll never break them. When they do, there will be consequences, with possible mitigation based on circumstances.”
I’d argue there’s far too much mitigation, and far too weak consequences, but that’s me.
Second, I think you are referring to ground combat rules of engagement, not general war-fighting limitations of the specific kind I was criticizing.
No. This applies to artillery/aerial bombardment and air strikes as well. I obviously have less familiarity with operational strictures/RoE in those areas, but they are broadly addressed in the laws of war, and in findings derived therefrom. Proportionality and military necessity are considerations.
In that context, there is no military value in a hard and fast rule that says “no military operation can be justified if innocent civilians will be killed”, which was Anscombe’s point that I was addressing, if you have followed this thread with any degree of detail.
Again, it’s far from clear this was what’s being discussed. This has looked an awful lot more like a discussion of whether targeting civilians is legitimate. Not whether civilian collateral damage illegitimatizes an attack, but whether attacks explicitly targeting civilians to advance strategic-level objectives is justifiable. We’ve not been discussing whether Pearl Harbor was bad because 50-80 civilians died; we’ve been discussing whether dropping bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – or firebombing Tokyo – IOT pressure the signing of an unconditional surrender and forestall invasion were legitimate.
Sure, in the context of after the fact judging whether somebody went to far in burning down a village.
No. In well-before-the-fact crafting of laws of war addressing whether e.g. aerial/artillery bombardment is lawful. And in shortly-before-the-fact legal reviews determining if a particular operation is lawful. So yeah, no. Proportionality and military necessity are considered in such matters – before the fact – at a higher (strategic) level, before being considered again in greater detail at a lower (operational) level. I’d say that I’d be much happier were the meanings of those terms construed more tightly than they are, but they are used as deciding factors and not merely justifying ones.
Look. I get that you don’t have any experience with the details of how legal matters work in modern war, but there are lawyers embedded all through the chain of command doing legal reviews of operations. You want to sit back and bloviate from your moral high horse about how unrealistic it is to consider civilian casualties when making strategic or operational war plans, fine. That’s not how it actually works. These things are considered. Not necessarily as much as I’d like, but by the sounds of it discernibly more than you think is necessary, or possibly even appropriate.
My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.
It might be worth your while to look into international law of war – which you had best believe informs how the DoD operates, though again, I’d prefer they tightened their interpretations rather a lot – before making broad, blanket statements like this. Proportionality and necessity are cited in limiting how targets of bombardment can be selected. There are black-and-white rules about this. The devil is in how these concepts are interpreted, and how anyone can hold the winners of a war to account for those interpretations if they won’t do it themselves.
“This is also historical revisionism and minimally supported”
I am merely a opinionated carpenter and make no pretense to be a historian but I am certain impressing Stalin was a consideration. No way to know how much of a factor it was in the decision to drop the bomb.
The ungodly awesomeness of it has been a factor in not using them since.
What I am curious to understand is the Japanese total pacification to every last man, and if some cultural sense of honor factors in?
Why no diehards?
From recent experience it seems improbable.
“This is also historical revisionism and minimally supported”
I am merely a opinionated carpenter and make no pretense to be a historian but I am certain impressing Stalin was a consideration. No way to know how much of a factor it was in the decision to drop the bomb.
The ungodly awesomeness of it has been a factor in not using them since.
What I am curious to understand is the Japanese total pacification to every last man, and if some cultural sense of honor factors in?
Why no diehards?
From recent experience it seems improbable.
“I think she was conveniently late in her moral grousing ….”
Such is the plight of a philosopher (and historians) living in linear time.
I don’t expect Truman rang Anscombe up before Hiroshima and Nagasaki to give her a shot at stopping the bombing beforehand.
She probably had to think about it awhile after hearing the news on the wireless and then collect her thoughts, as philosophers do.
Anscombe’s ethics, if I understand correctly, were deeply informed by her Catholic faith.
In fact, the use of the word “progressive”, he sniffed, here to include Anscombe and everyone else who questions/second guesses the degree of intent in wartime civilian casualties would probably cause Abscombe to forswear her ethics and begin a pogrom against those civilians who call her a “progressive”, to wit (from Wikipedia):
“She scandalised liberal colleagues with articles defending the Roman Catholic Church’s opposition to contraception in the 1960s and early 1970s. Later in life, she was arrested twice while protesting outside an abortion clinic in Britain, after abortion had been legalised (albeit with restrictions).”
War, it is said, is hell, and I can’t get around believing that Truman and the military were correct that strategic use of the atomic bomb would and did avoid much greater human carnage by other means, and you may factor in that my Dad would probably have been involved somehow in an invasion of Japan after nearly four years in New Guinea (Army Corps of Engineers, so probably mop up and cleanup after the invasion).
Still, there is something about the tone of word “progressive” used here that reminds me of this conversation from “A Hard Days Night”, in which Ringo has the relevant punchline for McTX, his derby stowed and casting his eyes about at what has became of the England he fought for:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h0WP8zGCqNs
Also, regarding the bombing of Dresden, there may well have been intent to damage civilian populations. Strategic intent perhaps, but intent nonetheless:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Dresden_in_World_War_II
Relevant passage:
“On 31 January, Bottomley sent a message to Portal saying a heavy attack on Dresden and other cities “will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts”.[22] British historian Frederick Taylor mentions a further memo sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by Sir Douglas Evill on 1 February, in which Evill states interfering with mass civilian movements was a major, even key, factor in the decision to bomb the city center. Attacks there, where main rail junctions, telephone systems, city administration, and utilities were located, would result in chaos. Britain had learned this after the Coventry Blitz, when loss of this crucial infrastructure had longer-lasting effects than attacks on war plants.”
Naturally, as in a movie, it had to be “Sir Evill” who raised the subject. No doubt the “progressive” on the joint staff who pooh-poohed bombing Dresden was one Colonel Percy Killjoy.
We “progressives” do an awful lot of second guessing, it’s true, but mostly in response to, say, the nearly universal sentiment among “conservative realists” that, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan and Iran and whomever else might be in the way in recent years should be “turned into glass”, which I imagine would not have so good for civilians.
The intent of most of my fine conservative friends and even some moderate to liberal ones after 9/11 was to kill every f*cking towelhead that moved and I’m pretty sure I could pop over to a comment section at Redstate right this minute on any Middle Eastern subject and find the same sentiment.
I imagine the attitude and intent of our civilian population in 1945 was much the same toward the Japs, the Nips, the Slant-eyes, perhaps for good reason, but still intent, if they’d had their way.
The intent of some American soldiers and military policy in Vietnam, even against the South Vietnamese civilian population, our supposed allies, you know, the gooks, is well-documented.
I am just relieved and feel somewhat off the hook, as a Progressive, and after the fact, that we didn’t give everyone smallpox on purpose.
McKT wrote:
“My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.”
What of poison gas and germ warfare? Aren’t we party to reams of treaties which forswear quite a few tactics and strategy?
By the way, I’m quite certain that were aliens from outer space to invade the United States and attempt to bring us a higher culture and civilization, a better way of life, a more pristine form of democracy, and better-tasting fast food and enlightenment by high-minded force that all of us here would fight dirty against the invasion, fashioning IEDs, crude nuclear devices, and homemade poisons, not to mention the AR-15s all of us own, to thwart the aggressor, regardless of their good intentions, because this is home sweet home.
No tactics would be forsworn, no international wartime conventions obeyed.
They’d be forced to retreat into orbit and death-ray us from space because we didn’t say thank you instead.
So there is that.
“I think she was conveniently late in her moral grousing ….”
Such is the plight of a philosopher (and historians) living in linear time.
I don’t expect Truman rang Anscombe up before Hiroshima and Nagasaki to give her a shot at stopping the bombing beforehand.
She probably had to think about it awhile after hearing the news on the wireless and then collect her thoughts, as philosophers do.
Anscombe’s ethics, if I understand correctly, were deeply informed by her Catholic faith.
In fact, the use of the word “progressive”, he sniffed, here to include Anscombe and everyone else who questions/second guesses the degree of intent in wartime civilian casualties would probably cause Abscombe to forswear her ethics and begin a pogrom against those civilians who call her a “progressive”, to wit (from Wikipedia):
“She scandalised liberal colleagues with articles defending the Roman Catholic Church’s opposition to contraception in the 1960s and early 1970s. Later in life, she was arrested twice while protesting outside an abortion clinic in Britain, after abortion had been legalised (albeit with restrictions).”
War, it is said, is hell, and I can’t get around believing that Truman and the military were correct that strategic use of the atomic bomb would and did avoid much greater human carnage by other means, and you may factor in that my Dad would probably have been involved somehow in an invasion of Japan after nearly four years in New Guinea (Army Corps of Engineers, so probably mop up and cleanup after the invasion).
Still, there is something about the tone of word “progressive” used here that reminds me of this conversation from “A Hard Days Night”, in which Ringo has the relevant punchline for McTX, his derby stowed and casting his eyes about at what has became of the England he fought for:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h0WP8zGCqNs
Also, regarding the bombing of Dresden, there may well have been intent to damage civilian populations. Strategic intent perhaps, but intent nonetheless:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Dresden_in_World_War_II
Relevant passage:
“On 31 January, Bottomley sent a message to Portal saying a heavy attack on Dresden and other cities “will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts”.[22] British historian Frederick Taylor mentions a further memo sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by Sir Douglas Evill on 1 February, in which Evill states interfering with mass civilian movements was a major, even key, factor in the decision to bomb the city center. Attacks there, where main rail junctions, telephone systems, city administration, and utilities were located, would result in chaos. Britain had learned this after the Coventry Blitz, when loss of this crucial infrastructure had longer-lasting effects than attacks on war plants.”
Naturally, as in a movie, it had to be “Sir Evill” who raised the subject. No doubt the “progressive” on the joint staff who pooh-poohed bombing Dresden was one Colonel Percy Killjoy.
We “progressives” do an awful lot of second guessing, it’s true, but mostly in response to, say, the nearly universal sentiment among “conservative realists” that, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan and Iran and whomever else might be in the way in recent years should be “turned into glass”, which I imagine would not have so good for civilians.
The intent of most of my fine conservative friends and even some moderate to liberal ones after 9/11 was to kill every f*cking towelhead that moved and I’m pretty sure I could pop over to a comment section at Redstate right this minute on any Middle Eastern subject and find the same sentiment.
I imagine the attitude and intent of our civilian population in 1945 was much the same toward the Japs, the Nips, the Slant-eyes, perhaps for good reason, but still intent, if they’d had their way.
The intent of some American soldiers and military policy in Vietnam, even against the South Vietnamese civilian population, our supposed allies, you know, the gooks, is well-documented.
I am just relieved and feel somewhat off the hook, as a Progressive, and after the fact, that we didn’t give everyone smallpox on purpose.
McKT wrote:
“My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.”
What of poison gas and germ warfare? Aren’t we party to reams of treaties which forswear quite a few tactics and strategy?
By the way, I’m quite certain that were aliens from outer space to invade the United States and attempt to bring us a higher culture and civilization, a better way of life, a more pristine form of democracy, and better-tasting fast food and enlightenment by high-minded force that all of us here would fight dirty against the invasion, fashioning IEDs, crude nuclear devices, and homemade poisons, not to mention the AR-15s all of us own, to thwart the aggressor, regardless of their good intentions, because this is home sweet home.
No tactics would be forsworn, no international wartime conventions obeyed.
They’d be forced to retreat into orbit and death-ray us from space because we didn’t say thank you instead.
So there is that.
and you may factor in that my Dad would probably have been involved somehow in an invasion of Japan after nearly four years in New Guinea (Army Corps of Engineers, so probably mop up and cleanup after the invasion).
Want to hear more about this, actually. The fact is that just as there is a generation gap among those (babyboomers) who were born 1946-1951, and those who were born 1952-1956, and thereafter, it really matters what the parents were doing as to what the kids think.
Parents who were in the thick of things had kids who know that the moral “issues” were live or die. I don’t blame them a bit. What I take from that for the future is different, because they, the participants, created the UN. Something that was meant to prevent those horrible “issues” for the future.
and you may factor in that my Dad would probably have been involved somehow in an invasion of Japan after nearly four years in New Guinea (Army Corps of Engineers, so probably mop up and cleanup after the invasion).
Want to hear more about this, actually. The fact is that just as there is a generation gap among those (babyboomers) who were born 1946-1951, and those who were born 1952-1956, and thereafter, it really matters what the parents were doing as to what the kids think.
Parents who were in the thick of things had kids who know that the moral “issues” were live or die. I don’t blame them a bit. What I take from that for the future is different, because they, the participants, created the UN. Something that was meant to prevent those horrible “issues” for the future.
Not only the UN, but the post-war Marshall Plan in Europe and the MacArthur occupation of Japan which sought to rebuild, despite their attendant drawbacks, rather than exact punitive economic tolls as was done to Germany by France, England and to some extent the United States following World War I, which led in part to the cult of victimization which Hitler exploited.
Yes, learning occurred.
You might call it progress. By Progressive thinkers. Realistic Progressive thinkers. Even Conservative Progressive Realistic thinkers, back before Frank Luntz and company shat on the language.
Not only the UN, but the post-war Marshall Plan in Europe and the MacArthur occupation of Japan which sought to rebuild, despite their attendant drawbacks, rather than exact punitive economic tolls as was done to Germany by France, England and to some extent the United States following World War I, which led in part to the cult of victimization which Hitler exploited.
Yes, learning occurred.
You might call it progress. By Progressive thinkers. Realistic Progressive thinkers. Even Conservative Progressive Realistic thinkers, back before Frank Luntz and company shat on the language.
I imagine the attitude and intent of our civilian population in 1945 was much the same toward the Japs
apparently US servicepeople would occasionally send Japanese body parts home to family members as some kind of souvenir.
it seems to me that the bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki were horrifying acts of mass brutality against civilian populations, and were also the best available option, in the sense of least loss of life overall and quickest way to bring the war to an end.
it seems to me that that kind of brutal calculus is inherent to waging war. war is f****d up. war, and WWII specifically if I’m not mistaken, is where the expression FUBAR comes from in the first place.
it also seems to me that if you find yourself in a war, it’s pretty important to win. that imperative often forces moral choices that are, in fact, abhorrent.
i wish that folks, rather than look back in judgement on decisions that other folks made in circumstances that we would be kind of hard pressed to imagine, would instead let the history and memory of what war actually is inform the choices they make now.
we haven’t really fought anything like an existential war since WWII. maybe the cold war, which was more of a combination of chess game and russian roulette, but not a real shooting war.
i think that has allowed us to forget, or ignore, that all wars are existential to somebody.
I imagine the attitude and intent of our civilian population in 1945 was much the same toward the Japs
apparently US servicepeople would occasionally send Japanese body parts home to family members as some kind of souvenir.
it seems to me that the bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki were horrifying acts of mass brutality against civilian populations, and were also the best available option, in the sense of least loss of life overall and quickest way to bring the war to an end.
it seems to me that that kind of brutal calculus is inherent to waging war. war is f****d up. war, and WWII specifically if I’m not mistaken, is where the expression FUBAR comes from in the first place.
it also seems to me that if you find yourself in a war, it’s pretty important to win. that imperative often forces moral choices that are, in fact, abhorrent.
i wish that folks, rather than look back in judgement on decisions that other folks made in circumstances that we would be kind of hard pressed to imagine, would instead let the history and memory of what war actually is inform the choices they make now.
we haven’t really fought anything like an existential war since WWII. maybe the cold war, which was more of a combination of chess game and russian roulette, but not a real shooting war.
i think that has allowed us to forget, or ignore, that all wars are existential to somebody.
Maybe this is a tangent or maybe most of this discussion is really a case of fundamental attribution error gone wild but the following by McKinneyTexas left me gobsmacked:
“Similarly, there is a distinction between bombing Hanoi Harbor during a time of open hostilities and flying commercial airliners into office buildings for no apparent reason.”
Do you really think that those 19 men killed themselves, and a few thousand other people, on a lark, without a reason? Whether or not they finally resort to murder, I find people caught up in any kind of fundamentalist fervor hard to understand, but I think it’s a mistake not to recognize that they tend to have clear reasons that to them are very powerful. Osama/Al Qaeda’s whole shtick is that “The West”, and the US in particular, is an existential threat to Islam. That’s about as far from “no particular reason” as you can get as humans have historically judged things.
Maybe this is a tangent or maybe most of this discussion is really a case of fundamental attribution error gone wild but the following by McKinneyTexas left me gobsmacked:
“Similarly, there is a distinction between bombing Hanoi Harbor during a time of open hostilities and flying commercial airliners into office buildings for no apparent reason.”
Do you really think that those 19 men killed themselves, and a few thousand other people, on a lark, without a reason? Whether or not they finally resort to murder, I find people caught up in any kind of fundamentalist fervor hard to understand, but I think it’s a mistake not to recognize that they tend to have clear reasons that to them are very powerful. Osama/Al Qaeda’s whole shtick is that “The West”, and the US in particular, is an existential threat to Islam. That’s about as far from “no particular reason” as you can get as humans have historically judged things.
“My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.”
Well so. The ends do justify (certain classes of) the means. Thanks for clearing that up.
“My whole thesis addresses foreswearing, prior to hostilities, certain classes of tactic and strategy–a completely different topic.”
Well so. The ends do justify (certain classes of) the means. Thanks for clearing that up.
“i think that has allowed us to forget, or ignore, that all wars are existential to somebody.”
And it is very crucial for us to remember that.
“i think that has allowed us to forget, or ignore, that all wars are existential to somebody.”
And it is very crucial for us to remember that.
“Whether it is massive loss of life in Tokyo or the botched rollout of Obamacare — if you think it was bad, someone must have deliberately caused it to be bad.”
That’s one of the weirdest comparisons I’ve ever seen. I’m not sure what particular sort of crackpot thinks the botched rollout of Obamacare was a conspiracy–not sure who was supposed to benefit, but I guess if one thought long enough one could come up with something. But we’re supposed to think that when people drop thousands of tons of incendiaries on Tokyo that killing 100,000 people was just some incidental side effect–collateral damage. The term has absolutely no meaning at all if we accept this sort of reasoning. It does let me know just how far some Westerners will go. I sometimes wonder why I hang out at some far left blogs, since some of the people there can be a little whacked, but then I see what good mainstream Americans think and it comes back.
As for generational thinking, which sapient brought up, my father and uncle were stationed in the Pacific and both were overjoyed by the bombing. I don’t blame them in the slightest. I’d have felt the same I’m sure. And my father was never personally offended by the revisionist thesis. He avidly read books about WWII from both perspectives–I was first introduced to the whole topic when he let me read a Japanese account (translated, of course) on the Battle of Midway and then later John Toland’s “The Rising Sun”. Not everyone goes into these discussions with the thought that because my life experience was X, I must think Y. Of course, some do, which is why so many people can come to the conclusion that when Those People kill civilians it’s because they’re evil, whereas when we burn a city to the ground with incendiaries only a conspiracy theorist would assume that part of the point was to kill people and lower morale among the survivors.
And speaking of that, wasn’t that part of the whole theory of strategic bombing? I’ve always read that. The wikipedia article starts out saying that lowering morale is part of the reason for it–
strategic bombing
Oh, and look at the Churchill quote. — The controversy stirred up by the Cowan news report reached the highest levels of the British Government when on 28 March 1945 the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, sent a memo by telegram to General Ismay for the British Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff in which he started with the sentence “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed….”[13][14] Under pressure from the Chiefs of Staff and in response to the views expressed by Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal, and the head of Bomber Command, Arthur “Bomber” Harris, among others, Churchill withdrew his memo and issued a new one.[14] This was completed on 1 April 1945 and started instead with the usual British euphemism for attacks on cities: “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of the so called ‘area-bombing’ of German cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our own interests….”.[15]–
“Whether it is massive loss of life in Tokyo or the botched rollout of Obamacare — if you think it was bad, someone must have deliberately caused it to be bad.”
That’s one of the weirdest comparisons I’ve ever seen. I’m not sure what particular sort of crackpot thinks the botched rollout of Obamacare was a conspiracy–not sure who was supposed to benefit, but I guess if one thought long enough one could come up with something. But we’re supposed to think that when people drop thousands of tons of incendiaries on Tokyo that killing 100,000 people was just some incidental side effect–collateral damage. The term has absolutely no meaning at all if we accept this sort of reasoning. It does let me know just how far some Westerners will go. I sometimes wonder why I hang out at some far left blogs, since some of the people there can be a little whacked, but then I see what good mainstream Americans think and it comes back.
As for generational thinking, which sapient brought up, my father and uncle were stationed in the Pacific and both were overjoyed by the bombing. I don’t blame them in the slightest. I’d have felt the same I’m sure. And my father was never personally offended by the revisionist thesis. He avidly read books about WWII from both perspectives–I was first introduced to the whole topic when he let me read a Japanese account (translated, of course) on the Battle of Midway and then later John Toland’s “The Rising Sun”. Not everyone goes into these discussions with the thought that because my life experience was X, I must think Y. Of course, some do, which is why so many people can come to the conclusion that when Those People kill civilians it’s because they’re evil, whereas when we burn a city to the ground with incendiaries only a conspiracy theorist would assume that part of the point was to kill people and lower morale among the survivors.
And speaking of that, wasn’t that part of the whole theory of strategic bombing? I’ve always read that. The wikipedia article starts out saying that lowering morale is part of the reason for it–
strategic bombing
Oh, and look at the Churchill quote. — The controversy stirred up by the Cowan news report reached the highest levels of the British Government when on 28 March 1945 the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, sent a memo by telegram to General Ismay for the British Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff in which he started with the sentence “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed….”[13][14] Under pressure from the Chiefs of Staff and in response to the views expressed by Chief of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal, and the head of Bomber Command, Arthur “Bomber” Harris, among others, Churchill withdrew his memo and issued a new one.[14] This was completed on 1 April 1945 and started instead with the usual British euphemism for attacks on cities: “It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of the so called ‘area-bombing’ of German cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our own interests….”.[15]–
It is amazing the number of people who, with no experience (and apparently no historical knowledge) second guess the use of the atomic bombs.
Really? This is an utterly fantastical statement. Perhaps all historical scholarship should cease forthwith…after all, what more can possibly be learned beyond the certitude of your prejudices?
As for the push-back against the ‘revisionist’ narrative surrounding the deployment of the A-bombs, the case is far from closed, the controversy lingers. For those of you interested in a brief synopsis of the dispute: http://www.uky.edu/Centers/Asia/SECAAS/Seras/2009/25_Yagami_2009.pdf
It is amazing the number of people who, with no experience (and apparently no historical knowledge) second guess the use of the atomic bombs.
Really? This is an utterly fantastical statement. Perhaps all historical scholarship should cease forthwith…after all, what more can possibly be learned beyond the certitude of your prejudices?
As for the push-back against the ‘revisionist’ narrative surrounding the deployment of the A-bombs, the case is far from closed, the controversy lingers. For those of you interested in a brief synopsis of the dispute: http://www.uky.edu/Centers/Asia/SECAAS/Seras/2009/25_Yagami_2009.pdf
I would have said the same about how unlikely it would be for someone to think that the botched Obamacare rollout was the result of a deliberate conspiracy. Then I ran into one. I couldn’t follow the “logic” well enough to reproduce with any reliability. But it seemed to involve making Obamacare fail in order to drive the country into a single-payer model for health care. I think.
I would have said the same about how unlikely it would be for someone to think that the botched Obamacare rollout was the result of a deliberate conspiracy. Then I ran into one. I couldn’t follow the “logic” well enough to reproduce with any reliability. But it seemed to involve making Obamacare fail in order to drive the country into a single-payer model for health care. I think.
Chuck Yeager said in his autobiography that there was one mission where he was ordered to strafe civilians during WWII. I remember seeing that while looking at the book in a grocery store many years ago, and it stuck in my mind but I didn’t buy it. But through the miracle of wikipedia, here’s part of the quote from the wiki Yeager biography–
“In his 1986 memoirs, Yeager recalled with disgust that “atrocities were committed by both sides” and went on to recount going on a mission with orders from the Eighth Air Force to “strafe anything that moved.”[8][9] During the mission briefing, he whispered to Major Donald H. Boschkay, “If we are going to do things like this, we sure as hell better make sure we are on the winning side.”[8][9] Yeager further noted, “I’m certainly not proud of that particular strafing mission against civilians. But it is there, on the record and in my memory.”
Chuck Yeager said in his autobiography that there was one mission where he was ordered to strafe civilians during WWII. I remember seeing that while looking at the book in a grocery store many years ago, and it stuck in my mind but I didn’t buy it. But through the miracle of wikipedia, here’s part of the quote from the wiki Yeager biography–
“In his 1986 memoirs, Yeager recalled with disgust that “atrocities were committed by both sides” and went on to recount going on a mission with orders from the Eighth Air Force to “strafe anything that moved.”[8][9] During the mission briefing, he whispered to Major Donald H. Boschkay, “If we are going to do things like this, we sure as hell better make sure we are on the winning side.”[8][9] Yeager further noted, “I’m certainly not proud of that particular strafing mission against civilians. But it is there, on the record and in my memory.”
wj way upthread:
“McK, I think you are overlooking a phenomena, exemplified by conspiracy theorists (in my experience) but not limited to them. The view seems to be that, while the government is inept (not to mention evil, in most versions) at everything else, it is positively brilliant at keeping secret its various nasty conspiracies. Not that it can keep most other stuff secret successfully, mind. But secret conspiracies are its one true skill.”
Yet another phenomena is the view that while the government is inept (not to mention evil, in most versions) in all of its endeavors, from issuing drivers licenses to running Medicare (another phenomena is that the government should stay out of my Medicare), it is positively brilliant at running the American war machine and shall not be second-guessed or questioned regarding its performance or intentions at the time it is being positively brilliant nor at any time into the future. The government couldn’t hit the broad side of a barn, say the usual suspects, as they pause the handful of popcorn halfway to their mouths and watch, on CNN, a cruise missile dip thru a window in Baghdad and hit a guy right smack dab in the eye.
Was that a civilian? And what’s with the bridesmaids?
No, you limp-wristed commie, that was a bullseye brought to you from Uncle Sugar hisself!
I’ve heard Obamacare compared to the Ukraine, Pearl Harbor, the Rape of Nanking, and Yankee perfidy at Fort Sumter, but never to the fire-bombing of Tokyo.
But John McCain was just compared to Neville Chamberlain in his home state the other day by our domestic al Qaeda affiliates, so I suppose anything is like anything else.
wj way upthread:
“McK, I think you are overlooking a phenomena, exemplified by conspiracy theorists (in my experience) but not limited to them. The view seems to be that, while the government is inept (not to mention evil, in most versions) at everything else, it is positively brilliant at keeping secret its various nasty conspiracies. Not that it can keep most other stuff secret successfully, mind. But secret conspiracies are its one true skill.”
Yet another phenomena is the view that while the government is inept (not to mention evil, in most versions) in all of its endeavors, from issuing drivers licenses to running Medicare (another phenomena is that the government should stay out of my Medicare), it is positively brilliant at running the American war machine and shall not be second-guessed or questioned regarding its performance or intentions at the time it is being positively brilliant nor at any time into the future. The government couldn’t hit the broad side of a barn, say the usual suspects, as they pause the handful of popcorn halfway to their mouths and watch, on CNN, a cruise missile dip thru a window in Baghdad and hit a guy right smack dab in the eye.
Was that a civilian? And what’s with the bridesmaids?
No, you limp-wristed commie, that was a bullseye brought to you from Uncle Sugar hisself!
I’ve heard Obamacare compared to the Ukraine, Pearl Harbor, the Rape of Nanking, and Yankee perfidy at Fort Sumter, but never to the fire-bombing of Tokyo.
But John McCain was just compared to Neville Chamberlain in his home state the other day by our domestic al Qaeda affiliates, so I suppose anything is like anything else.
McCain seems to have stopped working quite so hard as in the past at keeping moving to the right. With the result that he finds himself moving briskly to the (relative) liberal end of the Republican constellation. Having help to sow the wind, he is now looking at reaping the whirlwind.
McCain seems to have stopped working quite so hard as in the past at keeping moving to the right. With the result that he finds himself moving briskly to the (relative) liberal end of the Republican constellation. Having help to sow the wind, he is now looking at reaping the whirlwind.
Here’s an interview with Conrad Crane, a historian of bombing. This interview is about the firebombing of Japan. There are parts that support McKT’s position, but from my POV are just part of the doublethink that Westerners engage in when they kill civilians and wish to rationalize it. But in LeMay’s defense he did drop warnings. To me that’s not much of a defense.
link
Towards the end Crane goes into the psychology at work–the Japanese boast about how their whole population is a nation of kamikazes and the 5th Air Force issues a directive saying there are no civilians in Japan. So there’s a dynamic where the Japanese govt says everyone is a potential kamikaze and the Air Force gladly agrees. Back home almost nobody is upset by the bombing.
I think I most likely would have felt the same back then. And it’s long past and some of what we’ve done since is much less excusable, so I lost most of my interest in the whole revisionist argument about WWII bombing–there are more pressing things to worry about. It just seems funny how easily some Americans can justify our civilian killing and get so righteous about that of others, when sometimes those others have at least as much excuse to use unsavory tactics as we have.
Here’s an interview with Conrad Crane, a historian of bombing. This interview is about the firebombing of Japan. There are parts that support McKT’s position, but from my POV are just part of the doublethink that Westerners engage in when they kill civilians and wish to rationalize it. But in LeMay’s defense he did drop warnings. To me that’s not much of a defense.
link
Towards the end Crane goes into the psychology at work–the Japanese boast about how their whole population is a nation of kamikazes and the 5th Air Force issues a directive saying there are no civilians in Japan. So there’s a dynamic where the Japanese govt says everyone is a potential kamikaze and the Air Force gladly agrees. Back home almost nobody is upset by the bombing.
I think I most likely would have felt the same back then. And it’s long past and some of what we’ve done since is much less excusable, so I lost most of my interest in the whole revisionist argument about WWII bombing–there are more pressing things to worry about. It just seems funny how easily some Americans can justify our civilian killing and get so righteous about that of others, when sometimes those others have at least as much excuse to use unsavory tactics as we have.
For some reason I’m reminded of lobbying when it comes to statements like this: Are you saying it was established Allied policy to bomb civilians without regard to militarily legitimate targets for the purpose of breaking civilian morale? (which happens to have been posted by McKinney)
When someone is lobbying to get some specific law or provision enacted that would be favorable to them, it’s not like they waltz into Congressperson X’s office and state “vote for this because it’s good for me!” That would be crass and stupid (although I’m sure it happens). Rather, they build the overall case, preferably some form of “it’s good for America!” or “it’s good for your state!” or “it’s good for your district!” The “good for me” can go without stating.
So, “there are military targets there!” is the “good” reason, whereas the “bad” reason – killing civilians to sap population morale – can go unmentioned, or mentioned only in passing.
Further, it seems to me, that where there is any sufficiently concentrated population of civilians worth bombing there will also be enough “infrastructure” to provide a military reason for the bombing.
For some reason I’m reminded of lobbying when it comes to statements like this: Are you saying it was established Allied policy to bomb civilians without regard to militarily legitimate targets for the purpose of breaking civilian morale? (which happens to have been posted by McKinney)
When someone is lobbying to get some specific law or provision enacted that would be favorable to them, it’s not like they waltz into Congressperson X’s office and state “vote for this because it’s good for me!” That would be crass and stupid (although I’m sure it happens). Rather, they build the overall case, preferably some form of “it’s good for America!” or “it’s good for your state!” or “it’s good for your district!” The “good for me” can go without stating.
So, “there are military targets there!” is the “good” reason, whereas the “bad” reason – killing civilians to sap population morale – can go unmentioned, or mentioned only in passing.
Further, it seems to me, that where there is any sufficiently concentrated population of civilians worth bombing there will also be enough “infrastructure” to provide a military reason for the bombing.
This has been an interesting thread to follow, and not one I can really contribute much to.
What I keep thinking of, though, is LJ’s one gadget thread and its inspiration (at least, the published version…I understand the facts are under contention).
SEALs capture some goat herders while on a covert mission. They could kill them and remain undetected, in gross violation of the RoE, and I’m sure many would condemn them for it. They could not kill them, and run the risk that they alert the Taliban…the SEALs, and others, run the risk of dying.
Part of the problem in that situation, and the allied bombing efforts during WWII, is the uncertainty.
Visit known atrocities now in fear of atrocities visited on you. Or being forced into visiting worse ones later. Or both.
It must be an especially horrible form of calculus in making those decisions.
This has been an interesting thread to follow, and not one I can really contribute much to.
What I keep thinking of, though, is LJ’s one gadget thread and its inspiration (at least, the published version…I understand the facts are under contention).
SEALs capture some goat herders while on a covert mission. They could kill them and remain undetected, in gross violation of the RoE, and I’m sure many would condemn them for it. They could not kill them, and run the risk that they alert the Taliban…the SEALs, and others, run the risk of dying.
Part of the problem in that situation, and the allied bombing efforts during WWII, is the uncertainty.
Visit known atrocities now in fear of atrocities visited on you. Or being forced into visiting worse ones later. Or both.
It must be an especially horrible form of calculus in making those decisions.
And, in many cases, you’re stuck making those decisions under time pressure. Sometimes, as with your SEAL example, it’s a decision you have to make in minutes. Other times, as with Truman and the atomic bomb (which he hadn’t even heard of before FDR died), you may have hours or days and a larger and even less clear decision.
But it’s rarely a situation where you can sit back and meditate on the ethics pro and con. That’s left to the Monday Morning Quarterbacks with lots more information, 20/20 hindsight, and months to weigh the situation.
And, in many cases, you’re stuck making those decisions under time pressure. Sometimes, as with your SEAL example, it’s a decision you have to make in minutes. Other times, as with Truman and the atomic bomb (which he hadn’t even heard of before FDR died), you may have hours or days and a larger and even less clear decision.
But it’s rarely a situation where you can sit back and meditate on the ethics pro and con. That’s left to the Monday Morning Quarterbacks with lots more information, 20/20 hindsight, and months to weigh the situation.
I’ve heard Obamacare compared to the Ukraine, Pearl Harbor, the Rape of Nanking, and Yankee perfidy at Fort Sumter, but never to the fire-bombing of Tokyo.
Don’t forget the Holocaust. I can’t count the occasions where someone on the Right claimed that Hitler gave Germans health insurance in preparation for his extermination plans against the Jews (and the Christians and those who would not become gay). It’s of course the far more apt comparision since firebombing cities is a rather impersonal form of mass killing while both Obamacare and Auschwitz happen on a much more hands-on personal level. Not that Big O is against dropping nukes on US cities but he gets foiled every time by some of the few remaining patriots in the armed forces (no, I am not making that up. That is a real claim/conspiracy theory on the RW fringe).
I’ve heard Obamacare compared to the Ukraine, Pearl Harbor, the Rape of Nanking, and Yankee perfidy at Fort Sumter, but never to the fire-bombing of Tokyo.
Don’t forget the Holocaust. I can’t count the occasions where someone on the Right claimed that Hitler gave Germans health insurance in preparation for his extermination plans against the Jews (and the Christians and those who would not become gay). It’s of course the far more apt comparision since firebombing cities is a rather impersonal form of mass killing while both Obamacare and Auschwitz happen on a much more hands-on personal level. Not that Big O is against dropping nukes on US cities but he gets foiled every time by some of the few remaining patriots in the armed forces (no, I am not making that up. That is a real claim/conspiracy theory on the RW fringe).
Ok, then.
You know, I really have a special place in my heart for Austrians. Because as you know, an Austrian killed Hitler.
But then again, an Austrian killed the man who killed Hitler. So maybe not.
Ok, then.
You know, I really have a special place in my heart for Austrians. Because as you know, an Austrian killed Hitler.
But then again, an Austrian killed the man who killed Hitler. So maybe not.
Americans on the Right also tend to confuse Bismarck and Marx while anyone else of course knows that the former was a herring (not a red one) and the latter a false moustache.
Seriously, I have encountered (on the net) people that believe that the old reactionary O.v.B. was an archcommunist (who else could have invented that devilish device, the welfare state?).
Americans on the Right also tend to confuse Bismarck and Marx while anyone else of course knows that the former was a herring (not a red one) and the latter a false moustache.
Seriously, I have encountered (on the net) people that believe that the old reactionary O.v.B. was an archcommunist (who else could have invented that devilish device, the welfare state?).
Yes, the Holocaust. How did I forget that slur?
I will say this for Hitler, however. At least he didn’t mislead the Jews and Gypsies into believing they could keep their prior lousy health insurance policies they’d been suffering with since the days of von Bismarck.
The German and Polish trains ran most efficiently to the hospitals (getting back home was a tad problematic, yes) and the Death Panels met on time and hit their benchmarks and quotas for sign-up, unlike the rocky start with the ACA website.
Deductibles could be paid in gold, art, and jewelry, thus providing flexibility.
There was a dental plan as well, including free extraction.
Most of all, the Holocaust Death Panels made house calls to each and every patient (the needs of their entire families and neighbors were considered) to mete out special treatment for those with identifiable pre-existing conditions, and if a patient required further treatment they were escorted to the train depot for a supervised ride to the doctor where you could pet the dogs and receive a complimentary shower.
Try getting a shower or a petting zoo from Medicaid.
I will say this for America, however. At least our legislators included themselves into our Obamacare Holocaust, unlike the German politicians and leaders, who kept their own health plans and in fact seemed completely oblivious of the very health insurance scheme they constructed for the Volk.
And we have examples like Louie Gohmert of Texas who know what’s coming and refuse health insurance all together, unlike his Nazi counterpart, Hermann Goering, who finally committed suicide rather than face the music.
Gohmert is just like Anne Frank in his bravery and nobility, except for the former’s frequent public pronouncements in front of the microphones.
For some reason, Ms. Frank kept a low profile as she tried to avoid Adolphcare.
Yes, the Holocaust. How did I forget that slur?
I will say this for Hitler, however. At least he didn’t mislead the Jews and Gypsies into believing they could keep their prior lousy health insurance policies they’d been suffering with since the days of von Bismarck.
The German and Polish trains ran most efficiently to the hospitals (getting back home was a tad problematic, yes) and the Death Panels met on time and hit their benchmarks and quotas for sign-up, unlike the rocky start with the ACA website.
Deductibles could be paid in gold, art, and jewelry, thus providing flexibility.
There was a dental plan as well, including free extraction.
Most of all, the Holocaust Death Panels made house calls to each and every patient (the needs of their entire families and neighbors were considered) to mete out special treatment for those with identifiable pre-existing conditions, and if a patient required further treatment they were escorted to the train depot for a supervised ride to the doctor where you could pet the dogs and receive a complimentary shower.
Try getting a shower or a petting zoo from Medicaid.
I will say this for America, however. At least our legislators included themselves into our Obamacare Holocaust, unlike the German politicians and leaders, who kept their own health plans and in fact seemed completely oblivious of the very health insurance scheme they constructed for the Volk.
And we have examples like Louie Gohmert of Texas who know what’s coming and refuse health insurance all together, unlike his Nazi counterpart, Hermann Goering, who finally committed suicide rather than face the music.
Gohmert is just like Anne Frank in his bravery and nobility, except for the former’s frequent public pronouncements in front of the microphones.
For some reason, Ms. Frank kept a low profile as she tried to avoid Adolphcare.
Pete Seeger is dead.
In other news, Erick Erickson isn’t yet.
Pete Seeger is dead.
In other news, Erick Erickson isn’t yet.
Still, there is something about the tone of word “progressive” used here that reminds me of this conversation from “A Hard Days Night”, in which Ringo has the relevant punchline for McTX, his derby stowed and casting his eyes about at what has became of the England he fought for:
My use of the word “progressive” as compared to Republican vermin and conservatives generally?
As for the push-back against the ‘revisionist’ narrative surrounding the deployment of the A-bombs, the case is far from closed, the controversy lingers.
It always will. My favorite alternate thesis is that the decision to drop the bomb was grounded in racism–the man who integrated the armed forces was a racist.
There are parts that support McKT’s position, but from my POV are just part of the doublethink that Westerners engage in when they kill civilians and wish to rationalize it.
Donald, this conversation may be over, but if it isn’t, I’d like to ask why the focus on ‘Westerners’? My sense is that any and everybody, when the shooting starts, plays by the principal rule of expediency, and justifies their actions after the fact. So, why limit it to Westerners?
Let me also clarify a point about Allied bombing policy in WWII. Deliberate targeting of civilians independent of a military target was not, based on all I’ve seen, Allied policy. That said, I am confident there were many who viewed collateral civilian damage as an aid to victory in reducing civilian morale, production capacity and a source for additional soldiers.
Today, we treat collateral damage as regrettable and something to be avoided. Even today, I’m not sure that is a uniformly held view.
NV–I am glad to know the legal department vets operations. That is new, AFAIK. That said, none of the factors you mention are blanket prohibitions on tactics (which is what operations are). My premise is more focused on predetermined limitations. For example, we don’t use nerve gas. We have it, but we don’t use it. In WWII, by agreement, gas was not used.
Still, there is something about the tone of word “progressive” used here that reminds me of this conversation from “A Hard Days Night”, in which Ringo has the relevant punchline for McTX, his derby stowed and casting his eyes about at what has became of the England he fought for:
My use of the word “progressive” as compared to Republican vermin and conservatives generally?
As for the push-back against the ‘revisionist’ narrative surrounding the deployment of the A-bombs, the case is far from closed, the controversy lingers.
It always will. My favorite alternate thesis is that the decision to drop the bomb was grounded in racism–the man who integrated the armed forces was a racist.
There are parts that support McKT’s position, but from my POV are just part of the doublethink that Westerners engage in when they kill civilians and wish to rationalize it.
Donald, this conversation may be over, but if it isn’t, I’d like to ask why the focus on ‘Westerners’? My sense is that any and everybody, when the shooting starts, plays by the principal rule of expediency, and justifies their actions after the fact. So, why limit it to Westerners?
Let me also clarify a point about Allied bombing policy in WWII. Deliberate targeting of civilians independent of a military target was not, based on all I’ve seen, Allied policy. That said, I am confident there were many who viewed collateral civilian damage as an aid to victory in reducing civilian morale, production capacity and a source for additional soldiers.
Today, we treat collateral damage as regrettable and something to be avoided. Even today, I’m not sure that is a uniformly held view.
NV–I am glad to know the legal department vets operations. That is new, AFAIK. That said, none of the factors you mention are blanket prohibitions on tactics (which is what operations are). My premise is more focused on predetermined limitations. For example, we don’t use nerve gas. We have it, but we don’t use it. In WWII, by agreement, gas was not used.
But it seemed to involve making Obamacare fail in order to drive the country into a single-payer model for health care. I think.
I’ve heard that one, too, wj. You’re not crazy…well, at least not for thinking you heard that theory.
But it seemed to involve making Obamacare fail in order to drive the country into a single-payer model for health care. I think.
I’ve heard that one, too, wj. You’re not crazy…well, at least not for thinking you heard that theory.
i’ve heard it often – maybe even here.
Obamacare is said to be a way to deliberately wreck the healthcare system. and then once it’s wrecked, the govt will step in and take over the whole thing.
for example:
i’ve heard it often – maybe even here.
Obamacare is said to be a way to deliberately wreck the healthcare system. and then once it’s wrecked, the govt will step in and take over the whole thing.
for example:
hsh, what you’re saying is that I may be crazy, but I’m not delusional. I can accept that diagnosis. Although I would note that, when it comes to crazy, I’m not in a league with the conspiracy theorists. 😉
hsh, what you’re saying is that I may be crazy, but I’m not delusional. I can accept that diagnosis. Although I would note that, when it comes to crazy, I’m not in a league with the conspiracy theorists. 😉
I adopted the term “Republican vermin” after reading Frank Luntz’s list of recommended labels for liberals and spending time mucking about in conservative comment sections and Erickson posts at places like Redstate, figuring I needed some labels, too.
I don’t know who started it, but it wasn’t me. Like the NRA, my language weaponry are held in self-defense only.
I never shout out the word “vermin” in movie theaters, however or patrol my neighborhood looking for them.
Sean Hannity can pronounce “progressive” in such a way that it sounds spat forth like a bolus of hatred, so I used him as a model.
Same with Limbaugh’s name-calling.
The late, fallen Dinesh D’Souza’s pedantic clipped fake Indian inflections were particularly suited to meaning “vermin” without actually using the word.
I’d have a word with them if I were you about all of this, since they’ve somehow confused their brand of hateful vermin conservatism with your legitimate, reasonable, eloquent, principled Eisenhower conservatism.
They set the bar and I’m happy to limbo underneath it.
Anyway, McTX, I wouldn’t take it personally because there’s a meal in the balance. 😉
I just think the incivility of the real world as practiced and perfected by the Republican Party over the past 35 years needs to intrude here on occasion.
If it’s good enough for C-Span, why not here?
‘Bout 40 years ago, in college, I called the Symbionese Liberation Army the “real pigs”, which some of my lefty friends took personally, not that they had any idea how that group of haters thought they represented the legitimate Left.
I adopted the term “Republican vermin” after reading Frank Luntz’s list of recommended labels for liberals and spending time mucking about in conservative comment sections and Erickson posts at places like Redstate, figuring I needed some labels, too.
I don’t know who started it, but it wasn’t me. Like the NRA, my language weaponry are held in self-defense only.
I never shout out the word “vermin” in movie theaters, however or patrol my neighborhood looking for them.
Sean Hannity can pronounce “progressive” in such a way that it sounds spat forth like a bolus of hatred, so I used him as a model.
Same with Limbaugh’s name-calling.
The late, fallen Dinesh D’Souza’s pedantic clipped fake Indian inflections were particularly suited to meaning “vermin” without actually using the word.
I’d have a word with them if I were you about all of this, since they’ve somehow confused their brand of hateful vermin conservatism with your legitimate, reasonable, eloquent, principled Eisenhower conservatism.
They set the bar and I’m happy to limbo underneath it.
Anyway, McTX, I wouldn’t take it personally because there’s a meal in the balance. 😉
I just think the incivility of the real world as practiced and perfected by the Republican Party over the past 35 years needs to intrude here on occasion.
If it’s good enough for C-Span, why not here?
‘Bout 40 years ago, in college, I called the Symbionese Liberation Army the “real pigs”, which some of my lefty friends took personally, not that they had any idea how that group of haters thought they represented the legitimate Left.
It just seems funny how easily some Americans can justify our civilian killing and get so righteous about that of others, when sometimes those others have at least as much excuse to use unsavory tactics as we have.
It would be different if there were a clear-eyed assessment openly based on self-interest, rather than moral superiority. I can deal with that. Those f*ckers who did 9/11 killed Americans, so I don’t like it. It bothers me way more than than the civilians “we” killed in WWII, because killing those people saved American lives and the lives of our allies.
This isn’t based on nationalism, per se. It’s that, being an American, my friends and family are almost all Americans. For all the faults I see with this country, I still am glad to be an American and enjoy the life I live as one. America is my home and, all in all, it’s a good one.
So I’m biased. I sometimes favor actions for subjective reasons of self-interest. I don’t need to feel as though I’m morally superior to my enemies in order to wish to defeat them. It’s just better for me and the people I care about. It’s not that hard. There’s no need to pretend God is on our side or that we’re special or that the other side is evil (even though they can be, but so can we).
It just seems funny how easily some Americans can justify our civilian killing and get so righteous about that of others, when sometimes those others have at least as much excuse to use unsavory tactics as we have.
It would be different if there were a clear-eyed assessment openly based on self-interest, rather than moral superiority. I can deal with that. Those f*ckers who did 9/11 killed Americans, so I don’t like it. It bothers me way more than than the civilians “we” killed in WWII, because killing those people saved American lives and the lives of our allies.
This isn’t based on nationalism, per se. It’s that, being an American, my friends and family are almost all Americans. For all the faults I see with this country, I still am glad to be an American and enjoy the life I live as one. America is my home and, all in all, it’s a good one.
So I’m biased. I sometimes favor actions for subjective reasons of self-interest. I don’t need to feel as though I’m morally superior to my enemies in order to wish to defeat them. It’s just better for me and the people I care about. It’s not that hard. There’s no need to pretend God is on our side or that we’re special or that the other side is evil (even though they can be, but so can we).
McKinneyTexas,
You speak a lot about “encapsulating” military infrastructure in the middle of civilian landscape. It would be important to note that most, even vast majority of, such placement was not done to misuse the protection of civilians to shield military targets.
For example, before the advent of widespread ownership of motorcars, factories were built regularly near their workers and worker housing near factories. Similarly, railway switchyards, freight stations and harbours were near workimg-class neighbourhoods because that was economically efficient. (Even better neighbourhoods were within walkable distance.)
It could not be otherwise. Such city planning was an integral consequence of available technology and carried no moral significance. Thus, it cannot really be used as a defence for bombing these targets with wildly inaccurate weapons. The targets were not shielded by choice.
The question here is whether the killing of a hundred thousand civilians to disable a railway switchyard and a couple of telephone switchboards is proportional.
McKinneyTexas,
You speak a lot about “encapsulating” military infrastructure in the middle of civilian landscape. It would be important to note that most, even vast majority of, such placement was not done to misuse the protection of civilians to shield military targets.
For example, before the advent of widespread ownership of motorcars, factories were built regularly near their workers and worker housing near factories. Similarly, railway switchyards, freight stations and harbours were near workimg-class neighbourhoods because that was economically efficient. (Even better neighbourhoods were within walkable distance.)
It could not be otherwise. Such city planning was an integral consequence of available technology and carried no moral significance. Thus, it cannot really be used as a defence for bombing these targets with wildly inaccurate weapons. The targets were not shielded by choice.
The question here is whether the killing of a hundred thousand civilians to disable a railway switchyard and a couple of telephone switchboards is proportional.
we can just read the words of the people who made the decisions as to where the Bombs should go.
Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee
Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945
here’s what they thought about Kyoto:
today, the phrase “shock and awe” would’ve been used somewhere in the document, instead of “the people there are more apt to appreciate the significance of such a weapon”. it was a wordier time.
Kyoto managed to get off the list, due to the same cultural significance that got it on the list. some people thought it would be better to preserve it instead of vaporize.
Hiroshima:
8. Use Against “Military” Objectives
the word “civilian” does not occur in the document.
the document talks about following-up the a-bombs with a round of incendiary bombing, because the enemy’s fire-fighting system would be in shambles. they decided to see what the bomb would do on its own, first.
they were different times, and there was justification. but there should be no doubt these bombs were intended to shock and awe by doing exactly what they were made to do to as many people as possible.
we can just read the words of the people who made the decisions as to where the Bombs should go.
Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee
Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945
here’s what they thought about Kyoto:
today, the phrase “shock and awe” would’ve been used somewhere in the document, instead of “the people there are more apt to appreciate the significance of such a weapon”. it was a wordier time.
Kyoto managed to get off the list, due to the same cultural significance that got it on the list. some people thought it would be better to preserve it instead of vaporize.
Hiroshima:
8. Use Against “Military” Objectives
the word “civilian” does not occur in the document.
the document talks about following-up the a-bombs with a round of incendiary bombing, because the enemy’s fire-fighting system would be in shambles. they decided to see what the bomb would do on its own, first.
they were different times, and there was justification. but there should be no doubt these bombs were intended to shock and awe by doing exactly what they were made to do to as many people as possible.
my thoughts go about 10 different ways on this issue.
imo the bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki were beyond brutal. they did not just kill thousands of people, they literally caused them to cease to exist.
but there is also the fact that the war was the result of the cruelty greed and ambition of the fascist powers. their aim was the subjugation and enslavement of their neighbors, and as much of the world as they could grab.
it wasn’t just their aim, they were well on their way to making good on their ambitions.
it was total war, with little quarter given by either side. to a large degree, the means were total because the stakes were total.
we haven’t really seen that since then. thankfully. we didn’t see it in the cold war because ‘total war’ in the nuclear context was unthinkable.
all of it puts me in mind of sherman’s letter to the mayor and councilmen of atlanta, explaining why he was going to burn that city to the ground.
or if you like, sherman in a shorter form:
and, in the case of atlanta, the specific message that if you didn’t want your city burned down, you should not have started the war. what did you think was going to happen?
i don’t know if we had to firebomb tokyo, or nuke hiroshima or nagasaki. ‘had to’ is a hard thing to prove.
at the time, somebody did the calculus, and (mostly likely correctly) decided that it would take a serious level of brutality to compel the japanese to give up the war.
so yes, shock and awe, because the japanese were very very tough and very proud, and would quite likely have fought well past the point when it made sense anymore.
we own the responsibility for the bombings. the japanese (and germans, in their own context) own responsibility for embracing fascism in all of its arrogance and cruelty, and for initiating warfare, and for persisting in what was clearly becoming a wasteful lost cause.
there were thousands of innocent victims in tokyo and nagasaki and hiroshima, as there were innocent victims everywhere.
war is a horrendous, brutal, cruel, destructive practice. it’s hell, come to your very own neighborhood. if you think you can engage in war without bringing the most extreme possible pain, destruction, suffering, despair, and sorrow on people, then you don’t understand what it is.
my thoughts go about 10 different ways on this issue.
imo the bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki were beyond brutal. they did not just kill thousands of people, they literally caused them to cease to exist.
but there is also the fact that the war was the result of the cruelty greed and ambition of the fascist powers. their aim was the subjugation and enslavement of their neighbors, and as much of the world as they could grab.
it wasn’t just their aim, they were well on their way to making good on their ambitions.
it was total war, with little quarter given by either side. to a large degree, the means were total because the stakes were total.
we haven’t really seen that since then. thankfully. we didn’t see it in the cold war because ‘total war’ in the nuclear context was unthinkable.
all of it puts me in mind of sherman’s letter to the mayor and councilmen of atlanta, explaining why he was going to burn that city to the ground.
or if you like, sherman in a shorter form:
and, in the case of atlanta, the specific message that if you didn’t want your city burned down, you should not have started the war. what did you think was going to happen?
i don’t know if we had to firebomb tokyo, or nuke hiroshima or nagasaki. ‘had to’ is a hard thing to prove.
at the time, somebody did the calculus, and (mostly likely correctly) decided that it would take a serious level of brutality to compel the japanese to give up the war.
so yes, shock and awe, because the japanese were very very tough and very proud, and would quite likely have fought well past the point when it made sense anymore.
we own the responsibility for the bombings. the japanese (and germans, in their own context) own responsibility for embracing fascism in all of its arrogance and cruelty, and for initiating warfare, and for persisting in what was clearly becoming a wasteful lost cause.
there were thousands of innocent victims in tokyo and nagasaki and hiroshima, as there were innocent victims everywhere.
war is a horrendous, brutal, cruel, destructive practice. it’s hell, come to your very own neighborhood. if you think you can engage in war without bringing the most extreme possible pain, destruction, suffering, despair, and sorrow on people, then you don’t understand what it is.
Anyway, McTX, I wouldn’t take it personally because there’s a meal in the balance. 😉
Never, ever personal, Count. I’m thinking late May or July.
The question here is whether the killing of a hundred thousand civilians to disable a railway switchyard and a couple of telephone switchboards is proportional.
I agree that many, many valid targets lie in civilian areas without design but rather as a result of unintended circumstance. But, I also see the question you raise as being in a bit of a vacuum. The moral calculus begins with why the war is being fought and who is being bombed. It includes how the war has been waged by the party about to be bombed.
but there should be no doubt these bombs were intended to shock and awe by doing exactly what they were made to do to as many people as possible.
Well, as you note, the word ‘civilian’ does not appear. It is self evident to the Nth degree that atomic bombs were built to shock and awe, to wreak massive damage. As opposed to area bombing, however, you have to place the bomb with reasonable accuracy. I see nothing in what you’ve posted that suggests anything other than an objective evaluation of which target makes the most sense, it being a given that whichever target it is, one hell of a massive explosion will ensue.
Anyway, McTX, I wouldn’t take it personally because there’s a meal in the balance. 😉
Never, ever personal, Count. I’m thinking late May or July.
The question here is whether the killing of a hundred thousand civilians to disable a railway switchyard and a couple of telephone switchboards is proportional.
I agree that many, many valid targets lie in civilian areas without design but rather as a result of unintended circumstance. But, I also see the question you raise as being in a bit of a vacuum. The moral calculus begins with why the war is being fought and who is being bombed. It includes how the war has been waged by the party about to be bombed.
but there should be no doubt these bombs were intended to shock and awe by doing exactly what they were made to do to as many people as possible.
Well, as you note, the word ‘civilian’ does not appear. It is self evident to the Nth degree that atomic bombs were built to shock and awe, to wreak massive damage. As opposed to area bombing, however, you have to place the bomb with reasonable accuracy. I see nothing in what you’ve posted that suggests anything other than an objective evaluation of which target makes the most sense, it being a given that whichever target it is, one hell of a massive explosion will ensue.
and, in the case of atlanta, the specific message that if you didn’t want your city burned down, you should not have started the war. what did you think was going to happen?
Precisely.
and, in the case of atlanta, the specific message that if you didn’t want your city burned down, you should not have started the war. what did you think was going to happen?
Precisely.
He started it!
He started it!
. I see nothing in what you’ve posted that suggests anything other than an objective evaluation of which target makes the most sense
objective, yes. but the sticky part is in what the specific objectives were. and it looks to me that something like “killing as many people as possible, in as spectacular a fashion as possible” was one of the objectives.
i assume this is patently obvious to you and that you’re more than fine with it. i’m not.
. I see nothing in what you’ve posted that suggests anything other than an objective evaluation of which target makes the most sense
objective, yes. but the sticky part is in what the specific objectives were. and it looks to me that something like “killing as many people as possible, in as spectacular a fashion as possible” was one of the objectives.
i assume this is patently obvious to you and that you’re more than fine with it. i’m not.
To make it even more patently obvious:
To make it even more patently obvious:
Also, too:
Also, too:
Ugh, I would also add, with respect to the nuclear weapons:
B) making sure that we give the impression that we have more of the same available. So the Japanese can figure out for themselves what will happen to the rest of their cities if they don’t surrender.
We didn’t have more, of course. But with psychological warfare, what matters is not what you have, but what you can convice your emeny you have.
Ugh, I would also add, with respect to the nuclear weapons:
B) making sure that we give the impression that we have more of the same available. So the Japanese can figure out for themselves what will happen to the rest of their cities if they don’t surrender.
We didn’t have more, of course. But with psychological warfare, what matters is not what you have, but what you can convice your emeny you have.
Also, too:
Also, too:
i assume this is patently obvious to you and that you’re more than fine with it. i’m not.
I am ‘more than fine’ with ending WWII quickly and with much less loss of life than if the invasion had taken place, for the reasons stated initially. With exactly one bomb in reserve, are you contending the bomb should have been dropped in a minimally populated area to minimize casualties in the hope that the explosion would have been impressive enough to compel a surrender? I’m not tracking here–you agree there was justification, so what exactly are you saying?
i assume this is patently obvious to you and that you’re more than fine with it. i’m not.
I am ‘more than fine’ with ending WWII quickly and with much less loss of life than if the invasion had taken place, for the reasons stated initially. With exactly one bomb in reserve, are you contending the bomb should have been dropped in a minimally populated area to minimize casualties in the hope that the explosion would have been impressive enough to compel a surrender? I’m not tracking here–you agree there was justification, so what exactly are you saying?
so what exactly are you saying?
by the words of the people who made the decisions, the targets were not military targets. they were chosen, at least in part, explicitly for maximum psychological impact. for demonstration purposes.
the target of the Hiroshima bomb was a downtown bridge. it wasn’t a shipyard, or an armory or a munitions factory. it was a civilian bridge, in the middle of a city.
so this:
is not quite right.
the bombs were, in fact, dropped on civilian targets.
so what exactly are you saying?
by the words of the people who made the decisions, the targets were not military targets. they were chosen, at least in part, explicitly for maximum psychological impact. for demonstration purposes.
the target of the Hiroshima bomb was a downtown bridge. it wasn’t a shipyard, or an armory or a munitions factory. it was a civilian bridge, in the middle of a city.
so this:
is not quite right.
the bombs were, in fact, dropped on civilian targets.
cleek:
I think a key aspect of McK’s sentence you missed was “independent of a military target”
From the target committee:
“2) Hiroshima – This is an important army depot…”
From Truman’s diary:
“This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.
[…]
He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one…”
from:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltextid=15
I think much can be said about the use of nuclear weapons, and many other tactics, during WWII. But I don’t think
“killing as many people as possible, in as spectacular a fashion as possible”
is a particularly accurate portrayal of the decision to deploy nuclear weapons at Hiroshima.
cleek:
I think a key aspect of McK’s sentence you missed was “independent of a military target”
From the target committee:
“2) Hiroshima – This is an important army depot…”
From Truman’s diary:
“This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.
[…]
He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one…”
from:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltextid=15
I think much can be said about the use of nuclear weapons, and many other tactics, during WWII. But I don’t think
“killing as many people as possible, in as spectacular a fashion as possible”
is a particularly accurate portrayal of the decision to deploy nuclear weapons at Hiroshima.
Cleeks words:
by the words of the people who made the decisions, the targets were not military targets
The very first sentence from Cleek’s “in their own words” description:
(2) Hiroshima – This is an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area.
Three items here: army depot, port of embarkation and urban industrial area–all three are bona fide military targets.
Plus, what Thompson said.
Cleeks words:
by the words of the people who made the decisions, the targets were not military targets
The very first sentence from Cleek’s “in their own words” description:
(2) Hiroshima – This is an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area.
Three items here: army depot, port of embarkation and urban industrial area–all three are bona fide military targets.
Plus, what Thompson said.
Sounds pretty figleafy to me.
And the cynic whispers into my ear that there is always a terrorist in any wedding or funeral assembly when it gets blown up.
Sounds pretty figleafy to me.
And the cynic whispers into my ear that there is always a terrorist in any wedding or funeral assembly when it gets blown up.
That said, none of the factors you mention are blanket prohibitions on tactics (which is what operations are). My premise is more focused on predetermined limitations. For example, we don’t use nerve gas. We have it, but we don’t use it. In WWII, by agreement, gas was not used.
McK, please stop. First rule of holes. You normally make intelligent, cogent, and well-informed arguments, but you truly have no idea what you’re talking about here; you’re shooting from the hip by way of your fourth point of contact. To wit:
Army Field Manual 27-10 Ch. 1 §1-3 (1956, but still extant, with Change 1 added in 1976)
(Emphasis added.)
Selected paragraphs from FM 27-10, Ch. 2 §3 Forbidden Means of Waging Warfare
(Emphasis added.)
There’s also higher level discussions of classes of tactics which are forbidden; e.g., defining treachery/perfidy, limits on false-flag operations, forbidding improper use of Red Cross insignia. This stuff informs the preparation of everything from general strategies to ROEs all the way on down to individual operations. So yeah, no. Plenty of predetermined blanket prohibitions on tactics. Again, this is basic Law of War stuff.
The moral calculus begins with why the war is being fought and who is being bombed. It includes how the war has been waged by the party about to be bombed.
I don’t know how many times this will need said, but jus ad bellum does not jus in bello make. For a war tactic to be morally justifiable, it has to be justifiable on its own virtues and faults. Tell me, had Iraqi insurgents – let’s say the Mahdi Army – during the Surge successfully sent infiltrators to blow up 5-10 federal buildings containing Military Entrance Processing Stations in major American metropolitan areas, with the concurrent forseen-but-unintended hundreds or thousands of civilian deaths, would you have been all “Oh, sneaky! I’m upset that you did that, but we had it coming for invading you!”, or would you have been screaming bloody murder about cowardly, murderous acts of terrorism?
Having a just cause to engage in warfare does not mean any sort of warfare you engage in is just. Hell, it doesn’t even mean the bar is lowered for you. If Canada annexes the US side of Niagara Falls, we don’t get to nuke every Canadian city with a population over 100,000 and flay any captured soldiers alive just because “They started it!!!”. Proportionality and military necessity remain, as has long been customary, guiding principles for determining both the ethics and legality of given tactics in warfare. Not, I might add, convictions of righteousness and a zeal to punish those who you perceive to “have it coming”.
That said, none of the factors you mention are blanket prohibitions on tactics (which is what operations are). My premise is more focused on predetermined limitations. For example, we don’t use nerve gas. We have it, but we don’t use it. In WWII, by agreement, gas was not used.
McK, please stop. First rule of holes. You normally make intelligent, cogent, and well-informed arguments, but you truly have no idea what you’re talking about here; you’re shooting from the hip by way of your fourth point of contact. To wit:
Army Field Manual 27-10 Ch. 1 §1-3 (1956, but still extant, with Change 1 added in 1976)
(Emphasis added.)
Selected paragraphs from FM 27-10, Ch. 2 §3 Forbidden Means of Waging Warfare
(Emphasis added.)
There’s also higher level discussions of classes of tactics which are forbidden; e.g., defining treachery/perfidy, limits on false-flag operations, forbidding improper use of Red Cross insignia. This stuff informs the preparation of everything from general strategies to ROEs all the way on down to individual operations. So yeah, no. Plenty of predetermined blanket prohibitions on tactics. Again, this is basic Law of War stuff.
The moral calculus begins with why the war is being fought and who is being bombed. It includes how the war has been waged by the party about to be bombed.
I don’t know how many times this will need said, but jus ad bellum does not jus in bello make. For a war tactic to be morally justifiable, it has to be justifiable on its own virtues and faults. Tell me, had Iraqi insurgents – let’s say the Mahdi Army – during the Surge successfully sent infiltrators to blow up 5-10 federal buildings containing Military Entrance Processing Stations in major American metropolitan areas, with the concurrent forseen-but-unintended hundreds or thousands of civilian deaths, would you have been all “Oh, sneaky! I’m upset that you did that, but we had it coming for invading you!”, or would you have been screaming bloody murder about cowardly, murderous acts of terrorism?
Having a just cause to engage in warfare does not mean any sort of warfare you engage in is just. Hell, it doesn’t even mean the bar is lowered for you. If Canada annexes the US side of Niagara Falls, we don’t get to nuke every Canadian city with a population over 100,000 and flay any captured soldiers alive just because “They started it!!!”. Proportionality and military necessity remain, as has long been customary, guiding principles for determining both the ethics and legality of given tactics in warfare. Not, I might add, convictions of righteousness and a zeal to punish those who you perceive to “have it coming”.
“Sounds pretty figleafy to me.”
Maybe. I personally have a hard time comprehending how you would go about those decisions.
Russell’s comments upthread strike me as apt. War is brutal.
We demo the bomb? Maybe that’s enough, maybe not.
We take out a small, isolated military target? Maybe that’s enough, maybe not.
There was talk about using the early nukes not as psychological warfare, but purely as a component of the invasion…release multiple bombs in the early stages of the invasion. What’s the human cost there?
What’s the alternative? Conventional invasion of the main islands? Allow the Soviets to occupy Japan? A long war of attrition until the Japan is crushed under the weight of a destroyed industrial and agricultural base? Hope the generals yield and the emperor decides to end the war?
I can’t stand in judgement of that type of decision.
“Sounds pretty figleafy to me.”
Maybe. I personally have a hard time comprehending how you would go about those decisions.
Russell’s comments upthread strike me as apt. War is brutal.
We demo the bomb? Maybe that’s enough, maybe not.
We take out a small, isolated military target? Maybe that’s enough, maybe not.
There was talk about using the early nukes not as psychological warfare, but purely as a component of the invasion…release multiple bombs in the early stages of the invasion. What’s the human cost there?
What’s the alternative? Conventional invasion of the main islands? Allow the Soviets to occupy Japan? A long war of attrition until the Japan is crushed under the weight of a destroyed industrial and agricultural base? Hope the generals yield and the emperor decides to end the war?
I can’t stand in judgement of that type of decision.
(As a preemptive counter to a possibly overlooked implication in my last paragraphs above, I, custom, and the traditions do of course recognize the value in tit-for-tat in-kind retaliation for violations of the customs and laws of war, which could be (but I suspect is not) what your “how the war has been waged” line was referring to. That can and should factor into a “on its own virtues and faults” calculation. But that’s not really germane here, though. You’ve not been talking about escalation aimed at causing deescalation. You’ve primarily been talking about escalation for the sake of military expediency, where any “how the war was waged” wouldn’t rise above “you shot first”.)
(As a preemptive counter to a possibly overlooked implication in my last paragraphs above, I, custom, and the traditions do of course recognize the value in tit-for-tat in-kind retaliation for violations of the customs and laws of war, which could be (but I suspect is not) what your “how the war has been waged” line was referring to. That can and should factor into a “on its own virtues and faults” calculation. But that’s not really germane here, though. You’ve not been talking about escalation aimed at causing deescalation. You’ve primarily been talking about escalation for the sake of military expediency, where any “how the war was waged” wouldn’t rise above “you shot first”.)
I think I just dropped a small (no, really!) and at most marginally important slightly-paranoid addendum comment into the spamory hole.
I think I just dropped a small (no, really!) and at most marginally important slightly-paranoid addendum comment into the spamory hole.
“spectacular” was NOT cleek’s word.
See:
http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/hiroshima.htm
Relevant passages:
“There had been four cities chosen as possible targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki, and Niigata (Kyoto was the first choice until it was removed from the list by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson). The cities were chosen because they had been relatively untouched during the war. The Target Committee wanted the first bomb to be “sufficiently SPECTACULAR for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it was released.”3
“Staff Sergeant George Caron, the tail gunner, described what he saw: “The mushroom cloud itself was a SPECTACULAR sight, a bubbling mass of purple-gray smoke and you could see it had a red core in it and everything was burning inside. . . . It looked like lava or molasses covering a whole city. . . .”4 The cloud is estimated to have reached a height of 40,000 feet.”
Also:
“Unlike many other bombing raids, the goal for this raid had not been a military installation but rather an entire city. The atomic bomb that exploded over Hiroshima killed civilian women and children in addition to soldiers. Hiroshima’s population has been estimated at 350,000; approximately 70,000 died immediately from the explosion and another 70,000 died from radiation within five years.”
I would say that, regardless of the military nature of the target, it is no stretch of the language to state that “killed as many people as possible”, including women and children and fetuses, is an accurate description of what happened when ONE bomb, the most powerful weapon in human history, fell out of ONE airplane in 1945 and killed 70,000 people in a few minutes, with another 70,000 dying from the after effects.
Now, there were @300,000 combined German/English/French fatalities at the Battle of the Somme during World War I, but it took a few days. The sheer productivity of “Little Boy” was, dare I say it, SPECTACULAR.
The crew of the Enola Gay, while steadfastly maintaining that the bombings saved American AND Japanese lives in the bigger picture and thus had no regrets about carrying out their orders, testified as witnesses (there are places to look this up) to the carnage that they sat in stunned silence as their plane circled and turned away afterwards.
“My God, what have we done!” was the consensus.
O.K., if you don’t accept “spectacular”, how ’bout “holy f*cking sh*t”, which was probably an off-the-record response on the plane, though those were more civil times when nuclear bombs could be dropped but bad language was frowned upon.
These days, we try to avoid nuking folks, despite wishful thinking among some in the world, but our language has gone to pot.
We’re much worse now, what with the progressive loosening of the language and our reluctance to drop the big one.
As far as the high command trying to minimize civilian casualties, what about the deliberate nature of placing both military and civilian personnel near nuclear test sites on American soil to kinds ascertain, scientifically what might happen.
“spectacular” was NOT cleek’s word.
See:
http://history1900s.about.com/od/worldwarii/a/hiroshima.htm
Relevant passages:
“There had been four cities chosen as possible targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nagasaki, and Niigata (Kyoto was the first choice until it was removed from the list by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson). The cities were chosen because they had been relatively untouched during the war. The Target Committee wanted the first bomb to be “sufficiently SPECTACULAR for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it was released.”3
“Staff Sergeant George Caron, the tail gunner, described what he saw: “The mushroom cloud itself was a SPECTACULAR sight, a bubbling mass of purple-gray smoke and you could see it had a red core in it and everything was burning inside. . . . It looked like lava or molasses covering a whole city. . . .”4 The cloud is estimated to have reached a height of 40,000 feet.”
Also:
“Unlike many other bombing raids, the goal for this raid had not been a military installation but rather an entire city. The atomic bomb that exploded over Hiroshima killed civilian women and children in addition to soldiers. Hiroshima’s population has been estimated at 350,000; approximately 70,000 died immediately from the explosion and another 70,000 died from radiation within five years.”
I would say that, regardless of the military nature of the target, it is no stretch of the language to state that “killed as many people as possible”, including women and children and fetuses, is an accurate description of what happened when ONE bomb, the most powerful weapon in human history, fell out of ONE airplane in 1945 and killed 70,000 people in a few minutes, with another 70,000 dying from the after effects.
Now, there were @300,000 combined German/English/French fatalities at the Battle of the Somme during World War I, but it took a few days. The sheer productivity of “Little Boy” was, dare I say it, SPECTACULAR.
The crew of the Enola Gay, while steadfastly maintaining that the bombings saved American AND Japanese lives in the bigger picture and thus had no regrets about carrying out their orders, testified as witnesses (there are places to look this up) to the carnage that they sat in stunned silence as their plane circled and turned away afterwards.
“My God, what have we done!” was the consensus.
O.K., if you don’t accept “spectacular”, how ’bout “holy f*cking sh*t”, which was probably an off-the-record response on the plane, though those were more civil times when nuclear bombs could be dropped but bad language was frowned upon.
These days, we try to avoid nuking folks, despite wishful thinking among some in the world, but our language has gone to pot.
We’re much worse now, what with the progressive loosening of the language and our reluctance to drop the big one.
As far as the high command trying to minimize civilian casualties, what about the deliberate nature of placing both military and civilian personnel near nuclear test sites on American soil to kinds ascertain, scientifically what might happen.
“to kinda ascertain, scientifically, what might happen.”
“to kinda ascertain, scientifically, what might happen.”
I think I just dropped a small [redacted] comment into the spamory hole.
nv, you did and it has been rescued. Thanks for your patience and participation!
I think I just dropped a small [redacted] comment into the spamory hole.
nv, you did and it has been rescued. Thanks for your patience and participation!
Thompson wrote:
“I can’t stand in judgement of that type of decision.”
Sure you can.
Our conclusions ultimately converge on the decision to drop the bombs, I expect, but Harry Truman had a sign on his desk: “The Buck Stops Here”.
Which I take to mean that he made and took full responsibility for the final military decision to preserve your freedom to stand in judgement of his leadership and all civilian and military leadership to follow, and he might privately throw in a “Shut up!” over a martini with Bess if she asked him what he really thinks of history’s judgment, but go ahead, take your best shot.
It’s the Internet for crying out loud, the biggest advance in collective standing-in-judgment judgmental nuking in history.
Thompson wrote:
“I can’t stand in judgement of that type of decision.”
Sure you can.
Our conclusions ultimately converge on the decision to drop the bombs, I expect, but Harry Truman had a sign on his desk: “The Buck Stops Here”.
Which I take to mean that he made and took full responsibility for the final military decision to preserve your freedom to stand in judgement of his leadership and all civilian and military leadership to follow, and he might privately throw in a “Shut up!” over a martini with Bess if she asked him what he really thinks of history’s judgment, but go ahead, take your best shot.
It’s the Internet for crying out loud, the biggest advance in collective standing-in-judgment judgmental nuking in history.
would you have been all “Oh, sneaky! I’m upset that you did that, but we had it coming for invading you!”, or would you have been screaming bloody murder about cowardly, murderous acts of terrorism?
Two false choices. I would see it as a response to the invasion that was focused on legitimate military targets. But, nice try on the mind-reading.
I don’t know how many times this will need said, but jus ad bellum does not jus in bello make.
Ok, last time. There are very few hard and fast rules on war fighting. Other than biologicals and chemicals, nothing you listed was an actual blanket prohibition, because each is riddled with subjective exceptions, perceptions (“I’m sorry, I thought the village *was* defended.”), in’s and out’s. You may see clarity, I see mush (not unlike a lot of other laws).
And the mush I see allows for a moral calculus in determining how war is waged. For example, if a belligerent did not destroy crops and lay waste to the countryside, as act of restraint, if I were opposed to that belligerent, I would order similar self-imposed limits even though the opposite would be within the rules of war.
And, BTW, nothing you quote is conceptually all that sophisticated. It is simply a subset of the general class of ‘use of deadly force’ jurisprudence that has developed over centuries.
If an opposing belligerent takes the slightest pretext to impose civilian casualties, and if replying in kind or even drastically escalating *as a means of forcing moderation* seems advisable, my moral calculus would come into play in making that analysis.
You might call this an aspect of proportionality, but that is just a label. Figuring out that wars should be fought within limits, and that the conduct of the belligerents can define the limits was not a huge intellectual leap, even for someone who doesn’t do what you do daily.
McK, please stop.
Gladly. I’m done.
would you have been all “Oh, sneaky! I’m upset that you did that, but we had it coming for invading you!”, or would you have been screaming bloody murder about cowardly, murderous acts of terrorism?
Two false choices. I would see it as a response to the invasion that was focused on legitimate military targets. But, nice try on the mind-reading.
I don’t know how many times this will need said, but jus ad bellum does not jus in bello make.
Ok, last time. There are very few hard and fast rules on war fighting. Other than biologicals and chemicals, nothing you listed was an actual blanket prohibition, because each is riddled with subjective exceptions, perceptions (“I’m sorry, I thought the village *was* defended.”), in’s and out’s. You may see clarity, I see mush (not unlike a lot of other laws).
And the mush I see allows for a moral calculus in determining how war is waged. For example, if a belligerent did not destroy crops and lay waste to the countryside, as act of restraint, if I were opposed to that belligerent, I would order similar self-imposed limits even though the opposite would be within the rules of war.
And, BTW, nothing you quote is conceptually all that sophisticated. It is simply a subset of the general class of ‘use of deadly force’ jurisprudence that has developed over centuries.
If an opposing belligerent takes the slightest pretext to impose civilian casualties, and if replying in kind or even drastically escalating *as a means of forcing moderation* seems advisable, my moral calculus would come into play in making that analysis.
You might call this an aspect of proportionality, but that is just a label. Figuring out that wars should be fought within limits, and that the conduct of the belligerents can define the limits was not a huge intellectual leap, even for someone who doesn’t do what you do daily.
McK, please stop.
Gladly. I’m done.
Count:
“”spectacular” was NOT cleek’s word”
I didn’t say it was. It’s actually in the document he quoted, as well as the additional material you provided.
I simply said that I didn’t think his phrasing was an entirely accurate portrayal.
The rest of your post kinda of hinges on that ?misunderstanding?
Count:
“”spectacular” was NOT cleek’s word”
I didn’t say it was. It’s actually in the document he quoted, as well as the additional material you provided.
I simply said that I didn’t think his phrasing was an entirely accurate portrayal.
The rest of your post kinda of hinges on that ?misunderstanding?
Count:
“Sure you can.”
Fine. I could. I am capable of judging things arbitrarily.
I can not do it with any level of reasonableness, and, therefore, I choose not to.
Count:
“Sure you can.”
Fine. I could. I am capable of judging things arbitrarily.
I can not do it with any level of reasonableness, and, therefore, I choose not to.
My hinges are loose.
My hinges are loose.
There are three different things that should not be confused
1) Was the decision the ‘correct’ one?
2) Were the reasons given the real reasons or were they totally or in part a pretext?
3) Were the reasons right or wrong?
Each point can and should be discussed separately
My own subjective answers:
1) probably yes
2) mixed reasons and only some were admitted publically
3) At least partially wrong
In other words, I think it was a legitimate decision in that situation and probably saved more people longterm (by making a nuclear war visibly unacceptable morally) but a number of the decision-makers were dishonest about their reasons and some of those reasons were not legitimate but despicable. If I believed in the heaven/hell paradigma, I’d say some of them went down for it while others got a pass depending on the personal reasons that let them vote pro nuking.
There are three different things that should not be confused
1) Was the decision the ‘correct’ one?
2) Were the reasons given the real reasons or were they totally or in part a pretext?
3) Were the reasons right or wrong?
Each point can and should be discussed separately
My own subjective answers:
1) probably yes
2) mixed reasons and only some were admitted publically
3) At least partially wrong
In other words, I think it was a legitimate decision in that situation and probably saved more people longterm (by making a nuclear war visibly unacceptable morally) but a number of the decision-makers were dishonest about their reasons and some of those reasons were not legitimate but despicable. If I believed in the heaven/hell paradigma, I’d say some of them went down for it while others got a pass depending on the personal reasons that let them vote pro nuking.
I’m still not entirely sure whether what’s a issue here is:
a. Are there really fncked up circumstances under which targeting civilians is the best possible action, or not?
or
b. Did we not do such a thing, at least not on purpose, or did we?
My not-at-all-authoritative opinion is that we did purposely target civilians, but that doing so was at least arguably the best thing under the circumstances.
There was no “good” choice morally, but that’s no reason to pretend we did something other than what we did when we picked the least sh1tty thing to do.
(I have to say, it seems icky to think that I believe reasonable people can disagree on whether or not we should have, say, killed lots of children. I’m just not smart enough to find a logical way of avoiding that.)
I’m still not entirely sure whether what’s a issue here is:
a. Are there really fncked up circumstances under which targeting civilians is the best possible action, or not?
or
b. Did we not do such a thing, at least not on purpose, or did we?
My not-at-all-authoritative opinion is that we did purposely target civilians, but that doing so was at least arguably the best thing under the circumstances.
There was no “good” choice morally, but that’s no reason to pretend we did something other than what we did when we picked the least sh1tty thing to do.
(I have to say, it seems icky to think that I believe reasonable people can disagree on whether or not we should have, say, killed lots of children. I’m just not smart enough to find a logical way of avoiding that.)
Determination not to target civilians requires distinguishing between the government of the country which attacked you and the people of that country. Which requires more sensitivity to how, specifically, the rest of the world differs from us. Not exactly Americans’ strong suit.
Determination not to target civilians requires distinguishing between the government of the country which attacked you and the people of that country. Which requires more sensitivity to how, specifically, the rest of the world differs from us. Not exactly Americans’ strong suit.
Maybe I should add that I’m referring specifically to dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I’m pretty sure that we’ve targeted civilians when it wasn’t the least-bad thing we possibly could have done, among many other not-least-bad things we’ve done.
Maybe I should add that I’m referring specifically to dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I’m pretty sure that we’ve targeted civilians when it wasn’t the least-bad thing we possibly could have done, among many other not-least-bad things we’ve done.
To repeat my quote from cleek’s link, the three general criteria for picking an a-bombing site were “the following qualification: (1) they be important targets in a large urban area of more than three miles in diameter, (2) they be capable of being damaged effectively by a blast, and (3) they are unlikely to be attacked by next August.”
So, “important targets” but not so important that they have already been targeted, and indeed wouldn’t be targeted for around three months (at least). And “in a large urban area.” Why is this necessary, if not to specifically target civilians?
To repeat my quote from cleek’s link, the three general criteria for picking an a-bombing site were “the following qualification: (1) they be important targets in a large urban area of more than three miles in diameter, (2) they be capable of being damaged effectively by a blast, and (3) they are unlikely to be attacked by next August.”
So, “important targets” but not so important that they have already been targeted, and indeed wouldn’t be targeted for around three months (at least). And “in a large urban area.” Why is this necessary, if not to specifically target civilians?
Three items here: army depot, port of embarkation and urban industrial area–all three are bona fide military targets.
oh for chrissakes. you’re arguing against the people who made the actual decision. they are talking about maximum psychological impact, they are talking about showing what ‘the gadget’ could do. they weren’t trying to degrade military capabilities. they were making a statement. it’s the same statement they were making with the firebombing, but on a far far bigger scale.
they actually wrote:
“any small and strictly military objective should be located in a much larger area subject to blast damage”.
ie. if you can find some military targets, make sure there’s lots of other stuff around them that will be destroyed, too – don’t waste the bomb on some isolated military targets – they wanted to make it count.
the entire city of Hiroshima wasn’t a military target. their own words make that clear. what they set out to destroy, which included, along with the many tens thousands of dead civilians and their city, was a strategic target. it was one that would convince Japan and the rest of the world that we meant business. it was not a military target: it was a city full of people. not soldiers. it wasn’t a barracks. it was a city the size of Buffalo, NY.
read the document.
Three items here: army depot, port of embarkation and urban industrial area–all three are bona fide military targets.
oh for chrissakes. you’re arguing against the people who made the actual decision. they are talking about maximum psychological impact, they are talking about showing what ‘the gadget’ could do. they weren’t trying to degrade military capabilities. they were making a statement. it’s the same statement they were making with the firebombing, but on a far far bigger scale.
they actually wrote:
“any small and strictly military objective should be located in a much larger area subject to blast damage”.
ie. if you can find some military targets, make sure there’s lots of other stuff around them that will be destroyed, too – don’t waste the bomb on some isolated military targets – they wanted to make it count.
the entire city of Hiroshima wasn’t a military target. their own words make that clear. what they set out to destroy, which included, along with the many tens thousands of dead civilians and their city, was a strategic target. it was one that would convince Japan and the rest of the world that we meant business. it was not a military target: it was a city full of people. not soldiers. it wasn’t a barracks. it was a city the size of Buffalo, NY.
read the document.
McK:
But, nice try on the mind-reading.
Glad I could return the favor.
And, BTW, nothing you quote is conceptually all that sophisticated. It is simply a subset of the general class of ‘use of deadly force’ jurisprudence that has developed over centuries.
Wow, really? Common law nations derived law from existing legal traditions?!?!? Will wonders never cease?
(Though I’d add that an awful damned lot of conceptually sophisticated laws can be dismissed as simple by performing straightforward, uninformed readings of them w/o considering how they’re interpreted and used. Look at e.g. most of the Constitution.)
Other than biologicals and chemicals, nothing you listed was an actual blanket prohibition, because each is riddled with subjective exceptions, perceptions (“I’m sorry, I thought the village *was* defended.”), in’s and out’s.
Chem/Bio has ins and outs too; so does that mean there’s no blanket prohibition on that either because they specify what is and is not considered a chemical weapon in this context? Also: by your, um, interesting assertion above, the fact that MISTAKES can happen means there are no hard-and-fast rules?!?!? Fascinating.
I omitted them as beside-the-point, but had you examined the linked FM there’s also prohibitions on assorted other arms judged to cause “unnecessary suffering” (e.g., dum-dum rounds), and every time the DoD pushes out a new weapon, there is a legal review to make sure said system complies. Hmm. How are these not blanket proscriptions? Please tell me it’s because there’s exceptions, ins and outs, etc.; it’s so cute to hear a profession that defining what exactly is proscribed means that said defined item isn’t really being proscribed. Should I infer that only vague, broad, ambiguous, and conspicuously uninterpreted definitions are actually hard-and-fast, black-and-white blanket definitions? I’m having trouble reaching any other conclusion, though that seems like it’d invite all kinds of criticisms involving them being too subjective and subject to perception…
I also omitted, because again it seemed redundant, a pretty well-and-clear straightforward prohibition on poison. I’m curious how that’s not “really” a blanket prohibition.
And there are other straight-up prohibitions, too. Multiple classes of perfidy are out, though perhaps it being narrowly defined means you’d say “no it isn’t, there’s exceptions and interpretations!” (or perhaps you wouldn’t; I’ll try to leave the Carnac penalties for you).
And very much to the point, intentional targeting of civilian targets is explicitly prohibited. No subjective exceptions, perceptions, ins and outs. Not unless you want to return to the realm of your earlier claim in re: mistakes, such that if it’s possible for someone to (willfully or otherwise) misclassify someone as a non-civilian, there’s not REALLY a proscription against attacking them. In which case you’re not far from an argument that theft isn’t really prohibited by the law, because there can exist no blanket prohibition of it without subjective exceptions, perceptions (“I’m sorry, I thought they *gave* me their car.”), ins and outs. The fact that the law allows for someone to lend their car doesn’t mean it’s not prohibiting theft.
McKinney, seriously, you led in arguing that “military necessity” and “proportionality” were insidious pretexts used politically by people without skin in the game to criticize those who did have it after-the-fact, which, again, is a novel POV. You’ve backpeddled forward from there with authoritative blanket claim after authoritative blanket claim that don’t correspond to the living practice of the law of war (with a generous side of barbs, self-righteousness condescension, and mindreading that certainly contributed to the escalating deterioration of my tone, but that I hadn’t previously called you out on). Your final word on the subject was “You may see clarity, I see mush (not unlike a lot of other laws)” – it’s telling. Leaving aside truly mushy laws, the laws that seem the mushiest are the ones where one isn’t familiar with the common understanding of them – and law of war is bad about this because of how much is dragged in alongside conventional LoW by customary law of war. But that to one side, terms of art are terms of art. That someone wants to see mush doesn’t make e.g. the distinction between larceny and wrongful appropriation a meaningless mush of “ins and outs” – it means that those who work with this crap have an understanding of what it conventionally means. You know this, I know this. And yeah, the fact that it’s not spelled out in excruciating detail means sometimes you’ll have slimy weasels (cf. John Woo) who will carve new “understandings” out of “mush” by ignoring conventional ones. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t a hard and fast definition. It means they ignored it and found a justification for their preferred interpretation. And then managed to avoid blinking if they got called out on it. The fact that something is not explicitly spelled out to the nth degree such that it can be readily and unambiguously interpreted by a person not familiar with it doesn’t mean it’s “mush” – especially when faced with someone given to calling anything that does try to be more explicit a meaningless mess of exceptions and “ins and outs”.
BLUF, legal strictures exist in the United States on use of military force. The DoD is aware of these, and takes them into consideration in creating its rules, regulations, and suchlike. I think they should continue to do so (if anything, more strictly), you appear to think their doing so is “morally and practically wrong”, possibly even at the level they’re doing now, but certainly at the level some nations’ readings of our treaty obligations would entail. Fine. As neither one of us are in a position to make our wishes come true, we can leave it at that.
McK:
But, nice try on the mind-reading.
Glad I could return the favor.
And, BTW, nothing you quote is conceptually all that sophisticated. It is simply a subset of the general class of ‘use of deadly force’ jurisprudence that has developed over centuries.
Wow, really? Common law nations derived law from existing legal traditions?!?!? Will wonders never cease?
(Though I’d add that an awful damned lot of conceptually sophisticated laws can be dismissed as simple by performing straightforward, uninformed readings of them w/o considering how they’re interpreted and used. Look at e.g. most of the Constitution.)
Other than biologicals and chemicals, nothing you listed was an actual blanket prohibition, because each is riddled with subjective exceptions, perceptions (“I’m sorry, I thought the village *was* defended.”), in’s and out’s.
Chem/Bio has ins and outs too; so does that mean there’s no blanket prohibition on that either because they specify what is and is not considered a chemical weapon in this context? Also: by your, um, interesting assertion above, the fact that MISTAKES can happen means there are no hard-and-fast rules?!?!? Fascinating.
I omitted them as beside-the-point, but had you examined the linked FM there’s also prohibitions on assorted other arms judged to cause “unnecessary suffering” (e.g., dum-dum rounds), and every time the DoD pushes out a new weapon, there is a legal review to make sure said system complies. Hmm. How are these not blanket proscriptions? Please tell me it’s because there’s exceptions, ins and outs, etc.; it’s so cute to hear a profession that defining what exactly is proscribed means that said defined item isn’t really being proscribed. Should I infer that only vague, broad, ambiguous, and conspicuously uninterpreted definitions are actually hard-and-fast, black-and-white blanket definitions? I’m having trouble reaching any other conclusion, though that seems like it’d invite all kinds of criticisms involving them being too subjective and subject to perception…
I also omitted, because again it seemed redundant, a pretty well-and-clear straightforward prohibition on poison. I’m curious how that’s not “really” a blanket prohibition.
And there are other straight-up prohibitions, too. Multiple classes of perfidy are out, though perhaps it being narrowly defined means you’d say “no it isn’t, there’s exceptions and interpretations!” (or perhaps you wouldn’t; I’ll try to leave the Carnac penalties for you).
And very much to the point, intentional targeting of civilian targets is explicitly prohibited. No subjective exceptions, perceptions, ins and outs. Not unless you want to return to the realm of your earlier claim in re: mistakes, such that if it’s possible for someone to (willfully or otherwise) misclassify someone as a non-civilian, there’s not REALLY a proscription against attacking them. In which case you’re not far from an argument that theft isn’t really prohibited by the law, because there can exist no blanket prohibition of it without subjective exceptions, perceptions (“I’m sorry, I thought they *gave* me their car.”), ins and outs. The fact that the law allows for someone to lend their car doesn’t mean it’s not prohibiting theft.
McKinney, seriously, you led in arguing that “military necessity” and “proportionality” were insidious pretexts used politically by people without skin in the game to criticize those who did have it after-the-fact, which, again, is a novel POV. You’ve backpeddled forward from there with authoritative blanket claim after authoritative blanket claim that don’t correspond to the living practice of the law of war (with a generous side of barbs, self-righteousness condescension, and mindreading that certainly contributed to the escalating deterioration of my tone, but that I hadn’t previously called you out on). Your final word on the subject was “You may see clarity, I see mush (not unlike a lot of other laws)” – it’s telling. Leaving aside truly mushy laws, the laws that seem the mushiest are the ones where one isn’t familiar with the common understanding of them – and law of war is bad about this because of how much is dragged in alongside conventional LoW by customary law of war. But that to one side, terms of art are terms of art. That someone wants to see mush doesn’t make e.g. the distinction between larceny and wrongful appropriation a meaningless mush of “ins and outs” – it means that those who work with this crap have an understanding of what it conventionally means. You know this, I know this. And yeah, the fact that it’s not spelled out in excruciating detail means sometimes you’ll have slimy weasels (cf. John Woo) who will carve new “understandings” out of “mush” by ignoring conventional ones. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t a hard and fast definition. It means they ignored it and found a justification for their preferred interpretation. And then managed to avoid blinking if they got called out on it. The fact that something is not explicitly spelled out to the nth degree such that it can be readily and unambiguously interpreted by a person not familiar with it doesn’t mean it’s “mush” – especially when faced with someone given to calling anything that does try to be more explicit a meaningless mess of exceptions and “ins and outs”.
BLUF, legal strictures exist in the United States on use of military force. The DoD is aware of these, and takes them into consideration in creating its rules, regulations, and suchlike. I think they should continue to do so (if anything, more strictly), you appear to think their doing so is “morally and practically wrong”, possibly even at the level they’re doing now, but certainly at the level some nations’ readings of our treaty obligations would entail. Fine. As neither one of us are in a position to make our wishes come true, we can leave it at that.
Yeah, if you have a weapon that makes a really large explosion, it’s kind of a waste to use it on a solitary facility in the middle of nowhere. Big explosion; you want a big target.
Not really revelationary, I think.
Which isn’t to say that there haven’t been any good points made here, because saying that would be the opposite of truth.
Yeah, if you have a weapon that makes a really large explosion, it’s kind of a waste to use it on a solitary facility in the middle of nowhere. Big explosion; you want a big target.
Not really revelationary, I think.
Which isn’t to say that there haven’t been any good points made here, because saying that would be the opposite of truth.
“My sense is that any and everybody, when the shooting starts, plays by the principal rule of expediency, and justifies their actions after the fact. So, why limit it to Westerners?”
First, if you’re tired of arguing and feel outnumbered, feel free to ignore my comment. I never have enjoyed arguing in threads where I’m outnumbered and don’t imagine you care for it much either.
Anyway, my point is not that Westerners are worse than other people–my point is that Westerners are much the same as other people. i’m trying to undercut the claim that terrorism as used by others is a tactic we would never stoop to using.
I do think we’ve gotten less brutal in our tactics in recent decades, partly from public pressure, and more precise technology, but also because we realize carpet-bombing doesn’t win guerilla wars unless one is willing to destroy the country and call that a victory. Even the Bush Administration realized it couldn’t dump millions of tons of bombs on Iraq and Afghanistan, though we did dump millions of tons of bombs and artillery shells on South Vietnam a few decades earlier. Consequently the number of civilians killed by American forces in Afghanistan was far less than in Vietnam (this is probably also true in Iraq, but there’s such a wide range of death toll estimates the argument is fuzzier). But if we were in a situation where it was “kill enemy civilians or be conquered”, we’d kill enemy civilians and in large numbers if it was deemed necessary. I think we also still target civilians, but in plausibly deniable ways–for instance, with the targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Gulf War, with the idea that postwar sanctions would prevent or hamper repair and give us leverage. The idea is to cause civilian suffering and deaths, but all the time one could just blame it all on Saddam. We would never accept this for one moment if Arab countries could somehow impose such a policy on Israel, let alone ourselves. We’d call it for what it was, an attack on civilians.
“My sense is that any and everybody, when the shooting starts, plays by the principal rule of expediency, and justifies their actions after the fact. So, why limit it to Westerners?”
First, if you’re tired of arguing and feel outnumbered, feel free to ignore my comment. I never have enjoyed arguing in threads where I’m outnumbered and don’t imagine you care for it much either.
Anyway, my point is not that Westerners are worse than other people–my point is that Westerners are much the same as other people. i’m trying to undercut the claim that terrorism as used by others is a tactic we would never stoop to using.
I do think we’ve gotten less brutal in our tactics in recent decades, partly from public pressure, and more precise technology, but also because we realize carpet-bombing doesn’t win guerilla wars unless one is willing to destroy the country and call that a victory. Even the Bush Administration realized it couldn’t dump millions of tons of bombs on Iraq and Afghanistan, though we did dump millions of tons of bombs and artillery shells on South Vietnam a few decades earlier. Consequently the number of civilians killed by American forces in Afghanistan was far less than in Vietnam (this is probably also true in Iraq, but there’s such a wide range of death toll estimates the argument is fuzzier). But if we were in a situation where it was “kill enemy civilians or be conquered”, we’d kill enemy civilians and in large numbers if it was deemed necessary. I think we also still target civilians, but in plausibly deniable ways–for instance, with the targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Gulf War, with the idea that postwar sanctions would prevent or hamper repair and give us leverage. The idea is to cause civilian suffering and deaths, but all the time one could just blame it all on Saddam. We would never accept this for one moment if Arab countries could somehow impose such a policy on Israel, let alone ourselves. We’d call it for what it was, an attack on civilians.
“read the document.”
I did, and I’m still not summarizing it as “killing as many people as possible, in as spectacular a fashion as possible” but YMMV.
“don’t waste the bomb on some isolated military targets”
Because that would have basically the same effect as a demo…potentially none at all.
There are lots of things they could have done with a nuke, including nothing. Every single option they had involved unknown numbers civilian and military casualties.
“read the document.”
I did, and I’m still not summarizing it as “killing as many people as possible, in as spectacular a fashion as possible” but YMMV.
“don’t waste the bomb on some isolated military targets”
Because that would have basically the same effect as a demo…potentially none at all.
There are lots of things they could have done with a nuke, including nothing. Every single option they had involved unknown numbers civilian and military casualties.
Other interpretations of the document:
Sundance Kid: I can’t swim.
Butch Cassidy: Can’t swim? Hell, the fall alone is going to kill you.
Or:
There will be some people who are going to get …. and we use this term delicately … hurt.
Make it look like an accident. It hadda be done.
Or:
A single death is a tragedy. A million deaths is a statistic. Anything in between, not so much either way.
This has been a crackerjack thread. Except for the debate between McTX and Nombrilisme Vide (who, by the way, has my current favorite blogging handle), it’s not so much an argument about the what and the how, but a disagreement about how to word the press release.
This link is pretty concise regarding the thinking about using nuclear weapons going on in the Roosevelt/Truman administrations at the time:
http://www.mphpa.org/classic/LC/decision_to_drop.htm
I’ve skimmed it. Will read more closely later after I finish an amazing history of the events leading up to the Civil War and the war itself: “Battle Cry Of Freedom” by James McPherson.
Had nuclear weapons existed at the time, I think I know which side would have used them first.
Other interpretations of the document:
Sundance Kid: I can’t swim.
Butch Cassidy: Can’t swim? Hell, the fall alone is going to kill you.
Or:
There will be some people who are going to get …. and we use this term delicately … hurt.
Make it look like an accident. It hadda be done.
Or:
A single death is a tragedy. A million deaths is a statistic. Anything in between, not so much either way.
This has been a crackerjack thread. Except for the debate between McTX and Nombrilisme Vide (who, by the way, has my current favorite blogging handle), it’s not so much an argument about the what and the how, but a disagreement about how to word the press release.
This link is pretty concise regarding the thinking about using nuclear weapons going on in the Roosevelt/Truman administrations at the time:
http://www.mphpa.org/classic/LC/decision_to_drop.htm
I’ve skimmed it. Will read more closely later after I finish an amazing history of the events leading up to the Civil War and the war itself: “Battle Cry Of Freedom” by James McPherson.
Had nuclear weapons existed at the time, I think I know which side would have used them first.
There are lots of things they could have done with a nuke, including nothing. Every single option they had involved unknown numbers civilian and military casualties.
they could’ve dropped it on whatever large group of Japanese ships they could find. they could have dropped it on any number of island outposts. they could have dropped it on a port. Hiroshima had a big port; the bomb was targeted in the middle of the city, not on the port. the document tells us why.
they dropped it in the middle of a city of 300,000 because it would make a psychological impact. and the reason it made such a psychological impact was because it killed so many civilians in such a dramatic fashion.
and while the exact number of civilian casualties was unknown, it was guaranteed to be as large as possible because they dropped it in the middle of a city of 300,000, and not on a strictly military target. and it was intentional.
There are lots of things they could have done with a nuke, including nothing. Every single option they had involved unknown numbers civilian and military casualties.
they could’ve dropped it on whatever large group of Japanese ships they could find. they could have dropped it on any number of island outposts. they could have dropped it on a port. Hiroshima had a big port; the bomb was targeted in the middle of the city, not on the port. the document tells us why.
they dropped it in the middle of a city of 300,000 because it would make a psychological impact. and the reason it made such a psychological impact was because it killed so many civilians in such a dramatic fashion.
and while the exact number of civilian casualties was unknown, it was guaranteed to be as large as possible because they dropped it in the middle of a city of 300,000, and not on a strictly military target. and it was intentional.
OK, cleek, let’s try a little thought exercise. Suppose that the nukes had not been dropped, or only dropped on a group of ships out in the ocean where nobody much was around to see them. What would have been the course of the war?
Well, on the evidence at the time, the Japanese would not have surrendered any time soon. There would have been an invasion of the home islands, starting with naval bombardments and featuring hundreds of thousands of Allied troops storming beaches on one island after another. And resisted, not only by the Japanese Army but by the general civilian population as well.
How many casualties (Japanese and American) would have resulted? Take a wild guess . . . or consult the estimates made at the time for Operation Downfall. Hint: if you come up with any number under 100,000, just for Allied casualties, you aren’t even close.
OK, cleek, let’s try a little thought exercise. Suppose that the nukes had not been dropped, or only dropped on a group of ships out in the ocean where nobody much was around to see them. What would have been the course of the war?
Well, on the evidence at the time, the Japanese would not have surrendered any time soon. There would have been an invasion of the home islands, starting with naval bombardments and featuring hundreds of thousands of Allied troops storming beaches on one island after another. And resisted, not only by the Japanese Army but by the general civilian population as well.
How many casualties (Japanese and American) would have resulted? Take a wild guess . . . or consult the estimates made at the time for Operation Downfall. Hint: if you come up with any number under 100,000, just for Allied casualties, you aren’t even close.
What would have been the course of the war?
we don’t know. we can’t know.
we do know what actually happened and we know why it happened. and we also know that the claim that the allies didn’t target civilians is not true. they did.
i said above that there was justification for the bombing (to bring an end to the war). that doesn’t change the fact that the targets were chosen in order to maximize the damage and psychological impact on the Japanese civilian population, because they were.
What would have been the course of the war?
we don’t know. we can’t know.
we do know what actually happened and we know why it happened. and we also know that the claim that the allies didn’t target civilians is not true. they did.
i said above that there was justification for the bombing (to bring an end to the war). that doesn’t change the fact that the targets were chosen in order to maximize the damage and psychological impact on the Japanese civilian population, because they were.
At least that seems to be a rather straightforward thing: Use one on a military target, preferably one within sight but not explosion range of a large population centre. And announce it in advance (though not with an exact time and place). When that warning shot had not shown the desired effect, the second (wasn’t there one (unassembled) more in reserve?) could have been used on a city with the threat that there was more of that in stock.
One could argue in both directions. Iirc parts of the military did not care even after Nagasaki and would have fought on without the intervention of the emperor, so for them it would not have mattered what got hit by the first bomb. On the other hand news of an explosion next door (e.g. the harbour of Hiroshima instead of the city center) would be nearly as easy/difficult to suppress as one of it within a city.
The alternative could have been a city already target of a previous conventional attack and therefore with an already reduced population.
Psychology was one part but the test aspect should imo not be neglected. And for that an intact densely populated place was of course far more suitable.
Btw, what would have been the cost (in money and lives) to delay the invasion for 1-3 months (given that the conventional bombing campaign was going on all the time)?
How long would it have taken to get one or two more bombs ready? All these are additional fcators that should be included in the calculation.
At least that seems to be a rather straightforward thing: Use one on a military target, preferably one within sight but not explosion range of a large population centre. And announce it in advance (though not with an exact time and place). When that warning shot had not shown the desired effect, the second (wasn’t there one (unassembled) more in reserve?) could have been used on a city with the threat that there was more of that in stock.
One could argue in both directions. Iirc parts of the military did not care even after Nagasaki and would have fought on without the intervention of the emperor, so for them it would not have mattered what got hit by the first bomb. On the other hand news of an explosion next door (e.g. the harbour of Hiroshima instead of the city center) would be nearly as easy/difficult to suppress as one of it within a city.
The alternative could have been a city already target of a previous conventional attack and therefore with an already reduced population.
Psychology was one part but the test aspect should imo not be neglected. And for that an intact densely populated place was of course far more suitable.
Btw, what would have been the cost (in money and lives) to delay the invasion for 1-3 months (given that the conventional bombing campaign was going on all the time)?
How long would it have taken to get one or two more bombs ready? All these are additional fcators that should be included in the calculation.
I was just reading And the river flowed as a Raft of Corpses, which are the translated tanka of Tsutomu Yamaguchi, a survivor of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was working for Mitsubishi on a short term assignment in Hiroshima and was just leaving Hiroshima to return to his home in Nagasaki on Aug 6th. After he and three other Mitsubishi employees crossed the city, witnessing the effects of the bomb, they were able to get on a refugee train to Nagasaki. He went to the Mitsubishi company hospital, was treated, and went back to his family, but after seeing them, he insisted on going to the head Mitsubishi office on Aug 9th to explain what had happened to him and to Hiroshima. His superiors and co-workers didn’t believe him and he quotes one of them as saying “How could a single bomb destroy a city as huge as Hiroshima-You’re an engineer, think about it. You’ve had a serious injury to your head. You’re not thinking straight” Then, at 11:02 am, the second bomb was dropped and Yamaguchi went outside to be greeted by his second mushroom cloud.
Yamaguchi was also fired by Mitsubishi for not showing up to work.
I was just reading And the river flowed as a Raft of Corpses, which are the translated tanka of Tsutomu Yamaguchi, a survivor of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was working for Mitsubishi on a short term assignment in Hiroshima and was just leaving Hiroshima to return to his home in Nagasaki on Aug 6th. After he and three other Mitsubishi employees crossed the city, witnessing the effects of the bomb, they were able to get on a refugee train to Nagasaki. He went to the Mitsubishi company hospital, was treated, and went back to his family, but after seeing them, he insisted on going to the head Mitsubishi office on Aug 9th to explain what had happened to him and to Hiroshima. His superiors and co-workers didn’t believe him and he quotes one of them as saying “How could a single bomb destroy a city as huge as Hiroshima-You’re an engineer, think about it. You’ve had a serious injury to your head. You’re not thinking straight” Then, at 11:02 am, the second bomb was dropped and Yamaguchi went outside to be greeted by his second mushroom cloud.
Yamaguchi was also fired by Mitsubishi for not showing up to work.
Well thanks for yet another demonstration that American exceptionalism is alive and kicking. Let’s hope with Hegel that the cognitive dissonances it causes will eventually lead to its implosion and make way for something more mature and humane.
Well thanks for yet another demonstration that American exceptionalism is alive and kicking. Let’s hope with Hegel that the cognitive dissonances it causes will eventually lead to its implosion and make way for something more mature and humane.
But first the contradictions have to be heightened and that will not be pretty.
But first the contradictions have to be heightened and that will not be pretty.
“His superiors and co-workers didn’t believe him”
And this is an aspect of a why an isolated military target may not have worked. Or sinking a fleet (although Japan’s navy was pretty badly damaged at this point). Or dropping it off the coast.
cleek,
I’m not trying to argue about whether or not the military knew they were killing civilians. Its pretty obvious they knew that upfront.
I’m saying the Hiroshima had military value, and like I told Hartmut upthread, maybe that’s figleafy. I’m certainly not contesting that the entire city (including civilians) was the target.
What I’m saying bothers me is that I don’t see other good options at that point. The more focused, more entirely military targets ran risk of having minimal effect, and being right where you were before deployment.
And you could make an argument that we shouldn’t have dropped it at all. But that carries its own problems of extending the war, either by invasion or attrition, would potentially have larger civilian and military body counts.
What I dislike about your one line summary is that it dispenses with all those concerns and calculations. It disregards the ethical dilemma of a known evil versus a potentially much larger unknown evil.
It’s an ethical dilemma for me, and I’m loathe to say it wasn’t for any of the decision makers. I don’t see a clear “right” answer, so I’m not going to sit in judgement of the people that made it.
That’s all I’m saying. I’m trying very hard not to get pulled into the larger debate going on between NV, McK, you, and others.
Also, as a side note, isn’t it a little ironic that a thread about “why there is no memorial of the firebombing of Tokyo” turned into a discussion on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
“His superiors and co-workers didn’t believe him”
And this is an aspect of a why an isolated military target may not have worked. Or sinking a fleet (although Japan’s navy was pretty badly damaged at this point). Or dropping it off the coast.
cleek,
I’m not trying to argue about whether or not the military knew they were killing civilians. Its pretty obvious they knew that upfront.
I’m saying the Hiroshima had military value, and like I told Hartmut upthread, maybe that’s figleafy. I’m certainly not contesting that the entire city (including civilians) was the target.
What I’m saying bothers me is that I don’t see other good options at that point. The more focused, more entirely military targets ran risk of having minimal effect, and being right where you were before deployment.
And you could make an argument that we shouldn’t have dropped it at all. But that carries its own problems of extending the war, either by invasion or attrition, would potentially have larger civilian and military body counts.
What I dislike about your one line summary is that it dispenses with all those concerns and calculations. It disregards the ethical dilemma of a known evil versus a potentially much larger unknown evil.
It’s an ethical dilemma for me, and I’m loathe to say it wasn’t for any of the decision makers. I don’t see a clear “right” answer, so I’m not going to sit in judgement of the people that made it.
That’s all I’m saying. I’m trying very hard not to get pulled into the larger debate going on between NV, McK, you, and others.
Also, as a side note, isn’t it a little ironic that a thread about “why there is no memorial of the firebombing of Tokyo” turned into a discussion on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
thompson, I think you’re having the wrong argument with cleek. He wrote this in his last comment (emphasis mine):
thompson, I think you’re having the wrong argument with cleek. He wrote this in his last comment (emphasis mine):
The Count’s link is pretty interesting.
Seems like, once it was confirmed that the bomb actually worked, they should have revisited their approach more than they did, since decisions were made based on the worry that the bomb might not work (in particular, warning the Japanese about it).
The Count’s link is pretty interesting.
Seems like, once it was confirmed that the bomb actually worked, they should have revisited their approach more than they did, since decisions were made based on the worry that the bomb might not work (in particular, warning the Japanese about it).
HSH:
Thanks, yes, that’s part of what I was saying. I don’t really have any disagreement with cleek, except maybe a minor one in that I don’t like how he phrased something.
HSH:
Thanks, yes, that’s part of what I was saying. I don’t really have any disagreement with cleek, except maybe a minor one in that I don’t like how he phrased something.
I ask myself, when I’m reading histories of warfare, what all the fighting and the killing and the body bags were for.
Now I know:
http://www.newyorker.com/humor/issuecartoons/2014/02/03/cartoons#slide=7
I ask myself, when I’m reading histories of warfare, what all the fighting and the killing and the body bags were for.
Now I know:
http://www.newyorker.com/humor/issuecartoons/2014/02/03/cartoons#slide=7
It’s an ethical dilemma for me, and I’m loathe to say it wasn’t for any of the decision makers. I don’t see a clear “right” answer, so I’m not going to sit in judgement of the people that made it.
and i’m trying not to, either. i wasn’t there. my perspective is not theirs.
but ‘we’ did what we did. let’s own up to it.
Also, as a side note, isn’t it a little ironic that a thread about “why there is no memorial of the firebombing of Tokyo” turned into a discussion on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
yeah. (and the German civilians should get a solemn nod here, too. and the British.)
the a-bombs were just far more dramatic than the firebombings. so they clarify certain issues.
war is hell. things get out of hand. desperate times, etc. i get that. my real point here is that we really should admit that, despite the rhetoric and post-facto history-making, civilians really do end up on the target lists, eventually. we’re not angels. we bring horror, if we think horror is called for.
It’s an ethical dilemma for me, and I’m loathe to say it wasn’t for any of the decision makers. I don’t see a clear “right” answer, so I’m not going to sit in judgement of the people that made it.
and i’m trying not to, either. i wasn’t there. my perspective is not theirs.
but ‘we’ did what we did. let’s own up to it.
Also, as a side note, isn’t it a little ironic that a thread about “why there is no memorial of the firebombing of Tokyo” turned into a discussion on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
yeah. (and the German civilians should get a solemn nod here, too. and the British.)
the a-bombs were just far more dramatic than the firebombings. so they clarify certain issues.
war is hell. things get out of hand. desperate times, etc. i get that. my real point here is that we really should admit that, despite the rhetoric and post-facto history-making, civilians really do end up on the target lists, eventually. we’re not angels. we bring horror, if we think horror is called for.
Yes, that’s the conventional wisdom.
I’m hoping you can expand on this a bit.
Sure. I have no doubt that Japanese industry was decentralized at the job-shop and small subcontractor level, so that every little machine shop, or small textile plant making uniforms, etc., which burned in an incinerated urban square mile after firebombing, did reflected a degradation of Japan’s war-making ability.
But, I really don’t think that’s why LeMay targeted the cities for destruction the way he did. As with the dropping of the atomic bombs, I think the rationale for firebombing cities was a demonstration to the Japanese government and people that if they kept resisting we had the capability and the will to destroy Japan completely, i.e. to bomb them back into the stone age.
I see LeMay’s decision to use the B-29 force the way he did after “daylight precision bombing” of Japan proved impractical–due to the jet-stream, wear and tear on the bomber force from sustained high altitude operations, fighter opposition, which did cause casualties, though nowhere on the German scale, etc.– as a parallel to Truman’s own decision “drop the bomb” when conventional bombing proved insufficiently persuasive.
In both cases the American war economy had devoted extraordinary resources to developing both the B-29 force and the A-Bomb. The temper of the times was such that there was no way any military leader in LeMay’s or Truman’s position could not have used these air weapons to the maximum extent possible.
As I see it, the prospect of a land invasion of Japan by Allied forces was simply unthinkable if it could be avoided by aerial assault, because of the enormous casualties our side would suffer. Nobody on our side wanted to go after Japan on land, and risk a nationwide fight on the model of Iwo Jima or Okinawa, if it could possibly be avoided.
That, plus inter-service rivalry, is why I think LeMay pursued the firebombing campaign the way he did. I view the “decentralized small machine shop” justification as window dressing for total war (even if there was truth in the assertion.)
In the context of 1945 the firebombing was understandable, though obviously horrible. That’s my main point.
Yes, that’s the conventional wisdom.
I’m hoping you can expand on this a bit.
Sure. I have no doubt that Japanese industry was decentralized at the job-shop and small subcontractor level, so that every little machine shop, or small textile plant making uniforms, etc., which burned in an incinerated urban square mile after firebombing, did reflected a degradation of Japan’s war-making ability.
But, I really don’t think that’s why LeMay targeted the cities for destruction the way he did. As with the dropping of the atomic bombs, I think the rationale for firebombing cities was a demonstration to the Japanese government and people that if they kept resisting we had the capability and the will to destroy Japan completely, i.e. to bomb them back into the stone age.
I see LeMay’s decision to use the B-29 force the way he did after “daylight precision bombing” of Japan proved impractical–due to the jet-stream, wear and tear on the bomber force from sustained high altitude operations, fighter opposition, which did cause casualties, though nowhere on the German scale, etc.– as a parallel to Truman’s own decision “drop the bomb” when conventional bombing proved insufficiently persuasive.
In both cases the American war economy had devoted extraordinary resources to developing both the B-29 force and the A-Bomb. The temper of the times was such that there was no way any military leader in LeMay’s or Truman’s position could not have used these air weapons to the maximum extent possible.
As I see it, the prospect of a land invasion of Japan by Allied forces was simply unthinkable if it could be avoided by aerial assault, because of the enormous casualties our side would suffer. Nobody on our side wanted to go after Japan on land, and risk a nationwide fight on the model of Iwo Jima or Okinawa, if it could possibly be avoided.
That, plus inter-service rivalry, is why I think LeMay pursued the firebombing campaign the way he did. I view the “decentralized small machine shop” justification as window dressing for total war (even if there was truth in the assertion.)
In the context of 1945 the firebombing was understandable, though obviously horrible. That’s my main point.
Thanks Redhand. I’m not sure if I agree with that 100%, I think the US was actually surprised at how resilient the Japanese were in terms of manufacturing (toward the end of the war, they were distilling airplane fuel from pine trees and sweet potatoes) Of course, that was also the case in North Korea and Vietnam as well, so it’s not much of an excuse.
Thanks Redhand. I’m not sure if I agree with that 100%, I think the US was actually surprised at how resilient the Japanese were in terms of manufacturing (toward the end of the war, they were distilling airplane fuel from pine trees and sweet potatoes) Of course, that was also the case in North Korea and Vietnam as well, so it’s not much of an excuse.
The Germans got their rocket fuel from potatoes too (and some plastics from milk for that matter. Coal to butter worked less well and got fed to concentration camp inmates with nasty results). The Americans may have been the only ones that had not to resort to this kind of improvisation due to shortage of critical resources. That may explain their surprise.
The Germans got their rocket fuel from potatoes too (and some plastics from milk for that matter. Coal to butter worked less well and got fed to concentration camp inmates with nasty results). The Americans may have been the only ones that had not to resort to this kind of improvisation due to shortage of critical resources. That may explain their surprise.
cleek:
sorry about that, I got hung up on a small bit of phrasing.
“but ‘we’ did what we did. let’s own up to it.”
I agree. I think we must carry the burden of everything done in our names, much of it evil, much of it necessary. But its something that we should hold on our conscience.
cleek:
sorry about that, I got hung up on a small bit of phrasing.
“but ‘we’ did what we did. let’s own up to it.”
I agree. I think we must carry the burden of everything done in our names, much of it evil, much of it necessary. But its something that we should hold on our conscience.
i wasn’t there. my perspective is not theirs.
I wasn’t there either, but I attempt to figure out what their perspective was, because they were involved in a war that brought the world from 50 to 80 million deaths. Civilians were estimated to have been more than half of that. The atom bombs killed fewer than 200,000. Counting is gruesome and ghoulish, but everybody knew that there with or without the bomb, there were going to be a lot more dead people, probably more than 200,000.
but ‘we’ did what we did. let’s own up to it.
I don’t know anyone who denies it. Does anyone seriously deny that Truman or his advisors knew that these were cities which were occupied by civilians?
yeah. (and the German civilians should get a solemn nod here, too. and the British.)
Maybe a few other nods as well. In fact, look at the chart here entitled “Human losses of World War II by country”. There are two columns for civilian deaths.
Finding the most effective way to stop the slaughter was the right thing to do. Owning up to it is not a problem for me.
i wasn’t there. my perspective is not theirs.
I wasn’t there either, but I attempt to figure out what their perspective was, because they were involved in a war that brought the world from 50 to 80 million deaths. Civilians were estimated to have been more than half of that. The atom bombs killed fewer than 200,000. Counting is gruesome and ghoulish, but everybody knew that there with or without the bomb, there were going to be a lot more dead people, probably more than 200,000.
but ‘we’ did what we did. let’s own up to it.
I don’t know anyone who denies it. Does anyone seriously deny that Truman or his advisors knew that these were cities which were occupied by civilians?
yeah. (and the German civilians should get a solemn nod here, too. and the British.)
Maybe a few other nods as well. In fact, look at the chart here entitled “Human losses of World War II by country”. There are two columns for civilian deaths.
Finding the most effective way to stop the slaughter was the right thing to do. Owning up to it is not a problem for me.
I don’t know anyone who denies it. Does anyone seriously deny that Truman or his advisors knew that these were cities which were occupied by civilians?
that’s not my ‘it’.
I don’t know anyone who denies it. Does anyone seriously deny that Truman or his advisors knew that these were cities which were occupied by civilians?
that’s not my ‘it’.
I don’t know anyone who denies it. Does anyone seriously deny that Truman or his advisors knew that these were cities which were occupied by civilians?
No. But the issue on the thread was whether or not killing civilians was part of the strategy rather than an unavoidable side effect. Both Ugh and cleek provided evidence that it was, in fact, part of the decision to drop the bombs where they did.
It seems most of the commenters on the thread, including me, were okay with that under the circumstances (to the extent you can be “okay” with doing a really terrible thing, even though the alternatives were likely to lead to things even more terrible).
At least one commenter denied that killing civilians was even an integral part of the strategy, and that doing so was simply an unavoidable consequence of the only viable way of doing sufficient damage to militarily useful infrastructure.
I don’t know anyone who denies it. Does anyone seriously deny that Truman or his advisors knew that these were cities which were occupied by civilians?
No. But the issue on the thread was whether or not killing civilians was part of the strategy rather than an unavoidable side effect. Both Ugh and cleek provided evidence that it was, in fact, part of the decision to drop the bombs where they did.
It seems most of the commenters on the thread, including me, were okay with that under the circumstances (to the extent you can be “okay” with doing a really terrible thing, even though the alternatives were likely to lead to things even more terrible).
At least one commenter denied that killing civilians was even an integral part of the strategy, and that doing so was simply an unavoidable consequence of the only viable way of doing sufficient damage to militarily useful infrastructure.
Isn’t it a distinction without a difference in a situation (such as that one) where it was obvious that civilians were going to die in large numbers either way? If they’d had an effective option that didn’t include killing civilians, that would be a different matter.
Isn’t it a distinction without a difference in a situation (such as that one) where it was obvious that civilians were going to die in large numbers either way? If they’d had an effective option that didn’t include killing civilians, that would be a different matter.
Isn’t it a distinction without a difference
No, it’s not. It’s a question of intent.
We need to bomb a particular place, unfortunately a lot of civilians will be killed.
We need to bomb a particular place and part of the reason for choosing that place is *because* a lot of civilians will be killed.
Could be the same result, however the intention is different.
Isn’t it a distinction without a difference
No, it’s not. It’s a question of intent.
We need to bomb a particular place, unfortunately a lot of civilians will be killed.
We need to bomb a particular place and part of the reason for choosing that place is *because* a lot of civilians will be killed.
Could be the same result, however the intention is different.
We need to bomb a particular place and part of the reason for choosing that place is *because* a lot of civilians will be killed.
Again, that depends upon whether there was an option not to kill as many civilians. That was not an option. If the “spectacular” and frightening nature of the atomic bomb was intended to make people become quickly resigned to the fact that they would lose, and encourage them to surrender, that seems to me to be a legitimate goal, given that sparing civilians did not seem to be an option.
Also, I’m completely in favor of the concept of sparing civilians, and wouldn’t be one to support ignoring that longstanding convention. However, to be realistic about it, human beings are all valuable, and many soldiers volunteer because they’re either dutifully (or maybe zealously) representing their people (along with its cultural values) or because they were drafted.
The choices that seemed available justified making a dramatic case for ending the war quickly by instilling fear with a spectacular show of strength. Recognizing the tragedy of war and violence (including garden variety domestic violence) is an appropriate response. Judging harshly the morality of people who were trying to end the war, especially against a very brutal ideology that itself sought to exterminate people seems extremely inappropriate to me.
I have no doubt that had our adversaries developed that weapon, it would have been used against the Allied powers. I’m glad we didn’t wait to see.
We need to bomb a particular place and part of the reason for choosing that place is *because* a lot of civilians will be killed.
Again, that depends upon whether there was an option not to kill as many civilians. That was not an option. If the “spectacular” and frightening nature of the atomic bomb was intended to make people become quickly resigned to the fact that they would lose, and encourage them to surrender, that seems to me to be a legitimate goal, given that sparing civilians did not seem to be an option.
Also, I’m completely in favor of the concept of sparing civilians, and wouldn’t be one to support ignoring that longstanding convention. However, to be realistic about it, human beings are all valuable, and many soldiers volunteer because they’re either dutifully (or maybe zealously) representing their people (along with its cultural values) or because they were drafted.
The choices that seemed available justified making a dramatic case for ending the war quickly by instilling fear with a spectacular show of strength. Recognizing the tragedy of war and violence (including garden variety domestic violence) is an appropriate response. Judging harshly the morality of people who were trying to end the war, especially against a very brutal ideology that itself sought to exterminate people seems extremely inappropriate to me.
I have no doubt that had our adversaries developed that weapon, it would have been used against the Allied powers. I’m glad we didn’t wait to see.
especially against a very brutal ideology that itself sought to exterminate people
Again, just for emphasis, genocide was on the to do list of the Axis powers, and in some cases was pretty well checked off. It had to stop.
especially against a very brutal ideology that itself sought to exterminate people
Again, just for emphasis, genocide was on the to do list of the Axis powers, and in some cases was pretty well checked off. It had to stop.
Sure. But if we’re going to talk about forseen-but-unintended consequences, that applies here too. We didn’t enter the war to stop genocide.
Sure. But if we’re going to talk about forseen-but-unintended consequences, that applies here too. We didn’t enter the war to stop genocide.
We didn’t enter the war to stop genocide.
By that time, we knew about it for sure. The truth validated a lot of people’s preconceptions, and made victory all the more important.
We didn’t enter the war to stop genocide.
By that time, we knew about it for sure. The truth validated a lot of people’s preconceptions, and made victory all the more important.
(To clarify, my “sure” is agreeing with the immediately-preceding comment, not the preceding-but-one comment, which I can’t agree with. Saying that there was no intent to kill multitudes of civilians because we had decided on a course of action that would require us to kill multitudes of civilians is kinda equivocating the intentionality of the act out of existence.)
(To clarify, my “sure” is agreeing with the immediately-preceding comment, not the preceding-but-one comment, which I can’t agree with. Saying that there was no intent to kill multitudes of civilians because we had decided on a course of action that would require us to kill multitudes of civilians is kinda equivocating the intentionality of the act out of existence.)
Nom. v. your 8:35 makes no sense.
… the Japanese slaughtered as many as 30 million Filipinos, Malays, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians and Burmese, at least 23 million of them ethnic Chinese.
We definitely know that they weren’t particularly concerned about civilians, and that losing the war was not an option.
Nom. v. your 8:35 makes no sense.
… the Japanese slaughtered as many as 30 million Filipinos, Malays, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians and Burmese, at least 23 million of them ethnic Chinese.
We definitely know that they weren’t particularly concerned about civilians, and that losing the war was not an option.
Saying there was no intent to kill large quantities of civilians because we had decided on using a weapon in a psychological manner that could only be highly effective in that regard if it had high civilian casualties is pushing the intentionality to carry out the course of action up a level into the calculus that determined how the weapon would be best used. That means we can’t just take said calculus as a given IOT say there was no intent, which is what your 7:10 appears to be doing. There was a decision to use the bombs in a manner deemed to be the most effective psychologically. Accordingly, there was a conscious decision to target civilians. That’s all. Was it the best choice of a number of bad choices? Possibly. Perhaps even probably; the arguments for that are reasonably convincing. But it still was a conscious choice to target civilians, and there was definite intent that it be used in a manner that would assuredly cause mass civilian casualties. It was not foreseen-but-unintended. It was both foreseen and intended.
Saying there was no intent to kill large quantities of civilians because we had decided on using a weapon in a psychological manner that could only be highly effective in that regard if it had high civilian casualties is pushing the intentionality to carry out the course of action up a level into the calculus that determined how the weapon would be best used. That means we can’t just take said calculus as a given IOT say there was no intent, which is what your 7:10 appears to be doing. There was a decision to use the bombs in a manner deemed to be the most effective psychologically. Accordingly, there was a conscious decision to target civilians. That’s all. Was it the best choice of a number of bad choices? Possibly. Perhaps even probably; the arguments for that are reasonably convincing. But it still was a conscious choice to target civilians, and there was definite intent that it be used in a manner that would assuredly cause mass civilian casualties. It was not foreseen-but-unintended. It was both foreseen and intended.
(If this seems at all like meaningless/confusing quibbling over nothing, I wouldn’t dream of holding it against you. As a consequentialist, I’ve always found the doctrine of double effect to be both mildly incoherent and thoroughly repugnant.)
(If this seems at all like meaningless/confusing quibbling over nothing, I wouldn’t dream of holding it against you. As a consequentialist, I’ve always found the doctrine of double effect to be both mildly incoherent and thoroughly repugnant.)
There was a decision to use the bombs in a manner deemed to be the most effective psychologically. Accordingly, there was a conscious decision to target civilians. That’s all. Was it the best choice of a number of bad choices? Possibly.
“That’s all” seems to contradict the possibility that it was “the best choice of a number of bad choices.”
So, right, it does seem like a “meaningless/confusing quibbling over nothing.” People live in the real world and make decisions according to their interests, but (we always hope) tempered by morality. This one seems like a no brainer to me. The rest of the Chalmers Johnson article that I linked to seems far more troubling and worthy of controversy.
There was a decision to use the bombs in a manner deemed to be the most effective psychologically. Accordingly, there was a conscious decision to target civilians. That’s all. Was it the best choice of a number of bad choices? Possibly.
“That’s all” seems to contradict the possibility that it was “the best choice of a number of bad choices.”
So, right, it does seem like a “meaningless/confusing quibbling over nothing.” People live in the real world and make decisions according to their interests, but (we always hope) tempered by morality. This one seems like a no brainer to me. The rest of the Chalmers Johnson article that I linked to seems far more troubling and worthy of controversy.
“That’s all” seems to contradict the possibility that it was “the best choice of a number of bad choices.”
Well, no. Again, I’m trying to argue from an ethical standpoint I don’t actually subscribe to, so please bear with me if I wax incoherent. It was the best choice for maximizing the possibility of minimizing overall civilian, but that doesn’t mean it can still be considered a good choice. Ethical theories that would make such a distinction about intent can find themselves in situations where “you can’t get there from here” – the only morally permissible choice, the only one untainted by evil could be viewed as using the bombs in a psychologically non-optimal manner (i.e., in a manner that did not assure mass civilian casualties would occur), per the calculus determining how the psychological impact would be maximized. Hence, if you subscribe to such theories, it’s useful to make this distinction, as it admits that the people may have done something good (reduce overall civilian casualties), but they did so by bad means (intentionally ensuring mass civilian casualties). Per such an ethical outlook and calculus, at a minimum the first bomb should have been dropped in such a manner as to not ensure mass civilian casualties in order to have done something good by good means, even though the calculus of efficiency deemed this to be less likely to succeed in bringing about the good end of reduced overall civilian casualties. It would be more “moral” for the actor to refuse to use bad means even if it meant increasing the risk of the good end never being achieved.
(The appeal of such a moral outlook may seem irrational in this case, but it’s far, far easier to see in more commonplace examples; e.g., a terrorist bombing targeting civilians vs. strategic bombing where it’s “foreseen but not intended” that civilians die. One easy way to keep this more palatable judgement while not being forced to accept what might seem like an irrational one in the case of Little Boy was demonstrated upthread: refusing to admit that mass civilian casualties were ever intended, as opposed to merely foreseen.)
“That’s all” seems to contradict the possibility that it was “the best choice of a number of bad choices.”
Well, no. Again, I’m trying to argue from an ethical standpoint I don’t actually subscribe to, so please bear with me if I wax incoherent. It was the best choice for maximizing the possibility of minimizing overall civilian, but that doesn’t mean it can still be considered a good choice. Ethical theories that would make such a distinction about intent can find themselves in situations where “you can’t get there from here” – the only morally permissible choice, the only one untainted by evil could be viewed as using the bombs in a psychologically non-optimal manner (i.e., in a manner that did not assure mass civilian casualties would occur), per the calculus determining how the psychological impact would be maximized. Hence, if you subscribe to such theories, it’s useful to make this distinction, as it admits that the people may have done something good (reduce overall civilian casualties), but they did so by bad means (intentionally ensuring mass civilian casualties). Per such an ethical outlook and calculus, at a minimum the first bomb should have been dropped in such a manner as to not ensure mass civilian casualties in order to have done something good by good means, even though the calculus of efficiency deemed this to be less likely to succeed in bringing about the good end of reduced overall civilian casualties. It would be more “moral” for the actor to refuse to use bad means even if it meant increasing the risk of the good end never being achieved.
(The appeal of such a moral outlook may seem irrational in this case, but it’s far, far easier to see in more commonplace examples; e.g., a terrorist bombing targeting civilians vs. strategic bombing where it’s “foreseen but not intended” that civilians die. One easy way to keep this more palatable judgement while not being forced to accept what might seem like an irrational one in the case of Little Boy was demonstrated upthread: refusing to admit that mass civilian casualties were ever intended, as opposed to merely foreseen.)
If the “spectacular” and frightening nature of the atomic bomb was intended to make people become quickly resigned to the fact that they would lose, and encourage them to surrender, that seems to me to be a legitimate goal, given that sparing civilians did not seem to be an option.
I don’t think anyone is disputing this.
I don’t want to speak for cleek, but if I understand his comments here correctly, his point is simply to point out that, for various reasons including those you name here, deliberately targeting civilians was part of the reason for choosing the nuclear strike targets.
That’s not to argue that it wasn’t the best possible choice, however regrettable, it’s to counter McK’s claims upthread.
cleek will (I hope) correct this if I’m mistaken.
If the “spectacular” and frightening nature of the atomic bomb was intended to make people become quickly resigned to the fact that they would lose, and encourage them to surrender, that seems to me to be a legitimate goal, given that sparing civilians did not seem to be an option.
I don’t think anyone is disputing this.
I don’t want to speak for cleek, but if I understand his comments here correctly, his point is simply to point out that, for various reasons including those you name here, deliberately targeting civilians was part of the reason for choosing the nuclear strike targets.
That’s not to argue that it wasn’t the best possible choice, however regrettable, it’s to counter McK’s claims upthread.
cleek will (I hope) correct this if I’m mistaken.
I guess the concept of “targeting civilians” loses its meaning when there’s no chance of sparing civilians.
I guess the concept of “targeting civilians” loses its meaning when there’s no chance of sparing civilians.
sapient: “I guess the concept of “targeting civilians” loses its meaning when there’s no chance of sparing civilians.”
And you know this how?
sapient: “I guess the concept of “targeting civilians” loses its meaning when there’s no chance of sparing civilians.”
And you know this how?
“We didn’t enter the war to stop genocide.”
“By that time, we knew about it for sure. The truth validated a lot of people’s preconceptions, and made victory all the more important.”
This reminds me of the debate surrounding whether Lincoln entered the Civil War to vanquish slavery or preserve the Union.
It is only to the extent that genocide (that has changed somewhat since the mid-20th century, with dubious results) contributed to threatening our national self-interest that it was figured into the calculus (there’s a reason why the adjective “cold-blooded” is used with the noun “calculus”) of winning and ending the war, any war.
If we’re talking about the European Holocaust, Americans at large had many preconceptions about Jews that didn’t lend themselves to permitting Roosevelt to declare that we were fighting to free the Jews.
I’m ashamed to admit that I have relatives (now dead) who, despite their hatred for the Hun, thought, over drinks and loose conversation, that Hitler may have been on the right train track with is hatred toward the Jews.
As to the Japanese Holocaust throughout Asia, I don’t believe that would have even been on the radar without Pearl Harbor, as Yamamoto knew.
“We didn’t enter the war to stop genocide.”
“By that time, we knew about it for sure. The truth validated a lot of people’s preconceptions, and made victory all the more important.”
This reminds me of the debate surrounding whether Lincoln entered the Civil War to vanquish slavery or preserve the Union.
It is only to the extent that genocide (that has changed somewhat since the mid-20th century, with dubious results) contributed to threatening our national self-interest that it was figured into the calculus (there’s a reason why the adjective “cold-blooded” is used with the noun “calculus”) of winning and ending the war, any war.
If we’re talking about the European Holocaust, Americans at large had many preconceptions about Jews that didn’t lend themselves to permitting Roosevelt to declare that we were fighting to free the Jews.
I’m ashamed to admit that I have relatives (now dead) who, despite their hatred for the Hun, thought, over drinks and loose conversation, that Hitler may have been on the right train track with is hatred toward the Jews.
As to the Japanese Holocaust throughout Asia, I don’t believe that would have even been on the radar without Pearl Harbor, as Yamamoto knew.
“I don’t think anybody is disputing this.”
I certainly am. With that type of logic you can justify anything and the whole concept of jus in bello falls by the wayside.
“I don’t think anybody is disputing this.”
I certainly am. With that type of logic you can justify anything and the whole concept of jus in bello falls by the wayside.
I certainly am. With that type of logic you can justify anything and the whole concept of jus in bello falls by the wayside.
Actually, not. The “whole concept” of jus in bello has to be discussed case by case, as does most human behavior. Bright lines exist when there are clear choices.
I certainly am. With that type of logic you can justify anything and the whole concept of jus in bello falls by the wayside.
Actually, not. The “whole concept” of jus in bello has to be discussed case by case, as does most human behavior. Bright lines exist when there are clear choices.
As to the Japanese Holocaust throughout Asia, I don’t believe that would have even been on the radar without Pearl Harbor, as Yamamoto knew.
Perhaps not. But by the time the nukes were detonated, “If you were a Nazi prisoner of war from Britain, America, Australia, New Zealand or Canada (but not Russia) you faced a 4 per cent chance of not surviving the war; the death rate for Allied POWs held by the Japanese was nearly 30 per cent.”
Americans were quite well aware by 1945 that the Nazis were “not very nice”, and that the Japanese were “not very nicer”. But sure, they should have invited Japanese troops right into Washington.
As to the Japanese Holocaust throughout Asia, I don’t believe that would have even been on the radar without Pearl Harbor, as Yamamoto knew.
Perhaps not. But by the time the nukes were detonated, “If you were a Nazi prisoner of war from Britain, America, Australia, New Zealand or Canada (but not Russia) you faced a 4 per cent chance of not surviving the war; the death rate for Allied POWs held by the Japanese was nearly 30 per cent.”
Americans were quite well aware by 1945 that the Nazis were “not very nice”, and that the Japanese were “not very nicer”. But sure, they should have invited Japanese troops right into Washington.
“jus in bello” cannot be discarded at will on a “case by case” basis – the whole point of the concept is that there are taboos that cannot be broken: burning civilians alive to send a message would be one of those
“jus in bello” cannot be discarded at will on a “case by case” basis – the whole point of the concept is that there are taboos that cannot be broken: burning civilians alive to send a message would be one of those
Glad you think so novakant. You’re sure to go to heaven for thinking that, while the Japanese hung people up by their tongues.
Glad you think so novakant. You’re sure to go to heaven for thinking that, while the Japanese hung people up by their tongues.
…and that’s an absolute non sequitur.
I’m going to have to side with novokant here, albeit reluctantly. The pragmatist in me doesn’t want to, but yeah. If you can make a hypothetical calculus stating that some random cruelty will ultimately bring about less overall suffering, you’re well and good down the rabbit hole. If we can say that 500k+ civilians will die if a war continues, but if we take 500 enemy soldiers we’ve captured and flay them alive one by one on national television, and our moral calculus suggests this will end the war fast enough to bring about only 100k+ dead civilians, shouldn’t we do that? What if we determine through our calculus that if we flay 500 captured civilians alive it’ll end so fast only 10k+ will die? Isn’t it a moral imperative that we (tragically) flay them?
The biggest problem with your assertion that we need to consider jus in bello principles to be rough but very flexible guidelines is, well… the people doing the ethical calculus aren’t objective. They’re going to have an easier time seeing harm to themselves or their peers than harm to faceless civilians. They’re going to redistribute risk from themselves to said civilians. That’s what happens when you pick and choose when to abide by jus in bello restrictions. It’s human nature. It’s way too easy to assume the course of action that’ll result in the least harm to you will sync up with the least harm to your victims. It’s even easier to justify it after the fact when you have the realization of your example hypothetical that did occur, and can dismiss all the possible alternatives you rejected as misguided, rosy-eyed, and naive.
…and that’s an absolute non sequitur.
I’m going to have to side with novokant here, albeit reluctantly. The pragmatist in me doesn’t want to, but yeah. If you can make a hypothetical calculus stating that some random cruelty will ultimately bring about less overall suffering, you’re well and good down the rabbit hole. If we can say that 500k+ civilians will die if a war continues, but if we take 500 enemy soldiers we’ve captured and flay them alive one by one on national television, and our moral calculus suggests this will end the war fast enough to bring about only 100k+ dead civilians, shouldn’t we do that? What if we determine through our calculus that if we flay 500 captured civilians alive it’ll end so fast only 10k+ will die? Isn’t it a moral imperative that we (tragically) flay them?
The biggest problem with your assertion that we need to consider jus in bello principles to be rough but very flexible guidelines is, well… the people doing the ethical calculus aren’t objective. They’re going to have an easier time seeing harm to themselves or their peers than harm to faceless civilians. They’re going to redistribute risk from themselves to said civilians. That’s what happens when you pick and choose when to abide by jus in bello restrictions. It’s human nature. It’s way too easy to assume the course of action that’ll result in the least harm to you will sync up with the least harm to your victims. It’s even easier to justify it after the fact when you have the realization of your example hypothetical that did occur, and can dismiss all the possible alternatives you rejected as misguided, rosy-eyed, and naive.
To pour some extra oil on the fire, please look up the official WW2 policy about shooting hostages in case of attacks. On paper the US had the highest prescribed numbers by almost an order of magnitude.
In reality the threat was not carried out (at least not on a regular base) by the US (unlike the Nazis who often went beyond the prescription) but it is rather bloodchilling to see what some US bureaucrats came up with.
Btw, it saved at least one neck in Nuremberg (Dönitz*) in the only successful tu quoque defense.
*esp. concerning the Laconia and the Laertes case
To pour some extra oil on the fire, please look up the official WW2 policy about shooting hostages in case of attacks. On paper the US had the highest prescribed numbers by almost an order of magnitude.
In reality the threat was not carried out (at least not on a regular base) by the US (unlike the Nazis who often went beyond the prescription) but it is rather bloodchilling to see what some US bureaucrats came up with.
Btw, it saved at least one neck in Nuremberg (Dönitz*) in the only successful tu quoque defense.
*esp. concerning the Laconia and the Laertes case
Addendum: I assume a major reason for the disproportional threats was the Werwolf propaganda that created the false belief that the US occupation forces would be threatened by huge numbers of fanatic nazis attacking from within the civilian population. Unlike Afghanistan or Iraq today the Werwolf threat turned out to be mostly empty (and most victims were Germans not US soldiers). Let’s better not think about what would have happened, if that would not have been the case.
Addendum: I assume a major reason for the disproportional threats was the Werwolf propaganda that created the false belief that the US occupation forces would be threatened by huge numbers of fanatic nazis attacking from within the civilian population. Unlike Afghanistan or Iraq today the Werwolf threat turned out to be mostly empty (and most victims were Germans not US soldiers). Let’s better not think about what would have happened, if that would not have been the case.
Coming a bit late to this, but I too am a little surprised by the lack of discussion of the firebombings (as opposed to the atomic bombs).
Certainly in terms of lives lost, they were substantially more destructive – a single night’s fireraid on Tokyo killed at least 100,000, and quite possibly many times that number:
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/2414
LeMay had no qualms whatsoever about targeting civilians, and to argue otherwise is ridiculous:
“There are no innocent civilians. It is their government and you are fighting a people, you are not trying to fight an armed force anymore. So it doesn’t bother me so much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders.”
• Sherry, Michael (September 10, 1989). The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon, p. 287 (from “LeMay’s interview with Sherry,” interview “after the war,” p. 408 n. 108). Yale University Press. ISBN-13: 978-0300044140.
One of the reasons Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets for the A bomb was that they were among the few undamaged cities of any size left to bomb in Japan. A firestorm was one of the desired effects of their bombing, and would have been greatly diminished in a previously bombed target.
Given the abandonment of any significant moral restrictions on inflicting mass killing through bombing, in that respect the decision to drop the atomic bombs did not represent a significant change in policy.
Indeed, given the clear psychological blow of the Hiroshima bomb, which was war ending, that raid was arguably better justified than those preceding it.
Nagasaki to my mind cannot be justified at all. It is pretty clear that the war would have ended without it, and all the excuses for not issuing a warning prior to Hiroshima (they wouldn’t have believed us; we didn’t know if it would work etc) no longer applied.
As for describing either of them as “legitimate military targets”, I call utter BS.
Japan was completely finished militarily. It had neither air, nor sea power remaining to it.
The US had the power to blockade, and militarily neither raid was of any significance – unless you count civilians as a military target.
Coming a bit late to this, but I too am a little surprised by the lack of discussion of the firebombings (as opposed to the atomic bombs).
Certainly in terms of lives lost, they were substantially more destructive – a single night’s fireraid on Tokyo killed at least 100,000, and quite possibly many times that number:
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/2414
LeMay had no qualms whatsoever about targeting civilians, and to argue otherwise is ridiculous:
“There are no innocent civilians. It is their government and you are fighting a people, you are not trying to fight an armed force anymore. So it doesn’t bother me so much to be killing the so-called innocent bystanders.”
• Sherry, Michael (September 10, 1989). The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon, p. 287 (from “LeMay’s interview with Sherry,” interview “after the war,” p. 408 n. 108). Yale University Press. ISBN-13: 978-0300044140.
One of the reasons Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets for the A bomb was that they were among the few undamaged cities of any size left to bomb in Japan. A firestorm was one of the desired effects of their bombing, and would have been greatly diminished in a previously bombed target.
Given the abandonment of any significant moral restrictions on inflicting mass killing through bombing, in that respect the decision to drop the atomic bombs did not represent a significant change in policy.
Indeed, given the clear psychological blow of the Hiroshima bomb, which was war ending, that raid was arguably better justified than those preceding it.
Nagasaki to my mind cannot be justified at all. It is pretty clear that the war would have ended without it, and all the excuses for not issuing a warning prior to Hiroshima (they wouldn’t have believed us; we didn’t know if it would work etc) no longer applied.
As for describing either of them as “legitimate military targets”, I call utter BS.
Japan was completely finished militarily. It had neither air, nor sea power remaining to it.
The US had the power to blockade, and militarily neither raid was of any significance – unless you count civilians as a military target.
I guess the concept of “targeting civilians” loses its meaning when there’s no chance of sparing civilians.
An interesting question, I guess.
Kill them now in a big fireball, or one by one in a land invasion?
In any case, it would appear from the documents cited by cleek that among the reasons Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen was a desire to enhance the psychological effect of using the atomic bomb by killing a lot of people – civilians – with it.
That extremely narrow point is the beginning and end of what I have to say on the topic.
Good call on their part to not vaporize Kyoto. Aside from the bad PR, it may well have made the Japanese to decide to fight to the last man woman or child rather than surrender, ever.
I guess the concept of “targeting civilians” loses its meaning when there’s no chance of sparing civilians.
An interesting question, I guess.
Kill them now in a big fireball, or one by one in a land invasion?
In any case, it would appear from the documents cited by cleek that among the reasons Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen was a desire to enhance the psychological effect of using the atomic bomb by killing a lot of people – civilians – with it.
That extremely narrow point is the beginning and end of what I have to say on the topic.
Good call on their part to not vaporize Kyoto. Aside from the bad PR, it may well have made the Japanese to decide to fight to the last man woman or child rather than surrender, ever.
For me a big part of the issue is American exceptionalism–there’s always some reason why moral absolutes that apply to other people don’t apply to us. The other problem is the slippery slope argument–one point the torture defenders made a few years ago was that if we could kill civilians, why couldn’t we torture captured terrorists? And if some of the captured “terrorists” turn out to be innocent, then, hey, it’s collateral damage. I was glad so many people (and to some extent on all parts of the political spectrum) stuck to the moral absolute position on torture, but I admit to being a little puzzled by it. Still, it was a case where I was in favor of inconsistency–at least one form of barbarism is still thought to be inexcusable even when Americans do it. When the Iraq war started I took for granted that there would be torture and assumed it would be a story for the back pages and fringe lefty magazines–it wasn’t. Of course, it’s not entirely a happy ending–torture, it seems, is just one of those unfortunate policy choices, kinda shameful, but we’re moving on. Still, better than I would have predicted.
Also, the bombing of civilian targets in WWII set a precedent in moral reasoning I think we’ve been following ever since. We target civilians, argue that we’re putting pressure on a government (by targeting civilians) and deny that we’re targeting civilians. We quite possibly killed more North Korean civilians with bombs than Germans and Japanese put together and I’ve never seen anyone give any sort of plausible justification for it, in part because almost no one ever talks about it at all. We support dictators and death squads when it is supposedly the lesser of two evils, we impose sanctions whenever we feel like it, and I think it’s all a lot easier to do because of the WWII precedent.
And then when other people target civilians, all of a sudden it’s the absolute worst thing anyone could do, utterly inexcusable, barbaric, and so forth. They might actually be living under occupation or in their minds retaliating for violence against their civilians and it doesn’t matter. When they do it it’s terrorism, wrong by definition.
Plus everyone can use the “lesser of two evils” argument. I mentioned Assad and Syria upthread–you can find people (not me) who think Assad’s bombardment of Syrian towns is excusable because the opposition is in part composed of Al Qaeda. Well, why not? If the fanatics won the Alawites and the Christians and any Syrian who wasn’t a Sunni fundamentalist would be in real trouble. The argument for Assad being ruthless because Al Qaeda extremists are a large portion of the rebel movement seems at least as strong as any argument Americans could give for our acts.
For me a big part of the issue is American exceptionalism–there’s always some reason why moral absolutes that apply to other people don’t apply to us. The other problem is the slippery slope argument–one point the torture defenders made a few years ago was that if we could kill civilians, why couldn’t we torture captured terrorists? And if some of the captured “terrorists” turn out to be innocent, then, hey, it’s collateral damage. I was glad so many people (and to some extent on all parts of the political spectrum) stuck to the moral absolute position on torture, but I admit to being a little puzzled by it. Still, it was a case where I was in favor of inconsistency–at least one form of barbarism is still thought to be inexcusable even when Americans do it. When the Iraq war started I took for granted that there would be torture and assumed it would be a story for the back pages and fringe lefty magazines–it wasn’t. Of course, it’s not entirely a happy ending–torture, it seems, is just one of those unfortunate policy choices, kinda shameful, but we’re moving on. Still, better than I would have predicted.
Also, the bombing of civilian targets in WWII set a precedent in moral reasoning I think we’ve been following ever since. We target civilians, argue that we’re putting pressure on a government (by targeting civilians) and deny that we’re targeting civilians. We quite possibly killed more North Korean civilians with bombs than Germans and Japanese put together and I’ve never seen anyone give any sort of plausible justification for it, in part because almost no one ever talks about it at all. We support dictators and death squads when it is supposedly the lesser of two evils, we impose sanctions whenever we feel like it, and I think it’s all a lot easier to do because of the WWII precedent.
And then when other people target civilians, all of a sudden it’s the absolute worst thing anyone could do, utterly inexcusable, barbaric, and so forth. They might actually be living under occupation or in their minds retaliating for violence against their civilians and it doesn’t matter. When they do it it’s terrorism, wrong by definition.
Plus everyone can use the “lesser of two evils” argument. I mentioned Assad and Syria upthread–you can find people (not me) who think Assad’s bombardment of Syrian towns is excusable because the opposition is in part composed of Al Qaeda. Well, why not? If the fanatics won the Alawites and the Christians and any Syrian who wasn’t a Sunni fundamentalist would be in real trouble. The argument for Assad being ruthless because Al Qaeda extremists are a large portion of the rebel movement seems at least as strong as any argument Americans could give for our acts.
“But sure, they should have invited Japanese troops right into Washington.”
1. Ack!
2. Leading up to the Civil War and well into it, Lincoln’s position was that the Southern states could maintain their holocaust of slavery, as long as slavery was not exported to the territories and the Union remained intact, this latter stipulation being the bigger fish he chose to fry.
3. Without the provocation of Pearl Harbor, and the invasion of the American colony, the Philippines, Roosevelt was not about to enter another theater of war based solely on Japanese atrocities in Asia alone. U.S. economic necessity (trade and natural resource flows interrupted from the Pacific, etc) may have ultimately forced his hand and led to war, but American public opinion was not interested in saving millions of Chinese and southeast Asians from Japanese savagery as the sole or primary reason to declare war.
Same with the Jews in Europe.
The Lend-Lease Act came well after the commencement of the Battle of Britain and Churchill had to plead for the U.S. to enter the war, despite Roosevelt being fully aware of Hitler’s murderous anti-Semitism throughout the 1930s.
This is not to say that Roosevelt and the American government were not aware or didn’t care about, or wouldn’t have eventually moved because of the European Holocaust and Japanese slaughter of civilians in Asia, it is to assert that cold-blooded military and economic necessity in the service of America’s national self-interest was foremost in guiding their strategies, not man’s inhumanity to man.
Why? Mostly because American public opinion had to be swayed and to justify the loss of blood and treasure.
So, yes Pearl Harbor convinced the American public that the Japanese were about to enter Washington, as you put it, and the imminent invasion of England (this simplifies considerably, natch) convinced the American people that Germany and Italy were going to sail up the Potomac, and the rest is history.
Similarly, the decisions to firebomb Dresden and Tokyo and to nuke Hiroshima and Nagasaki were cold-blooded strategic military decisions made for the furtherance of American interests (ending the war and avoiding even worse carnage) and catastrophic civilian deaths and casualties were a bullet point far down the list of caveats in situation rooms at the time.
By the way, Fort Sumter during the Civil War was the flashpoint that threw northern public opinion Lincoln’s way, but it was the very early threat of the enemy, the Confederacy, entering Washington D.C. that galvanized public opinion in favor of all-out war.
Again, a simplification of a complex dynamic, but more in answer to “inviting Japanese troops right into Washington”, so what’s a guy supposed to do?
Now, of course, we allow these same people (Confederate rubes) to holler and tweet at the President from the Congressional gallery during the SOTU, but I haven’t been able to galvanize American public opinion to kick their asses militarily, so I guess we have to live with it.
“But sure, they should have invited Japanese troops right into Washington.”
1. Ack!
2. Leading up to the Civil War and well into it, Lincoln’s position was that the Southern states could maintain their holocaust of slavery, as long as slavery was not exported to the territories and the Union remained intact, this latter stipulation being the bigger fish he chose to fry.
3. Without the provocation of Pearl Harbor, and the invasion of the American colony, the Philippines, Roosevelt was not about to enter another theater of war based solely on Japanese atrocities in Asia alone. U.S. economic necessity (trade and natural resource flows interrupted from the Pacific, etc) may have ultimately forced his hand and led to war, but American public opinion was not interested in saving millions of Chinese and southeast Asians from Japanese savagery as the sole or primary reason to declare war.
Same with the Jews in Europe.
The Lend-Lease Act came well after the commencement of the Battle of Britain and Churchill had to plead for the U.S. to enter the war, despite Roosevelt being fully aware of Hitler’s murderous anti-Semitism throughout the 1930s.
This is not to say that Roosevelt and the American government were not aware or didn’t care about, or wouldn’t have eventually moved because of the European Holocaust and Japanese slaughter of civilians in Asia, it is to assert that cold-blooded military and economic necessity in the service of America’s national self-interest was foremost in guiding their strategies, not man’s inhumanity to man.
Why? Mostly because American public opinion had to be swayed and to justify the loss of blood and treasure.
So, yes Pearl Harbor convinced the American public that the Japanese were about to enter Washington, as you put it, and the imminent invasion of England (this simplifies considerably, natch) convinced the American people that Germany and Italy were going to sail up the Potomac, and the rest is history.
Similarly, the decisions to firebomb Dresden and Tokyo and to nuke Hiroshima and Nagasaki were cold-blooded strategic military decisions made for the furtherance of American interests (ending the war and avoiding even worse carnage) and catastrophic civilian deaths and casualties were a bullet point far down the list of caveats in situation rooms at the time.
By the way, Fort Sumter during the Civil War was the flashpoint that threw northern public opinion Lincoln’s way, but it was the very early threat of the enemy, the Confederacy, entering Washington D.C. that galvanized public opinion in favor of all-out war.
Again, a simplification of a complex dynamic, but more in answer to “inviting Japanese troops right into Washington”, so what’s a guy supposed to do?
Now, of course, we allow these same people (Confederate rubes) to holler and tweet at the President from the Congressional gallery during the SOTU, but I haven’t been able to galvanize American public opinion to kick their asses militarily, so I guess we have to live with it.
Also, the bombing of civilian targets in WWII set a precedent in moral reasoning I think we’ve been following ever since.
If I’m not mistaken, prohibitions against targeting civilians in wartime was a fairly recent concept as of WWII.
There was some international law or conventions governing warfare prior to WWII, but I’m not it included an explicit prohibition on targeting civilians.
Geneva IV does contain that, but it dates from after WWII.
I’m not sure the targeting of civilians in WWII represents a precedent. Historically, it is probably closer to the norm.
Folks with a deeper understanding of the law of war may wish to weigh in to correct my understanding of the history.
Also, the bombing of civilian targets in WWII set a precedent in moral reasoning I think we’ve been following ever since.
If I’m not mistaken, prohibitions against targeting civilians in wartime was a fairly recent concept as of WWII.
There was some international law or conventions governing warfare prior to WWII, but I’m not it included an explicit prohibition on targeting civilians.
Geneva IV does contain that, but it dates from after WWII.
I’m not sure the targeting of civilians in WWII represents a precedent. Historically, it is probably closer to the norm.
Folks with a deeper understanding of the law of war may wish to weigh in to correct my understanding of the history.
Eh, has somebody here heard of the obscure set of conventions named after the Hague that the US signed on to at least for the 1907 edition?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hague_Conventions_%281899_and_1907%29
The 1899 edition even included a ban on aerial bombardment but it was limited to 5 years (and thus expired at some date during the Russian-Japanese War).
Of course such an ancient piece of paper (was paper even invented yet?) had no bearing on WW1 let alone WW2 (although some prehistory nerds tried to make a point but got as usual ignored).
Eh, has somebody here heard of the obscure set of conventions named after the Hague that the US signed on to at least for the 1907 edition?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hague_Conventions_%281899_and_1907%29
The 1899 edition even included a ban on aerial bombardment but it was limited to 5 years (and thus expired at some date during the Russian-Japanese War).
Of course such an ancient piece of paper (was paper even invented yet?) had no bearing on WW1 let alone WW2 (although some prehistory nerds tried to make a point but got as usual ignored).
Hague 1899 and 1907 appear to prohibit attacks on undefended towns and cities, but I don’t see a prohibition on targeting civilian populations per se.
So, civilians living in a town or city that is defended in some way would appear to be fair game. As of 1907, anyway.
I might be misunderstanding the language of the convention.
Also, in case it’s not clear, I’m not arguing for the goodness or morality of targeting civilians.
Hague 1899 and 1907 appear to prohibit attacks on undefended towns and cities, but I don’t see a prohibition on targeting civilian populations per se.
So, civilians living in a town or city that is defended in some way would appear to be fair game. As of 1907, anyway.
I might be misunderstanding the language of the convention.
Also, in case it’s not clear, I’m not arguing for the goodness or morality of targeting civilians.
I was only pointing out that the concept of NOT targeting civilians (if avoidable) was not as new as some seem to imply or assume and even had a rudimentary legal form (open to interpretation of course). It was not a complete legal tabula rasa.
Despite the slight snark I did not intend to imply that you (or anyone else here) favored the opinion that targeting civilians was moral because it was not explicitly banned in all circumstances (or that even no law or construct was conceived before the WW2 atrocities thus making them kosher morally by definition).
I was only pointing out that the concept of NOT targeting civilians (if avoidable) was not as new as some seem to imply or assume and even had a rudimentary legal form (open to interpretation of course). It was not a complete legal tabula rasa.
Despite the slight snark I did not intend to imply that you (or anyone else here) favored the opinion that targeting civilians was moral because it was not explicitly banned in all circumstances (or that even no law or construct was conceived before the WW2 atrocities thus making them kosher morally by definition).
Donald:
You brought up torture and why that bright line remains even though there isn’t really a bright line on targeting civilians.
I have a few thoughts (but I’m not an ethicist or otherwise qualified to answer).
The two things that strike me as different are (1) a fairly large cultural distinction between torture and death, and (2) an analogy to a thermodynamic critical point (bear with me, I’m an engineer).
The first is pretty simple. We as a society, are far more willing to kill then we are to torture. I have no idea why that is, but its true. You can euthanize an animal in a shelter, but you can’t torture them. A pet gets wounded and you can’t afford to pay the vet bill? The merciful thing to do is to kill them. Animals, except for some hunting regulations and endangered species, you can kill but you can not torture. With humans, we still have executions, but we go to fairly extreme lengths to minimize pain and agony.
The second relies on the concept of a critical point, which is a pressure and temperature above which there is no distinction between a liquid and a gas. Up until that point, there is a bright line…something is either a liquid or a gas. Afterwards, its a supercritical fluid, and might be more gas like or more fluid like depending on the specifics, but there is no longer a clear boundary.
More simply, and less engineeringly, put: I think all rules and bright lines break down at some point. Some people would disagree with that, there are some lines you never cross, and I respect that. But I don’t share it.
The firebombings and the nukes were part of a large, vicious war. Civilian and military causalities were high and would get higher as the war went on. The death toll could have easily trended to 10 million Japanese causalities with an invasion. To me, they were past the critical point. There’s no longer a bright line, and the ethics get horrible.
Torture? I don’t see that. Notoriously unreliable (and horrible) method used against an incredibly weak enemy that got really lucky once? This wasn’t existential. It might have been a wakeup call to secure cockpit doors and not cooperate with hijackers. It might have been a wakeup call for intelligence and LE agencies to coordinate better. But we were left with a slim chance that maybe torture might ward off another once in a few decades attack? That’s not an ethical dilemma to me, its just barbaric.
But again, not an ethicist. So take it for what its worth.
Donald:
You brought up torture and why that bright line remains even though there isn’t really a bright line on targeting civilians.
I have a few thoughts (but I’m not an ethicist or otherwise qualified to answer).
The two things that strike me as different are (1) a fairly large cultural distinction between torture and death, and (2) an analogy to a thermodynamic critical point (bear with me, I’m an engineer).
The first is pretty simple. We as a society, are far more willing to kill then we are to torture. I have no idea why that is, but its true. You can euthanize an animal in a shelter, but you can’t torture them. A pet gets wounded and you can’t afford to pay the vet bill? The merciful thing to do is to kill them. Animals, except for some hunting regulations and endangered species, you can kill but you can not torture. With humans, we still have executions, but we go to fairly extreme lengths to minimize pain and agony.
The second relies on the concept of a critical point, which is a pressure and temperature above which there is no distinction between a liquid and a gas. Up until that point, there is a bright line…something is either a liquid or a gas. Afterwards, its a supercritical fluid, and might be more gas like or more fluid like depending on the specifics, but there is no longer a clear boundary.
More simply, and less engineeringly, put: I think all rules and bright lines break down at some point. Some people would disagree with that, there are some lines you never cross, and I respect that. But I don’t share it.
The firebombings and the nukes were part of a large, vicious war. Civilian and military causalities were high and would get higher as the war went on. The death toll could have easily trended to 10 million Japanese causalities with an invasion. To me, they were past the critical point. There’s no longer a bright line, and the ethics get horrible.
Torture? I don’t see that. Notoriously unreliable (and horrible) method used against an incredibly weak enemy that got really lucky once? This wasn’t existential. It might have been a wakeup call to secure cockpit doors and not cooperate with hijackers. It might have been a wakeup call for intelligence and LE agencies to coordinate better. But we were left with a slim chance that maybe torture might ward off another once in a few decades attack? That’s not an ethical dilemma to me, its just barbaric.
But again, not an ethicist. So take it for what its worth.
This is not to say that Roosevelt and the American government were not aware or didn’t care about, or wouldn’t have eventually moved because of the European Holocaust…
The evidence tends to go against this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Karski
“…Karski personally met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Oval Office, telling him about the situation in Poland and becoming the first eyewitness to tell him about the Jewish Holocaust. During their meeting Roosevelt asked about the condition of horses in Poland. Roosevelt did not ask one question about the Jews…”
The failure of the Allies to take any action was public knowledge at the time:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bermuda_Conference
“To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap Bermuda was a Cruel Mockery,” New York Times, 04 May 1943
This is not to say that Roosevelt and the American government were not aware or didn’t care about, or wouldn’t have eventually moved because of the European Holocaust…
The evidence tends to go against this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Karski
“…Karski personally met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the Oval Office, telling him about the situation in Poland and becoming the first eyewitness to tell him about the Jewish Holocaust. During their meeting Roosevelt asked about the condition of horses in Poland. Roosevelt did not ask one question about the Jews…”
The failure of the Allies to take any action was public knowledge at the time:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bermuda_Conference
“To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap Bermuda was a Cruel Mockery,” New York Times, 04 May 1943
As a note, the NYT headline was an advert purchased by Jewish interest.
Not saying it was incorrect.
As a note, the NYT headline was an advert purchased by Jewish interest.
Not saying it was incorrect.
Nigel:
Thanks for the links.
I was aware that was probably the case, but I was throwing a bone to sapient, the point being that even if the U.S. and Allies had cared about and believed reports like Karski’s, it would not have shifted their actions and military strategy in the context of American interests.
I notice from your link that Karski briefed Felix Frankfurter as well on the same trip and the latter said he couldn’t and thus didn’t believe it, which says something about my point regarding the futility of using the gathering Holocaust as a lever to sway American public opinion in favor of outright American military involvement.
Frankfurter even.
As I pointed out in a comment way upthread, I’m ashamed to admit that I have (had) relatives (no dead) who, if apprised of the treatment of Jews in Poland at the time would reply with a flippant, “Yes, yes, but what about the horses.”
Nigel:
Thanks for the links.
I was aware that was probably the case, but I was throwing a bone to sapient, the point being that even if the U.S. and Allies had cared about and believed reports like Karski’s, it would not have shifted their actions and military strategy in the context of American interests.
I notice from your link that Karski briefed Felix Frankfurter as well on the same trip and the latter said he couldn’t and thus didn’t believe it, which says something about my point regarding the futility of using the gathering Holocaust as a lever to sway American public opinion in favor of outright American military involvement.
Frankfurter even.
As I pointed out in a comment way upthread, I’m ashamed to admit that I have (had) relatives (no dead) who, if apprised of the treatment of Jews in Poland at the time would reply with a flippant, “Yes, yes, but what about the horses.”
“now dead”
“now dead”
Russell–I’m not an expert on the history of the law of war, but my amateur impression is that there was a period running from roughly the 1700’s up until the early 20th century when attacks on civilians were regarded as beyond the pale. Or rather, attacks on white civilians. Wars between Native Americans and European Americans had no rules, but in the Civil War most of the casualties were military. There were exceptions, of course, even in this period, when there were attacks on civilians. But during WWI there were some German air and sea attacks on British cities, tiny by later standards, but they were seen as shocking. The same for Guernica and other air attacks in Spain. I don’t have a copy of John Toland’s “The Rising Sun”, but I think there and in other places there were descriptions of how attitudes towards civilian bombing changed–it was considered barbaric in the West before the war and during the war when the Germans did it, but when the British and Americans were able to do it to the Germans and Japanese it became heroic. (Though according to most of what I’ve read, the Americans did try to do “precision” daylight bombing in Europe and weren’t trying to burn cities down, as the British did. In Japan the policy was different.)
My point was that every defense I’ve ever heard of some barbaric act of US foreign policy seems to echo WWII arguments. Every tinpot dictator that comes along has to be stopped because he’s another Hitler, and every ruthless action we take is justified because it’s the lesser of two evils and is necessary to save American lives. Just in the way we use Godwin’s law to ridicule Hitler analogies, I wish people would just bracket WWII altogether as a special case and not think that because we did horrible things then that it has any bearing on other situations. (And that’s not to say that all the horrible things we did then were necessarily justified, just that there’s a better case to be made for them than for actions we’ve taken since.)
Thompson–I’m not actually arguing with you on the difference between WWII and the “war on terror”. As I just said, I wish people would bracket off actions taken in WWII from the modern era. It’s one reason I lost most of my original interest in arguing about the A-bombs and the Tokyo firebomb raid. Without endorsing them, I can see that the situation back then was horrible no matter what decision one made. I do find it ironic to hear Americans denounce terrorism, given our long history of attacking civilians or supporting others who do.
Russell–I’m not an expert on the history of the law of war, but my amateur impression is that there was a period running from roughly the 1700’s up until the early 20th century when attacks on civilians were regarded as beyond the pale. Or rather, attacks on white civilians. Wars between Native Americans and European Americans had no rules, but in the Civil War most of the casualties were military. There were exceptions, of course, even in this period, when there were attacks on civilians. But during WWI there were some German air and sea attacks on British cities, tiny by later standards, but they were seen as shocking. The same for Guernica and other air attacks in Spain. I don’t have a copy of John Toland’s “The Rising Sun”, but I think there and in other places there were descriptions of how attitudes towards civilian bombing changed–it was considered barbaric in the West before the war and during the war when the Germans did it, but when the British and Americans were able to do it to the Germans and Japanese it became heroic. (Though according to most of what I’ve read, the Americans did try to do “precision” daylight bombing in Europe and weren’t trying to burn cities down, as the British did. In Japan the policy was different.)
My point was that every defense I’ve ever heard of some barbaric act of US foreign policy seems to echo WWII arguments. Every tinpot dictator that comes along has to be stopped because he’s another Hitler, and every ruthless action we take is justified because it’s the lesser of two evils and is necessary to save American lives. Just in the way we use Godwin’s law to ridicule Hitler analogies, I wish people would just bracket WWII altogether as a special case and not think that because we did horrible things then that it has any bearing on other situations. (And that’s not to say that all the horrible things we did then were necessarily justified, just that there’s a better case to be made for them than for actions we’ve taken since.)
Thompson–I’m not actually arguing with you on the difference between WWII and the “war on terror”. As I just said, I wish people would bracket off actions taken in WWII from the modern era. It’s one reason I lost most of my original interest in arguing about the A-bombs and the Tokyo firebomb raid. Without endorsing them, I can see that the situation back then was horrible no matter what decision one made. I do find it ironic to hear Americans denounce terrorism, given our long history of attacking civilians or supporting others who do.
Hey Donald, thanks for your comments here.
I wish people would just bracket WWII altogether as a special case
In my mind, WWII is not a relevant point of comparison to the post-WWII world, because total war nowadays would last about a half hour, after which most folks on the planet would be dead, along with most other living things.
Hey Donald, thanks for your comments here.
I wish people would just bracket WWII altogether as a special case
In my mind, WWII is not a relevant point of comparison to the post-WWII world, because total war nowadays would last about a half hour, after which most folks on the planet would be dead, along with most other living things.
I, for one, welcome our new tardigrade overlords.
I, for one, welcome our new tardigrade overlords.
I, for one, welcome our new tardigrade overlords.
My money is on the very-deep-sea methane ecologies.
That said, the waterbears are seriously bad-@ss critters.
I, for one, welcome our new tardigrade overlords.
My money is on the very-deep-sea methane ecologies.
That said, the waterbears are seriously bad-@ss critters.
Donald:
I wasn’t trying to argue with you. Just offer some potential explanations re: torture vs. killing.
WoT vs. WWII, I agree, they are just completely different things.
Donald:
I wasn’t trying to argue with you. Just offer some potential explanations re: torture vs. killing.
WoT vs. WWII, I agree, they are just completely different things.
russell:
“total war nowadays would last about a half hour”
It depends on the combatants. WWII had a number of weapons (chemical) that were generally considered off limits, if only out of fear of retaliation-in-kind. I don’t think nukes are an absolute deterrence to a conventional total war.
I think the level of economic interdependence between superpowers is a substantial deterrence, however.
russell:
“total war nowadays would last about a half hour”
It depends on the combatants. WWII had a number of weapons (chemical) that were generally considered off limits, if only out of fear of retaliation-in-kind. I don’t think nukes are an absolute deterrence to a conventional total war.
I think the level of economic interdependence between superpowers is a substantial deterrence, however.
russell:
Hague 1899 and 1907 appear to prohibit attacks on undefended towns and cities, but I don’t see a prohibition on targeting civilian populations per se.
My understanding is this is covered between the aforementioned prohibition on attacking undefended places and Article 46: “[In occupied territory f]amily honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected.”
Aerial bombardment, however, complicates this, as it affords the opportunity to kill noncombatants without occupying their homeland, though the “undefended places” clause would be argued to still apply.
The real PITA with understanding this is that the Hague Convention is conventional law of war – it was attempting to codify customary law of war, but it would not perforce capture everything, especially “common sense” customary rules.
Donald Johnson:
Russell–I’m not an expert on the history of the law of war, but my amateur impression is that there was a period running from roughly the 1700’s up until the early 20th century when attacks on civilians were regarded as beyond the pale. Or rather, attacks on white civilians.
This is pretty much in keeping with my amateur impression of the history of the law of war (I only had a professional impression from the Civil War on, and only a meaningful professional impression from the Hague Conventions on – and most of it is somewhat myopically focused on an American military PoV). I’m inclined to suspect (either from half-remembered scholarship, or from posterior-derived “reasoning”) that increases in logistical sophistication helped with this – as an army became less required to live off the land, foraging and pillaging became more luxuries and less general necessities. Some of it also likely harkens to relatively recent conceptions of the profession of arms – outrages against civilians or prisoners being deemed prejudicial to good order and discipline within an army’s own ranks.
thompson:
WWII had a number of weapons (chemical) that were generally considered off limits, if only out of fear of retaliation-in-kind.
Actually, no, not just fear of retaliation; they were outlawed by treaty for most of the belligerent states in WWII. There may have been an assumption that if things got bad enough that would be as effective as the prior outlawing in the Hague Convention, and there were reservations to the signatoures saying retaliation was fair game, but they were outlawed. Not in the US or Japan, mind you, as the Geneva Protocol went signed but unratified until the ’70s in both countries. But for most of the belligerents, there was formal agreement not to use them.
russell:
Hague 1899 and 1907 appear to prohibit attacks on undefended towns and cities, but I don’t see a prohibition on targeting civilian populations per se.
My understanding is this is covered between the aforementioned prohibition on attacking undefended places and Article 46: “[In occupied territory f]amily honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected.”
Aerial bombardment, however, complicates this, as it affords the opportunity to kill noncombatants without occupying their homeland, though the “undefended places” clause would be argued to still apply.
The real PITA with understanding this is that the Hague Convention is conventional law of war – it was attempting to codify customary law of war, but it would not perforce capture everything, especially “common sense” customary rules.
Donald Johnson:
Russell–I’m not an expert on the history of the law of war, but my amateur impression is that there was a period running from roughly the 1700’s up until the early 20th century when attacks on civilians were regarded as beyond the pale. Or rather, attacks on white civilians.
This is pretty much in keeping with my amateur impression of the history of the law of war (I only had a professional impression from the Civil War on, and only a meaningful professional impression from the Hague Conventions on – and most of it is somewhat myopically focused on an American military PoV). I’m inclined to suspect (either from half-remembered scholarship, or from posterior-derived “reasoning”) that increases in logistical sophistication helped with this – as an army became less required to live off the land, foraging and pillaging became more luxuries and less general necessities. Some of it also likely harkens to relatively recent conceptions of the profession of arms – outrages against civilians or prisoners being deemed prejudicial to good order and discipline within an army’s own ranks.
thompson:
WWII had a number of weapons (chemical) that were generally considered off limits, if only out of fear of retaliation-in-kind.
Actually, no, not just fear of retaliation; they were outlawed by treaty for most of the belligerent states in WWII. There may have been an assumption that if things got bad enough that would be as effective as the prior outlawing in the Hague Convention, and there were reservations to the signatoures saying retaliation was fair game, but they were outlawed. Not in the US or Japan, mind you, as the Geneva Protocol went signed but unratified until the ’70s in both countries. But for most of the belligerents, there was formal agreement not to use them.
NomVide:
Thanks for the clarification. I remember reading somewhere that the Nazi’s considered using gas attacks at one point, but decided against it.
A poorly cited Wiki supports that view:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_warfare#The_causes_of_the_nonuse_of_poison_gas_in_World_War_II_by_Nazi_Germany
But that could very well be the fun result of:
http://xkcd.com/978/
Regardless, I don’t have further evidence for that assertion and am fully willing to accept your obviously better educated opinion on such things.
It’s tangential to my larger point, however. That is, I don’t think the existence of nukes itself is a complete deterrent to a conventional total war.
NomVide:
Thanks for the clarification. I remember reading somewhere that the Nazi’s considered using gas attacks at one point, but decided against it.
A poorly cited Wiki supports that view:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_warfare#The_causes_of_the_nonuse_of_poison_gas_in_World_War_II_by_Nazi_Germany
But that could very well be the fun result of:
http://xkcd.com/978/
Regardless, I don’t have further evidence for that assertion and am fully willing to accept your obviously better educated opinion on such things.
It’s tangential to my larger point, however. That is, I don’t think the existence of nukes itself is a complete deterrent to a conventional total war.
In my mind, WWII is not a relevant point of comparison to the post-WWII world, because total war nowadays would last about a half hour, after which most folks on the planet would be dead, along with most other living things.
It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy, but it’s an extremely important point of reference with regard to how the world works today. It’s also useful to remember that belligerents can become dangerous if they aren’t stopped early on. We take it for granted that it won’t happen these days because we won’t let it.
I don’t think the US has always used its power wisely since WWII (although I’m not going to be beating my breast about its conduct during that war for the reasons I’ve already stated). But I’m very glad it has that power. I wouldn’t want to see what WWII would have become if we hadn’t won, and for quite a while it was very dicey.
In my mind, WWII is not a relevant point of comparison to the post-WWII world, because total war nowadays would last about a half hour, after which most folks on the planet would be dead, along with most other living things.
It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy, but it’s an extremely important point of reference with regard to how the world works today. It’s also useful to remember that belligerents can become dangerous if they aren’t stopped early on. We take it for granted that it won’t happen these days because we won’t let it.
I don’t think the US has always used its power wisely since WWII (although I’m not going to be beating my breast about its conduct during that war for the reasons I’ve already stated). But I’m very glad it has that power. I wouldn’t want to see what WWII would have become if we hadn’t won, and for quite a while it was very dicey.
“It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy, but it’s an extremely important point of reference with regard to how the world works today.”
Well, yes. If someone wants to argue the US into a stupid war like Vietnam or Iraq or use mass bombing of civilians in an otherwise arguably just war (Korea) or support brutal dictators as they slaughter their own dissidents (too many to list) or in some way do something guaranteed to kill innocents, it’s usually done by saying we have to do these things or go down in history as Chamberlain reincarnated.
“It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy, but it’s an extremely important point of reference with regard to how the world works today.”
Well, yes. If someone wants to argue the US into a stupid war like Vietnam or Iraq or use mass bombing of civilians in an otherwise arguably just war (Korea) or support brutal dictators as they slaughter their own dissidents (too many to list) or in some way do something guaranteed to kill innocents, it’s usually done by saying we have to do these things or go down in history as Chamberlain reincarnated.
Well, Donald, although I agree that the Chamberlain comparison is overused, that wasn’t my point.
Just as WWI reshaped the world, so did WWII. The US wasn’t accustomed to its new role as superpower, and it stumbled along the way. At the same time, it really did represent a beacon for democracy to much of the world. You can deny this, or blame it on happy propaganda, but for many years, we were loved because we disposed of the powers that championed the ideologies of Hitler and Hirohito, and opposed the ideology of Stalin.
The generation that fought WWII aren’t quite all dead (although my own parents are). Many of them came out of the war with extreme optimism about what a united United States can accomplish, and what government can do. I was infected by that optimism by my own parents, and I continue to carry it. I’m dismayed that so many people have a passion either for constant contrition (people on the left) or for distrust of government (libertarian right). We’re failing to live up to our own promise because we don’t expect it of ourselves anymore.
Well, Donald, although I agree that the Chamberlain comparison is overused, that wasn’t my point.
Just as WWI reshaped the world, so did WWII. The US wasn’t accustomed to its new role as superpower, and it stumbled along the way. At the same time, it really did represent a beacon for democracy to much of the world. You can deny this, or blame it on happy propaganda, but for many years, we were loved because we disposed of the powers that championed the ideologies of Hitler and Hirohito, and opposed the ideology of Stalin.
The generation that fought WWII aren’t quite all dead (although my own parents are). Many of them came out of the war with extreme optimism about what a united United States can accomplish, and what government can do. I was infected by that optimism by my own parents, and I continue to carry it. I’m dismayed that so many people have a passion either for constant contrition (people on the left) or for distrust of government (libertarian right). We’re failing to live up to our own promise because we don’t expect it of ourselves anymore.
sapient, I think you may be on to something. The generation which won WW II was optimistic that we could accomplish anything we put our mind to. But starting with the generation which fought in Korea (draw) and Vietnam (loss), people had a very different view of the possible. People are molded by their experiences.
It does make me wonder how the generation which saw the defeat of the USSR will see the world….
sapient, I think you may be on to something. The generation which won WW II was optimistic that we could accomplish anything we put our mind to. But starting with the generation which fought in Korea (draw) and Vietnam (loss), people had a very different view of the possible. People are molded by their experiences.
It does make me wonder how the generation which saw the defeat of the USSR will see the world….
even if the U.S. and Allies had cared about and believed reports like Karski’s…
Hi Count. From what I’ve read, I’m pretty sure that the top Allied leadership knew pretty well that reports like Karski’s were credible, since they were confirmed by intercepts of German signals.
(Frankfurter would not have been in that category.)
Of course maintaining the secret of GCHQ capabilities would have been seen as a far higher priority than confirming the German policy of extermination.
It is not a comfortable story.
If you haven’t read it, I highly recommend Timothy Snyder’s extraordinary book Bloodlands which describes the mass killing in Central Europe between Germany and Soviet Russia.
even if the U.S. and Allies had cared about and believed reports like Karski’s…
Hi Count. From what I’ve read, I’m pretty sure that the top Allied leadership knew pretty well that reports like Karski’s were credible, since they were confirmed by intercepts of German signals.
(Frankfurter would not have been in that category.)
Of course maintaining the secret of GCHQ capabilities would have been seen as a far higher priority than confirming the German policy of extermination.
It is not a comfortable story.
If you haven’t read it, I highly recommend Timothy Snyder’s extraordinary book Bloodlands which describes the mass killing in Central Europe between Germany and Soviet Russia.
It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy
On the contrary the perceived success of the mass bombing campaigns meant the strategy continued on in Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia.
Though I do not believe (and quite admittedly with the benefit of hindsight) that the extent and manner of the mass bombing of Japan is defensible morally, I acknowledge it is not an easy question. Japan was truly an evil empire, and the calculus of war is harsh. Proportionate or not, the bombing did end the war.
The mass bombings in Vietnam and Cambodia are to my mind quite simply unjustifiable, then or now.
It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy
On the contrary the perceived success of the mass bombing campaigns meant the strategy continued on in Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia.
Though I do not believe (and quite admittedly with the benefit of hindsight) that the extent and manner of the mass bombing of Japan is defensible morally, I acknowledge it is not an easy question. Japan was truly an evil empire, and the calculus of war is harsh. Proportionate or not, the bombing did end the war.
The mass bombings in Vietnam and Cambodia are to my mind quite simply unjustifiable, then or now.
I was aware that was probably the case, but I was throwing a bone to sapient, the point being that even if the U.S. and Allies had cared about and believed reports like Karski’s, it would not have shifted their actions and military strategy in the context of American interests.
It sure would have been nice for Americans to have specifically championed the Jews and other victims of the Nazi Holocaust. Typically, Americans don’t get exercised about the goings on of other countries until the situation represents an “existential threat”. Just ask russell.
In this case, fighting the “existential threat” was further vindicated when we thought about the other monstrous stuff that was happening: the concentration camps, the killing fields, the rapes and slaughters. Kind of puts a whole new spin on “targeting civilians” – civilians targeted for no purpose whatsoever except for hate, genocide and massacre – not even arguably to win the war.
wj, I think the generational differences are subtle, but clear, between children of soldiers in WWII, and children of those who were just too young to fight (or maybe Korea veterans). I feel that difference very strongly among people that I know. The attitude of WWII veteran children is much more idealistic than their younger counterparts.
I was aware that was probably the case, but I was throwing a bone to sapient, the point being that even if the U.S. and Allies had cared about and believed reports like Karski’s, it would not have shifted their actions and military strategy in the context of American interests.
It sure would have been nice for Americans to have specifically championed the Jews and other victims of the Nazi Holocaust. Typically, Americans don’t get exercised about the goings on of other countries until the situation represents an “existential threat”. Just ask russell.
In this case, fighting the “existential threat” was further vindicated when we thought about the other monstrous stuff that was happening: the concentration camps, the killing fields, the rapes and slaughters. Kind of puts a whole new spin on “targeting civilians” – civilians targeted for no purpose whatsoever except for hate, genocide and massacre – not even arguably to win the war.
wj, I think the generational differences are subtle, but clear, between children of soldiers in WWII, and children of those who were just too young to fight (or maybe Korea veterans). I feel that difference very strongly among people that I know. The attitude of WWII veteran children is much more idealistic than their younger counterparts.
The mass bombings in Vietnam and Cambodia are to my mind quite simply unjustifiable, then or now.
Agreed. Sadly, the mass bombings became the new paradigm until it was rejected by popular demand.
The mass bombings in Vietnam and Cambodia are to my mind quite simply unjustifiable, then or now.
Agreed. Sadly, the mass bombings became the new paradigm until it was rejected by popular demand.
I just checked out “Bloodlands” from the library the other day, along with Tony Judt’s “Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945”.
Both highly recommended by Ta-Nehesi Coates.
sapient: Yes, it would have been nice, but I wonder: if the Roosevelt had championed the Jewish plight by taking a declaration of war to Congress based on that evidence, I wonder if Congress would have gone along. I doubt very much the American people of that time would have been persuaded without overwhelming, graphic evidence and a clear and present danger to the United States.
As to all of that, I suppose we could exercise a suspension of post-judgement of these policy decisions like many of us have about military tactics against Japan regarding bombing areas of high civilian populations.
I’m with cleek pretty much. Before judgement can come, let’s state plainly what we did and why.
As to Russell, he’s right here. You ask him.
I just checked out “Bloodlands” from the library the other day, along with Tony Judt’s “Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945”.
Both highly recommended by Ta-Nehesi Coates.
sapient: Yes, it would have been nice, but I wonder: if the Roosevelt had championed the Jewish plight by taking a declaration of war to Congress based on that evidence, I wonder if Congress would have gone along. I doubt very much the American people of that time would have been persuaded without overwhelming, graphic evidence and a clear and present danger to the United States.
As to all of that, I suppose we could exercise a suspension of post-judgement of these policy decisions like many of us have about military tactics against Japan regarding bombing areas of high civilian populations.
I’m with cleek pretty much. Before judgement can come, let’s state plainly what we did and why.
As to Russell, he’s right here. You ask him.
As to Russell, he’s right here. You ask him.
He’s answered in other threads. I’m too lazy to find them, but: russell? Hey, russell?
I agree, though, that it was true then that the Americans would probably have not gone along solely to save the Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and others, just as they would not go along now for purely humanitarian military efforts. This is not necessarily because they were anti-Semitic (although of course many, many were), but because we like to mind our own business unless there’s a threat. We were also anti-immigration enough not to want the refugees. So, yeah – we could have, and should have done way more.
You know, it’s not that I don’t think a lot of our history is shameful, and I’m not against setting it out. Lynne Cheney wrote a children’s book, rewriting history. That’s not where I’m at. Obsessing over it is what I am troubled by. There’s real heroism in our history, including the emancipation, fighting fascism, the civil rights movement, etc.
Mythology is helpful to human aspiration and movement forward. Acknowledging our sins, but dwelling on our potential seems like the right balance to me. Dwelling on our sins seems like self-flagellation. Fun for some, but not very inspiring for most.
As to Russell, he’s right here. You ask him.
He’s answered in other threads. I’m too lazy to find them, but: russell? Hey, russell?
I agree, though, that it was true then that the Americans would probably have not gone along solely to save the Jews, homosexuals, gypsies and others, just as they would not go along now for purely humanitarian military efforts. This is not necessarily because they were anti-Semitic (although of course many, many were), but because we like to mind our own business unless there’s a threat. We were also anti-immigration enough not to want the refugees. So, yeah – we could have, and should have done way more.
You know, it’s not that I don’t think a lot of our history is shameful, and I’m not against setting it out. Lynne Cheney wrote a children’s book, rewriting history. That’s not where I’m at. Obsessing over it is what I am troubled by. There’s real heroism in our history, including the emancipation, fighting fascism, the civil rights movement, etc.
Mythology is helpful to human aspiration and movement forward. Acknowledging our sins, but dwelling on our potential seems like the right balance to me. Dwelling on our sins seems like self-flagellation. Fun for some, but not very inspiring for most.
And, yeah, Count, a good question for the audience: should we have intervened when we weren’t threatened, solely to help the Jews (and others)? Because that same question presents itself quite often these days, and we usually find a way to just say no.
And, yeah, Count, a good question for the audience: should we have intervened when we weren’t threatened, solely to help the Jews (and others)? Because that same question presents itself quite often these days, and we usually find a way to just say no.
“The attitude of WWII veteran children is much more idealistic”
I think that word is often misused to mean “willing to use force in supposedly noble ways”. And it was the idealistic WWII generation that plunged us into Vietnam. To some degree Iraq was supported by some Democrats who were inspired by the success as they saw it of the Kosovo intervention and of course some people were also claiming we’d remake postwar Iraq the way we did Japan. So successful interventions, whether on a gigantic scale like WWII (leaving aside why we got into it) or a small scale like Kosovo lead people to be overly optimistic about the likely efficacy of American force. And that’s even before one adds in the hypocrisy and double standards that are never very far away when countries start using violence.
One can go too far in the pacifist direction too, of course, and that’s why interventionists are always pointing to the 30’s. But in the majority of cases the danger is going to be going too far in the other direction. “Idealism” has little to do with it.
“The attitude of WWII veteran children is much more idealistic”
I think that word is often misused to mean “willing to use force in supposedly noble ways”. And it was the idealistic WWII generation that plunged us into Vietnam. To some degree Iraq was supported by some Democrats who were inspired by the success as they saw it of the Kosovo intervention and of course some people were also claiming we’d remake postwar Iraq the way we did Japan. So successful interventions, whether on a gigantic scale like WWII (leaving aside why we got into it) or a small scale like Kosovo lead people to be overly optimistic about the likely efficacy of American force. And that’s even before one adds in the hypocrisy and double standards that are never very far away when countries start using violence.
One can go too far in the pacifist direction too, of course, and that’s why interventionists are always pointing to the 30’s. But in the majority of cases the danger is going to be going too far in the other direction. “Idealism” has little to do with it.
I think that word is often misused to mean “willing to use force in supposedly noble ways”. And it was the idealistic WWII generation that plunged us into Vietnam.
Your reading of my comment was flawed. “Idealism” is a term I used to describe the children of WWII parents, who opposed the Vietnam war. Not to interfere with the self-hating American.
I think that word is often misused to mean “willing to use force in supposedly noble ways”. And it was the idealistic WWII generation that plunged us into Vietnam.
Your reading of my comment was flawed. “Idealism” is a term I used to describe the children of WWII parents, who opposed the Vietnam war. Not to interfere with the self-hating American.
I wonder if Congress would have gone along. I doubt very much the American people of that time would have been persuaded without overwhelming, graphic evidence and a clear and present danger to the United States.
Count, there certianly was no visible appitiate to actually get militarily involved in support of Britain or France. Not even when American ships were among those getting attacked in international waters in the Atlantic.
The only reason that the US Congress was moved to go to war was that we had been directly attacked. Nothing less was sufficient, in the days before we decided to be the world’s policeman in charge of fixing everything.
I wonder if Congress would have gone along. I doubt very much the American people of that time would have been persuaded without overwhelming, graphic evidence and a clear and present danger to the United States.
Count, there certianly was no visible appitiate to actually get militarily involved in support of Britain or France. Not even when American ships were among those getting attacked in international waters in the Atlantic.
The only reason that the US Congress was moved to go to war was that we had been directly attacked. Nothing less was sufficient, in the days before we decided to be the world’s policeman in charge of fixing everything.
“Idealism” is a term I used to describe the children of WWII parents, who opposed the Vietnam war. Not to interfere with the self-hating American.”
I thought you were using the term in the usual foreign policy sense, where “idealists” favor sending in the military to stop this or that atrocity, while the “realists” favor only using force after cold calculations of American interests. Kissinger was the classic realist. (Though not all realists are bad people, any more than all idealists are delusional warmongers.) We self-hating Americans are left out in the cold in this classification scheme, which was perhaps devised by narcissistic Americans, if I may add to the taxonomy.
As for Vietnam, the people who saw how much good the US did in WWII in helping to defeat Germany and Japan (with the Soviets doing the bulk of the work in the case of Germany) seemed to see everything in terms of “Munich”, though the fact that Democrats were accused of losing China didn’t help matters. And I know some of the liberals who favored the Iraq War were in part motivated by liberal interventionist idealism, which they had seen at work in the 90’s. Their thinking was that Kosovo was good, the lack of intervention in Rwanda bad, so hey, let’s do some more good in Iraq.
“Idealism” is a term I used to describe the children of WWII parents, who opposed the Vietnam war. Not to interfere with the self-hating American.”
I thought you were using the term in the usual foreign policy sense, where “idealists” favor sending in the military to stop this or that atrocity, while the “realists” favor only using force after cold calculations of American interests. Kissinger was the classic realist. (Though not all realists are bad people, any more than all idealists are delusional warmongers.) We self-hating Americans are left out in the cold in this classification scheme, which was perhaps devised by narcissistic Americans, if I may add to the taxonomy.
As for Vietnam, the people who saw how much good the US did in WWII in helping to defeat Germany and Japan (with the Soviets doing the bulk of the work in the case of Germany) seemed to see everything in terms of “Munich”, though the fact that Democrats were accused of losing China didn’t help matters. And I know some of the liberals who favored the Iraq War were in part motivated by liberal interventionist idealism, which they had seen at work in the 90’s. Their thinking was that Kosovo was good, the lack of intervention in Rwanda bad, so hey, let’s do some more good in Iraq.
Anyway, sapient, rather than go any deeper into one of our spats, I’m mostly interested in making a point–when the US is successful in some war, it seems to lead to hubris. It’s not exactly an original observation. I know I’ve seen people link overconfidence in Vietnam to victory in WWII and liberals have said they supported Iraq because of Kosovo and our duty to overthrow Saddam. It wasn’t just crazy neocons. That doesn’t mean we were wrong to win WWII. I’m repeating myself, so I’ll go to sleep now.
Anyway, sapient, rather than go any deeper into one of our spats, I’m mostly interested in making a point–when the US is successful in some war, it seems to lead to hubris. It’s not exactly an original observation. I know I’ve seen people link overconfidence in Vietnam to victory in WWII and liberals have said they supported Iraq because of Kosovo and our duty to overthrow Saddam. It wasn’t just crazy neocons. That doesn’t mean we were wrong to win WWII. I’m repeating myself, so I’ll go to sleep now.
It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy
I was referring to the doctrine of waging total war, as ought to be evident from my comment.
Just ask russell.
Once again, I’m obliged to ask that you not cite things I say – often out of context and in inaccurate and misleading ways – to make a point *you* want to make.
Make your own point, and leave me out of it. And I will do the same for you.
If you can’t do that, I will no longer engage in discussion with you, because I find it dead rude, and have asked you on a number of occasions to stop doing it.
Oddly, I have no issues like this, at all, with people here who are supposedly my opposites. Slarti, McK, Brett, Marty, any conservative or libertarian you care to name, I have no issue with, because they do not deliberately misconstrue things I say in order to use my words as a stalking horse to make their own points.
Only you.
So I’ll ask you, once more and once more only, to knock it off.
Thanks.
I’m too lazy to find them, but: russell? Hey, russell?
If you’re too lazy to go look, why the f**k should I help you out?
Do your own homework. That’s what the rest of us do.
It may not be a relevant point of comparison with regard to military strategy
I was referring to the doctrine of waging total war, as ought to be evident from my comment.
Just ask russell.
Once again, I’m obliged to ask that you not cite things I say – often out of context and in inaccurate and misleading ways – to make a point *you* want to make.
Make your own point, and leave me out of it. And I will do the same for you.
If you can’t do that, I will no longer engage in discussion with you, because I find it dead rude, and have asked you on a number of occasions to stop doing it.
Oddly, I have no issues like this, at all, with people here who are supposedly my opposites. Slarti, McK, Brett, Marty, any conservative or libertarian you care to name, I have no issue with, because they do not deliberately misconstrue things I say in order to use my words as a stalking horse to make their own points.
Only you.
So I’ll ask you, once more and once more only, to knock it off.
Thanks.
I’m too lazy to find them, but: russell? Hey, russell?
If you’re too lazy to go look, why the f**k should I help you out?
Do your own homework. That’s what the rest of us do.
Proportionate or not, the bombing did end the war.
…and the beauty of counterfactuals is that since we’ll never be able to know if the war could have been ended as quickly without the bombs being dropped in the manner they were, we will forever assure each other that the bombs “ended the war” in a tone of voice that implies that they were necessary simply because they were sufficient.
Were they sufficient to end the war? Sure. History proved that definitively. It did not prove they were necessary, though. Nor can it, really. The question of proportionality should not be cast aside on this basis.
Proportionate or not, the bombing did end the war.
…and the beauty of counterfactuals is that since we’ll never be able to know if the war could have been ended as quickly without the bombs being dropped in the manner they were, we will forever assure each other that the bombs “ended the war” in a tone of voice that implies that they were necessary simply because they were sufficient.
Were they sufficient to end the war? Sure. History proved that definitively. It did not prove they were necessary, though. Nor can it, really. The question of proportionality should not be cast aside on this basis.
No one ever says, “What sapient said Russell said.”
It’s wordy and so secondhand.
No one ever says, “What sapient said Russell said.”
It’s wordy and so secondhand.
we will forever assure each other that the bombs “ended the war” in a tone of voice that implies that they were necessary simply because they were sufficient.
The “tone of voice” takes into account the exhaustion with war of those who lived through the 60 to 80 million already dead. They wanted it over, and they thought that this weapon would do it. It did.
we will forever assure each other that the bombs “ended the war” in a tone of voice that implies that they were necessary simply because they were sufficient.
The “tone of voice” takes into account the exhaustion with war of those who lived through the 60 to 80 million already dead. They wanted it over, and they thought that this weapon would do it. It did.
…and the beauty of counterfactuals is that since we’ll never be able to know if the war could have been ended as quickly without the bombs being dropped in the manner they were, we will forever assure each other that the bombs “ended the war” in a tone of voice that implies that they were necessary simply because they were sufficient.
That wasn’t at at what I intended to imply.
Indeed, it’s pretty obvious to me that the war would have ended more or less when it did had we refrained from dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki – and yet the apologists almost always make no distinction between Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Nagasaki bomb is of a piece with the firebombing of so many Japanese cities. It indicates a complete disregard for the value of civilian life in the calculation.
While I don’t believe that the fire bombings were proportionate, it is nonetheless undeniable that they ended the war without invasion of the Japanese mainland, and it is equally undeniable that both the US leadership and the troops who would have participated in it feared greatly the consequences of such an invasion.
What level of bombing might have been proportionate is an impossible question to answer.
What troubles me most is that the question does not seem even to have been considered, unless the answer was assumed to be the absolute maximum that we were technically capable of.
…and the beauty of counterfactuals is that since we’ll never be able to know if the war could have been ended as quickly without the bombs being dropped in the manner they were, we will forever assure each other that the bombs “ended the war” in a tone of voice that implies that they were necessary simply because they were sufficient.
That wasn’t at at what I intended to imply.
Indeed, it’s pretty obvious to me that the war would have ended more or less when it did had we refrained from dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki – and yet the apologists almost always make no distinction between Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Nagasaki bomb is of a piece with the firebombing of so many Japanese cities. It indicates a complete disregard for the value of civilian life in the calculation.
While I don’t believe that the fire bombings were proportionate, it is nonetheless undeniable that they ended the war without invasion of the Japanese mainland, and it is equally undeniable that both the US leadership and the troops who would have participated in it feared greatly the consequences of such an invasion.
What level of bombing might have been proportionate is an impossible question to answer.
What troubles me most is that the question does not seem even to have been considered, unless the answer was assumed to be the absolute maximum that we were technically capable of.
What troubles me most is that the question does not seem even to have been considered, unless the answer was assumed to be the absolute maximum that we were technically capable of.
In hindsight, there are probably a lot of things that could have been done differently, but the people making the decisions had to deal with what they knew. Their experience told them that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that only a spectacular sense of hopelessness on the part of the Japanese would bring about the end of the war. Maybe they were wrong, but they had plenty of reason to believe that. I don’t see the point in second guessing the morality of their choices.
As to subsequent wars, there is more to discuss. But even then, the disaster that was WWII guided decisions in how to contain the Soviet Union and China. It all seems so simple now that we live in a world where those wars have been won.
What troubles me most is that the question does not seem even to have been considered, unless the answer was assumed to be the absolute maximum that we were technically capable of.
In hindsight, there are probably a lot of things that could have been done differently, but the people making the decisions had to deal with what they knew. Their experience told them that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that only a spectacular sense of hopelessness on the part of the Japanese would bring about the end of the war. Maybe they were wrong, but they had plenty of reason to believe that. I don’t see the point in second guessing the morality of their choices.
As to subsequent wars, there is more to discuss. But even then, the disaster that was WWII guided decisions in how to contain the Soviet Union and China. It all seems so simple now that we live in a world where those wars have been won.
I don’t see the point in second guessing the morality of their choices.
Then don’t do that.
I don’t see the point in second guessing the morality of their choices.
Then don’t do that.
“It all seems so simple now that we live in a world where those wars have been won.”
To whom?
The folks doing the second guessing or the folks who say, ” They wanted it over, and they thought that this weapon would do it. It did.”
It was very complicated.
There, we agree. 😉
“It all seems so simple now that we live in a world where those wars have been won.”
To whom?
The folks doing the second guessing or the folks who say, ” They wanted it over, and they thought that this weapon would do it. It did.”
It was very complicated.
There, we agree. 😉
It wouldn’t be an open thread for me without an appearance by Dinesh D’Souza:
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/douza-obama-2016-campaign-fraud-charges
He suggests the charges against him, not the ones leveled by his former employer, King’s College for schtuping while being self-righteous, but the federal election charges, are political payback for his “scholarly” tome and “documentary” which he claims got inside the mind of Barack Obama.
Well, I certainly hope so. It’s about time.
That, and for outing gay men at Dartmouth and whatever else this smug, pedantic Brahmin putz/crank/fakir has infected our national blankets with lo these past 30 years.
The word “vermin” comes to mind.
In a Jersey sort of way, I’d like the word to go out nationally from the White House that all bridges in every state across the country suddenly and mysteriously be closed for traffic whenever D’Souza approaches.
I’d like to be the one who manipulates the orange traffic cones, in his case, for insertion into his fundament.
It wouldn’t be an open thread for me without an appearance by Dinesh D’Souza:
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/douza-obama-2016-campaign-fraud-charges
He suggests the charges against him, not the ones leveled by his former employer, King’s College for schtuping while being self-righteous, but the federal election charges, are political payback for his “scholarly” tome and “documentary” which he claims got inside the mind of Barack Obama.
Well, I certainly hope so. It’s about time.
That, and for outing gay men at Dartmouth and whatever else this smug, pedantic Brahmin putz/crank/fakir has infected our national blankets with lo these past 30 years.
The word “vermin” comes to mind.
In a Jersey sort of way, I’d like the word to go out nationally from the White House that all bridges in every state across the country suddenly and mysteriously be closed for traffic whenever D’Souza approaches.
I’d like to be the one who manipulates the orange traffic cones, in his case, for insertion into his fundament.
Then don’t do that.
Okay.
It was very complicated.
There, we agree. 😉
Yep.
Then don’t do that.
Okay.
It was very complicated.
There, we agree. 😉
Yep.
Wrong thread on the Dinesh D’Souza thingy, though every thread seems open.
Wrong thread on the Dinesh D’Souza thingy, though every thread seems open.
it’s pretty obvious to me that the war would have ended more or less when it did had we refrained from dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki
Nigel, let me restate the point that sapient made. It is “obvious to you” . . . today, with all the advantages of hindsight. Not least, you have the benefit of a lot of information from Japan on how they were seeing things at the time. But knowing what the Allies did a the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
And unless you restrict yourself to the information that those making the decision in real time actually had, you simply cannot make a judgement on how ethical they were or were not.
Here’s an analogy. You are a policeman, going into an area where shots have been fired. And are continuing to be fired. You see a young man running towards you with something roughly gun-sized in his hand. And meanwhile shots are whizzing past your head. Is it ethical at the time to shoot him?
And what do you say a week later, when it turns out that what he was holding was not a gun? Or was a toy gun? Or was a gun, but out of bullets? Or that he was fleeing, and was carrying the gun to get it away from the shooters?
Real easy, sitting back in your chair with more information and lots of time to consider, to condemn the shooting as “unnecessary.” Real easy, but wrong.
it’s pretty obvious to me that the war would have ended more or less when it did had we refrained from dropping the second bomb on Nagasaki
Nigel, let me restate the point that sapient made. It is “obvious to you” . . . today, with all the advantages of hindsight. Not least, you have the benefit of a lot of information from Japan on how they were seeing things at the time. But knowing what the Allies did a the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
And unless you restrict yourself to the information that those making the decision in real time actually had, you simply cannot make a judgement on how ethical they were or were not.
Here’s an analogy. You are a policeman, going into an area where shots have been fired. And are continuing to be fired. You see a young man running towards you with something roughly gun-sized in his hand. And meanwhile shots are whizzing past your head. Is it ethical at the time to shoot him?
And what do you say a week later, when it turns out that what he was holding was not a gun? Or was a toy gun? Or was a gun, but out of bullets? Or that he was fleeing, and was carrying the gun to get it away from the shooters?
Real easy, sitting back in your chair with more information and lots of time to consider, to condemn the shooting as “unnecessary.” Real easy, but wrong.
There actually were a few people critical of civilian bombing at the time, but they were the exception. My sense is that there wasn’t much moral agonizing going on at the time when it came to the Japanese. Americans really did try to do precision bombing (by the standards of the time) when they hit Germany–bombing in daylight, not trying to burn cities to the ground. It was the British who tried to burn German cities. In Japan, as Conrad Crane and other historians like John Dower have pointed out, Americans felt a much greater degree of hatred, because of Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March (actually, I’m not sure when Americans learned about that) and all the atrocities and fanaticism that Japanese soldiers and sailors exhibited all through the war. So I don’t think there was some carefully thought out moral decision about killing a few hundred thousand innocent civilians to end a war that had killed tens of millions of people–Americans cared about American lives, which was natural enough, and didn’t care very much how many Japanese had to die to end the war with as few lives lost on our side as possible. Truman threatened the Japanese with “If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.” Outside of this thread, in virtually every discussion I’ve ever read or seen about Hiroshima (Tokyo doesn’t come up as much), someone says “It was necessary in order to save American lives.” That’s the main emphasis. Sometimes they’ll argue that it killed fewer Japanese lives than an invasion or a prolonged blockade (and as someone who sees harsh sanctions as an assault on civilians, I find that plausible). But usually it’s the American lives.
And again, I really wouldn’t have expected anything different and probably would have felt the same in their shoes. But it should make us a little hesitant to assume that terrorists are different from us. Which has been one of my themes in this thread–the other being that we tend to use and reuse the justification for killing civilians no matter what the circumstance.
There actually were a few people critical of civilian bombing at the time, but they were the exception. My sense is that there wasn’t much moral agonizing going on at the time when it came to the Japanese. Americans really did try to do precision bombing (by the standards of the time) when they hit Germany–bombing in daylight, not trying to burn cities to the ground. It was the British who tried to burn German cities. In Japan, as Conrad Crane and other historians like John Dower have pointed out, Americans felt a much greater degree of hatred, because of Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March (actually, I’m not sure when Americans learned about that) and all the atrocities and fanaticism that Japanese soldiers and sailors exhibited all through the war. So I don’t think there was some carefully thought out moral decision about killing a few hundred thousand innocent civilians to end a war that had killed tens of millions of people–Americans cared about American lives, which was natural enough, and didn’t care very much how many Japanese had to die to end the war with as few lives lost on our side as possible. Truman threatened the Japanese with “If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.” Outside of this thread, in virtually every discussion I’ve ever read or seen about Hiroshima (Tokyo doesn’t come up as much), someone says “It was necessary in order to save American lives.” That’s the main emphasis. Sometimes they’ll argue that it killed fewer Japanese lives than an invasion or a prolonged blockade (and as someone who sees harsh sanctions as an assault on civilians, I find that plausible). But usually it’s the American lives.
And again, I really wouldn’t have expected anything different and probably would have felt the same in their shoes. But it should make us a little hesitant to assume that terrorists are different from us. Which has been one of my themes in this thread–the other being that we tend to use and reuse the justification for killing civilians no matter what the circumstance.
Not least, you have the benefit of a lot of information from Japan on how they were seeing things at the time. But knowing what the Allies did a the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
Two points…
First, they had a great deal more information than you give them credit for – we knew Russia was about to declare war and we were also able to decrypt the Japanese codes, so we were not entirely ignorant of Japanese thinking.
Secondly, and more significantly, there wasn’t even a debate – and there wasn’t a warning.
The rationale for no warning or ultimatum prior to Hiroshima (it might not work; they wouldn’t believe us anyway) simply did not apply.
There was no pressing need requiring the second bomb to be dropped as soon as it was – any invasion of the mainland would have been months away.
It is as though the lives of fifty thousand or so were less important than waiting another couple.of days.
Hindsight ? Sure.
But most of the above could quite easily have been worked out at the time had anyone been bothered to do so.
Not least, you have the benefit of a lot of information from Japan on how they were seeing things at the time. But knowing what the Allies did a the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
Two points…
First, they had a great deal more information than you give them credit for – we knew Russia was about to declare war and we were also able to decrypt the Japanese codes, so we were not entirely ignorant of Japanese thinking.
Secondly, and more significantly, there wasn’t even a debate – and there wasn’t a warning.
The rationale for no warning or ultimatum prior to Hiroshima (it might not work; they wouldn’t believe us anyway) simply did not apply.
There was no pressing need requiring the second bomb to be dropped as soon as it was – any invasion of the mainland would have been months away.
It is as though the lives of fifty thousand or so were less important than waiting another couple.of days.
Hindsight ? Sure.
But most of the above could quite easily have been worked out at the time had anyone been bothered to do so.
On a somewhat related note, the current issue of Harper’s has an article on the A-10 . Apparently the Air Force wants to ditch the A-10 and rely on B-1 bombers and jet fighters for close air support, though the A-10 is designed for close air support and enables pilots to fly close enough to potential targets to tell the difference between civilians and Taliban. In telling the story, Cockburn repeats what one sometimes reads–that strategic bombing was highly overrated in WWII and close air support for ground troops was far more important in contributing to victory. The shock of the A-bombs would presumably be the exception to that, but that doesn’t come into Cockburn’s article, which is mainly about the Air Force prejudice against the unglamorous A-10.
The opening part of the article tells how an Afghan family was killed by a B-1 strike, after A-10 pilots had refused to hit the building, since they were close enough to see that it looked like an ordinary farm building with no sign of any guerilla activity going on.
There’s also some criticism of high definition video such as what drones provide–according to (unnamed) Air Force officers quoted in the article it’s a poor substitute for the human eye and makes civilian and friendly fire casualties more likely.
On a somewhat related note, the current issue of Harper’s has an article on the A-10 . Apparently the Air Force wants to ditch the A-10 and rely on B-1 bombers and jet fighters for close air support, though the A-10 is designed for close air support and enables pilots to fly close enough to potential targets to tell the difference between civilians and Taliban. In telling the story, Cockburn repeats what one sometimes reads–that strategic bombing was highly overrated in WWII and close air support for ground troops was far more important in contributing to victory. The shock of the A-bombs would presumably be the exception to that, but that doesn’t come into Cockburn’s article, which is mainly about the Air Force prejudice against the unglamorous A-10.
The opening part of the article tells how an Afghan family was killed by a B-1 strike, after A-10 pilots had refused to hit the building, since they were close enough to see that it looked like an ordinary farm building with no sign of any guerilla activity going on.
There’s also some criticism of high definition video such as what drones provide–according to (unnamed) Air Force officers quoted in the article it’s a poor substitute for the human eye and makes civilian and friendly fire casualties more likely.
Hindsight ? Sure.
We shouldn’t be at all critical about things people did in the past, because it was some time ago. And more stuff has happened.
Hindsight ? Sure.
We shouldn’t be at all critical about things people did in the past, because it was some time ago. And more stuff has happened.
sapient:
Their experience told them that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that only a spectacular sense of hopelessness on the part of the Japanese would bring about the end of the war.
Their experience? Was that the only thing at work here?
Also, if they truly thought the Japanese would rather die than surrender, the decision to drop the atomic bombs moves from even potentially understandable or justifiable to absolutely monstrous. I’m aware you’re being absolute for brevity in the first clause, but that doesn’t change the twin assertion so frequently and unblinkingly made in such discussions that the Japanese people (and/or their command and control structures) were thought to be utterly implacable fanatics who wouldn’t surrender for any reason, and yet that the droppers of the bombs knew they would convince them to surrender.
Maybe they were wrong, but they had plenty of reason to believe that. I don’t see the point in second guessing the morality of their choices.
Not all of the reasons were good reasons.
Also, as Donald Johnson eloquently observed, the point in second-guessing their morality is because we still have people citing their morality as justification for modern actions. If it was a purely academic question, we would be quibbling about unknowables, but when they stand as a cited moral precedent even now…
wj:
Nigel, let me restate the point that sapient made. It is “obvious to you” . . . today, with all the advantages of hindsight. Not least, you have the benefit of a lot of information from Japan on how they were seeing things at the time. But knowing what the Allies did a the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
As Nigel pointed out, they knew better than you’re letting on. But if we take this at face value, we need to consider it’s the hindsight of knowing the bombs were sufficient to force surrender that lets you make a statement like this. It’s “obvious” to you that this would be an effective course of action. But knowing what the Allies did at the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
And unless you restrict yourself to the information that those making the decision in real time actually had, you simply cannot make a judgement on how ethical they were or were not.
As above, this cuts both ways. Also, do you really want to put this forward as a guiding principle? Should we be unable to condemn 2LT Calley for My Li unless we can somehow determine precisely what information he had, and use only that? Can we consider Mengele’s morality without first limiting our POV to what he knew… and what he “knew”? That’s more than a little reductio ad absurdum but seriously, this is probably not a path you want to go down. Therein lies moral relativity, and self-enforced myopia.
Real easy, sitting back in your chair with more information and lots of time to consider, to condemn the shooting as “unnecessary.” Real easy, but wrong.
Not necessarily wrong. Especially since your simplistic scenario fails to address what alternatives were available to the hypothetical peace officer. Also, heat-of-the-moment tactical judgements are not particularly good analogies to strategic decisions. They’re not perforce totally unanalogous, but they’re not good analogies.
sapient:
Their experience told them that the Japanese would rather die than surrender, and that only a spectacular sense of hopelessness on the part of the Japanese would bring about the end of the war.
Their experience? Was that the only thing at work here?
Also, if they truly thought the Japanese would rather die than surrender, the decision to drop the atomic bombs moves from even potentially understandable or justifiable to absolutely monstrous. I’m aware you’re being absolute for brevity in the first clause, but that doesn’t change the twin assertion so frequently and unblinkingly made in such discussions that the Japanese people (and/or their command and control structures) were thought to be utterly implacable fanatics who wouldn’t surrender for any reason, and yet that the droppers of the bombs knew they would convince them to surrender.
Maybe they were wrong, but they had plenty of reason to believe that. I don’t see the point in second guessing the morality of their choices.
Not all of the reasons were good reasons.
Also, as Donald Johnson eloquently observed, the point in second-guessing their morality is because we still have people citing their morality as justification for modern actions. If it was a purely academic question, we would be quibbling about unknowables, but when they stand as a cited moral precedent even now…
wj:
Nigel, let me restate the point that sapient made. It is “obvious to you” . . . today, with all the advantages of hindsight. Not least, you have the benefit of a lot of information from Japan on how they were seeing things at the time. But knowing what the Allies did a the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
As Nigel pointed out, they knew better than you’re letting on. But if we take this at face value, we need to consider it’s the hindsight of knowing the bombs were sufficient to force surrender that lets you make a statement like this. It’s “obvious” to you that this would be an effective course of action. But knowing what the Allies did at the time? Not so obvious. Not at all.
And unless you restrict yourself to the information that those making the decision in real time actually had, you simply cannot make a judgement on how ethical they were or were not.
As above, this cuts both ways. Also, do you really want to put this forward as a guiding principle? Should we be unable to condemn 2LT Calley for My Li unless we can somehow determine precisely what information he had, and use only that? Can we consider Mengele’s morality without first limiting our POV to what he knew… and what he “knew”? That’s more than a little reductio ad absurdum but seriously, this is probably not a path you want to go down. Therein lies moral relativity, and self-enforced myopia.
Real easy, sitting back in your chair with more information and lots of time to consider, to condemn the shooting as “unnecessary.” Real easy, but wrong.
Not necessarily wrong. Especially since your simplistic scenario fails to address what alternatives were available to the hypothetical peace officer. Also, heat-of-the-moment tactical judgements are not particularly good analogies to strategic decisions. They’re not perforce totally unanalogous, but they’re not good analogies.
Hogwash! (Unless you were being sarcastic, HSH, in which case I apologize.)
I have no problem with criticizing things people did in the past, provided it is based on what information was available to them at the time.
Just for variety, let’s take a really foolish decision where someone lucked out big time. In the late 1400s, educated people knew that the earth was round. More than that, they had a fairly accurate idea of just how big around it was. Which meant, they knew how far they would have to sail westward before they ever reached China. (Further than anyone could carry supplies to survive.)
Yet the King and Queen of Spain were persuaded to finance a nut case who was sure that the earth was much smaller. It was, given what they knew, a really bad decision. Of course, Columbus lucked out and found the Americas for them.
So in hindsight was it a farsighted and wise decision? No — based on what they knew at the time it was a ridiculous waste of money. (Even though buying a lottery ticket is a terrible investment decision, occasionally it will pay off….)
Hogwash! (Unless you were being sarcastic, HSH, in which case I apologize.)
I have no problem with criticizing things people did in the past, provided it is based on what information was available to them at the time.
Just for variety, let’s take a really foolish decision where someone lucked out big time. In the late 1400s, educated people knew that the earth was round. More than that, they had a fairly accurate idea of just how big around it was. Which meant, they knew how far they would have to sail westward before they ever reached China. (Further than anyone could carry supplies to survive.)
Yet the King and Queen of Spain were persuaded to finance a nut case who was sure that the earth was much smaller. It was, given what they knew, a really bad decision. Of course, Columbus lucked out and found the Americas for them.
So in hindsight was it a farsighted and wise decision? No — based on what they knew at the time it was a ridiculous waste of money. (Even though buying a lottery ticket is a terrible investment decision, occasionally it will pay off….)
Nomb, I’m not disputing that the Allies knew a lot of things, like the probability of the USSR entering the war against Japan. My point (obviously not well made) is that they didn’t know that Japan was near the point where the High command would decide (or could be persuaded by the Emperor to agree) to surrender. And without knowing what Japan was likely to do, and how much stress would be required to get them to surrender, it is far harder to decide that something is unnecessary.
Nomb, I’m not disputing that the Allies knew a lot of things, like the probability of the USSR entering the war against Japan. My point (obviously not well made) is that they didn’t know that Japan was near the point where the High command would decide (or could be persuaded by the Emperor to agree) to surrender. And without knowing what Japan was likely to do, and how much stress would be required to get them to surrender, it is far harder to decide that something is unnecessary.
Donald Johnson:
There’s also some criticism of high definition video such as what drones provide–according to (unnamed) Air Force officers quoted in the article it’s a poor substitute for the human eye and makes civilian and friendly fire casualties more likely.
First, thanks for the article suggestion. That was an excellent read. I’ll admit the line I quote is why I went hunting for the article, so as to contentiously disagree with it – airborne surveillance technology is amazing, and has progressed enormously, and is amazingly informative and capable of preventing the exact sort of tragedy the article’s opening anecdote describes. Capable. Not assured to, though. By any means. And the author convinced me his point was a good one; it was the A-10 pilot’s “drinking straw” analogy. You can see a truly breathtaking level of detail from an airborne camera… but you naturally zoom in so far that that’s all you see. It’s severe tunnel vision. So yeah, excellent article, thanks.
Having said that, yeesh. Yeah. The AF hates its legacy CAS role, and that’s its least morally questionable role. If they finally manage to kill the A-10… ugh. CAS is not something that strategic air assets should ever be used for, ever.
Donald Johnson:
There’s also some criticism of high definition video such as what drones provide–according to (unnamed) Air Force officers quoted in the article it’s a poor substitute for the human eye and makes civilian and friendly fire casualties more likely.
First, thanks for the article suggestion. That was an excellent read. I’ll admit the line I quote is why I went hunting for the article, so as to contentiously disagree with it – airborne surveillance technology is amazing, and has progressed enormously, and is amazingly informative and capable of preventing the exact sort of tragedy the article’s opening anecdote describes. Capable. Not assured to, though. By any means. And the author convinced me his point was a good one; it was the A-10 pilot’s “drinking straw” analogy. You can see a truly breathtaking level of detail from an airborne camera… but you naturally zoom in so far that that’s all you see. It’s severe tunnel vision. So yeah, excellent article, thanks.
Having said that, yeesh. Yeah. The AF hates its legacy CAS role, and that’s its least morally questionable role. If they finally manage to kill the A-10… ugh. CAS is not something that strategic air assets should ever be used for, ever.
This is a recurring theme. And given that they’ve just finished dumping a boatload of money into modernizing the A-10, it’s probably more likely to happen now than it ever has.
This is my cynical side speaking, naturally.
Keep tabs on HR.3657 and S.1764, as these are both bills to keep the A-10 in inventory, specifically.
I’m a big fan of the airplane, because it does and will continue to do what the F-35 cannot do and never will be able to do.
The B-1’s problem is not so much that it’s “lumbering” (Cockburn’s word), it’s more the opposite: it’s too fast, and can’t spend much time loitering at close range. “Lumbering” would be a word more appropriate to B-52, which is still flying and receiving avionics upgrades.
So: is keeping the A-10 because it’s ideal for conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq “fighting the last war”, or is it just sensible?
This is a recurring theme. And given that they’ve just finished dumping a boatload of money into modernizing the A-10, it’s probably more likely to happen now than it ever has.
This is my cynical side speaking, naturally.
Keep tabs on HR.3657 and S.1764, as these are both bills to keep the A-10 in inventory, specifically.
I’m a big fan of the airplane, because it does and will continue to do what the F-35 cannot do and never will be able to do.
The B-1’s problem is not so much that it’s “lumbering” (Cockburn’s word), it’s more the opposite: it’s too fast, and can’t spend much time loitering at close range. “Lumbering” would be a word more appropriate to B-52, which is still flying and receiving avionics upgrades.
So: is keeping the A-10 because it’s ideal for conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq “fighting the last war”, or is it just sensible?
Hmmm…I haven’t seen all the drone video there is to see, but I haven’t seen any that wasn’t crap.
But things may have changed. I’d want to be convinced. From my perspective, the problem with drones is you either make them large and capable of dropping weapons with more oomph, which requires you to view the target from further away, or you make them small and hard to spot, which makes the optics and servo control systems small. Make the aperture smaller and you get degraded video, which means the ability to get closer is at least partially if not completely negated; make it larger and you have a larger vehicle that needs more standoff range to remain visually undetected, which means (in general) you still get degraded video.
Airborne optical sensors have improved, but nothing is ever going to give you a better picture than someone hidden a couple of hundred meters away with decent binoculars.
Hmmm…I haven’t seen all the drone video there is to see, but I haven’t seen any that wasn’t crap.
But things may have changed. I’d want to be convinced. From my perspective, the problem with drones is you either make them large and capable of dropping weapons with more oomph, which requires you to view the target from further away, or you make them small and hard to spot, which makes the optics and servo control systems small. Make the aperture smaller and you get degraded video, which means the ability to get closer is at least partially if not completely negated; make it larger and you have a larger vehicle that needs more standoff range to remain visually undetected, which means (in general) you still get degraded video.
Airborne optical sensors have improved, but nothing is ever going to give you a better picture than someone hidden a couple of hundred meters away with decent binoculars.
There actually were a few people critical of civilian bombing at the time, but they were the exception. There actually were a few people critical of civilian bombing at the time, but they were the exception.
I’m not sure if Donald is speaking about bombing in general, the firebombing of Tokyo or the atomic bombing, but there were a lot of conservatives who expressed great reservations about the use of Atomic weapons. This is a summary, but there was much more discussion on the various History lists (H-Japan, H-Asia, H-Diplo) that is really difficult to summarize. I think a lot of the discussion centered around Gar Alperovitz’s book The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, and the discussions were around 1997 that I read.
There actually were a few people critical of civilian bombing at the time, but they were the exception. There actually were a few people critical of civilian bombing at the time, but they were the exception.
I’m not sure if Donald is speaking about bombing in general, the firebombing of Tokyo or the atomic bombing, but there were a lot of conservatives who expressed great reservations about the use of Atomic weapons. This is a summary, but there was much more discussion on the various History lists (H-Japan, H-Asia, H-Diplo) that is really difficult to summarize. I think a lot of the discussion centered around Gar Alperovitz’s book The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, and the discussions were around 1997 that I read.
Keep tabs on HR.3657 and S.1764, as these are both bills to keep the A-10 in inventory, specifically.
I’m a big fan of the airplane, because it does and will continue to do what the F-35 cannot do and never will be able to do.
Well, the bills are to keep them in the inventory until the F-35 is rolled out in large enough numbers to take their place. Better than nothing, but…
Keep tabs on HR.3657 and S.1764, as these are both bills to keep the A-10 in inventory, specifically.
I’m a big fan of the airplane, because it does and will continue to do what the F-35 cannot do and never will be able to do.
Well, the bills are to keep them in the inventory until the F-35 is rolled out in large enough numbers to take their place. Better than nothing, but…
(Sorry, that should be “take their place”)
(Sorry, that should be “take their place”)
Hogwash! (Unless you were being sarcastic, HSH, in which case I apologize.)
Well, I was being sarcastic, but I would think that would put us at odds on the issue, making your highly charged use of “hogwash” an appropriate response.
In any case, I wasn’t really thinking of you when I wrote that. I don’t have a problem with considering what they knew and when they knew it, even if there’s room for disagreement on what that knowledge actually was.
Hogwash! (Unless you were being sarcastic, HSH, in which case I apologize.)
Well, I was being sarcastic, but I would think that would put us at odds on the issue, making your highly charged use of “hogwash” an appropriate response.
In any case, I wasn’t really thinking of you when I wrote that. I don’t have a problem with considering what they knew and when they knew it, even if there’s room for disagreement on what that knowledge actually was.
lj’s link to the article summarizing conservative reaction and revulsion to the bombing of Hiroshima is an eyeopener on many fronts.
William F. Buckley, Human Events, the Luce dynasty, etc.
Who knew that crowd would express such progressive, revisionist, politically correct counter views to the bedrock, never-to-be-questioned, facticity of American history, he cracked?
This once again proves to me the entire obsession of today’s “conservatives” with the “political correctness” of the Left has been largely a crock of sh*t from the get go.
In another historical vein, which title is politically correct and which is politically incorrect: the long-standing “Battle of Sand Creek”, or the more recently christened “Sand Creek Massacre”.
Good NPR segment yesterday on that subject.
Maybe we could do a ghost dance and summon up the wraithes of Buckley, Luce, and the long-dead editors of Human Events and have them spit the salt from their mouths so they could enlighten us.
While we’re at it, maybe they will tell us how much they loved the Brown vrs Board of Education decision and how they were the real ideological precursors and heirs to the teachings of Martin Luther King.
Everything is just made up as we go along.
lj’s link to the article summarizing conservative reaction and revulsion to the bombing of Hiroshima is an eyeopener on many fronts.
William F. Buckley, Human Events, the Luce dynasty, etc.
Who knew that crowd would express such progressive, revisionist, politically correct counter views to the bedrock, never-to-be-questioned, facticity of American history, he cracked?
This once again proves to me the entire obsession of today’s “conservatives” with the “political correctness” of the Left has been largely a crock of sh*t from the get go.
In another historical vein, which title is politically correct and which is politically incorrect: the long-standing “Battle of Sand Creek”, or the more recently christened “Sand Creek Massacre”.
Good NPR segment yesterday on that subject.
Maybe we could do a ghost dance and summon up the wraithes of Buckley, Luce, and the long-dead editors of Human Events and have them spit the salt from their mouths so they could enlighten us.
While we’re at it, maybe they will tell us how much they loved the Brown vrs Board of Education decision and how they were the real ideological precursors and heirs to the teachings of Martin Luther King.
Everything is just made up as we go along.
I will not countenance criticism of the technical prowess of drone technology:
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/31/tech/innovation/beer-drone-faa/
I will not countenance criticism of the technical prowess of drone technology:
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/31/tech/innovation/beer-drone-faa/
A very interesting summary, lj.
Note, again, that the decision to bomb Nagasaki is elided completely – even by those who condemned Hiroshima.
A very interesting summary, lj.
Note, again, that the decision to bomb Nagasaki is elided completely – even by those who condemned Hiroshima.
:LJ–I meant during the war I don’t think there was too much criticism of civilian bombing. I know there were some pacifist types in Great Britain (Vera Brittain for instance) who were critical of it during the war, and also some in the US. But it’s my impression most people supported it. I did read Gar Alperowitz during my interest in the revisionist arguments back in the 90’s and so recall that there were some conservatives who were revolted by the use of the A-bomb, but my impression this was not a public debate that occurred while the war was going on. For that matter, some years ago Patrick Buchanan criticized the civilian bombing in WWII. Sometime or other Churchill is said to have expressed revulsion at the torching of Korean cities in that war, but I’d have to go looking for the quote (probably in Cumings somewhere). Ironic, since I think Churchill was in favor of bombing Arab tribesmen back in the 20’s.
Nombrilisme Vide–I’m glad you found the Harper’s piece interesting. I brought it up partly in hopes that you and Slarti would read and comment on it, being the two people who would presumably know most about the subject at this blog. I might actually do something unusual for me–write a brief letter on behalf of a weapons system to my Senators and Congressperson. Weird for me, actually, but if we are going to be involved in stupid wars one might as well use the weapons system that would cut down on the civilian and friendly fire incidents.
:LJ–I meant during the war I don’t think there was too much criticism of civilian bombing. I know there were some pacifist types in Great Britain (Vera Brittain for instance) who were critical of it during the war, and also some in the US. But it’s my impression most people supported it. I did read Gar Alperowitz during my interest in the revisionist arguments back in the 90’s and so recall that there were some conservatives who were revolted by the use of the A-bomb, but my impression this was not a public debate that occurred while the war was going on. For that matter, some years ago Patrick Buchanan criticized the civilian bombing in WWII. Sometime or other Churchill is said to have expressed revulsion at the torching of Korean cities in that war, but I’d have to go looking for the quote (probably in Cumings somewhere). Ironic, since I think Churchill was in favor of bombing Arab tribesmen back in the 20’s.
Nombrilisme Vide–I’m glad you found the Harper’s piece interesting. I brought it up partly in hopes that you and Slarti would read and comment on it, being the two people who would presumably know most about the subject at this blog. I might actually do something unusual for me–write a brief letter on behalf of a weapons system to my Senators and Congressperson. Weird for me, actually, but if we are going to be involved in stupid wars one might as well use the weapons system that would cut down on the civilian and friendly fire incidents.
“write a brief letter on behalf of a weapons system to my Senators and Congressperson.”
The last time I wrote to a Senator about how I disapproved of X, I got a very nicely worded form letter back thanking me for my support of X, and asking for money to fight the good fight on X.
I was…amused.
But I wish you better luck in your quest to save the A-10. It’s a good plane, and I don’t think we’ll be involved in anything other than COIN and police actions anytime soon.
“write a brief letter on behalf of a weapons system to my Senators and Congressperson.”
The last time I wrote to a Senator about how I disapproved of X, I got a very nicely worded form letter back thanking me for my support of X, and asking for money to fight the good fight on X.
I was…amused.
But I wish you better luck in your quest to save the A-10. It’s a good plane, and I don’t think we’ll be involved in anything other than COIN and police actions anytime soon.
I’ll mention that I read Noam Chomsky–if the thought of a Chomsky reader supporting a weapons system doesn’t sway them, nothing will.
On second thought, probably best if I don’t mention that.
Actually, I was wondering if it matters when one writes letters, and if it does matter, does it matter how many letters one writes on different subjects, and if I should pick and choose very carefully which issues I do write about. I suspect they probably get bombarded by letters from the same people, judging from how it works in the local paper. We get fierce debates over leaf blowers and the Iran sanctions and everything in-between, but it’s some of the same people on many of the issues.
I’ll mention that I read Noam Chomsky–if the thought of a Chomsky reader supporting a weapons system doesn’t sway them, nothing will.
On second thought, probably best if I don’t mention that.
Actually, I was wondering if it matters when one writes letters, and if it does matter, does it matter how many letters one writes on different subjects, and if I should pick and choose very carefully which issues I do write about. I suspect they probably get bombarded by letters from the same people, judging from how it works in the local paper. We get fierce debates over leaf blowers and the Iran sanctions and everything in-between, but it’s some of the same people on many of the issues.
Donald:
I have been told by a low level office employer for my congressman (that I know socially, so I reasonably expect its not a load of crap):
Letters and emails get sorted by subject (food stamps), and then by stance (for food stamps, against food stamps).
Policy is influenced by the size of the piles.
But she also said the more effective thing was to call. Calls have to be handled (in that somebody has to politely tell to **** off), and that means you talked to somebody.
Letters go to piles, calls go to people.
Donald:
I have been told by a low level office employer for my congressman (that I know socially, so I reasonably expect its not a load of crap):
Letters and emails get sorted by subject (food stamps), and then by stance (for food stamps, against food stamps).
Policy is influenced by the size of the piles.
But she also said the more effective thing was to call. Calls have to be handled (in that somebody has to politely tell to **** off), and that means you talked to somebody.
Letters go to piles, calls go to people.
To be cynical, it would probably more effective politically to lobby for a new plane that does exactly what the A-10 does (at twice the price at least) than to fight for the fleet of existing ones because there is much money in the former but little in the latter.
To be cynical, it would probably more effective politically to lobby for a new plane that does exactly what the A-10 does (at twice the price at least) than to fight for the fleet of existing ones because there is much money in the former but little in the latter.
“Policy is influenced by the size of the piles.”
That explains why so many of them stand on principle.
“Policy is influenced by the size of the piles.”
That explains why so many of them stand on principle.
But she also said the more effective thing was to call.
A call is probably worth 10 letters.
A (personal) letter is probably worth 100 emails.
A (personal) email is worth 1,000 signatures on a chain-email petition.
Anything is better than nothing.
But she also said the more effective thing was to call.
A call is probably worth 10 letters.
A (personal) letter is probably worth 100 emails.
A (personal) email is worth 1,000 signatures on a chain-email petition.
Anything is better than nothing.
That doesn’t exactly speak in favor of F-35 acquisition, I note.
So. I hate to be pulling too hard for the A-10, given that I work for the company that makes the F-35, but the A-10 is the right tool for the job, IMHO. I actually know (as in: have worked with) a pilot who is a rarity in that he flies both the A-10 and F-16 (naturally, not at the same time) and he loves the Warthog.
I think if you let the people who do CAS for a living decide what platform they’d prefer to use for CAS, you’d probably have an outcome that isn’t quite what we’re headed for right now.
That doesn’t exactly speak in favor of F-35 acquisition, I note.
So. I hate to be pulling too hard for the A-10, given that I work for the company that makes the F-35, but the A-10 is the right tool for the job, IMHO. I actually know (as in: have worked with) a pilot who is a rarity in that he flies both the A-10 and F-16 (naturally, not at the same time) and he loves the Warthog.
I think if you let the people who do CAS for a living decide what platform they’d prefer to use for CAS, you’d probably have an outcome that isn’t quite what we’re headed for right now.
Anything that inspired this must be kept!
Anything that inspired this must be kept!
If the brass cared for the opinion of the grunts a lot would look different.
The brass tends to declare problems nails in order to justify the acquisition of pliers that it claims are actually hammers (and cost much more).
If the brass cared for the opinion of the grunts a lot would look different.
The brass tends to declare problems nails in order to justify the acquisition of pliers that it claims are actually hammers (and cost much more).
That doesn’t exactly speak in favor of F-35 acquisition, I note.
Except the A-10 doesn’t fly combat air patrol, interdiction, etc. The F-35 is an attempt, as I understand it, to make a multi-service, multi-role aircraft and eventually realize some kind of economies of scale. It may not work as planned, but isn’t that the intent?
And isn’t the F-35 supposed to be the less expensive air superiority option compared to the F-22?
That doesn’t exactly speak in favor of F-35 acquisition, I note.
Except the A-10 doesn’t fly combat air patrol, interdiction, etc. The F-35 is an attempt, as I understand it, to make a multi-service, multi-role aircraft and eventually realize some kind of economies of scale. It may not work as planned, but isn’t that the intent?
And isn’t the F-35 supposed to be the less expensive air superiority option compared to the F-22?
So: aircraft should be multi-multirole?
Next up: the air superiority/interceptor/CAS/long-range tactical bomber/strike/heavy lift fighter.
So: aircraft should be multi-multirole?
Next up: the air superiority/interceptor/CAS/long-range tactical bomber/strike/heavy lift fighter.
The Swiss Army Drone
The Swiss Army Drone
“flies both the A-10 and F-16 (naturally, not at the same time)”
I was *this close* to having my mind blown…
“flies both the A-10 and F-16 (naturally, not at the same time)”
I was *this close* to having my mind blown…
McK:
That’s what they say, anyway. Others probably can talk about it more intelligently than I, but I never really saw that as possible.
My background is aeronautical engineering (although not what I practice). Trying to make something that multi-role sounded incredibly hard. The design space around something like that is just to broad to be really good at anything.
CAS, as I understand it (not well…talked a very little about it in a design class a LONG time ago), is best served by low altitude, long loiter, fairly slow moving aircraft.
From the aerodynamics alone you’ve already moved away from something that’s going to be good in an air superiority role.
McK:
That’s what they say, anyway. Others probably can talk about it more intelligently than I, but I never really saw that as possible.
My background is aeronautical engineering (although not what I practice). Trying to make something that multi-role sounded incredibly hard. The design space around something like that is just to broad to be really good at anything.
CAS, as I understand it (not well…talked a very little about it in a design class a LONG time ago), is best served by low altitude, long loiter, fairly slow moving aircraft.
From the aerodynamics alone you’ve already moved away from something that’s going to be good in an air superiority role.
Perhaps the best way to look at the “one plane does it all” approach is to look at ships. After all these centuries, nobody is silly enough to try and make a naval vessel which simultaneously is able to do the jobs of a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a cruiser. Let alone an aircraft carrier.
If the one size fits all approach is so great, why hasn’t the navy embraced it? I mean, it ought to work just as well there, shouldn’t it…?
Perhaps the best way to look at the “one plane does it all” approach is to look at ships. After all these centuries, nobody is silly enough to try and make a naval vessel which simultaneously is able to do the jobs of a minesweeper, a destroyer, and a cruiser. Let alone an aircraft carrier.
If the one size fits all approach is so great, why hasn’t the navy embraced it? I mean, it ought to work just as well there, shouldn’t it…?
The F-4 was used on and off carriers and by the Air Force as well as the Navy and Marines. It was a multi-role fighter/bomber/close air support jet.
Unlike the A-10, which is very slow and thus has loiter time and a very short turning radius, the faster jets are more limited in CAS, or so I’ve read and been told by people who did/do the flying.
The F-4 was used on and off carriers and by the Air Force as well as the Navy and Marines. It was a multi-role fighter/bomber/close air support jet.
Unlike the A-10, which is very slow and thus has loiter time and a very short turning radius, the faster jets are more limited in CAS, or so I’ve read and been told by people who did/do the flying.
Everything is just made up as we go along.
I’m throwing this in every thread, at some point, from now on.
Everything is just made up as we go along.
I’m throwing this in every thread, at some point, from now on.
McK, my apologies, I was not clear.
I wasn’t talking about using aircraft off of various naval vessels. I was (trying to) talk about the vessels themselves, as another part of warfare that had different equipment (vessels) for different missions.
McK, my apologies, I was not clear.
I wasn’t talking about using aircraft off of various naval vessels. I was (trying to) talk about the vessels themselves, as another part of warfare that had different equipment (vessels) for different missions.
That doesn’t exactly speak in favor of F-35 acquisition.
Nothing much does these days, does it? I’ve heard of (cough, cough) cost overruns.
What is the infinite time horizon cost of this program?
That doesn’t exactly speak in favor of F-35 acquisition.
Nothing much does these days, does it? I’ve heard of (cough, cough) cost overruns.
What is the infinite time horizon cost of this program?
” cost overruns.”
In a government program? Surely not!
” cost overruns.”
In a government program? Surely not!
wj’s note about ships reminds me that perhaps the best thing to do would be to fold the Air Force back into the Army.
wj’s note about ships reminds me that perhaps the best thing to do would be to fold the Air Force back into the Army.
“In a government program? Surely not!”
We’ve privatized everything but the blame.
Lockheed, General Dynamics, General Electric, and Fairchild have shareholders to feed.
“In a government program? Surely not!”
We’ve privatized everything but the blame.
Lockheed, General Dynamics, General Electric, and Fairchild have shareholders to feed.
let’s fold about half the military budget into domestic spending.
let’s fold about half the military budget into domestic spending.
cleek,
Let’s do it the other way around: start labeling all sorts of domestic programs as “defense spending”. It would be a lot easier to pass things through the GOP House that way.
–TP
cleek,
Let’s do it the other way around: start labeling all sorts of domestic programs as “defense spending”. It would be a lot easier to pass things through the GOP House that way.
–TP
wj’s note about ships reminds me that perhaps the best thing to do would be to fold the Air Force back into the Army.
I’d be willing to see the Navy take some of it. And the Army gets to pick which parts, and no backsies!
let’s fold about half the military budget into domestic spending.
Yeah, that works too. But since we’re talking about unrealizable counterfactuals, there’s absolutely no reason to make this an either-or…
wj’s note about ships reminds me that perhaps the best thing to do would be to fold the Air Force back into the Army.
I’d be willing to see the Navy take some of it. And the Army gets to pick which parts, and no backsies!
let’s fold about half the military budget into domestic spending.
Yeah, that works too. But since we’re talking about unrealizable counterfactuals, there’s absolutely no reason to make this an either-or…
Military families and veterans are recipients of food stamps.
SNAP — the bulwark against foreign aggression.
Military families and veterans are recipients of food stamps.
SNAP — the bulwark against foreign aggression.
start labeling all sorts of domestic programs as “defense spending”.
In higher education, they’ve been doing this for at least half a century. Most of the “area studies” programs (and fellowships for graduate students in those programs) have been at least partially funded by the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) and the National Defense Foreign Languages (NDFL) program.
This actually makes good sense. Having more “experts” in foreign cultures and languages probably helps reduce (marginally) the necessity of our having to “defend” against them by more violent means. Unfortunately, there’s no built-in profit in this for “defense” industries, so the logic hasn’t resulted in much extension of this principle, so far as I can tell.
ObCaveat – this is how NDEA & NDFL used to work many decades ago. I believe they’re still around in some guise or another, but I’m open to correction on this point.
start labeling all sorts of domestic programs as “defense spending”.
In higher education, they’ve been doing this for at least half a century. Most of the “area studies” programs (and fellowships for graduate students in those programs) have been at least partially funded by the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) and the National Defense Foreign Languages (NDFL) program.
This actually makes good sense. Having more “experts” in foreign cultures and languages probably helps reduce (marginally) the necessity of our having to “defend” against them by more violent means. Unfortunately, there’s no built-in profit in this for “defense” industries, so the logic hasn’t resulted in much extension of this principle, so far as I can tell.
ObCaveat – this is how NDEA & NDFL used to work many decades ago. I believe they’re still around in some guise or another, but I’m open to correction on this point.
Interesting post sorta-kinda related to the original thread:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-04/learning-from-iraq-katrina-and-other-policy-disasters.html
Interview with someone who teaches a class on policy disasters. Very short, and not very deep, but one line jumped out at me
We all say that the “lessons” of X or Y are whatever, but a “lesson” involves extracting something from one case and applying it to a very different one. That’s hard, and easy to do very badly, with terrible effects.
I think a lot of what the discussion became was how WWII shapes our current policy, and how we’ve extrapolated out from decision X during the war to decisions Y and Z a few decades later.
Humility is good when estimating our ability to extrapolate from one situation to another.
Interesting post sorta-kinda related to the original thread:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-04/learning-from-iraq-katrina-and-other-policy-disasters.html
Interview with someone who teaches a class on policy disasters. Very short, and not very deep, but one line jumped out at me
We all say that the “lessons” of X or Y are whatever, but a “lesson” involves extracting something from one case and applying it to a very different one. That’s hard, and easy to do very badly, with terrible effects.
I think a lot of what the discussion became was how WWII shapes our current policy, and how we’ve extrapolated out from decision X during the war to decisions Y and Z a few decades later.
Humility is good when estimating our ability to extrapolate from one situation to another.
I’ve been lurking on this thread for days, with most of the observations I considered making (esp. on the A-bomb) having been made by someone else in this lengthy dialogue. As a historian I’m acutely aware of how tricky it is to judge the past in hindsight, but also how easy it is to assume that They Just Did The Best They Could With What They Knew. Good revisionism challenges the latter assumption with evidence pointing toward the conclusion They Could (Should!) Have Known Better.
Gar Alperovitz made useful – if not dispositive – contributions to the debate in this area, by pointing to evidence that Truman et al. could (should?) have known the Japanese were about to surrender anyway. This may or may not be proven – I haven’t kept up with the ongoing debate – but it is far more relevant to the topic than assertions that someone had a father (brother, uncle, whatever) who was in the Pacific in 1945 and firmly believed the Bomb won the war and thus may have saved his life. This widespread belief, which I also grew up with, is of social and historical interest in itself, but of no evidentiary value when it comes to assessing what Truman et al. knew or should have known. Yet I see it crop up again and again – “Uncle Jim fought at Iwo Jima and always said that Hiroshima saved his life. He was there, you weren’t. So there!” Understandable sentiment, but defective logic.
Also: I may have missed something – it’s a long thread – but is it possible that we’ve discussed the public awareness of various WWII bombing atrocities, including Dresden, all this time without anyone mentioning Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five? I would have thought that for about half of the American reading public, at least, this was the most immediate and memorable account of fire-bombing, and might therefore have affected public perceptions in some way.
I’ve been lurking on this thread for days, with most of the observations I considered making (esp. on the A-bomb) having been made by someone else in this lengthy dialogue. As a historian I’m acutely aware of how tricky it is to judge the past in hindsight, but also how easy it is to assume that They Just Did The Best They Could With What They Knew. Good revisionism challenges the latter assumption with evidence pointing toward the conclusion They Could (Should!) Have Known Better.
Gar Alperovitz made useful – if not dispositive – contributions to the debate in this area, by pointing to evidence that Truman et al. could (should?) have known the Japanese were about to surrender anyway. This may or may not be proven – I haven’t kept up with the ongoing debate – but it is far more relevant to the topic than assertions that someone had a father (brother, uncle, whatever) who was in the Pacific in 1945 and firmly believed the Bomb won the war and thus may have saved his life. This widespread belief, which I also grew up with, is of social and historical interest in itself, but of no evidentiary value when it comes to assessing what Truman et al. knew or should have known. Yet I see it crop up again and again – “Uncle Jim fought at Iwo Jima and always said that Hiroshima saved his life. He was there, you weren’t. So there!” Understandable sentiment, but defective logic.
Also: I may have missed something – it’s a long thread – but is it possible that we’ve discussed the public awareness of various WWII bombing atrocities, including Dresden, all this time without anyone mentioning Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five? I would have thought that for about half of the American reading public, at least, this was the most immediate and memorable account of fire-bombing, and might therefore have affected public perceptions in some way.
Vonnegut was on the tip of my tongue as soon as Dresden came up.
I don’t know why I didn’t bring it up. It’s like not bringing up Picasso’s “Guernica” in a discussion of the Spanish Civil War.
I’ve said everything else.
Good catch, dr ngo.
Vonnegut was on the tip of my tongue as soon as Dresden came up.
I don’t know why I didn’t bring it up. It’s like not bringing up Picasso’s “Guernica” in a discussion of the Spanish Civil War.
I’ve said everything else.
Good catch, dr ngo.
I would have thought that for about half of the American reading public, at least, this was the most immediate and memorable account of fire-bombing, and might therefore have affected public perceptions in some way.
In my cynical moments, I’m tempted to say that most of the American reading public equates Dresden with Tralfamadore…
I would have thought that for about half of the American reading public, at least, this was the most immediate and memorable account of fire-bombing, and might therefore have affected public perceptions in some way.
In my cynical moments, I’m tempted to say that most of the American reading public equates Dresden with Tralfamadore…
wj’s note about ships reminds me that perhaps the best thing to do would be to fold the Air Force back into the Army.
Farleyite!!!! And I don’t mean James.
wj’s note about ships reminds me that perhaps the best thing to do would be to fold the Air Force back into the Army.
Farleyite!!!! And I don’t mean James.
“start labeling all sorts of domestic programs as “defense spending”.”
The Interstate program, anybody? I know people are probably half kidding, but robust infrastructure is tied very closely with homeland defense.
“start labeling all sorts of domestic programs as “defense spending”.”
The Interstate program, anybody? I know people are probably half kidding, but robust infrastructure is tied very closely with homeland defense.
Farleyite!!!!
I’d not read Farley on this in quite a while, so that discussion looks promising to get back to when I have time. From a superficial first look, and on the subject of things to get back to later, it did already lead me to the USAF COIN manual; if the introductory chapter is anything to judge by, this will be either a trove of subtle comedy gold, or a rapid decent into blissfully blinkered self-satire.
Farleyite!!!!
I’d not read Farley on this in quite a while, so that discussion looks promising to get back to when I have time. From a superficial first look, and on the subject of things to get back to later, it did already lead me to the USAF COIN manual; if the introductory chapter is anything to judge by, this will be either a trove of subtle comedy gold, or a rapid decent into blissfully blinkered self-satire.
The F-35 is an attempt, as I understand it, to make a multi-service, multi-role aircraft and eventually realize some kind of economies of scale. It may not work as planned, but isn’t that the intent?
That was the intent, but I think we’re far enough along to make at least a provisional judgment as to whether the attempt was wildly misconceived or not.
I tend to the wildly misconceived conclusion.
(I think everyone might be able to agree on that.)
🙂
The F-35 is an attempt, as I understand it, to make a multi-service, multi-role aircraft and eventually realize some kind of economies of scale. It may not work as planned, but isn’t that the intent?
That was the intent, but I think we’re far enough along to make at least a provisional judgment as to whether the attempt was wildly misconceived or not.
I tend to the wildly misconceived conclusion.
(I think everyone might be able to agree on that.)
🙂
Nigel, everybody would agree with “wildly misconcieved”. Except all the Congressmen with companies in their district which are working on it. And since the plans were carefully customized to spread the work across as many districts as possible….
Nigel, everybody would agree with “wildly misconcieved”. Except all the Congressmen with companies in their district which are working on it. And since the plans were carefully customized to spread the work across as many districts as possible….
Funny that folks here suggested re-categorizing all domestic programs under military appropriations because I just read that John Boehner is trying to convince his caucus to demand that the White House restore cuts in military benefits as the ransom for increasing the debt ceiling.
Think about it.
The Republican Party wants to INCREASE spending or they will force the country to default on the national debt.
Next up, FOX’s Bill O’Reilly will beg the President in an interview to slap his (O’Reilly’s) surly mouth and tell him — O-Reilly — to STFU, and in return, Roger Ailes will endorse Obama for a third term and replace Steve Doocy with the embalmed corpse of Abby Hoffman.
Funny that folks here suggested re-categorizing all domestic programs under military appropriations because I just read that John Boehner is trying to convince his caucus to demand that the White House restore cuts in military benefits as the ransom for increasing the debt ceiling.
Think about it.
The Republican Party wants to INCREASE spending or they will force the country to default on the national debt.
Next up, FOX’s Bill O’Reilly will beg the President in an interview to slap his (O’Reilly’s) surly mouth and tell him — O-Reilly — to STFU, and in return, Roger Ailes will endorse Obama for a third term and replace Steve Doocy with the embalmed corpse of Abby Hoffman.
not all spending is equal. a dollar spent on booms and bangs and bloodletting is a better dollar than one spent on filling a boy’s empty belly.
G!
O!
P!
not all spending is equal. a dollar spent on booms and bangs and bloodletting is a better dollar than one spent on filling a boy’s empty belly.
G!
O!
P!
And the price of raising the debt ceiling is apparently to be approval of increased spending (and thus raising the deficit). Sometimes the GOP’s logic is a bit hard to follow.
And the price of raising the debt ceiling is apparently to be approval of increased spending (and thus raising the deficit). Sometimes the GOP’s logic is a bit hard to follow.
The logic is simple. It’s all about making rich people richer.
The logic is simple. It’s all about making rich people richer.